European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord McNally

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally (LD)]

My Lords, my name has been added to a number of the amendments in this group and I appreciate the Minister’s intervention, which should make this debate fairly short. I want to take up an earlier point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley: he said that he thought some of the speeches were too long and bordering on filibustering. That set a little alarm bell ringing in my mind. I have sat in on some of the debates and I have read others, and I think that this Bill is being handled by this House in the appropriate way that it deserves. Some of the speeches, from all the Benches, have been among the best I have heard in parliamentary debate.

The Minister, in referring to his Privy Council Bench, said that they were poachers turned gamekeepers. I say, en passant, that I look on them as sinners turned penitents, but that is a matter of taste really.

As I say, there have been some magnificent debates, but I worry where we are going on this. Sometimes I wonder whether the Ministers are adopting the tactics of the great boxing champion Muhammad Ali. His “rope a dope” strategy was to take all the punishment in the early stages and then have his own way in the later stages of the fight.

I hear what many noble Lords have said—the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, among them—that of course the House of Lords can go only so far with its opposition in the face of the Commons. The contribution from the father of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who warned of an elected dictatorship, comes into play here. So too does something I have mentioned on a number of occasions over the past 20 years that I have sat in this House: this House has the right to say no. We must ask ourselves why successive Governments, some with very large majorities in the House of Commons and some who have reformed this House from time to time, have left it with the right to say no. The reason is that unless we retain the right to say no, we would become a debating Chamber and the Government could simply use their Commons majority to force things through willy-nilly, regardless of whether or not we oppose them. I realise that, in some areas, we bow to the wishes of the elected House, even when we do not want certain things to go through.

As happened in the past two sittings of this Committee, we have discussed in great detail two very important constitutional issues: the right to impose taxation and, now, with this group of amendments, the right to create criminal offences. The proposals go to the very heart of our constitutional settlement and, in my opinion, to the very heart of the responsibilities of this House. Therefore, although I appreciate that a considerable promise was made at the opening of this debate, I say this to Ministers and to colleagues who have made outstanding speeches: regarding our red lines about the right to impose taxation and to create criminal offences, somewhere down the line, if what the Government come up with is not satisfactory, in our responsibility to defend the constitution this House must reserve the right to say no.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I want to add one short point to what has been said about sentences of imprisonment. It is likely that if the Government think it necessary to introduce new criminal offences, they are not going to be offences of assault or anything of that kind, but offences that relate to the conduct of business between the United Kingdom and the European Union. What we are talking about here are possibly mainly regulatory offences, for which sentences of imprisonment may not be necessary at all. However, such offences may affect severely the conduct of companies and the relationships between them, the conduct of local authorities and so on. Therefore, I ask that included in the scrutiny that the Minister has very helpfully promised is a slightly more sophisticated test that bears in mind the effect of potential new offences on the business community and the economy.

Criminal Defence Service (Very High Cost Cases) (Funding) Order 2013

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord McNally

Wednesday 11th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords—

[Lord McNally]

It is very late and noble Lords have all had a very good time.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

It is very late, but this is an important debate, as has been made clear. I have one question to ask. If my noble friend thought it right that there should be an extensive consultation on the generality of legal aid, why was there no consultation on VHCC cases?

[Lord McNally]

This is the first time that VHCC cases have been cut by this Government. I do not think that they were cut by the previous Government. Were they? I stand corrected.

There was a consultation and this has not come out of the blue. I have been talking to the Bar for three and a half years about these cuts.

I hope we do not get an interruption from my noble friend Lord Phillips. He came in very late.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, it is now 11 pm so I shall be very brief but I do want to reply to the debate. Twelve out of the 13 Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken in this debate have spoken consistently with the same thread, criticising the Government for the introduction of these statutory instruments. As I listened to those contributions, I reminded myself of what a privilege it is to be a Member of your Lordships’ House. There were magnificent speeches, many of them from the Cross Benches, three from noble and learned Lords who have held very senior positions in the judiciary, and two from noble and learned Members of this House who have been Attorney-General on opposite sides, with very different types of practice in their experience.

I believe that your Lordships have provided my noble friend the Minster with the finest debating tutorial he could ever have had and that the Lord Chancellor could ever have had in how wrong the Government’s decision to introduce these statutory instruments has been.

[Lord McNally]

My noble friend interrupted me and I shall interrupt him just once. It is only for this reflection: yes, we have had a good debate and I do not doubt the eminence of those who contributed to it, but I have said it before: the legal profession must not exist in a bubble and congratulate or commiserate with itself. I sometimes wish that this House was full to the gunwales so that we could have a proper debate on these matters and see whether this unanimity of view about the sufferings of the legal profession was quite so evenly spread as a debate like this might sometimes indicate.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My noble friend is a much liked, popular and witty Member of this House and I will not rise to the uncharacteristic and unjustified provocation of that intervention. I was about to say that I hope that the Lord Chancellor himself will read every word of this debate and will take note of what I think I described earlier as the finest debating tutorial one could have. If my noble friend is saying that all that has happened in this House in the past couple of hours has been a demonstration of self-interest by lawyers, one or two non-lawyers, judges and others who are acting in concert to defy the Government then, in my view, that demeans what has been a magnificent debate. I thank all those who have taken part for giving me the privilege that I described earlier.

I have some sympathy for my noble friend the Minister who sought to respond to the debate. He read out a familiar litany, but it was a litany without a message save the message of mistake. He allowed himself to stray into the suggestion that there had been consultation about the VHCC changes. He sought to elide into the VHCC changes consultation that had taken place on completely different legal issues. It is important to emphasise at the end of this debate that there was no—zero, zilch—consultation on these VHCC changes, and that is fundamental to the complaint that the Bar makes about the high-handed way in which this unilateral breach of contract has occurred.

My noble friend said that the Government were “under responsibilities to make these cuts”—those were his very words; I noted them as he said them. However, with great respect to my noble friend, that phrase is meaningless. The Government have the responsibility to get it right, not just to make cuts for the sake of making them. He said in relation to what is going to happen to these VHCC cases, in which there are now no advocates, that “we will just have to see how this works out”. That took my breath away. It is an acceptance that there are now cases with no advocates, that there is no plan B for these cases and that the promises that the Government made to everyone that it would all be all right on the day have simply been shown to be wrong. I would never accuse my noble friend of being incoherent but the brief that he had was full of incoherence, and we saw it displayed this evening.

At this late hour, I do not propose to divide the House but I believe that I do not need to do so. This debate has been well worth having because of its overwhelming effect of showing that the Government are wrong in what they have done with these cases and that the explanation which my noble friend sought to give just did not hold water at all. With the permission of the House, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.

Legal Aid

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord McNally

Thursday 11th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)]

My Lords, it is important that I put on the record the Government’s point of view in this important debate, so I will not be able to follow the usual courtesy of a detailed response to the many individual points and questions raised. However, I will treat the Hansard of this debate as an input into the consultation under way, and I will see whether I can cover some of the specific points raised in an omnibus letter that we will circulate to noble Lords.

First, I, too, congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, on securing a debate on this important subject. It has attracted a speakers list of great experience and expertise, and the debate as a whole has been a major contribution to what I emphasise is a consultation still in progress. This debate and the consultation that has initiated it take place against a background of two inescapable realities. The first was stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, herself when she spoke in the debate on the gracious Speech on 9 May. She was also quoted today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. She said:

“It is self-evident that there cannot be a bottomless fund for legal aid”.—[Official Report, 9/3/13; col. 101.]

The second reality was made clear by the noble Lord, Lord Carter, in his review of the procurement of legal aid conducted in 2006. He said:

“A healthy legal services market should be driven by best value competition based on quality, capacity and price. All three of these factors should lead to the restructuring of the supply market”.

Of his own proposals, he said:

“The emphasis of the proposals has been upon providing incentives for firms to structure their businesses in such a way that legal aid services can be procured more effectively, and that the service is delivered more efficiently”.

It is therefore no surprise that previous Governments wrestled with this issue.

The establishment of the Legal Services Commission in 1999 reformed the part of the system which funds legal aid services but not the part which delivers them. Costs continued to increase, giving rise to several series of fee cuts. The case for reform was certainly enough to persuade the Opposition to include a commitment to find greater savings from the legal aid scheme in their 2010 manifesto. Their consultation document, Restructuring the Delivery of Criminal Defence Services, published earlier that year—this was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—said:

“Currently the criminal defence service is highly fragmented, with a large number of small suppliers and relatively few large suppliers”.

The need for reform of legal aid-funded services in order to deliver a cost-effective, sustainable legal aid scheme is well established, but it is not the only driver for reform of the legal professions. Changes in technology and its increasingly fundamental role in the functioning of the criminal justice system demand the kinds of changes to working practices and business models seen throughout the public and private sectors. The introduction of alternative business structures, Jackson reforms and an increasingly well informed customer base are all examples of changes which present their own challenges that the legal professions must meet. Those changes are accompanied by the brutal fact that the number of businesses providing criminal legal aid services now vastly outstrips demand for such services.

The realities have been gathering force and relevance for decades, so it is absurd for the professions to claim that they have been bounced by a short and ill considered consultation. When I first came into this office in 2010, the Bar Council was starting to consider ways to restructure the way that it delivers its services. It was looking at what it called procure co-type organisations. I had a very interesting discussion with the then chair of the Bar Council about its vision for the future of the Bar. I understand that work to explore such arrangements ceased at the request of senior members of the Bar due to concerns that it would aid the Government in introducing competitive tendering. We want the Law Society and the Bar Council to engage with changes which are in many cases inevitable.

The Government recognise that the services the professions deliver are a vital component of our legal system and ensure access to justice and equality before the law. We recognise that the independent judiciary—perhaps the most critical element of our justice system—could not survive without drawing from the pool of talent that the professions create.

However, alongside the need to ensure access to justice and a healthy, sustainable legal sector, the professions must also recognise that the Government are entitled to seek the best possible value for money from the legal aid budget. The coalition’s programme for government made a commitment to review the legal aid scheme with the aim of finding savings, culminating in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. This will have removed around £320 million from the legal aid budget by 2014-15—largely, as has been explained, from the civil legal aid budget—as well as strengthening accountability and introducing a more rigorous approach to financial management by creating the Legal Aid Agency.

However, the current financial climate means that it is necessary to look again at everything that the Ministry of Justice is doing, including in relation to legal aid, in order to make further savings, particularly in respect of criminal legal aid. This was the focus of the consultation, which has recently concluded, and the aim is to further reduce the legal aid spend by around £220 million by 2018-19.

The consultation, published in April, included a proposal to move to a model of price-competitive tendering in the criminal legal aid market. Conscious of the professions’ objections to the principle of “one case, one fee”, we proposed to exclude criminal advocacy from the competition model, instead proposing to restructure the Crown Court advocacy scheme. Being mindful of the great disparity in the level of fee income received by advocates for Crown Court work, our proposals would rebalance fee income so that those at the top end took the greatest reduction and the lower earners the least. Indeed, some lower earners may see a small increase in their fee income.

Alongside this, we sought to further increase efficiency by proposing a sensible reduction in the use of multiple counsel. To ensure public confidence in the level of expenditure on the longest and most expensive cases, as well as delivering the necessary savings for the legal aid scheme, we propose to reduce the rates paid for criminal, very high-cost cases by 30%. We have also included some small but important reforms to civil legal aid and expert fees to ensure that these, too, are fair and proportionate, and consistent with those paid for similar work elsewhere.

Our proposals also seek to address a number of issues where the savings may be small but we believe that the impact on public confidence in the legal aid scheme is significant. We propose to reduce the scope of prison law cases funded through legal aid, directing less serious matters to the internal prisoner complaints process. The prisoner complaints system was updated in 2012 and has recently been audited with a review of the adequacy, effectiveness and reliability of controls over prisoner complaints, with no significant concerns identified. Criminal legal aid will remain for a significant number of cases where liberty is at stake, such as parole hearings, or where there is a risk of extra days being added, such as in disciplinary cases.

By proposing a Crown Court eligibility threshold, we are ensuring that those who have the means to pay for their own defence do so. By setting it at twice the average household disposable income, we have ensured that it is fair.

In introducing a residence test, we seek to ensure that civil legal aid expenditure is targeted at those who have a strong connection to the UK. As with other public services, legal aid is paid for by UK taxpayers and we do not believe that it should be provided to those who have never set foot in this country or whose connection is tenuous.

We have already proposed an exception for asylum seekers in recognition of their particular vulnerability—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords—

[Lord McNally]

No, I am not giving way. I am sorry. I have five minutes left. It is a time-limited debate and the noble Lord has had his time.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Will the noble Lord answer the debate?

[Lord McNally]

I am answering the debate.

We have already proposed an exception for asylum seekers, in recognition of their particular vulnerability, and made clear that persons who did not meet the test would be entitled to apply for exceptional funding. We have heard the concerns raised during the consultation and in today’s debate in respect of the impact of the test on other groups of people or types of cases. We will reflect carefully on these points before making any further decisions.

We recognise judicial review as an important tool of redress which balances the power of the state. We continue to believe that it is important to make legal aid available for most judicial review cases. Under this proposal, legal aid for the earlier stages of a case would not be affected. Payment would continue as now for work to investigate the strength of a claim or to engage in correspondence as required by the pre-action protocol. This is important as many cases will settle or conclude at this point without issuing an application, avoiding further costs to the legal aid scheme, the courts and public authorities. However, we are concerned that legal aid is sometimes treated as a resource to further pursue weak cases that have little effect other than to waste taxpayers’ money. We do not think it is fair for taxpayers to pay the bills for weak cases that have little effect other than to incur costs for public authorities and the legal aid scheme. We set out our initial assessment of the impact of the proposals along with the consultation paper and invited consultees to comment on the extent and range of those impacts and set out any concerns that they had in this regard. We are now carefully considering all responses and the issues that they raised.

Much of what has been said about our proposals on price competition has quite simply been false. The debate has been dogged by a baffling conflation of the Government’s intention to manage the criminal legal aid scheme, through around a quarter of the current number of contracts, with a mythical intention to see only around a quarter of the present number of firms. Some of the rhetoric has risked misleading the public that legal aid would no longer be available. However, the professions have made clear their views on the importance of client choice both for the benefit of clients themselves and for the health of the market more generally. As the Justice Secretary told the Justice Select Committee last week, we have listened and will put forward revised proposals in the autumn. We have also listened on the proposed residence test and will consider the issues raised as well as the comments made across the proposals from nearly16,000 responses.

This House has much collective wisdom and experience about the issues that we have been discussing today. I want to make it clear that this is a real consultation and we are listening. The decision that Ministers have to take will be in the context of the economic realities from which the legal aid fund cannot escape. There will be cuts that will mean some tough choices. However, when the cuts have been made we will still be left with one of the most generous legal aid schemes in the world. I would make the point that although I have never compared it with continental legal aid schemes, I have compared it with common law legal aid schemes in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and elsewhere—and noble Lords will find that it is one of the most generous in the world. I am proud of that fact. I want us to have a generous legal aid scheme. Access to justice is important. I want us to work on ways and ideas, some of which have been thrown up by the consultation, which will give long-term sustainability to legal aid.

However, long-term sustainability means the legal professions facing up to some hard facts. There continues to be oversupply in both parts of the profession, with too many lawyers chasing a limited amount of publicly funded work. Lawyers themselves have to address the further issues of quality and consolidation which will remain long after this present argument has been settled. Alternative business structures, the Jackson reforms, no-win no-fee, damage-based agreements and conditional fee agreements, will all impact on the organisation and structure of the profession. There are wider issues, such as a lack of social mobility and diversity which cannot be solved simply by tweaking the legal aid scheme.

In some ways, I have been disappointed at the way in which those who have responsibilities in these areas have refused to engage with these fundamental issues. I agree with my noble friend Lord Marks that we have to seek a new settlement in this matter. There is still time to do so. Our legal system, our respect for the rule of law and the eminence and integrity of our judiciary are precious gifts passed down from one generation to another. We all have a duty to protect what is best while managing the change that is inevitable. That is the task before us now, and I again call on all those who care about the system of justice to join us in that task.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord McNally

Thursday 9th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

I asked for the House of Commons Hansard for 1 November. I could have picked quite a few but I shall pick one for the House to catch the flavour. As I have said, I have been faced with such unanimity today. Mr Sadiq Khan said:

“No amount of smoke and mirrors can disguise the fact that, by abolishing indeterminate sentences, he”—

the Lord Chancellor—

“is risking the safety of communities in each and every constituency”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/11/11; col. 793.]

You can imagine him banging the Dispatch Box and a growl of “Hear, hear” coming from behind him. That is the difficulty we have in this. Quite frankly, if the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, or perhaps my noble friend, was dishing out awards for political posturing, it would not be to only one side of the House or to this end of the corridor. I am also a little—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I hesitate to interrupt my noble friend who I know will say that in the spirit of what he said earlier he regards all his Liberal Democrat colleagues in this House as entirely reasonable. But this is a bicameral Parliament. What are we to read into the fact that, as it happens in this House as we debate this important matter, there are seven Liberal Democrats on the Government side of the House and one Conservative Peer, who deserves credit for being here. If the Conservative Party is really committed in the way in which he has explained from that quotation, should its Peers not be here to say so?

[Lord McNally]

That perhaps is why my noble friend is on the Back Benches rather than enjoying the pleasures of coalition government. He will also know that—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

What is that supposed to mean?

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord McNally

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

How unworthy! The test of that will be what we bring back on Report, but this is not a way of dodging a debate tonight.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I hesitate to interrupt my noble friend, but we are curtailing the debate and what he has said is very helpful. Can he assure the Committee that, in preparing an amendment, the Government have in mind the importance of the duty solicitor scheme and of there being a process of integrity in the police station, so that suspects do not choose to refuse to answer questions in interview because they are not properly represented? Can he also assure us that the Government will bear in mind the risks of evidence obtained in police stations being rejected by courts because of a failed and unfair procedure in those police stations? Those of us who started practice at the Bar would say to my noble friend that there were long periods in our early practice when we cross-examined police officers about what used to be called “verballing”. I am sure that my noble friend understands the expression. I hope that whatever amendment is introduced will ensure that we do not have to return to the bad old days before the enactment of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

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[Lord McNally]

Nevertheless, the previous Government passed the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which prevents restrained funds being released to a defendant for legal expenses in relation to the offences to which the restraint order relates. The Committee will be aware that assets recovered from the proceeds of crime are already applied to offset the overall costs to the public purse, although I note the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the success of confiscation orders. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, will know that when he put this idea to me, it seemed very attractive with a little Robin Hood stuff about it. However, the reason that the previous Government took action through the Proceeds of Crime Act was that in their judgment there was a risk that individuals might recklessly dissipate assets through lavish spending on their defence in order to try to secure an acquittal at any cost. In 2002, the then Government decided that it was better to allow access to legal aid than to allow an individual to draw down restrained funds to pay for their defence. Restrained assets in these cases are suspected to be the proceeds of crime. They are not therefore legitimate money, and they should not be used to fund the costs of a person’s defence lawyers. First and foremost, the victims of crime ought to be compensated for their loss.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Before my noble friend goes down this course, which is an accusation that defence lawyers are simply going to charge what they like and take as much as they want, will he read his own clause? Nobody is saying that defence lawyers should be able to say, “Okay, I’ll take £1,000 an hour for representing you”. It is all subject to regulation and to the kind of limitations that currently apply through the LSC. What the Minister is saying at the moment simply does not recognise what the amendment provides. Will he please answer the amendment?

[Lord McNally]

I think the noble Lord protests too much. I was explaining to him the motivations of the previous Government for bringing in the Proceeds of Crime Act.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord McNally

Wednesday 18th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Before my noble friend moves on from that point, can he go a little further in answering the issue raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about cross-examination? Yes, of course the judge has power to limit inappropriate cross-examination, but the judge cannot prevent the person concerned putting their case, and putting it fully and properly. That is the issue that the noble and learned Baroness is trying to deal with. It is in that situation that the allegedly abused person faces real anguish, and in which the protection of the judge is but a very small instrument.

[Lord McNally]

I will take this back but, again, I am speaking as a layman to professionals. As far as I understand it, there are increasingly ways in the courts of preventing that kind of face-to-face, aggressive cross-examination. I think that there was a case recently which caused a good deal of public comment and distress. I will take the matter away and take further advice but, as I say, both my impression as a layman and the advice that I have are that there are safeguards to prevent that kind of brutal, face-to-face, intimidating cross-examination. I hear what my noble friend says and I will take further advice on the matter.

I turn to Amendments 43, 44, 45, 46 and 48 and start by reiterating why we are taking most private family law cases out of the scope of legal aid. The cost of legal aid as it stands is, we believe, simply unsustainable, and legal aid resources need to be focused on those cases where legal aid is most needed. Accordingly, for most divorces, child contact applications or ancillary relief applications to divide family assets, legal aid will no longer be available. We believe that it is right to encourage families, where appropriate, to resolve their disputes without going to court. We want to prioritise mediation, which can be cheaper, quicker and less acrimonious than contested court proceedings. Legal aid will therefore remain available for mediation in private law family cases. We estimate that we will spend some extra £10 million a year on mediation, taking the total to £25 million a year.

We accept, however, that mediation might not be suitable in every case—particularly, as we made clear, in cases involving domestic violence. It is important to remember that the inclusion of this provision is to ensure that legal aid remains available for private family law cases where there is evidence of domestic violence, creating a disadvantage for one party, and cases where a child is at risk of abuse.

Amendments 44 and 45 would put in paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 to the Bill, in place of the existing definition of abuse, parts of the definition of domestic violence first used by the Association of Chief Police Officers but subsequently more widely adopted for operational purposes—although not, it should be noted, by the courts. The existing definition of abuse used in the Bill is a broad and comprehensive one, having been drafted deliberately and explicitly so as not to be limited to physical violence. It should be noted that it is used elsewhere in Schedule 1: in paragraph 3, which provides for legal aid to be available in relation to the abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, and paragraph 11, which provides for legal aid to be available for a person seeking an order to protect a child at risk of abuse.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord McNally

Tuesday 10th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

If there are circumstances in which it would be inappropriate to consult the Law Society and the Bar Council about payments to be made to their members from public funds, will the noble Lord please explain to us what those circumstances are?

[Lord McNally]

No, my Lords. I go back to what I have said. Neither I nor my noble friend the Lord Chancellor wants to allow the Opposition to sprinkle the Bill with “must” in this respect. We need to apply common sense to this matter. I would be as hard put as him to find a reason why one would not consult such bodies—indeed, I would add the Institute of Legal Executives to the list. Common sense dictates that a Lord Chancellor would want to do this. I will give way but I add, to help the noble Lord with his next shaft, that that seems to me the sensible thing to do.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I am very grateful to my noble friend and I apologise for interrupting him again but this is intended to be a shaft of light and not a bolt of lightning. Can he think of any circumstances in which a failure to consult ILEX, the Bar Council or the Law Society about their respective members’ pay would not be judicially reviewable? Surely, it is right that a failure to consult would provide a certain judicial review against the Government.

[Lord McNally]

One of the joys of this job is answering questions on the law posed by learned QCs. I honestly do not know whether that situation would be judicially reviewable. However, we do not think that it is necessary to include “must”. We have made it very clear that a sensible Lord Chancellor would consult these bodies and perhaps if some future—

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Go on.

[Lord McNally]

No, I recognise a red rag when I see one. I will think about the point that the noble Lord made. I commend him for merging two groupings and ask him to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, having inherited a number of returns from my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford when we were both barristers outside London many years ago, I share the memory of the effectiveness of those committees, including the gloss placed on it by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf.

I would like to point out a parallel that exists today. Those of us who from time to time undertake very high-cost criminal cases have to apply for permission to the Legal Services Commission to do certain aspects of preparation. If the commission refuses permission, for example to obtain an expert witness’s report or to make photocopies of original documents—believe it or not, it can descend to that—there is a committee made up of practising lawyers who determine whether that permission should be granted, and it works very well. If the committee decides against the applicant, he or she has the opportunity to apply for permission to apply for judicial review. That involves a paper process, initially before a judge. If permission is refused, it is open to the applicant to have an application heard before the full court, but it is far from universal that that is done.

We therefore have in the existing provisions for very high-cost cases something very similar to that described by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford. I suggest to the Minister that this would be a practical way of dealing with this appeal problem that would cover the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, those who have signed his amendment and those of us who have signed my noble friend’s amendment.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, the intention of the amendment is to establish a tribunal to review determinations made by the director about whether an individual qualifies for legal aid. This is very closely related to Amendment 96, which would make it a requirement for all reviews concerning determinations by the director under Clauses 8 and 9 to be referred to an independent panel.

The amendment is unnecessary. The Bill already establishes the director in a way that maintains and protects the director’s independence of decision-making in individual cases. The director is created by statute. Although the director must comply with directions and take account of guidance given by the Lord Chancellor about the carrying out of the director’s functions under Part 1, the Lord Chancellor cannot give directions or guidance to the director about carrying out those functions in relation to individual cases. There is already provision in the Bill for review of the director’s decisions and appeals against them. This means that there is no need for an amendment to create a separate tribunal.

Clause 11(5) provides that regulations must make provision for procedures for the review of the determinations of the director under Clauses 8 and 9 as to whether a person qualifies for civil legal aid and for the withdrawal of such determinations. There is also power in Clause 11(6) to make provision for appeals to a court, tribunal or other person against the making or withdrawal of a determination in relation to civil legal aid. The Government intend to continue with the Legal Services Commission’s existing appeal and review procedures for cases determined under Clause 8—that is, those within the general scope of the civil legal aid scheme—including the use of independent funding adjudicators. Those procedures are well established and understood, and the intention is that they will include provision for internal review of decisions by the director.

Additionally, where a client is dissatisfied with the conclusions of a review on merits grounds concerning a decision on legal representation in civil and family proceedings in scope under the Bill, the client will be able to appeal to an independent funding adjudicator. As at present, there would be no appeal against refusal on means grounds, although a client can ask for their means to be reassessed.

In reflecting the current review arrangements, there will also under Clause 9 be a right of internal review for exceptional case determinations, although independent funding adjudicators will have no role in the review of exceptional funding decisions. This is because of the particular nature of the assessment at the heart of such cases, which will focus on an interpretation of the relevant obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to provide legal aid. Exceptional case determinations, along with all other decisions by the director, would be subject to judicial review.

This is more than adequate provision to ensure that scrutiny can be applied to the decisions of the director where an individual believes that there are grounds for review. There is also provision for making regulations about the review of and appeals against the director’s determination on criminal legal aid. I refer noble Lords to Clause 14(9)—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I apologise for interrupting my noble friend, but he referred in passing to Clause 11(6). Can he explain to the Committee the difference between subsection (5), which requires provision establishing procedures for the review of determinations, and subsection (6), which provides that regulations may make provisions for appeals to a court? Why the difference between “must” and “may” in those two subsections?

[Lord McNally]

Which was the first one to which the noble Lord referred?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Clause 11(5) says “must”, whereas Clause 11(6) says “may”—perhaps echoing a point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, earlier.

[Lord McNally]

I will have to take advice on that, but I thank the noble Lord for drawing it to my attention. I sometimes wonder whether mays and musts are not spread through a Bill according to whether parliamentary counsel gets bored with the use of “must” and decides to put “may”, but I am sure there are far more legal reasons why those choices are made.

As I was saying, there is more than adequate provision to ensure that scrutiny can be applied to the decision of the director where an individual believes that there are grounds for review. There is also provision for making regulations about the review of and appeals against the director's determination on criminal legal aid.

Amendments 97 and 98 would change Clause 11(6), which concerns determinations of whether funding should be granted for any of the matters included in Schedule 1 or any excluded cases under Clause 9. These amendments would require regulations under Clause 11 to make provision for appeals to a court or tribunal against determinations made by the director under Clauses 8 and 9 and against the withdrawal of such determinations.

I have described the intention and effect of Clauses 11(5) and (6), as well as the intention to continue with the existing, effective processes and procedures currently used by the LSC in the new model, and I do not propose to cover the same ground here, although I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. However, requiring provision to be made for appeals to a court or tribunal against all determinations by the director would be expensive, resource intensive and likely to lead to delay in the hearing of appeals.

Clause 14 creates a power to make regulations that prescribe what advice and assistance must be made available if the director has determined that a person qualifies for advice and assistance. That largely reflects the provisions in Section 13 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which requires the Legal Services Commission to fund such advice and assistance as it considers appropriate. The circumstances in which such advice and assistance will be made available are prescribed in regulation. Advice and assistance for criminal proceedings is distinct from that provided under Clause 12 to individuals arrested and held in custody. The services we are talking about here would include those provided by a duty solicitor in court or to a prisoner preparing for his appearance before a parole board.

Although Clause 14 and Section 13 of the Access to Justice Act are framed differently, their overall effect is essentially the same. Clause 14 is intended to replace Section 13(1)(b) of the Access to Justice Act. The Bill confers a power to make regulations under Clause 14 for consistency with Section 13(1)(b) of the Access to Justice Act. That section provides that the Legal Services Commission's duty to provide advice and assistance to the individuals mentioned there arises only in prescribed circumstances, and “prescribed” means prescribed in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor.

The combined effect of Amendments 105 to 107 would require regulations made by the Lord Chancellor under Clause 14(1) to provide for appeals, but not reviews, to a court or tribunal in relation to the aspects of determination on legal aid set out in Clauses 14(9)(a) and (b).

Amendment 107 would preclude regulations allowing for appeals to any other person. The Government judge it more appropriate to allow the Lord Chancellor to make regulations, if he considers it appropriate, than to require him to do so. We will retain the existing arrangements whereby advice and assistance for criminal proceedings provided under Clause 14 are subject to a “sufficient benefit” test. In practice, this would be conducted on behalf of the Director of Legal Aid Casework by the litigator, who would provide the legal aid services. The LSC criminal contract provides that advice and assistance may only be provided on legal issues concerning English or Welsh law,

“and where there is sufficient benefit to the Client, having regard to the circumstances of the matter, including the personal circumstances of the Client, to justify work or further work being carried out”.

There is currently no appeal to a court or tribunal in relation to the sufficient benefit test. However, there is a right, set out in the LSC contract, for the person refused legal aid to apply to an independent funding adjudicator for a review of the decision not to grant legal aid. There are no plans to introduce appeals provisions immediately, although subsection (9) would allow for the introduction of provisions for reviews and appeals in the future if it were considered appropriate.

Procedures for review and appeal might, in any event, not be necessary or proportionate in establishing whether all criteria specified in regulations under subsection (5)(b) were met. For example, if a criterion was that the provider had to hold a contract to provide such services, then an appeal would not be necessary to establish whether a provider held a contract. The Government therefore believe that a duty to secure such arrangements is unnecessary and heavy-handed. In such circumstances, a right of appeal to a body other than a court might be more appropriate. The Government believe it is appropriate to have the flexibility to make regulations that could provide for either a review or an appeal, or a combination of both, and that a review or appeal might be made to a body other than a court or tribunal.

The noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Thomas, raised points concerning Article 6. It is intended that any arrangements made will comply with the ECHR.

On the rather interesting background to previous systems, it was the previous Administration that brought to an end what sounded like a nice little earner for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Carlile.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

It was free.

[Lord McNally]

Free? Oh my goodness. I withdraw that remark.

Personal Injury Lawyers

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord McNally

Thursday 7th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

Whether the question of referral fees will find its way into the Bill is a matter for the study that we are undertaking into ways that this could be implemented. However, we are trying to bring forward a range of the Jackson proposals in that Bill. As to referral fees, as my noble friend will be aware, the Legal Services Board and the Transport Select Committee advised a solution in terms of transparency. Lord Justice Jackson recommended a ban and, as I indicated, the Government are sympathetic to the idea of a ban.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, in addition to that, will my noble friend confirm—as he indicated to me in a Written Answer to me on 23 June—that referral fees or kick-back fees in criminal cases are illegal, corrupt and should not be undertaken in any case by any lawyer?

[Lord McNally]

If that is what I said in a Written Answer it must be—[Laughter.] Even more so, it just sounds right.

Social Welfare Law

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord McNally

Wednesday 29th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, under our proposals, legal aid will be retained in the highest priority housing cases, where a person’s home is at immediate risk, for homelessness, serious disrepair, unlawful eviction, orders for the sale of the home, and asylum support cases relating to accommodation. Legal aid will be available in debt matters where a person’s home is at immediate risk. We will still be spending about £50 million a year on this section of legal aid.

I have read the comments of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale. I have said from this Dispatch Box that if you have a policy that is aimed at the poorest in our society and you cut the budget, of course there will be an inevitable impact. But in trying to develop this policy we have tried to minimise that impact and focus our resources on those most in need.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, would my noble friend like to take a short journey down to the Lambeth County Court and other comparable courts in London, Manchester, Sheffield and other cities, where he would find if he spent half a day there that the only way in which to get your house repaired is to sue the local council? All other measures to obtain house repairs are not succeeding. He would then perhaps realise that limiting legal aid to quite the extent which the Government are ambitious to limit it is going a step too far.

[Lord McNally]

Well, I hear what my noble friend is saying. The department was faced with some very hard decisions on a £2 billion cut in a department which, as I have said before, has expenditure on only four areas—prisons, probation, legal aid and on the administration of justice. We have tried to focus where we can on areas of need. I was very interested in the editorial in the Guardian on legal aid, which was headed, “Unjust cuts”. In the course of that editorial, it said:

“It is now being examined for the eighth time since the Children Act 1989”.

The noble Lord knows very well that his own Administration were looking hard at legal aid and how to cut it. It went on:

“The need for reform, and for a more cost-effective system, is undisputed … Professionals acknowledge that too many of these cases come to court, and welcome the proposal for greater use of mediation … Change is needed. There are savings to be made”.

That is under the title of “Unjust cuts”. Those are the realities that we are facing.