Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Clinton-Davis
Main Page: Lord Clinton-Davis (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Clinton-Davis's debates with the Wales Office
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 43 and 44, to which I have attached my name, and to a part of the group which focuses on the question of domestic violence and the way in which the Bill approaches domestic violence.
The history of the justice system and domestic violence is not a very happy one. For many years, crimes within the home were hardly regarded as the business of the state; they were, in the rather grim phrase, “domestics”—issues to be sorted out as best as they could be between the parties. Of course, the problem was that the parties were very rarely equal. Children, who are often the most damaged victims, are the least equal of all. In all the years that I was a prosecutor, I saw the effects and consequences of that injustice. At its most brutal, I dealt with a startling number of women who had been murdered by their partners, and who had repeatedly been victims of persistent and escalating assault. In too many cases, those assaults had gone completely unpunished and undetected and they were allowed to escalate into killing. It would be difficult to imagine a worse failure of law enforcement policy.
When I was the DPP, the prosecution service and the police, notably aided and encouraged by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, when she was a distinguished Attorney-General, spent a great deal of time on this issue, as she knows. We did research, we spoke to victims and to experts, and we educated ourselves, prosecutors and police officers. The most important lesson that we learnt was that the signals sent out by victims of domestic violence can be confused and difficult to read. Sometimes they have to be decoded and understanding that was the key to all the reforms that we undertook. Of course, people in these situations do not send out confusing signals or sometimes behave in ways that are, for us, counterintuitive because they are necessarily lying, but the complex human relationships that are in play do not always allow for a rational train of evidence, so the police and we as prosecutors had to think differently and imaginatively about this category of crime. The Government also have to do that.
At the most basic level, a woman who has been beaten up does not always come forward to make an official complaint, but the absence of a complaint is not evidence that a crime has not occurred. The British Crime Survey tells us that up to 25 per cent of women have experienced domestic violence, but the numbers coming forward are far below that: indeed, on the Bar Council's figures from another survey, only 16 per cent of victims of domestic violence come forward.
The truth is that an abused woman will not always report her assailant to the police. Often, she will not. If she does, she will not always support a prosecution. Often she will not; often she will return home to face more violence. No doubt sometimes she has children who want their father. Sometimes he is the breadwinner and she fears destitution without him. Sometimes she may simply continue to love him in some way that draws her back. As prosecutors, we learnt not to take the behaviour of victims of domestic abuse at face value. We learnt that we had to get beyond those responses if we were to get the assailant. That was the key: to get beyond the responses. The result was that prosecutions of domestic abusers rose dramatically, as did the rates of conviction. This was painstaking work and it would be a very great shame to see any of it undone.
Which of the lessons that we learnt have the drafters of the Bill learnt? The answer is: not enough of them. Frankly, in their understanding of domestic violence, the proposed legal aid reforms could have been written 10 or 15 years ago. It is a matter of great regret that a Bill presented by the coalition Government of which my party is a member appears to step backwards in expecting victims of domestic violence to conform to a stereotype of conduct, so that they will not be believed, their gateway will be shut and they will not get legal aid. This risks condemning many victims of domestic violence to a future with little or no legal succour. It is a policy with which the Government should not be associated.
In essence, the Government have done the right thing in Schedule 1 by retaining legal aid in private family law cases where domestic violence is present, but have done the wrong thing by requiring categories of evidence to support the existence of domestic violence that are very commonly absent, such as a criminal conviction, a finding of court and so on. So often, the victims of this sort of conduct seek advice and help from sources other than the authorities.
Has the noble Lord made representations to this effect? If so, what has been the reply?
I am certain that the points that I and other noble Lords made were carefully considered by the Government, who I hope will continue to consider the points. My point was that frequently victims of domestic violence seek support other than from the authorities, for obvious reasons; they seek it from doctors, support organisations, social services and the like. Material from these sources should be acceptable as evidence for the purposes of the legal aid gateway.
We can dress up the Government’s present scheme in any way we like, but the reality is that the legal aid budget will reduce as a direct result of the reluctance of many victims of intimate domestic violence to expose themselves and their children to the threat of more abuse by identifying and reporting their assailant to the authorities. That is unacceptable. Of course, we all hope that victims will come forward and seek protection for themselves and their children. It is important to give them every encouragement to do so. However, often they will not, and if they do not they should not be denied legal aid for that reason.
The Government's justification for the Bill's approach is, if anything, less attractive than its substance: namely, that we need a conviction or some other officially reported evidence of abuse in case women are tempted to make up allegations of assault in order to get legal aid. This is a rather depressing reinterpretation of the old stereotype of the woman who cries rape. Of course, women very occasionally invent allegations of rape but, in my experience both as a defence counsel and as chief prosecutor, these cases are exceedingly rare and very heavily outnumbered by cases in which the woman has been attacked. A vast and overwhelming number of women do not invent the attacks that have been visited on them. Domestic abuse is real and far too widespread, as I know the Secretary of State and the Minister realise and understand.
It is particularly difficult to understand why the definition of domestic violence in this Bill is different from and, on any analysis, narrower than the definition used by ACPO and the Crown Prosecution Service in detecting and prosecuting these crimes. I hope this is an accident. If it is, let the error be rectified at once. If it is not, let the Government think again. What possible justification can there be for this Bill to contain a definition of domestic violence that offers less protection to the victims of domestic violence than the definition used successfully day in and day out by our law enforcement agencies? If that is the reality, as I believe it is, this definition has no place in this Bill.
I accept that the legal aid budget must reduce. It is for this reason that I am able to support, as the Minister knows, many of the reforms proposed by the Government. Indeed, I have no problem at all with some of the more controversial proposals, including competitive tendering for criminal legal aid, although this does not make me very popular with many of my professional colleagues, but I have a major problem—
My Lords, I rise to deal with the amendments in this group, one of which, Amendment 90ZZA, is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Bach. It might be thought odd that that amendment is included in the group we are discussing, but I will deal with that later.
I wish to deal first with the amendment spoken to by my noble friend Lord Berkeley. I suppose that it can only appropriately be described as an original amendment as it relates to the Duchy. However, it raises an interesting constitutional point which needs to be explored, although, it may be thought, probably not in the context of this Bill. The noble Lord raises a legitimate concern and he is not responsible for the grouping. The matter does not fall entirely within the purview of the group that we are discussing and perhaps not of the Bill, but no doubt those matters will be addressed in some other way at an appropriate time.
I wish to touch briefly on the government amendments which are wholly uncontroversial and entirely acceptable to the Opposition. The Minister may not offer a detailed description of those amendments as they speak for themselves.
We certainly support Amendments 60 and 61, which were spoken to so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. We entirely agree with him that we need clarity as to what constitutes harm for the purpose of the Bill, and in this context the loss of liberty must certainly be included. I trust that that is acceptable to the Minister. Frankly, it would be absurd if that were not the case. There is a question in my mind, and perhaps those of other noble Lords, about the precise meaning of “deliberate” in this context. Does that refer to the act of omission or commission—the substantive act—or to the fact that the consequences which are complained of were intended all along or ignored in a negligent way? It seems to me and to other noble Lords who have spoken that this amendment deals very adequately with those matters, and should be accepted.
The noble Lord who moved the amendment properly referred to immigration. In a briefing provided by Bail for Immigration Detainees, the point is made that the Bill does not define what “deliberate” or “harm” mean. It expresses concern that the ministry will seek to interpret “deliberate” as more than unlawful, and “harm” as injury, and that that would result in the exclusion of many claims for damages for unlawful intention or false imprisonment brought by individuals who lost their liberty as a result of unlawful acts by the immigration authorities or the police. In that event, it is quite unrealistic to suppose that without legal assistance such claimants could properly make their case. No doubt, the Minister will clarify the intention of the Bill in that respect.
However, these matters are not necessarily confined to immigration cases. There might well be other cases in which liberty might be lost, arrests made and people detained—for example, under the auspices of defective warrants. It may be that arrests are unlawful on the grounds that the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act were not observed, where the actions of officers were unlawful but were not thought to be deliberate. Other cases might arise out of breaches of the Data Protection Act, where a disclosure might wrongfully be made about someone who, for example, alleged that he had a criminal record when that was not the case and damage might be occasioned. Another example might be where someone in custody, either in a police station or prison, might be assaulted by someone else simply because of the negligence of those operating the facility in question. I should not imagine that the Government would seek to exclude the provision of legal aid in those cases.
Amendment 90ZZA refers to a rather different set of circumstances—in fact, an entirely different set of circumstances—that bring into play the position that might arise in the Court of Protection. On an earlier amendment, we heard the noble Lord, Lord McNally, restraining his glee at pointing out the defects in amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and supported by me, on the applicability of Court of Protection proceedings. However, this amendment relates to a different case. It seeks to insert “mental or psychological” harm, in addition to physical harm, into paragraph 4 of Part 3 of Schedule 1, relating to,
“Advocacy in the proceedings in the Court of Protection”.
At the moment, legal aid would be limited to,
“a person’s right to life … a person’s liberty or physical safety”,
and some other matters. However, physical safety is not by any means the be-all and end-all, and there are clearly cases where people might be subjected to psychological or emotional harm and may require legal assistance. One can think of people with learning disabilities being abused or taunted, generally suffering as a result of the actions of others, and needing the protection of the Court of Protection—and therefore needing legal aid to pursue their remedy and obtain protection. It is fair to say that it is unlikely that there would be many cases of this kind, and therefore, as has been suggested in respect of other amendments that we have discussed, the cost would be likely to be limited. However, the Court of Protection can deal with such matters by granted orders and injunctions to protect people from harm that may amount to physical or emotional harm, in addition to the ordinary rights that would be available regarding legal aid.
I am concerned about the position of the Official Solicitor. Would he not be inhibited from acting at all in certain instances? Therefore, the vulnerable person concerned would be exposed to increase vulnerability.
That certainly must be a risk, and the need for the assistance of the Court of Protection is therefore enhanced. I am grateful to my noble friend for allowing that point to be emphasised. It is therefore essential that legal aid is available so that the court can be approached and the Official Solicitor can represent the person in question. Otherwise, he would be unable to do so because there would be no provision for costs.
I hope that despite the odd location of our amendment the Minister might look at it with some sympathy, and that if he cannot come to a conclusion on it, given that it was tabled very late, he will at least agree that he will take this matter back to look at before we reach Report.
My Lords, as I have sought to explain, we are trying to recognise in the Bill that there are limited resources and to ensure that those limited resources are best and most fairly targeted. I think that in asking the question the noble Lord, Lord Bach, accepted that not all abuse should lead to a claim. That is what we are seeking to do: we are trying to strike a balance between where it would and would not be appropriate for legal aid to be made available. That is why, along that continuum, it is at the serious end where we have sought—
Did the Minister really say that in no circumstances would legal aid be available where the infringement immediately appeared to be minor? Does he not recognise that lawyers often come across cases that appear to be minor but later become rather more serious? What remedy is available in such an instance? Is the Minister really arguing that, once it is decreed that a situation is minimal, there is no possible remedy?
It is not that there is no possible remedy; it is a question of whether legal aid would be available—whether it is within scope. I do not shy away from the fact that these are difficult judgments to make, but the resources are not unlimited. The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, refers to a minimal infringement. If the resources are limited, it is very difficult to see why a minimal infringement, which may be one of error, should attract the same level of resources as a case where there has clearly been a misuse or abuse of power on the part of a public authority.
I am talking about the solicitor who originally investigates a case being not very competent. He concludes that the case is minimal but he might be wrong. Why should legal aid not be available later?
I am not sure that I fully understand the point that the noble Lord is making. Obviously, if at a later stage a case clearly qualifies for legal aid under the definition here, one would expect legal aid to be available. Furthermore, in many of the cases that we are talking about where legal aid might not be available, conditional fee agreements might provide a viable alternative where there is clearly merit in the case but it would not qualify under the definition here.