(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords Chamber
Baroness Sater (Con)
My Lords, the amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament within 12 months of the Act coming into force a report reviewing the criminal records disclosure regime. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who unfortunately cannot be here today, for supporting it.
The purpose of the amendment is straightforward: to ensure that a thorough review of the criminal records disclosure regime is undertaken within 12 months. We know that having a criminal record can have profound consequences for individuals’ ability to rehabilitate and move forward with their lives. It is therefore important that we understand whether the current regime is operating proportionately and whether changes might be required to ensure that it strikes the right balance between public protection and rehabilitation. Many noble Lords have in the past raised concerns about aspects of the criminal records disclosure regime. I believe that this is a timely moment to bring this amendment forward, so that we can look at this in the round.
Your Lordships will know that I have previously spoken in this House on, and put forward amendments where I have highlighted, the postcode lottery that can arise when an offence is committed before the age of 18 but the individual is not brought before a court until after their 18th birthday. In these circumstances, for example, a young person who might otherwise have received a youth disposal such as a referral order may instead be sentenced as an adult, simply because their case reaches court after they have turned 18. That difference can have significant long-term consequences, including for what later appears on a Disclosure and Barring Service check and therefore for access to employment, education and training, and indeed their rehabilitation prospects.
I thank the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt —for engaging constructively with me on this matter. Her willingness to meet me shows that there is genuine openness within government to look at this anomaly more closely. The Justice Secretary has recently indicated that the Government are considering opportunities to simplify the criminal records regime, particularly in relation to childhood offences, with the aim of ensuring that the system is clear and proportionate and does not unduly harm future job prospects. That signals recognition that reform is needed.
If the amendment were to be accepted, it would be helpful for the review also to consider the anomaly and to begin to address the issues I have concerns about, which I believe are deeply unfair. In preparing the report, the Secretary of State would be asked to consult widely, including with employers, the Disclosure and Barring Service, criminal justice agencies and organisations representing people with convictions, to ensure that the review reflected the experience of those most affected. Accepting this modest amendment would be a good and constructive step forward: simply a request for a review that could help inform future policy.
My Lords, I very much support this amendment. In Committee, I tabled an amendment, which was debated—the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, was acting Minister at the time—and would have prevented a criminal record being kept for children who are prosecuted by private rail companies under Section 5 of the Regulation of Railways Act 1889 and criminal records being created as a result, because there seemed to be a practice in certain magistrates’ courts for prosecuting such children for what were inadvertent, youthful transgressions, which were wrong but certainly did not merit a criminal record which, as I understand it, could be searched by potential employers for between eight and 11 years. I would like a commitment that this review, if it takes place, will cover that sort of case. It is all part of that bigger picture of children having criminal records created against them.
My Lords, I want to give enthusiastic support to this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sater. I think that a criminal record disclosure regime is very important—we all understand that we do not want the worst of the worst working with children and so on —but the impact on rehabilitation is quite serious.
On Monday evening, it was therefore a great relief when the Minister said to those of us who were worried that non-crime hate incidents might be stored on a criminal database that could be used to prevent future employment or volunteering opportunities that that was a misplaced concern—although having the word “hate” by your name on a police database might not be what one would want.
In this instance, we are talking about people who have criminal convictions, have been in prison or have been serving their time. In working with former prisoners, I have known former drug addicts and gang members who have been invaluable as volunteers or in working with young people or youth services, but many of them are simply kept out of being able to help because of the barring scheme. A group of ex-prisoners that I had some dealing with wanted to do some work with care homes—we desperately need people to work in care homes. They were fully rehabilitated but were basically going to be barred from doing so. That seemed to me to be unfair and counterproductive. There was also a teenage victim of a grooming gang—a victim—who was convicted for soliciting prostitution at the age of 16. She should get a pardon, of course, but the main thing is that she is barred even from going on her own child’s school trips. She desperately wants to help out in the school, but she cannot.
These things should be looked at quite straight- forwardly. It is tricky, because I am aware that we do not want threatening people to work with, for example, children, but we should not be risk averse. I commend the noble Baroness on the wording, which is an appropriate balance between public protection and rehabilitation. There is no point putting people in prison and telling them that they will be different people and be given a second chance if they rehabilitate but then denying them that second chance when they leave prison. They might as well just carry on being criminals. I think this amendment is, as they say, a no-brainer, and I hope the Government will accept it.
(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to just two amendments, Amendments 393B and 394. Amendment 393B is the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has introduced about anonymity. Noble Lords will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with him. However, I shared with him a few days ago that I have some sympathy with the general position. Police officers should be accountable and one of the main ways in which to be accountable is to be identifiable, which is why they wear numbers and now wear their names. That is important. I therefore hesitate before I argue for anonymity. I am not saying that it is a black-and-white question. However, on balance, I agree with the Government’s proposal, which is to provide anonymity for firearms officers. The assumption is changed from the present: it is that there will be anonymity unless the judge decides there will not be. That is the complete reverse of the situation today. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, prefers it as it is today, but would put it in statute rather than common law.
I am going to say more on Amendment 394 and the group of special people we rely on. It is important because, in the case we have heard about of Sergeant Blake and Chris Kaba, the man that he shot, there was clear information before the court that Mr Kaba was a member of an organised crime group. In fact, he was wanted for two firearms offences, so there was reasonable suspicion that he and others who were linked to him had firearms access. That will not always be the case. Despite that, the judge in the case decided to lift the anonymity that had been possible. I met Sergeant Blake a few months ago. The effect on his life and his family was significant. When someone has been named, it cannot be retracted, which is why it is so important to get it right at the beginning. That is why I prefer the Government’s position. It could be argued out but, once argued in, everybody is named and consequences flow from that. Sergeant Blake was incredibly understanding of what had happened. He was not overly critical of anyone at all. We as Parliament have to consider him as one example, but there have been others. So, I prefer the Government’s position and I think it is defensible.
Finally, I made a mistake when I was speaking about this in Committee. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, corrected me. He was quite right. I said that it was a small case. It was not about being a small issue but about a small number of people. That is the point I misapplied. I realise it is an important issue. It is also important that these officers get supported. This protection, which can be argued out, is more important than the general principle on this occasion. I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that other officers have come under threat who do not carry firearms. They can also apply for anonymity. However, if you are shooting someone dead, it raises the threat and the risk level and I prefer the Government’s calculation. So, I support the Government and not the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Amendment 394 is about trying to get a higher bar before officers are prosecuted. Not too many officers have been prosecuted over the years, and everyone who has been charged has been found not guilty. Some lawyers have said, “Therefore, the system works, why do you worry?” The trouble is that it sometimes takes three to five years for that outcome to arrive, during which time the officers and their families are under incredible pressure. So it matters who gets charged and we have to consider this special group of people. Out of the 145,000 police officers, probably about 3,500 can carry a firearm. They deploy to around 17,000 incidents a year. That was in 2025 in England and Wales. They actually discharged their weapon in between five and 10 operations. They hit fewer people and not everyone who was hit died. My broad point is that they are not a trigger-happy group. There is no evidence that they regularly go out and shoot people. When it happens, it is a serious issue, and of course there should be some accountability. But we rely on them as volunteers. They do not get paid more, and if they ever change their mind—which I think was the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carter—we have no way to force them to do it. You cannot order an officer to carry a firearm in our present regime. We are not America, where it is a condition of service. So we rely on them an awful lot and we prey on their good will quite a lot, too.
I do not want to address the legal issue in terms of these officers, but I want to bring our attention to the policy involved. We all have to bear in mind that there are probably three broad groups of firearms operations. Something happens in front of an officer or they get deployed quickly; it is a planned operation, they are going to arrest somebody in their home; or it is a crime in progress. It all comes down to the same thing. In that second in which you have to make a decision, you remain a human being. You have to decide whether you are going to shoot or not. On the whole, the evidence shows that they get it right. Should they kill someone or hurt them seriously, the whole system, the whole panoply of the state, descends on them. “Why did you do that?” That is not the problem for me.
The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, raised the issue of other professions. I do not know how many surgeons there are in the Chamber, but when a surgeon makes a mistake and slashes an artery, the whole world does not descend and say, “Why did you do that?” But it does when a firearms officer shoots. I realise there is some distinction, but the outcome is the same. The firearms officer is going to come under severe scrutiny during that period. We have to consider that they remain a human being who did their best that day. They did not go to work to try to kill someone. They went to work to try to do the job that we had asked them to do on our behalf. In an unarmed society with an unarmed police force, I believe that they are a special group.
As I come towards the end of my speech, I should say that I have met most of the officers who, over the past few years, have been charged. One is called Anthony Long. He was under inquiry for 11 years before he was cleared by a Crown Court jury. Each officer I have met who has been in this position has shown great humility. They are the sort of people you would want to give a gun to. It is not about just whether they can shoot straight; it is about the judgment they apply at that time. You want sensible, mature people.
Despite the fact that all these people had been under inquiry for so long, they were incredibly understanding of why they were in that position. They understood that there had to be an inquiry, and they were very understanding of all the different processes. I think that this group of people deserves our honour as well as their own. At the moment, I am afraid, the system—not individuals—is treating them badly. Somebody has to speak up for them, which is why, for me, these amendments have so much power. I realise that there are big legal issues that must be considered—no one is immune to that—but my passion has been to try to support these people in what is, I think, a very difficult job. There is evidence that they are doing it properly; over the past 40 years, there has been no evidence of them doing it badly. There have been no convictions of an officer.
My final point is that it seems as though, on the route to getting into a court, everybody makes the judgment that this is a criminal charge. There is the investigation, which the police sometimes did; now, it is the IOPC. The CPS makes a decision, then it is put before a jury. To me, that is where some common sense gets applied. The benefit of a jury is that we have the judgment of our peers. When they apply their judgment, they conclude that this group of officers is generally doing things right. I wonder why the system cannot do more for firearms officers to encourage them to carry on doing this and taking these very difficult decisions on our behalf without having, in that second, to worry about the consequences over the next few years. We cannot sustain that, and I do not think that they should. That is my reason for arguing for these two amendments.
My Lords, Amendment 403 in this group is in my name.
The group that we are talking about raises the issue whether authorised firearms officers deserve any special protection if they are, or may be, prosecuted for their conduct or if they are convicted. Some would say that they are not so deserving, because it would not be giving equal treatment to all. Others, me included, believe that they most certainly need some additional protection, whether that is a presumption of anonymity, a higher threshold before a prosecution can be brought, a lesser penalty if they are convicted, or a combination of all three.
These are among the bravest people in society. They volunteer for the job so as to protect the public, even though it means exposing themselves to a high risk of death or injury. They are motivated by the highest ideals and deserve special consideration because of it. They are emphatically not in the same position as ordinary members of the public who injure or kill others with a firearm, so I support the statutory presumption of anonymity, which the Government commendably proposed. I also oppose Amendment 393B, which would impose conditions before there can be anonymity.
In fact, I do not think that there is a huge difference between the Government’s Clause 168 and the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—whatever number it is. In essence, we are talking about what the default position should be and whether that can be rebutted in the interests of justice, one or either way. The Government have come down in favour of a presumption of anonymity, which is where I come down as well, but I do not think that there is a huge gap.
For me, it goes without saying that the safety of firearms officers and their families is at real risk because of the extensive publicity that such cases attract. Parliament should, therefore, presume that to be the case. However, even anonymity does not avoid the intense stress that such officers, who have put their lives on the line for the rest of us, must endure while waiting for trial, which can, of course, take years, so I agree with the principle behind Amendment 394: that a higher threshold should be set before such a prosecution can take place. Whether this should be as high a threshold as requiring the case to be exceptional before there can be a prosecution is a matter for debate, but I agree that the factors set out in proposed new subsection (5), which would be inserted by Amendment 394—
“the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and … the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments”—
should always be given particular weight.
Where a prosecution is brought, especially if there is no higher threshold for prosecution, my Amendment 403 is designed to mitigate the penalty imposed if certain conditions are met. I tabled this amendment in Committee. but the debate took place with just 10 Peers in the Chamber at 11.15 at night, so I have brought it back on Report. It is about whether police firearms officers who use excessive force on the spur of the moment in the honest but mistaken belief that the degree of force is reasonable, and who would otherwise be entitled to rely on self-defence, should be found guilty of murder or manslaughter.
Thirty years ago, in the Lee Clegg case, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords recommended that, in these circumstances, law enforcement officers should not be treated the same as terrorists and other murderers if they use excessive force; and that they should be convicted of manslaughter, not murder. I find that a statement of the obvious. Quoting the Court of Appeal, Lord Lloyd of Berwick said:
“There is one obvious and striking difference between Private Clegg and other persons found guilty of murder. The great majority of persons found guilty of murder, whether they are terrorist or domestic murders, kill from an evil and wicked motive. But when Private Clegg set out on patrol on the night of 30 September 1990 he did so to assist in the maintenance of law and order and we have no doubt that as he commenced the patrol he had no intention of unlawfully killing or wounding anyone. However, he was suddenly faced with a car driving through an army checkpoint and, being armed with a high velocity rifle to enable him to combat the threat of terrorism, he decided to fire the … shot from his rifle in circumstances which cannot be justified … we consider that a law which would permit a conviction for manslaughter would reflect more clearly the nature of the offence which he had committed”.
However, Lord Lloyd ruled that it was inappropriate for the courts to change the law and that it was for Parliament to do so. Here we are, 30 years on, with that opportunity.
In rejecting my amendment in Committee, the noble Baroness the Minister said that it would
“create a two-tier justice system where police officers who kill or injure in the course of their duties are judged by a more lenient standard than applies to the rest of the population”.
But is treating police firearms officers differently from other murderers a two-tier justice system? Surely not. We are not treating like with like. Police firearms officers who go on duty, risking their lives to protect us all and, in the words of the Minister, are
“having to make life and death decisions in an instant”.—[Official Report, 20/1/26; col. 266.]
are emphatically in a different category from those who kill with an evil motive. The law should therefore treat them differently.
(1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful for the support of my noble friend.
This is an important issue. I have campaigned for many years around fly-tipping and the importance of having a stronger regulatory settlement, so I very much support my noble friend’s amendments in this group. It is a very large-scale problem: the noble Lord, Lord Katz, I believe, referred at an earlier stage to an estimate of some 1.15 million fly-tipping events reported to local authorities. That is a huge number, and I expect that that thoroughly underreports the true scale of the problem.
The noble Lord, Lord Katz, was kind enough to write to me in response to a question I raised on 17 November in Committee, when I inquired as to the number of cost recovery orders that had been successfully made by the courts. It appears that the Government do not hold that information. I looked at the manifesto, about which we have heard an awful lot in this Parliament, and indeed today, and there was a commitment to make the fly-tippers pay for the clear-up, yet the Government do not hold the statistics. I am slightly puzzled as to how the Government are going to make progress on that without holding the relevant information. The noble Lord, in his letter to me, did say that 1,378 fines had been made in respect of fly-tipping. That is a tiny number: it is 1 in 1,000, or 0.1%. It is quite clear —the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, in response to a question about the Kidlington outrage, agreed—that the current regulatory position is not working. This is a particular issue in the countryside, where there is a heavy burden on farmers, as we have heard. Here, I declare an interest of sorts, as the owner of a farm.
I have Amendment 21 in this group. Its effect is simple: it would place a duty on local waste authorities to remove waste and then to attempt to pursue cost recovery from the culprits. It builds, really, on Amendment 13, in my noble friend’s name, which seeks to amend the guidance. Both have a similar intent. In my view, it is simply unfair that the victim of the crime should be responsible for clearing it up. There are many factors that drive this crime, but at least two are within the direct control of public authorities as a whole—namely, the pricing of the landfill tax and, as my noble friend referred to, the accessibility of waste disposal facilities, and the Environment Agency and police enforcement effort.
My noble friend referred to the incident reported of a farmer who recently had 200 tonnes of rubbish dumped on his land. This is a perfect illustration of the problem that landowners, and indeed community trusts and others—for example, sports grounds and football clubs and so forth—can face. This individual faced a bill for some £40,000. Now, I understand that the council and the police had failed to identify the culprits and had failed to protect him after repeated previous incidents. Indeed, he alleges that he had also been the victim of intimidation. Why should he face financial ruin for the failures of public authorities to protect him from the actions of a criminal gang?
I would argue that it is simply not realistic, nor is it fair, to expect landowners to take on the role of detective to identify offenders and then to pursue them for the recovery of costs. They do not know how to make the various agencies involved work more effectively, they are vulnerable to intimidation and they do not have the resources.
The time has now come for the responsibility for protection, clear-up, investigation and prosecution to sit with the appropriate and relevant public agencies. To my mind, the arguments for doing this are clear, as it would create a complete system where public sector agencies control landfill pricing, access to legitimate waste disposal sites, identification and prosecution of culprits, and recovery of costs. This would incentivise the Environment Agency, the police and local waste authorities to be much more proactive in pursuing the culprits, facilitating their prosecution and recovering their costs. It would allow for faster removal, which is a very important factor. With waste lying around on farmland, private land or any open ground, one thing follows another, and more suddenly turns up. It would also give much fairer treatment to landowners.
It is clear that the current system is not working. On the one hand, we have had a member of the public being fined for pouring the dregs of her cup of coffee down the drain, but, on the other hand, no one seems to have noticed or done anything to stop at least 300 heavy goods vehicles dumping upwards of 10,000 tonnes of rubbish illegally in Kidlington. How can that possibly have happened? How can we have confidence in the system? If it cannot catch 300 trucks, what chance does the poor landowner have in this type of situation? This is a failure of the whole government system in the broadest sense of the term—central agencies and local—to protect victims. They now need to take responsibility.
I support my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower’s other amendments, all of which are designed to strengthen the regulatory settlement to tackle fly-tipping. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I strongly support the intention and spirit of Amendment 13. Fly-tipping shows a shocking disregard for other people, the local community, society and the environment. It is not right that the cost of removing the consequences of it fall on the victims, as has been said, at huge expense.
My point is a technical one about the way that this amendment is drafted. I do not think that imposing this liability in guidance is the right way to go about it. Guidance is not normally legally binding. Those to whom it is addressed have to have regard to it, simply—even if it is laid before Parliament with a stronger procedure, as I think the Government are proposing. In my view, the right way to do it is by an amendment to Section 33(8) and (9) of the Environmental Protection Act, where the penalties for the offence are set out. That would be the correct place to put it. That is the approach taken in Amendment 19, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. While I strongly support the amendment, and would vote for it in any Division, I think the way it is drafted is not quite right.
My Lords, I declare an interest as a director of a farming company that is regularly the victim of fly-tipping of various scales.
I agree absolutely with every word that the noble Viscount shared with us a little while ago. I would add that the waste, often toxic waste, piled up on land is getting into the watercourses. This is a serious issue. Very often, landowners, even if they have the wherewithal to finance its removal, which many of them do not, do not have the technical expertise to deal with toxic waste. I spoke about this in Committee, so I am not going to go on in great detail, but it is a huge problem and every day it is getting worse.
The current legislation, which I have probed through Written Questions, is absolutely clear that the local authorities have no responsibility currently to do anything to assist, either through punitive legislation, assisting in the clean-up or by financially supporting those who are trying to do the clean-up. There is no support at all. We cannot allow this to continue. These amendments are a good start in the right direction.
To illustrate that, I will share one experience that I had. On a farm track, a large amount of building materials and other unpleasant items was tipped out of a truck. The perpetrators were so confident of not being caught or punished that they even threw on the pile the parking ticket that they had got earlier that day with the registration number. I called the police, who, to their credit, came out; we looked at it together, and afterwards I spent the weekend clearing it up. I showed the parking ticket to the policeman, who said, “Yes, that’s all very helpful, but I am not going to tell you whose vehicle it is in case you do something. I can assure you that, if we were to contact the people whose vehicle this is, they will simply say, ‘A lot of people drive that truck; it wasn’t me. I don’t know who it was; all sorts of people drive it’, and nothing will happen”. No further action was taken. That is one tiny example of the sort of things that people in rural areas face with waste, which is mainly generated in cities and simply taken out into the countryside and dumped with complete impunity.
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I respectfully disagree with the proposition that these clauses should be removed from the Bill. My views will come as no surprise to the 10 noble Lords who were present in the Chamber on Tuesday night at 11.15 pm to debate my amendment on why police officers who use excessive force on the spur of the moment, in the honest but mistaken belief that their use of force was reasonable, should be sentenced differently. There will be an opportunity to debate that further at on Report.
The underlying principles here as to whether anonymity should be given to police firearms officers in criminal proceedings where they are charged with a qualifying offence are exactly the same. As the House of Lords Judicial Committee said 30 years ago in the case of Lee Clegg, law enforcement officers deserve to be treated differently, since they go on patrol to assist in the maintenance of law and order with no intention of killing or wounding anyone. They face evil people who get out of bed with the full intention of trying to kill them and us. That life and death situation does not normally confront the rest of us. These officers have to make split-second decisions in order to protect us and deserve, at the very least, to be given anonymity if they are charged with a criminal offence, so that they and their families are protected from adverse publicity during those proceedings.
The last thing we want is such brave officers being deterred from volunteering for firearms training when the National Police Chiefs’ Council says that police forces across England and Wales are grappling with a significant shortage of firearms officers, exacerbated by the lack of legal protections afforded to them, particularly regarding criminal and misconduct proceedings.
Clauses 152 to 155 are a welcome recognition by the Government that police firearms officers are in a unique position. As I have said, I would take this further to address how such officers are sentenced, but that must wait for Report. In the meantime, the modest protection of anonymity during criminal proceedings, with an exception built in where anonymity would not be in the interest of justice, is a proportionate measure which is long overdue.
(3 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is absolutely right to highlight this issue, and I welcome his continued engagement on it. The agency will provide straightforward, sector-specific guidance written with small and micro-businesses in mind. The requirements are not new—minimum wage, holiday pay and sick pay already apply. When changes are made, SMEs will have clearer instructions, simpler routes to advice and a single enforcement body—the Fair Work Agency—rather than several other bodies that currently exist. We will work closely with representative bodies to ensure that small employers receive the practical help they need.
My Lords, the Fair Work Agency and the Secretary of State are legally one and the same entity. Given the extent of enforcement and police powers which the agency will enjoy, will the service level agreement, which I assume will be agreed between the Secretary of State and the agency, ensure that the agency has full operational independence from the Secretary of State?
The noble Lord is absolutely right. The Fair Work Agency will be set up as an executive agency independent of the Secretary of State. However, it will have to report to the Secretary of State for its actions and enforcement. It will bring the four current enforcement units together into a single unit that all businesses should be able to address, and it will simplify the whole issue.
(6 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, stated in this House on 4 September last year, that the Government’s commitment is
“to ensure that any debate on assisted dying … will take place in a broader context of access to high-quality palliative and end-of-life care”.—[Official Report, 4/9/24; col. 1151.]
Well, here we are having that debate. Has access to palliative and end-of-life care improved so much in the past few months? The experts say not. We have heard—but it bears repeating—that the evidence shows that 100,000 people die each year in the UK with unmet palliative care needs. Fewer than 50% have input from a specialist palliative care team in their last three months of life.
The Bill sidesteps this crucial issue because, as was pointed out by the noble Lords, Lord Lamont and Lord Grabiner, it contains no requirement that a person who is suffering from a terminal illness must also be suffering intolerable pain. Under the Bill, anyone given a prognosis of six or fewer months to live would be eligible for assistance to die, regardless of whether they are experiencing pain. Some of these people will require palliative care in any event, but if the focus of the debate were instead on relieving intolerable pain and suffering, then it would be more apparent that we should be legislating for wider access to higher-quality palliative care, not a state-assisted death regime.
As the Health and Social Care Committee heard, patients in countries with assisted dying who request help to die frequently change their mind if provided with proper palliative care. Evidence from Oregon, for example, showed that 46% of patients who received substantive palliative care changed their minds about an assisted death, compared with just 15% who did not receive such palliative care. Yet the Bill does not require a person to receive palliative care before electing an assisted death, merely that they be given the opportunity to discuss it. There is therefore a strong case for the huge sums that would be spent on state-assisted deaths to be spent instead on improving access to specialist palliative care.
Yet the intention seems to be quite the opposite. The impact statement sets out the tens of millions of pounds currently spent on care, state pensions and benefits that would be saved if this Bill were enacted. Is this really a relevant consideration? If so, we need to re-examine our priorities here. We should be encouraging those who are ill, depressed or struggling in any way to believe that life is a precious gift and worth living. We should be treating them as individuals who never cease to be important, even in frailty or decline, and that they deserve to have a dignified life in all its seasons by being cared for to the end, with the state meeting the full costs of that.
In speaking on this Bill, each of us will individually have searched our consciences, which is exactly how it should be. In searching mine and taking the line that I have, I have been guided by my Christian beliefs on life and on how life comes to an end.
(9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in speaking to this group of amendments I note the sorry absence of my noble friend Lord Fox, whose contributions on these matters have always been thoughtful and constructive. Unfortunately, the Committee has me instead. I will focus in particular on Amendments 317 and 329, both tabled by my noble friend Lord Fox, which aim to provide much-needed clarity and certainty to small businesses as they seek to understand and comply with the provisions of the Bill.
Amendment 317 would require the Secretary of State to publish statutory guidance to support small businesses in meeting the employment and legal obligations introduced by this legislation. This is a modest and reasonable ask that would have a significant practical benefit. For many small businesses, compliance is a question not of good will but capacity. Unlike larger firms, they do not have in-house legal departments or external consultants on retainer. They need clear, accessible, authoritative guidance that they can rely on from day one. This amendment is not about watering down the law, nor is it about shielding firms from responsibility. It is about enabling small businesses to do the right thing without having to second-guess the detail or bear disproportionate cost in trying to interpret it.
Amendment 329 would build on that principle by making the commencement of the Act contingent on the publication and parliamentary approval of such guidance. It is important to say that we on these Benches understand the mandate that the Government won at the last election, and we have no intention of delaying the Bill beyond our duty to scrutinise it. However, this amendment reflects a deep concern about the real-world impact that the legislation may have on small businesses if clarity is not in place from the outset.
It is not necessarily about the measures in the Bill itself but about how they are communicated and implemented. Without clear guidance, there is a risk that well-intentioned businesses will fall foul of the law through no fault of their own. These amendments offer the Government a constructive route to avoid that outcome. I hope that Ministers will engage with them in that spirit. We are just trying to make it so that businesses, like the Minister, would know what they have to do. They need it to be set out. I hope that the Government will feel this is a possibility that they will consider before Report. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 326 in this group. I begin by saying again how gracious it was of the Minister to meet me to discuss my amendments in advance a couple of weeks or so ago. My Amendment 326 is on the same theme of the need for impact assessments before provisions are brought into force. It provides that:
“Regulations which would amend primary legislation may not be laid … unless an assessment of the impact … has been laid before Parliament and three months has elapsed”
from that date.
Delegated powers that can amend primary legislation are, of course, known as Henry VIII powers. This derives from the Statute of Proclamations in 1539 when Henry VIII persuaded the Commons to include a provision in a Bill that would permit him to issue decrees having the same effect as an Act of Parliament and thereby bypass the normal parliamentary process.
Henry VIII powers can be draconian and raise real questions as regards compliance with the rule of law. This is not just my view. In his much-lauded Bingham lecture on 14 October 2024, entitled “The Rule of Law in an Age of Populism”, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, the Attorney-General, was obviously right when he said that excessive reliance on delegated powers, including Henry VIII clauses
“upsets the proper balance between Parliament and the Executive. This not only strikes at the rule of law ... but also at the cardinal principles of accessibility and legal certainty”—
issues that
“raise real questions about how we are governed”.
These are wise words indeed and very welcome, but I find it difficult to reconcile them with our Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, pointed out at Second Reading, there are around 163 delegated powers in our Bill and 12 Henry VIII powers. As he powerfully put it:
“Ministers are, in effect, asking Parliament today to empower them to do whatever they decide to do, whenever they decide to do it”.—[Official Report, 27/3/25; col. 1845.]
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, in its report of 24 April, described various Henry VIII powers in the Bill as, “overly broad”, “inadequately justified”, and an
“inappropriate use of the … affirmative process”.
As it said, Henry VIII powers are subject to far less scrutiny than primary legislation.
And this is the heart of the problem. Much of the legislation needed is yet to come, but it will not be capable of being scrutinised as it should be because of the reliance on Henry VIII clauses. It is a symptom of a rushed agenda but also, more worryingly, of a growing acceptance that Henry VIII powers are okay. They are becoming the default option.
The Select Committee on the Constitution, in its report, points out that Clause 24, “Dismissal during pregnancy”, and Clause 25, “Dismissal following period of statutory family leave”, both
“contain and extend Henry VIII powers that … act as placeholders while the Government consults further on the specifics of the measures to be implemented”.
This can mean only that
“substantive policy decisions have not yet been taken”
on those issues. But it also means a lack of certainty about how the provisions will operate in practice, which the Select Committee-considered to be “particularly concerning”, given that the provisions enable primary legislation to be modified.
In addition, Schedule 7 contains a list of extensive legislative powers in connection with labour market enforcement, under Part 5, which are passing to the Secretary of State. Paragraph 35 confers on the Secretary of State a Henry VIII power to add by regulations any enactment which affects the rights of employees, trade unions and the duties of employers.
These extensive enforcement powers in Part 5 also need to be considered alongside Clauses 151 and 153. These clauses contain a power to make any consequential provision, which may amend, repeal, revoke or otherwise modify
“any provision made by or under primary legislation passed before, or in the same session as … this Act ... and may make different provision for different purposes or … areas”
or
“contain supplementary, incidental, consequential, transitional or saving provision”.
The Government may respond that the power to make consequential provision is confined to what is purely consequential. That is true, but what is purely consequential turns on the scope of the provisions they are said to be in consequence of. Combining these consequential powers with the wide powers in Part 5, for example, would seem to give the Secretary of State the power to confer on his enforcement officers even wider powers when entering offices to search and seize documents, if they are in some way connected with the operation. I think even Henry VIII would have been impressed. His 1539 Statute of Proclamations allowed him to amend legislation by decree, but even he was not permitted to prejudice
“any person’s offices, liberties, goods”
or “chattels”.
Then there is the power to make provision for different purposes or different areas. What is the need for that power? When I was in government as a lawyer, parliamentary counsel would probe closely as to why we needed this power, and we would have to justify it. My amendment is therefore designed to bring some transparency and due diligence to the use of these Henry VIII powers before they are laid and debated. It would simply provide that, before such regulations could be laid, there would need to be an impact assessment laid before Parliament for three months to enable a bit more parliamentary scrutiny. This would give time for reflection and, if the Government decided to proceed with laying the regulations, it would serve to enhance the level of parliamentary debates on the regulations that subsequently take place under the affirmative procedure.
I give the last word to the great Lord Judge, who spoke strongly against such clauses when he was Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. He said:
“You can be sure that when these Henry VIII clauses are introduced they will always be said to be necessary. William Pitt warned us how to treat such a plea with disdain. ‘Necessity is the justification for every infringement of human liberty’”.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord Carter of Haslemere, for their amendments in this group. As the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, commented, it gives us the chance to send further good wishes to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for a speedy recovery. We look forward to seeing him back in this Chamber to discuss this vital Bill.
Dealing with Amendment 317 first, the Government have already acknowledged that the vast majority of the costs associated with this legislation will fall on smaller businesses, but it is not just the obvious headline of which we must be mindful. As the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, pointed out, there are significant hidden costs too. These include the need to hire legal professionals, expand human resource capacity, and navigate increasingly complex compliance requirements, which many smaller firms simply cannot afford. That is why statutory guidance specifically tailored for small businesses—those with fewer than 50 employees—is not just helpful; I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that it is essential. These businesses are the backbone of our economy. They do not have in-house counsel, nor the luxury of large HR departments, yet they are bound by the same obligations under this Bill as any large corporation.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, obviously brings great experience to this question and this discussion, and I appreciate the discussions I have had with him—not just in the Chamber of this House but also outside the Chamber.
The noble Lord will know, and understand, why I cannot comment in too much detail on what happened in relation to this case. He will also know, however, that the decision to charge was made within the Code for Crown Prosecutors and the DPP guidance to prosecutors, particularly in relation to death in custody guidance, which covers any deaths following contact with the police. That was the procedure; I am not the CPS and nor should I be. It made the determination to prosecute in this case and the result was a very speedy acquittal by the jury. There was a two-year hangover, which caused great distress to the family of both the victim and the police officer. I understand that, and we are trying to speed up as part of the response to that case.
The important thing, which I hope I can guide the noble Lord to focus on, is the issue of the future, because we are trying to rebalance the prosecution threshold, which is key for the future. I fully accept the noble Lord’s point that we ask a lot of officers to, on our behalf, arrive at a scene, make split-second judgments and put their lives at risk. One of the things we are trying to do in the review’s response is to more effectively balance that balance between the response of an officer and the individual they may face. That is part of the working through of the code of practice that will be developed by the DPP, the review by the Attorney-General of guidance on charging police officers and the review by his former colleague Tim Godwin and Sir Adrian Fulford.
We can revisit this again in a few months’ time, but I hope, when we finalise the reviews, that will refocus how we best support officers dealing with extremely difficult situations.
My Lords, 30 years ago, the House of Lords sitting judicially in the criminal appeal of Lee Clegg expressed concern that only a charge of murder was available in these cases, instead of an offence of, for example, using excessive force. The Law Lords pointed out—as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has—that law enforcement officers do not go out intending to kill or cause grievous bodily harm: they go to protect the public. The two cases are very different.
Therefore, would the Government consider looking at the substantive law that applies in these cases and possibly introducing a change to strengthen the position of law enforcement officers? It would be not dissimilar to the way in which the position of householders was strengthened in 2013 by giving them additional defences when they used force to defend themselves and their property.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for that suggestion. We are in the process of reviewing the legislation and I do not want to pre-empt the reviews that are being undertaken by the Attorney-General and the individuals commissioned by the Home Secretary. It is clear, however, that we need to give clarity and support to officers. The key element that has come out of this case is that an officer found themselves prosecuted through the decision of the CPS, which rightly was its independent decision. However, in light of that decision, we have to review whether the threshold for the prosecution was right and whether we need to examine the issues the noble Lord has mentioned. Those are things we will do, but I cannot give a commitment today to finalise it.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my interest as a trustee of the Prison Reform Trust, since I will focus yet further, I am afraid, on our failing prison system. My emphasis will be on the need for a new sentencing policy.
I congratulate the Minister on his outstanding maiden speech. He has had the ordeal of having to combine his maiden speech with a maiden Statement and a speech outlining the Government’s ambitious agenda for justice and home affairs—no mean feat, given that he was introduced only a couple of days ago. The Big Issue magazine of 29 April this year carried an article about the noble Lord, and it starts with the intriguing line:
“James Timpson wears Doc Martens”.
What many people may not know is that when customers go to his shops for theirs to be mended, they are apparently sent to a prison in Warrington—that is the shoes, not the customers—whose prisoners handle the expert yellow stitching required. This tells your Lordships everything about his commitment to give offenders the expertise they need to find a job after release. He comes to his new role with a deep understanding of why our prisons are failing and a burning desire to make things better. He is warmly welcome.
The gracious Speech referred to planning reform, and the Lord Chancellor has subsequently indicated that the Government will ensure that the planning system does not prevent more prisons being built. Prisons are apparently to be classified as being of national importance. My question is whether building more prisons is purely to deal with the capacity crisis or to continue a policy of sending more and more people to prison for longer and longer sentences.
Everyone knows that our prison population is the highest in western Europe; the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, made that point earlier. Ministers often justify longer and longer sentences by saying they maintain confidence in the criminal justice system, but are the public really more confident in a criminal justice system that costs £50,000 per prisoner per year and results in such huge levels of reoffending? As we have heard, nearly 80% of crime is reoffending—a staggering figure—so the truth is that long sentences do not help to prevent crime in society.
The Lord Chancellor’s Statement contained encouraging words about improving rehabilitation of offenders who are in prison, but many of these people should never have been sent to prison in the first place. Of course dangerous people should be locked up for as long as necessary, but 58% of those sent to prison in the year to June 2023 had committed a non-violent offence. They are there because they made bad choices, but the reality is that these were often the result of poor mental health, drug addiction and dysfunctional backgrounds.
If we are to address this prisons crisis, not just today but for years to come, we need to take a long, hard look at sentencing policy. The Government have encouragingly said that they will have a review; I hope it will look at bold and innovative alternatives to prison, with a wider range of disposals, which in appropriate cases can avoid the criminal justice system altogether. Radical reform of sentencing like this, with more non-custodial options, will work only if it is combined with a highly trained, properly resourced and effective Probation Service, not a Probation Service that is failing in 97% of areas.
In conclusion, the Labour manifesto correctly said that
“prisons are a breeding ground for more crime”.
Building more prisons may be necessary as a short-term measure to cope with a capacity crisis, but let us have a long-term strategy of gradually closing quite a lot of prisons. Sorting out sentencing policy would be an excellent start.