Democratic Republic of the Congo

Lord Chidgey Excerpts

Tuesday 16th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Chidgey]

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, on securing this very timely debate, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chalker of Wallasey, for her very informative contribution.

The distance from the Atlantic coast of the DRC west of Kinshasa to Goma on the eastern border with Rwanda is not far short of 2,000 kilometres as the crow flies. If it were possible to make the journey by road, the distance would be at least half as much again. As in many African countries, the road network is at best patchy, mainly graded and rolled laterite. At worst, it is just muddy tracks. In fact, the maps show that the river network in the Congo is far denser than that of the roads.

Much of the economic activity in the DRC, apart from mining, is confined to the urban area around Kinshasa. Communications with the rest of this vast country are at the mercy of an unreliable internal air service. The difficulties of administering a country with such sparse infrastructure are bad enough. Factor in a non-existent local government and a central government described as weak and corrupt and the task becomes immensely challenging.

Local elections have never occurred in the DRC. They have been regularly postponed since 2006. Civil society, NGOs and international donors all agree that the organisation of these elections would form a critical education and empowerment process. Beyond elections themselves, the reform of the National Electoral Commission—CENI—has been under scrutiny since before the 2011 general elections. Prior to the election, I and a small team of parliamentarians met CENI in Kinshasa. Its main objective seemed to be to present an election-funding and facilitating wish list beyond reason. We were not impressed. It may be that the mission that visited in May, which the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, described, has better news, and I look forward to seeing its report in due course.

Civil society sees revision of CENI as just one step in a wider process of reform of electoral institutions. A review of the electoral roll, the redefinition of constituencies and improving and supporting civic education are all on the urgent agenda. According to the constitution, the president should not be able to run for a third term but, having amended the constitution in 2011 to reduce the presidential election to just one round, many anticipate Kabila being tempted into further amendments to give himself a third term.

International commentators are slowly coming to the conclusion that there is little to show for all the peacekeeping missions, special envoys, inter-agency processes and diplomatic initiatives in the failed state that is the DRC. Since Mobutu’s removal from power in 1997, probably more than 5 million people have died in the DRC through civil war, massacre and criminal activities. The DRC is second only to Somalia in the failed states index. It is last in the UN Human Development Index, last in GDP per capita, behind even Somalia and South Sudan, and very close to bottom of the Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index.

Since 2000, the DRC has received $27 billion in development assistance and is probably the world’s largest recipient of international assistance after Afghanistan, yet there is still no effective governmental structure serving the needs of the two-thirds of the population—60 million people—who live outside Kinshasa’s area of influence. To DfID’s credit, it has launched a humanitarian development aid programme from 2011-15 which, if the security situation allows, will begin to make a difference to the people of the DRC.

In November 2012, the M23 rebel group, which is thought to be backed by Rwanda, seemingly walked past MONUSCO troops and occupied Goma, North Kivu’s provincial capital. A few days later, their point made, the rebels melted back into the forest. This March, fighters of the Mai-Mai Bakata Katanga entered the DRC’s second largest city, Lubumbashi, clashed with government forces and then surrendered, harking back to events in the 1960s when Katanga province broke away from the Congolese state. The latest report from a UN group of experts given the role of gathering and analysing relevant information on flows of arms and networks operating in violation of the embargo on the DRC has to date found no evidence of support for the M23 rebels from Uganda. However, it has evidence of limited and continuous support to the M23 from within Rwanda. When my noble friend the Minister responds, will she say what impact the continuous outbreaks of violence are having on DfID’s programme for 2011-15?

The UN Panel of Experts report goes into great detail about the changes in leadership of the M23 and the rivalry between indicted war criminal General Bosco Ntaganda and his deputy Sultani Makenga. Their struggles led to a split in the M23 and, ultimately, to military confrontations and the surrender of Bosco Ntaganda. Supplied with arms in exchange for gold and ivory gained from poaching activities in many parts of the DRC, the M23 are now thought to have some 1,500 soldiers spread over an area of 700 square kilometres. Yet the authorities have been slow to recognise the dangers in the current situation, given Katanga’s pivotal prominence in the region’s economy. Meanwhile, Joseph Kony now has a window in which to regroup his repugnant LRA in the Central Africa Republic that could soon spread again to the DRC. This could well reverse the gains made in quelling the rebellion in the region which, with the help of US advisers based in Uganda, cut attacks by half. There is a real concern that, with this mission currently on hold, attacks will build again. Can my noble friend the Minister shed some light on when this US-supported mission is likely to recommence?

As part of the strategic review of MONUSCO included in the peace, security and co-operation framework for the region, the UN Security Council’s resolution 2098 provides, as noble Lords have mentioned, for a brigade of over 3,000 troops drawn from Tanzania, South Africa and Malawi. At last, MONUSCO has been given a more offensive mandate, providing for targeted and robust offensives with a view to neutralising and disarming armed groups, while taking into account the necessity to protect civilians and reduce risks.

The MONUSCO senior staff I met in Goma would have been mightily pleased at the strengthening of their mandate. However, the emphasis on civilian protection will be hard to achieve. I met a group of five women in a church hall in Goma who had come to tell us how they had suffered multiple rapes at the hands of soldiers: whether they were rebels or army was not clear. They carefully and earnestly explained the details of their suffering. One had had a toddler snatched from her arms and butchered in front of her before they raped her. Another had been caught on her way to school and repeatedly raped. At that time, she was just nine years old.

Ban Ki-Moon has made it clear that the UN brigade is only one element of a much larger process. The peace deal has to deliver a peace dividend: health, education, jobs and opportunity. Can my noble friend tell the House where the allocation of additional resources needed to support the implementation of the peace, security and co-operation framework is to be made? What is the Government’s assessment of the military and logistics capability and capacity of the 3,000-strong UN brigade to take on and eliminate the 20 to 40 guerrilla groups consistently wreaking havoc across North Kivu and South Kivu alone? What does my noble friend believe has been learnt from the UN operations in 2009 that were intended to enable the government to regain control of the region? Finally, what plans are in place to prevent a repeat of armed groups being chased away to be immediately replaced by new ones, resulting in more displacement of civilians, armed groups fragmenting and spreading across Kivu and more retaliatory attacks on the civilian population?