(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe killings in the east of the Congo that we were debating a moment ago are one thing, and it is not for me to declare that they were to do with the undoubted violence that occurred during the actual elections. I fully concede that, as the noble Lord has rightly pointed out, there were reports of irregularities during the elections, and we are not going to just ignore them and pretend that nothing went wrong; it did. The Minister for Africa, my honourable friend Henry Bellingham, has called on the DRC authorities to investigate all irregularities promptly and fairly, and we have pressed the Congolese electoral commission—CENI—to make key improvements in the compilation process for the legislative count. We will also urge CENI to carry out with international help an in-depth review of irregularities raised by the observer missions, and will press it to implement any recommendations. We are not letting the matter rest. We recognise that there were some serious irregularities and that these need to be pursued and reviewed with great vigour.
What will be the Government’s response to the UN group of experts’ report on the DRC, which highlighted the failure of the Mines Ministry to take control of mining out of the ICC-indicted military’s hands? This has resulted in increasing criminalisation and increasing funding streams to military groups, which are all part of the problems of violence in the Congo. What steps will the Government take to raise awareness among UK-based firms of the risks they run in the mining industries and of the international diligence standards for mineral trade? What has been done to put forward the UN conditions, which were introduced more than a year ago, on the trade in conflict minerals?
These are very detailed questions on which I would like to write to my noble friend in more detail. Generally, we recognise these problems and general approaches to them have been taken, particularly in our close work with MONUSCO and the UN, but I shall write to him in more detail on his precise analysis.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI certainly could be a lot more specific if I had more time because an enormous number of important objectives will be pursued. Among them, as I have already indicated, we are keen that the upholding of the Commonwealth core values of human rights, good governance, the rule of law, democracy and parliamentary development should be pushed very hard indeed, and that new machinery may be needed in the Commonwealth to do that. I do not guarantee that all these things will be accepted exactly as they are proposed by the Eminent Persons Group or the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, which is proposing similar ideas, but these matters will be pushed extremely hard and are a very high priority for Her Majesty’s Government.
Does my noble friend agree with the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, which I understand shares the view that the current failings of the Commonwealth Secretariat are the result of long-term underinvestment over many years, and that one of the ways forward is to enable it, through better funding, to recruit more capable and perhaps well recognised staff to undertake the functions better? In that context, can my noble friend tell us whether the Government will endorse the report of the Eminent Persons Group and support the range of essential recommendations? He has already mentioned human rights, but there are many other important issues, particularly the publishing of the group’s report.
My noble friend is right. There are 106 recommendations in the EPG report and many more in the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group report. There are funding implications for the Secretariat and for the machinery of the Commonwealth, and we are looking at those very carefully. We will have to evaluate them and decide what we can do, given the inevitable limits of resources. One also has to remember that a large part of the Commonwealth is both bilateral between Commonwealth countries and, even more important, separate from government. The unique nature of the Commonwealth is its huge latticework of professional, business, scientific, medical and judicial relationships that exist in no other multinational organisation. Those, too, will need to be developed and encouraged.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, welcome this debate and congratulate my noble friend Lady Falkner on securing it. I am pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, who reminds those of us who take a great interest in the affairs of the developing world of the stark reality of the impact that instability and conflict have on developing communities in terms of poverty, sickness and the denial of basic rights of education and a reasonable life. This affects many communities, and not just African countries such as Sudan or the Congo. Afghanistan is a classic case in point. We should not forget the terrible situation that existed in the Balkans. Therefore, I welcome the debate and I welcome very much the Government’s paper, Building Stability Overseas Strategy, about which I wish to make some detailed remarks.
Part one concentrates on the reasons why we should engage in conflict prevention and why stability matters. As recent international events have clearly shown, there is little to disagree with in this assessment. Part two of the paper, however, is where the meat of the argument, discussion or analysis—whichever way you want to put it—lies, dealing, as it does, with the concept of early warning, improving our ability to anticipate instability and conflict triggers. It deals with rapid crisis prevention and response, improving the ability to take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent crises developing, spreading or escalating. The final section deals with investing in upstream prevention, building strong institutions and robust societies in fragile countries able to withstand and manage tensions and shocks, reducing the potential for instability and conflict. That should be underpinned—it must be added—by democratic accountability, locally and nationally.
Within the concept of early warning, the production of a watch list of fragile states and an early warning report based on a Cabinet Office six-monthly review of countries at risk, and assessed by the building security overseas steering group for overall efficacy, are all appropriate measures. There is no question of that. They do, however, suggest that previously departments of state went about conflict prevention in a more ad hoc and unco-ordinated manner. The danger is that these high-level initiatives will not be followed by positive action at working level. In the context of early warning there is a need to ensure that evidence gained from these initiatives is acted on in a timely manner. For example, the UNPD produces a monthly early warning report, which originates in the field, on countries at risk. Rarely is it acted upon in a timescale that prevents further deterioration of a situation. To quote senior officials,
“there is often too much process and not enough progress”.
Therefore, my first concern that I ask the Minister to address relates to the processes that will be established to ensure that departments, particularly DfID, are recording and then working on indicators produced by the early warning report and annual horizon scan. Too often these outputs are read and then just filed while existing planned programmes continue stubbornly on their way unaltered and unaffected.
As regards crisis prevention and response, the BSOS recognises the speed at which events can change and stresses the UK’s comparative advantages in adaptability, speedy action and whole-government approach. That is very worthy. The creation of a £20 million annual early action facility within the Conflict Pool seems to underline this. Given the anticipated greater use of stabilisation response teams, as first deployed in Libya earlier this year, can the Minister provide details of the composition, training and availability of personnel for these SRTs? Are they to comprise serving civil servants from government departments and military personnel drawn from the MoD? Will they be held on the strength of the Stabilisation Unit or will they be called on as required? How are their training, availability and fitness for deployment to be monitored? Will deployable civilian experts or civilian stabilisation groups be deployed or will it be a combination of both? Again, how will they be recruited and trained? Is the Minister confident that the core team at the Stabilisation Unit is of sufficient size and has the right expertise to deal with rapidly changing scenarios, and that the right mix of DfID, MoD, FCO and Cabinet Office staff will be maintained? In this regard, are these civil servants and military personnel to be “double hatted” to ensure that we get value for money in periods of calm between crises?
The Minister will be aware that in its responses to the BSOS document Saferworld suggested that the Government could build on their multilateral aid review and the BSOS by evaluating the impact that multilateral institutions have on prospects for promoting peace and sustainable security. Saferworld has also suggested that the scope of the Government’s analysis of multilateral institutions should be expanded beyond those with which the UK has an aid relationship; for example, to the UNSC, the African Union and the OSCE. What is the Government’s assessment of the usefulness of such measures, and are they considering implementing them?
A number of noble Lords have mentioned investing in upstream prevention. Upstream conflict prevention requires, in part, developing a thorough understanding of what generates conflict within or between communities. As Saferworld points out, responses need to address both underlying drivers of conflict and the factors that lead to it becoming violent. The BSOS considers that work to prevent conflict is most likely to succeed when it marshals diplomatic effort with development programmes and defence engagement around a shared integrated strategy.
The Government are providing more resources for upstream prevention through the Conflict Pool, which provides joined-up delivery across DfID, the MoD and the FCO. Stronger results focus and improved programme management will be introduced as part of this process. As I understand it, some £1.25 billion worth of funding will be provided for the BSOS, which will include investing in partnerships beyond fragile-state Governments in, for example, key groups such as local government, the private sector, faith groups, civil society and the media, as previous speakers have discussed.
The to-do list includes work to reduce corruption and enhance the role of women. It also includes ensuring that the defence engagement strategy sets out clearly how a commitment to direct more non-operational defence engagement to conflict prevention will be implemented. The BSOS also provides an opportunity to set out the Government’s analysis of how the broader international aid effectiveness agenda impacts on conflict and fragility and how it can promote dialogue on ways in which aid can support peace and stability in fragile states.
As many noble Lords will know, the Government have been co-chairing the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding that will feed into the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. The UK is seen as a world leader in this area and in many other international initiatives that are taking place. Do the Government agree that a vital aspect of their programme and that of the Building Security Overseas Strategy is investing in the development of democracy in fragile states, investing in strengthening Parliaments and in their capacity to hold Executives to account, and in monitoring the delivery and effectiveness of aid projects?
With regard to the overall extremely worthy, not to say challenging, to-do list, can the Minister elaborate on how engagement with civil society and faith groups and how efforts to reduce corruption will be undertaken in practical terms? What procedures are envisaged for facing host Government opposition and observing key, defined and stubborn local ownership practices? How will they be monitored and evaluated?
We seek clarification of the monitoring and evaluation and results framework that the BSOS will use to assess the long-term impact of actions taken to prevent conflict upstream. These actions frequently concern changes in institutional and individual policies, along with attitudes of behaviour, which are very difficult to measure. How do the Government plan to overcome these problems?
In its response to the BSOS report, Saferworld stresses that a key aspect of evaluating upstream conflict prevention should be the measurement of public perceptions of safety and security in conflict-affected and fragile states. It also sees a need to include an assessment of how well conflict-affected communities have been included in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the UK’s conflict-prevention work. The BSOS does not set out how measurement of upstream conflict-prevention efforts or its rapid crisis-prevention and response activities will be achieved. It will be helpful to know what criteria and what indicators will be used, and which organisation in London and in the field will be responsible for this onerous and costly responsibility.
Finally, the successful implementation of the BSOS will require the closest possible co-operation between key departments—the FCO, DfID and the MoD. This will not just happen. The creation of the National Security Council will provide that umbrella but that will not in itself ensure that the three departments adopt a common approach. It can happen only through making sure that key players establish working relationships and come to appreciate the different cultures and skills that the other departments can bring to the table.
There have already been some very good reports on the outcomes of joint exercises, which have brought together the three departments to work together on resolving problems that require military, diplomatic, humanitarian and aid interventions. I trust that Ministers will now ensure that there are more such opportunities for the departments to work together on such exercises to maximise the chances of success when we have to deal with real situations in the real world.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe leaders—the chairman of the council, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, and the prime minister, Mr Mahmoud Jibril—are strong and remarkable people. Mr Jibril served under Colonel Gaddafi and was part of that regime, but he moved over. There are others who have had associations with other groups in the past. There is one prominent case, which I suspect the noble Lord has in mind, of someone who appears to have been involved in terrorist activities—that was certainly the case, so one can never be totally sure. However, there are wise heads leading the NTC and we believe that with careful pressures and support from outside we can proceed in a way which avoids the intrusion of extremism, which in Tripoli yesterday morning the prime minister was warning that he did not want to see in the new Government.
My Lords, three weeks ago, the BBC reported that the joint FCO, MoD and DfID stabilisation unit had identified five long-term objectives for Libya, which included a conclusive political settlement ensuring security, the rule of law and restarting the economy. Can my noble friend say whether the Government will set out in a Statement how they intend to achieve those objectives, what resources will be deployed and what provisions have been made for a multilateral response to stabilisation from the three departments involved?
Those are indeed the objectives, as my noble friend acknowledges, and we will pursue them. How will we do it? We want to see the UN take the co-ordination role. A lot of co-ordination is needed, with wide international efforts for stabilisation, reconstruction and general social improvement, and recovery from the horrors of the last few months. Alongside that, we will work with all the agencies and through our own contribution to achieve these aims. I do not think that I can be more specific at this stage. In addition, as my noble friend knows, the Department for International Development is providing considerable funds to help with the reconstruction.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Baroness. I think that symmetry is the wrong word, because we are under no illusions about the ferocity of the attacks by the Sudan armed forces, ordered apparently by President al-Bashir, and by the Sudan armed air force as well. Nevertheless, the truth is that these are disputed areas outside South Sudan. Many of them wanted to be in that but they have been left out. There is bitterness and both sides blame each other. That is a fact.
What are we doing? We are pushing for a strong line at the United Nations, where the matter is being discussed this very day at the Security Council. Our defence attaché is working hard in Addis Ababa, supporting the African Union implementation panel. We are, of course, putting strong DfID funds into South Sudan. The resources are already in the disputed areas, although it is very hard to get access to them, and we are backing the EU special representative, Rosalind Marsden, who is also very active in pressing Khartoum to halt the violence. Pressure is going on but it is not easy. The access is difficult and not all the parties concerned seem to recognise the awfulness of what is happening, but we are doing our very best.
My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s earlier Statement condemning the bombardments of civilians in the area. However, is he aware that the reports of Amnesty International and human rights groups on the ground confirm the UN’s concerns over the possibilities of war crimes through the bombing of civilians and villagers in that area? We are the lead member of the troika in the north of Sudan. Will we also take the lead in pursuing the investigations into these alleged war crimes of the bombing of civilians?
The short answer is: yes, we are aware of this. We support the recommendation of the report by Navi Pillay that there should be an independent inquiry into these atrocity allegations. This will be pushed ahead as fast as possible.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, in congratulating the noble Baroness on securing this timely and important debate. If I may reflect briefly on his last comment, about the Republic of Ireland, is it beyond the wit of man to think that Afghanistan might rejoin us at some stage, this time in a civil rather than a military fashion? I leave that thought on the table.
My contribution today is on the continuing role of the Commonwealth in my position as chair of the International Advisory Board of the Commonwealth Advisory Bureau, formerly known as the Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit. In this regard, I am pleased to acknowledge the support provided to me by the bureau’s director, Daisy Cooper.
Reform is high on the agenda of the Commonwealth. The two groups previously mentioned, the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group and the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, are set to report on their proposals for reform at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth in Australia in November. Meanwhile, DfID will be reviewing progress on the reform of the Commonwealth Secretariat after CHOGM and again, one year later.
Dealing with these initiatives in reverse order, in its multilateral aid review earlier this year, DfID concluded that the Commonwealth Secretariat was one of the multinational organisations offering poor value for money for the UK. As such, DfID placed it under what it called special measures. The Commonwealth Secretariat could play a key role in strengthening democracy and supporting development across the Commonwealth, and in making the Commonwealth’s voice heard on global issues. DfID’s review found, however, that the secretariat’s programmes were thinly spread over many interest areas and its potential was not being realised. As a result, DfID planned to increase its engagement with the secretariat and to work closely with other member states to drive reform forward. Its top priorities were to secure greater focus on areas of comparative advantage, to support and represent the interests of small states, global networking, advocacy and specialist advisory services to its members and to strengthen management and oversight systems within the Commonwealth Secretariat.
A goodly part of DfID’s year has passed and the Perth CHOGM is fast approaching. Can the Minister say what monitoring has taken place by his colleagues in DfID so far? What have been the outcomes? Based on progress to date, how confident are the Government that DfID’s funding levels for development, only to be triggered if progress is made, will in fact be released?
The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, CMAG, will be reporting at Perth on how it intends to strengthen its role in ensuring that members abide by the Commonwealth’s principles and values of democracy, the rule of law and of human rights. Past calls for reform have criticised CMAG’s terms of reference for being too restrictive and not allowing for situations where otherwise democratically elected governments might be involved in widespread and sustained abuses. The main suggestion for reform called for the development of objective triggers which, if activated, would result in the immediate referral to CMAG. They would be based on unconditional and arbitrary actions such as postponing national elections without the agreement of all political parties, violating opposition rights and compromising the judiciary’s independence.
After some years spent garnering support for these reforms, they were defeated, apparently by the veto of a single vote at a Heads of Government Retreat in 1999. We understand that CMAG is now looking at these proposals again and that there is a call for it to adopt a more considered and proactive approach and not be just a censorious or punitive body. In this regard, do the Government plan to support and encourage CMAG in measures that would enable it to expand its mandate, to set objective triggers and to adopt a proactive approach to constructive engagement?
Finally, there is a report to CHOGM of the Eminent Persons Group. We understand the EPG is to make over 100 different recommendations to CHOGM. The most notable include a charter for the Commonwealth, a commissioner for democracy and the rule of law, an expert group on climate change, rationalisation of the secretariat’s work plan to discard low-priority and lower-impact programmes by 2012 and measures to ensure that the Secretary-General and all the Commonwealth heads of government play their part in enhancing the profile of the association.
The EPG report to CHOGM is full of exciting and challenging ideas. Can the Minister say what the approach of the Government will be in responding to that report? Will it be to select those initiatives they most favour or to welcome the report as a whole? Or will it be to be guided by the following principles: reform should provide something for everyone in 54 countries, big or small, rich or poor; reform that advances democracy and development; reform that recognises the comparative advantage of the Commonwealth’s convening power and ability to influence; and, as a member state, will the UK honour its commitments? If we wish to see new initiatives, we should pledge the financial resources to help fund them, or suggest areas of work that could be discontinued to release funds that could then be redirected.
DfID has highlighted this issue by making further funding dependent on reform of the Commonwealth Secretariat. If, however, we are serious about taking up the recommendations from CMAG and the EPG, members must be ready to fund the secretariat adequately. Many of its current shortcomings are the result of serious underinvestment over many years. It is unrealistic to call for additional funds without a clear demonstration by the secretariat that a programme for reform of the organisation and its working schedule has been developed and can demonstrably be seen to be in place. So I would urge the Minister and his colleagues to press vigorously for a binding commitment to such a reform programme from the secretariat as soon as possible as a condition of further funding.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the preparations for the forthcoming elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
My Lords, we are closely following the DRC elections. Despite delays, there has been considerable progress. The election calendar has been published, the electoral law passed, and over 30 million Congolese have registered to vote. There have been reports of harassment of political activists and demonstrations in Kinshasa earlier this month led to violence. However, so far we have seen no sign of systematic attempts to undermine the process. The Department for International Development is providing significant support.
I thank my noble friend for that response. Is he aware that, during a recent visit to the DRC, we found that CENI’s electoral calendar was unrealistic and unworkable? For example, in spite of a completion date for voter registration at the end of June, by July only four out of 11 provinces had been signed off. Is he also aware that, perhaps more worryingly, the most serious threat to forthcoming elections is the increase in LRA activities, with numbers back at 2008 levels; and that MONUSCO, with just 5 per cent of its peacekeepers active in the LRA-controlled areas, is deeply frustrated by the lack of resources to utilise the intelligence gathered for DDRRR purposes?
I was aware of my noble friend’s recent visit to the DRC and I appreciate his concerns about the timing of the election. We reckon that the independent national electoral commission, to which he referred, CENI, is going reasonably well with its operations. Of course the timetable is tight, but we think that it is just realistic and that it is managing to get wider participation and better registration than some feared earlier. The Lord’s Resistance Army is a plague, as it were, a trouble which affects both the DRC and other countries in the region. Our aim is to get the African Union to support and work with MONUSCO, the UN force, in meeting this continuing threat. I fully recognise that it is a problem but if we can get the African Union fully engaged, as we are trying to, we believe that we can create the conditions in which the problem can be addressed effectively.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberNaturally, on the last point, we hope that this warning, which no doubt is justified by the long history of atrocities, is not fulfilled. As to the noble Lord’s question on the comprehensive peace agreement, in theory it ends on 9 July with the independence of Southern Sudan, but it has been recognised that key issues are yet to be resolved and must be talked about.
As for our role with the United Nations, the UN Security Council, as the noble Lord knows, has extended the remit of UNMIS until 9 July and has signalled that it wants the remit to continue beyond then despite the continued strong opposition of Khartoum, which says that UNMIS must remove itself. As well as that, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1990 empowers the Ethiopians to move into Abyei. They are on their way, although they have not yet arrived. Those are the activities of the United Nations and we continue to play a full and central part in them.
Is my noble friend aware that the chair of the Sudan Disarmament Immobilisation and Reintegration Committee has estimated that with the current level of resources, when the conflict ends it will take at least six years to assimilate 150,000 surplus soldiers back into civilian life? What assistance do the Government plan to provide to speed up this DDR process and reduce the risk of what is a major security threat to the region?
Clearly, this is one more problem on top of the problems of refugees, resettlement, basic development and provision of infrastructure in the two countries; notably, in Southern Sudan, which is a very poor country, and in the north. I can give my noble friend only the general answer that my right honourable friend the DfID Secretary of State has indicated that our substantial and detailed programmes to meet these and future problems will continue and will be administered in a very detailed and hands-on way.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberOn the first point, the noble Lord is not quite correct; the figures that we have show that there were 47 hijacks in 2009 and 41 in 2010. In the first six months of this year the number was down to 18 and the number of unsuccessful attacks has also dropped very dramatically, so the total number of attacks so far this year is way down on last year. There is no room for complacency there at all because it is still a very ugly situation, as the noble Lord indicates, but a number of measures are being taken on land in building the prisons to deal with convicted pirates and on the high seas through unprecedented co-ordination between all the navies of countries such as the United States, Russia, all the NATO countries, Japan and China—a degree of co-ordination never before seen among navies. This is having the effect of reducing, not increasing, the incidence of piracy, but we still have a long way to go.
Is my noble friend aware that the African Union has stated that the United Nations is actively considering an air and sea blockade of Somalia in an attempt to prevent infiltration of insurgents into the Horn of Africa and to meet the crippling piracy challenge? Has such a blockade been agreed? If so, when might it come into play, and what part might the United Kingdom play in it?
My noble friend is perfectly correct that the African Union has proposed an air and sea blockade of Somalia, and its idea is to blockade ports such as Kismayo to put pressure on al-Shabaab logistics and funding. I should have said to the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, that we have very little evidence of connections between al-Qaeda and the piracy operations, although there may be some at an individual level.
As to blockades, an issue that my noble friend Lord Chidgey raises, the difficulty with permanent blockades is that they are hugely demanding on resources and a lot of the pirate operations are from beaches, not ports, so if you blockaded the port you still would not catch the pirates. However, intermittent or occasional blockades make sense, have already been tried against several operating bases and appear to have had a dramatic effect in reducing pirate operations. As a “from time to time” operation, this makes sense, but mounting permanent blockades would be immensely expensive and probably not very effective.
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberIf the noble Lord is talking about a rising intolerance against people for their religious beliefs, he is absolutely right. This is an extremely worrying trend, which we should not only resist but work against most actively wherever it occurs.
Will my noble friend confirm that Article 46 of the previous Egyptian constitution guaranteed freedom of belief and freedom of worship and that the penal code provided for up to five years in jail for exploiting,
“religion in order to promote extremist ideologies”?
Will the Government call on the new Egyptian Administration for these constitutional safeguards to be retained, respected and enforced in their new legislation?
That is certainly the theme of our exchanges and dialogues, and those of my right honourable friend, with the leaders of the Supreme Council. As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, the Government are drafting a new law on the construction of places of worship, which is to be equal for both Copts and Muslims, and a new anti-discrimination law. That will, in a sense, reinforce what went before. As my noble friend appreciates, Egypt is in the process of moving out of the constitutional pattern of the past and, therefore, all the positive laws that come from the past will need to be reinforced and redrafted.