Wales Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) : House of Lords
Monday 31st October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, with all the Celtic fervour that I can muster. The principle is undoubtedly a proper one, but the technicality is narrow. Some arguments turn upon the existence of Welsh law—its distinctive character—and they are not without their merit. However, that to my mind is not the issue, which is the juxtaposition of a parliamentary jurisdiction and a court jurisdiction. I would go so far as to say that there is something wrong with the constitutional geometry of the situation where more than one parliament operates within the sphere of one legal jurisdiction. That is the essence of it.

Even if there was no difference whatever between Welsh and English law in this matter—and we know there is—it would still be the case, parliaments having the inimitable bent to go their own way, that to have two or more parliaments operating within a single jurisdiction was wrong. I think I heard the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, say that he doubted whether there was any situation in the whole world where that is so, but I ask the Minister—not perhaps in his ministerial capacity but in his capacity as a very distinguished professor of law—whether in any democratic system in the world there is an instance of two parliaments operating within a single legal jurisdiction.

Having said that, I appreciate that there are difficulties, and I have profound respect for what has been said by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Judge. A great deal has already been started and been done. The Administrative Court has been referred to and it is undoubtedly a success. In addition—I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, had a great deal to do with this—the civil and criminal divisions of the Court of Appeal were given every encouragement to meet in Wales, and they did so on many occasions.

There are many trends of that kind; nevertheless, the basic problem still has to be met. We have already heard of the situation in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey have their own parliaments and their own jurisdictions. As a matter of legal purity, there should never be a situation where more than one parliament operates within one jurisdiction. Having said that, I appreciate that there are practical difficulties.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, I joined the Wales and Chester circuit of the Bar 45 years and two months ago. I went to chambers in Chester, where my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford was already well established, and I confess that I learned a great deal from him, almost all of it good. It is therefore with a good deal of pleasure that I rise to support his amendment.

I have some sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, in his aspirations for Welsh institutions, but I fear that I have to come to the same conclusion as my noble friend Lord Thomas—that what he proposes is not needed and nor would it work. Speaking only for myself, I suspect, I have long been in favour of the creation of a separate Wales division of the High Court to cover civil and criminal proceedings. Although a great deal has been done, which I shall mention in a moment, we still do not quite have that formal division. In my view, that would be an excellent measure, well understood, and it would possibly allow Wales to have some appointments that would be appropriate to such a division, such as a presidency of the division—there are presidents of the other divisions of our senior courts. I think that that would be met with approval throughout the legal profession in Wales, although, as I shall set out in a moment, it is not necessarily those in the legal profession who are the right people to decide these things.

I join in the tribute that has been paid to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who as Lord Chief Justice did a great deal to give the Welsh jurisdiction an identity which previously it had not had for several hundred years. Of course, as I think my noble friend said at Second Reading—I have certainly heard him say it in your Lordships’ House—there used to be a chief justice of Wales. Indeed, he and I appeared at the Chester city quarter sessions, in the building of which there is a large portrait of a former chief justice of Wales—the well-known Lord Jeffreys or Judge Jeffreys. He is not necessarily the best precedent for such an appointment; nevertheless, there is that precedent. There could be a president of a Wales division, although not in a Jeffreys-like way—who, by the way, was not half as bad as history has made him out to be. Of course I will give way to my noble friend.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Tuesday 13th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, alongside those who have already spoken, I humbly subscribe my support for this amendment. If ever there was an argument on the part of government that has been shot through and shattered, this is it. If ever there was a piece of legislation where there was an overwhelming and unanswerable case against it, this, in my respectful submission, is it. I appreciate the argument put forward on 30 October by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, when he mildly, with considerable charm, chastised me. He said that it is wrong to argue that a Government should take a view which is different from the policy that has been established by judges over a long period of time. I think I do him fairness in summarising it in that way. He must be right. Parliament is sovereign and supreme. Judges do their best within the limits set down by law, but they can—and should, on occasion—be overruled by Parliament. That is what Parliament is about.

However, I believe that there should be a qualification to that rule: Parliament should never do that, and certainly should never circumscribe the discretion of judges, properly and justly used, unless a case had been made for that, and that case would rest on facts. In my submission, this case does not rest on facts at all. It rests much more on some form of political prejudice. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, on 30 October, quoted a speech made by the Prime Minister on 22 October dealing with this particular matter. These were the words used by the Prime Minister on that occasion:

“‘At every single level of sentence this Government is getting tougher ... we are toughening up community sentences too. If you are on a community sentence you will be supervised-you will be properly punished-you will be forced to complete that sentence’.”.—[Official Report, 30/10/12; col. 523.]

It seems to me—and I made the point in a general way on the previous occasion—that essentially the Prime Minister was talking about including some element of hurt in a sentence. That is not the same thing as punishment.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has already made the point that the fact that a person, with the sanction of the law, is enjoined to do something that he may not wish to do, is of itself a punishment. He is subjected to the sovereignty of the court in that respect. I would argue further that the very fact that a person is convicted of a criminal offence, and that stain will be on his escutcheon for ever, even with all the ameliorations of the 1974 Act, is of itself a punishment. However, what is asked for here is something that society regards as hurting the offender. The rationale behind it seems to be that society in some way, through the courts, has failed to recognise that essential element of hurt. In other words, it is saying, “You are namby-pamby. You are soft. You are far too liberal in your attitude in this matter. You are not tough enough”. There is no evidence whatever to support that contention.

As far as the probation service is concerned, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has shown quite clearly that it is tough, it is not soft and it is succeeding. The vast majority of cases are dealt with satisfactorily up to level 3; indeed, some of them up to level 4. No professional body could be expected to do better than that. Where is the evidence of the failure to exercise the element of harshness and pain—for that is what the Prime Minister was talking about?

It is entirely proper for a Government, where they are justified in doing so, to circumscribe the discretion that lies with any judge. I think that both Governments have been doing it a little too liberally over the past 20 years. Be that as it may, where they genuinely believe that there is such a case, they are entitled and indeed, one might say, obliged to do so. The case has not been made. If the Government cannot come forward with any hard evidence at all, they will, in effect, be relying on what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, described really as a cosmetic and rather vulgar attitude, where they will be seeking a populist commendation for something that is utterly unworthy.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I support entirely the sentiments behind the amendment moved so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. I support verbatim the comments that were made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and share the concerns expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, about the use of the word “exceptional” in these provisions.

These proposals ignore what happens every day of the week in court rooms up and down the country. There is a substantial class of cases—or there are classes of cases—which are not particularly common but fall far short of being exceptional. I am the last person here who should attempt to explain to this House in the presence of members of the judiciary who have already spoken what the term “exceptional” means, but usually it means roughly what the dictionary definition says that it means. These are not the common class of cases; they are truly exceptional.

I mention one group of cases that I have experienced as a practitioner and sitting as a recorder and that causes me real concern in the context of this part of the schedule. It is a group of cases in which the defendants are usually women who have been subjected to often very severe domestic violence and sometimes sexual violence. They have done something fairly serious in terms of criminal law and have usually pleaded guilty. They have to be sentenced by the court, but punishment is somewhere low down the list of the priorities that the judge passing sentence has in mind. The sentence can serve a useful service; there are elements in community sentences that are restorative or retributive and can help to resolve the situation that has given rise to the appearance in court. The requirement of punishment in all but exceptional cases seems to ignore the reality of a class like the one that I have mentioned. For that reason, I invite my noble friend the Minister to hearken very closely to this debate, which has had some very authoritative voices speaking in it, and think again.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I fully understand the concerns that have been expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, however, for the reasons principally given by my noble friend Lord Faulks, I disagree with this proposal. It does scant justice to the judges who have shown great independence in the control order and TPIM cases that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned. I do not understand the substance of this proposed amendment to be a complaint made by the special advocates at all. My view is that the way in which judges are trained and apply themselves to their cases does not require an elaborate amendment of this kind.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, the motivations behind this amendment are, I have no doubt, noble, honourable and sensitive. I greatly respect, therefore, the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. I respectfully tend to agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, that it may well be that there is a case for having what is almost a jury situation. In such a situation—again, bearing in mind that juries very seldom operate in civil cases—we would not normally have a jury in any event, but the real problem is, I think, a much deeper one.

Imagine a judge having to determine the fundamental issue of whether this matter is to be dealt with by way of a secret hearing. Does he look at the prose of the application by the Secretary of State or the affidavits? Does he look into the eyes of learned counsel to see whether there is a burning sincerity in the face of the counsel for the claimant or whether there are doubts genuinely registered in the face of the counsel for the defendant? Is the judge not placed in a situation that is virtually impossible?

To a large extent the question of a special advocate under Clause 5 and, I would say, to a limited extent the appointment of a special counsel under Clause 8, will deal with part of that. There will be a totally independent advocate, but an advocate, however brilliant, forensically skilled and eloquent, can be only as effective as the ammunition that he has at his disposal, which is the correctitude of certain facts that are relied on by a party. If that estimate, however genuine, is wrong, then the decision of the learned judge must be utterly fallacious. How do you deal with that situation? I harken back to debates that we had some years ago in relation to a criminal situation and PII. It seems to me that there is a very strong and unanswerable case for a special investigator operating under the special advocate. It does not seem from my reading of Clause 8 that there is any power for the special advocate to appoint such a person. However, the fairness of the situation will depend entirely on the assiduity with which some other person or body would be able to examine these sensitive facts. That person must be someone in whom the community has total confidence in terms of confidentiality and secrecy but also their competence to bring to the attention of the court that vital element of the correctitude or otherwise of those facts.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

At the moment I am dealing with the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I listened with great care to my noble friend Lord Henley from the Front Bench, and I am very content with the approach that he has taken. We should wait and see what the Government come up with in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who has great wisdom and experience in these things—I am completely open-minded about that. But I am not happy with the idea that we should have a conventional Select Committee or, even worse, a Select Committee whose rules have been fiddled with for this purpose.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, like many Members I have been greatly impressed by the contribution made by the noble Lords, Lord Campbell-Savours and Lord Carlile. Both have the gift of being able to articulate their views with awesome clarity and very great force. If one had to, I should find it somewhat difficult to decide which one is correct in this matter. However, in respect of this debate and the earlier Amendments 1 and 2, it seems that everybody’s objectives point very much in the same direction.

In the first instance is the desire for sovereignty and independence for this particular body. By sovereignty one means that it is an organ, extension and delegation of Parliament, to such a degree that, as far as the Bill of Rights is concerned, it would be unchallengeable in the courts. I think that we are all agreed on that matter. At the same time, it has to be independent of the Executive and Prime Minister, which means that it should be, to use a canine expression, the watchdog of Parliament rather than the poodle of the Prime Minister. It is much easier to enunciate that principle than to work it out exactly because, by definition, the Prime Minister and to a large extent the Home Secretary has a constant flow of intelligence information, which will simply not be disseminated generally.

My other point relates to Select Committees. I listened carefully to the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, and believe that the concept of a Select Committee is sufficiently broad and flexible to allow a great deal to be done of the nature suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I would have thought that a Select Committee could always decide whether to sit in public or not and, if so, on exactly what terms. A Select Committee can decide whether a single word of its report is to be published or whether there is to be general publication, subject to sidelining. Sidelining, of course, can be a severe sanction. I will never forget the day, in about 1967, when I was a Member of the House of Commons and that flamboyant and splendid Member of Parliament Tam Dalyell was hauled before the House to answer a serious charge of contempt. It related to a Select Committee that was looking into the affairs of Porton Down, a most delicate situation as we all appreciate. There was an awesome hush; it was almost like a public flogging. There was the miscreant standing ashen-faced at the Bar of the House. It taught me a lesson about the tremendous and terrible jurisdiction that the House of Commons has, if it wishes to use it in a situation like that.

Where do we arrive? First, at a body that is not appointed by the Prime Minister; secondly, a body that is unchallengeable in the courts; and thirdly, a body—possibly a Select Committee—that is able to do its work with the confidence of the public, and yet able to maintain an absolute confidentiality which is so important to its very function.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Monday 16th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Like other noble Lords, I wish to support what has been said by all speakers so far in this short debate. We are talking not merely about reinstatement of legal aid but about adding to legal aid issues that have not yet been considered. In the first debate this afternoon, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to his experience, which I share. When I and many others in this House started practising the law, there were many things that we had not envisaged that we now take to be absolutely basic rights. For example, equalities legislation, the equality of women and the right to equal pay in the workplace for equal work had barely started when I was called to the Bar in 1970. We must, therefore, keep the door open for such issues to be added to legal aid.

The final point is a question to my noble friend the Minister. Why are the Government opposed to addition or reinstatement? The only informed speculation, if I can call it that, which I have heard on the reasons for this provision is that Ministers feel that they would avoid being lobbied by outside interest groups if this were a one-way-only provision. Surely being lobbied is something that we expect and welcome in political life in this country, and Ministers of the Crown and their officials should be robust enough to resist if the lobbying lacks merit. If the Minister is to resist the spirit of the amendments this afternoon, the House would be grateful for a coherent set of reasons why.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I was exhilarated, enthralled and deeply flattered by the reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, to my existence 50 years ago. It is surprising that he should remember that I was there at all, let alone the hackneyed clichés that I was given to in those days.

I shall speak to this amendment, and to Amendment 23, if I may. Their effect would be to give the lie to the canard, which may well be suspected by many people, that the Government are a liquidator of legal aid. The first part of Schedule 1 is the remnant, remainder and rump of what was once a splendid system created in 1949. I make no apology for reminding the House that in 1949 the financial condition of Britain, having fought and won a dreadful war, at massive expense, was even more parlous than it is today. Yet the Government did exactly that. They sent John Maynard Keynes to the United States to negotiate, on very hard terms, a massive loan that had harsh conditions, the last instalments of which were repaid only some six or seven years ago. That was the situation and it would have been easy for the Government of the day to have said, “Justice is a magnificent thing—it is a noble ideal—but in our weakened condition we simply cannot afford it”. They did not say that, to their eternal credit. The first point to be made is that the amendments give the lie to the idea that the present Government are trying to reduce legal aid and that they are a liquidator of everything that legal aid fundamentally represents. That is neither the attitude nor the intention of the Government.