(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, that was my fault. I was not for one moment suggesting that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, was saying that the Bulger case did not require enormously sensitive handling, nor that she was in any way underestimating the seriousness of it. I was seeking to say that the fact that there were tabloid campaigns about it and that people were very concerned about it was absolutely legitimate. What they were asking for was not necessarily legitimate, but there was very real concern. Obviously, there must be anonymity, but if the matter is dealt with entirely in the care system, without any public element of how the law is dealing with it, then the community never gets satisfaction in relation to what is happening. By satisfaction, I mean that there must be some recognition within the justice system of the appalling nature of what has happened.
Surely the noble and learned Lord is not saying that the public aspect of this, which he describes rightly, must be dealt with by a criminal trial. Numerous other mechanisms can be used. An inquiry, for example, can ventilate all the public factors that need to be discussed without the artifices of a criminal trial for 10 year-olds.
I agree that it does not need to be dealt with in a criminal trial, but there needs to be some process. Before one increases the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 12, which we should do, this must be looked at. This is why I rather favour the second amendment, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which is a review of this, because broadly the case is made in relation to it. It probably should not be something ad hoc, as is the nature of an inquiry, but it should have some recognition that cases such as the Bulger case, which have a significant effect on not only the local but the national community, must be dealt with in a special way.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I agree entirely with my noble and learned friend who has just spoken that there is a principle here that needs to be considered rather than the granularity of these amendments. Indeed, I would say to the noble Viscount that, although we should try to achieve the protection of all people who are vulnerable, you cannot do everything at once. It is the whole of the life of the child in front of them that is affected if a parent is in prison.
The right reverend Prelate moved these amendments eloquently. I will say, very respectfully, that I think she omitted one or two key elements. These may lead one to the conclusion that we do not need quite complicated amendments but can achieve her aims, which I share, by a simpler method that is more evolutionary in its process. I might perhaps raise a couple of specifics. First, the information that the right reverend Prelate referred to is sometimes simply not before the court. That is because legal aid does not now provide solicitors with the earning potential—and it is not a high earning potential—to go out and investigate the reality of a child’s position. This means that the necessary information may not get in front of the court at all.
I had a conversation some time ago with somebody who was working as a manager of excluded primary school children in one of the London boroughs. She told me that she often rang the solicitors for 11 year-olds right at the top of the primary sector, or sometimes when they had just moved from the primary sector, to ask if they were aware of certain aspects of the child’s life—and they had no idea. They do not have the resources to make those inquiries. Furthermore, when cases come before the court, it is nowadays very rare in the Crown Court for a solicitor to be there instructing counsel in such cases, and, in the nature of the profession and the fees payable, counsel may have received the brief only the night before, and it may be a very junior counsel. These are the practical issues that judges encounter all the time.
I want also to say something about judges; I have a family interest in this, which I will not go into in great detail, despite the urgings of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. It is this: judges should be given credit for understanding the problems that the right reverend Prelate raised; she perhaps did not quite get there. Judges, many of whom are mothers themselves, hear these cases and understand perfectly well. They do not need a statute to tell them that it is not in the interests of a child for that child’s mother to be sent to prison .They do everything they can—on the basis of the information they are given, which may give rise to the real problem—to ensure that, if at all possible, a woman who has primary caring responsibility for a child is not sent to prison.
I apologise for interrupting. The right reverend Prelate’s Amendment 215 says:
“A court must make inquiries to establish whether the offender is a primary carer for a child”,
and, if those inquiries suggest that the defendant is a primary carer, then, according to the amendment, the court has to direct a pre-sentence report on the circumstances of the child. Does the noble Lord object to that burden on the courts?
I do not object to that burden on the courts, but I am surprised that it has to be placed upon the court. My view is that that sort of report should be part of the process when a young mother, for example, appears before the court. Mechanisms already exist that can ensure that such information is given. I am saying that we can achieve the same purpose more simply—for example, by the use of the Sentencing Council, if it is asked to concentrate on these issues.
I simply add this. The last statistics I have seen for women in prison, for 2020, show that 3.4% of prisoners are women. This is the lowest percentage it has ever been, and it is continuing to fall because the courts absolutely understand what those who tabled these worthy amendments are saying.
When the Minister replies, I hope he may be able to provide reassurance that the ends of these amendments will be achieved but in a more flexible way that can evolve over time, rather than by slightly clunky statutory provisions that, in my view, should not be necessary. Do we really need an Act of Parliament to ensure that courts give proper account to the paramount interests of children, which my noble and learned friend referred to a few moments ago?