European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, for those of us who have real enjoyment in the law, a nice bit of law at three minutes past midnight is rather like a comforting, calm, creamy cup of cocoa, but I recognise that not everybody is of the same view. With that in mind, I propose to elide in the remarks I am going to make comments on Amendment 45, which appears in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and on Amendments 48 and 50, which appear with the same names. That should save time in a few minutes because I understand that we intend to complete that group as well.

These amendments are designed to retain the so-called Francovich principle. I congratulate the noble Lord who has just spoken on summarising it very well. I will add a little bit of flesh on it because I wish to try to tease out of the Minister a welcome response to those of us who seek to preserve at least part of the Francovich principle, although I would happily pass to him the burden of perfected drafting.

In the Gina Miller litigation, in which the noble and learned Lord and my noble friend Lord Pannick played starring parts, the Government in their submissions place considerable weight on their intention to enact what was then called a “great repeal Bill”. As the Supreme Court understood it, that Bill would—and this is a quotation from the majority judgment at paragraph 34,

“repeal the 1972 Act and, wherever practical … convert existing EU law into domestic law at least for a transitional period”.

Surprisingly, in relation to the Francovich principle, there has been no conversion and no transition. I ask the Minister to explain whether that really is the position that the Government wish to maintain.

The Francovich principle is a principle of existing EU law which requires damages to be available where three conditions are met: first, that the rule infringed was intended to confer rights on individuals—I am sure that we would all applaud that; secondly, that the breach was sufficiently serious to give rise to a legal action, which I am sure we would also applaud; and, thirdly, that there was a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the defendant and the damage sustained by the injured party, and I am sure that we would all applaud that, too. Perhaps the Minister would explain why he wants to get rid of that principle.

To provide a little more explanation for the fascinated non-lawyers here, who may just about be in a majority—

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Con)]

Hear, hear!

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I always listen with great respect to the Government Chief Whip, especially when he sympathetically allows us to debate these issues after midnight.

In Francovich, workers who suffered damage when their employer became insolvent were entitled to compensation under an EU directive which required member states to secure their protection. Since Italy had failed to implement the directive, the individual workers brought a claim before their national courts for compensation from the state for the damage they had suffered due to this failure, and I think that we would all applaud that, too.

State liability is enforced not through the European courts but through national courts, thus the ECJ stipulated that national procedures should determine how state liability is enforced. The procedures for claiming damages from the state before national courts must comply with the principles of equivalence—that is, with the procedures available for comparable claims for damages—and effectiveness, to secure that EU law as well as national law is respected. As long as it respects these two principles, the member state can prescribe its own procedures for claims as regards, for example, proof and time limits —so it is hardly imposing wicked European ideas on the national courts, since they are left to enforce the principles concerned.

The Francovich principle has led to some significant legal actions; perhaps the best known in the UK is the Factortame litigation, which contained five cases concerning fishing rights.

What is the problem with the Bill? It is confusing. I quote from the summarised views of commentators more expert than me on this subject. It is said that Clause 6(1) removes the right to rely on EU law and obtain a reference to the ECJ after the date of exit. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule 1 plainly remove the ability to rely on EU law or utilise the Francovich principle after the date of exit. Or do they? I ask that because paragraph 27(3) of Schedule 8, which all noble Lords will have been reading carefully in preparation for this short debate, makes it clear that cases begun prior to the exit date are not subject to the restriction that I have described and therefore can continue to rely on Francovich.

As was pointed out by Dame Cheryl Gillan in another place on 14 November last, the Bill is contradictory, in that it both allows continued reliance on Francovich in cases commenced before the date of exit but also removes that right. That appears to mean that a litigant in a case started before the date of exit, and who has a legitimate expectation that the law will not change retrospectively and that he or she will be able to rely on Francovich, will lose that expectation. If I am wrong in that, I am not the only one and I would like a correction, please. All litigants have a legitimate expectation to have their cases heard under the rules applicable not at an arbitrary time, such as the date of exit, but at the time of the breach of the law concerned. This includes EU law at that time, if it was applicable, and on the face of it, the right of a reference to the ECJ if they are dissatisfied. The purpose of the two groups of amendments is to achieve something much simpler, clearer and more just than the conclusion if the complaints I have described are correct.

I respectfully suggest that if a relevant cause of action accrues before the date of exit, the claimant should be able to pursue that cause of action. That would be their normal litigation right, and exit should not retrospectively remove that normal litigation right. As the Bill stands, because of ambiguity there is a risk that some or all Francovich claims, unless they have already been completed, will be extinguished. Surely, that would be an incorrect and unintended consequence. Plainly—and I will deal with this in a moment—there are some concerns about the potential role of the ECJ.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Con)]

I do not wish to stifle debate but the noble Lord should know that we are on Report, and the opportunity to interrupt a speaker is not an opportunity to make a speech.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown, knows, I have enormous admiration for his skill and ability. He is at his best when he makes points with simplicity, but that point was not made with simplicity. I am totally confused by what he sought to say and I reject his argument completely. He knows perfectly well, as all the Liberal Democrats know, that what was put to the country was a referendum in the normal constitutional and legal form. No Liberal Democrat, least of all the noble Lord, Lord Ashdown—perhaps he was too busy eating his hat as a result of his comments on television during the general election—suggested for one moment that there was something different about the referendum that we faced last June. However, I am sure that noble Lords will want me to move on.

The truth of the matter is that we are facing this proposal for the second time—now rather better drafted, thanks to the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott—because unfortunately the Liberal Democrats do not like the result of last June’s referendum. Nor did I, but my advice to your Lordships’ House, for what it is worth, is: be careful what you wish for. The Liberal Democrats’ record on referenda ain’t so good. Noble Lords will recall the alternative vote referendum, as well as what happened in June. Indeed, I would say that Amendment 1 seeks to compress a huge quantity of extremely complicated issues into a simplistic binary question. It just will not work, and the Government do not need this kind of patronising advice in order to get on with the negotiations.

I now turn briefly to the constitutional issue. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, failed to answer the challenge from the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, as to whether it would be a binding or an advisory referendum. He sought to answer it by saying that he thought that, on balance, it would be a binding referendum. If that is the basis of this amendment, it is ridiculous, because there is no provision in the law for a binding referendum.

The whole debate we have been having in your Lordships’ House has been about how much respect we should pay to the referendum that took place last June. My answer is that we should pay a lot of respect to it. I do not want to leave the European Union, but I recognise that the referendum has taken us to Article 50, which we must get on with triggering as soon as possible. The Government know perfectly well what they have to do. They know that, if they produce a completely unsatisfactory result, they will face a Motion of no confidence in the other place and will fall. We can well do without messing around with the arrangements which should now be in action.

Child Abuse

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Thursday 17th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, given the unfortunate circumstance that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is no longer to chair the inquiry, is the Minister aware that there are seven extremely distinguished, female members of the Court of Appeal, Lady Justices? Is he aware that the appointment of any one of those seven would be extremely welcome to most Members of this House, and that a number of them, like the noble and learned Baroness, have special experience in dealing with issues concerning family law?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I have expressed the views of the Home Secretary and the disappointment that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, will not be taking this inquiry. The House has shown its feelings on that matter. I do not doubt that we will find a competent person to take the chairmanship and that, in turn, we will find people to join that person in forming the panel that will lead the inquiry.

Ibrahim Magag: Disappearance

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Tuesday 8th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I hope that I have just given the noble Lord an indication of the way we think about these matters. It is too soon to say whether lessons can be learnt. The most important thing is to ascertain the whereabouts of this person and to apprehend him.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Will the Minister accept that the fact that Mr Magag did not abscond while subject to a judicially approved relocation order, and that he absconded when that was removed, is in itself clear evidence of the poor decision to remove relocation orders? Will he also acknowledge that nobody absconded while subject to a relocation order, and that there were no absconds at all during the last four and a half years of control orders?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Again, the noble Lord speaks with a great deal of experience on this issue. I note the point that he makes, but I have given my answer and I hope that noble Lords will accept it.