Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Baroness Noakes

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I disagree with what my noble friend Lord Blackwell has just said. He has fallen into the trap of believing that an accountability process can be effective within Parliament. The experience that I and my committee have had is that there are limits to what can be achieved in terms of parliamentary accountability. That is one of the reasons why there are other amendments later in this Bill to find other mechanisms for improving accountability.

It is important to differentiate between those areas where Parliament has a right to be democratically involved in the decisions and those areas that can safely be left to the regulators to carry out the detail and to be held accountable for that. It is the balance that we are concerned about. I would probably end up with a different decision on whether certain of the protections in the existing legislation need to be retained as well as on improving the way in which the legislation works by updating it to a modern digital age. There is genuinely a case for looking again at whether the sanctions that exist in the consumer credit legislation are right for today’s world. I believe that some of them are too severe or can be disproportionate to the issues that are involved in practice—for example, minor breaches in relation to enforcement notices.

I would not necessarily end up with the view that what is currently in the legislation must be preserved for all time, but I think that Parliament needs an involvement in some of those key decisions about the parameters of where liability exists and what sort of sanctions can be applied. That is why I think that we must constantly differentiate between democratic oversight and parliamentary accountability. They are complementary but different things.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I speak with diffidence on this matter, as I am not an expert on consumer credit. I have been involved in many cases over the years when consumers have been dissatisfied with the consumer credit arrangements that they have undertaken and have felt that there was a serious breach of contract. I am concerned that we are suggesting here that parliamentary process is the answer to many consumer credit complaints, even though parliamentary process is just about the least living instrument in our possession. It seems that the purpose of Clause 1 and Schedule 1 is to ensure that what is created is a living instrument that will modernise the consumer credit framework—not weaken consumer protection—and will become more effective because it sits in FCA rules rather than in primary legislation. It has been suggested that FCA rules are not subject to the courts, but there is already an elaborate system in place in the FCA rules.

In this debate so far, no one has mentioned the Consumer Duty, an extremely detailed document that has been in existence for three and a half years and that has, in my view, served the FCA well. If you look at the comments from law firms, which one can find all over the internet, the result is that there has been a much more informal resolution of difficulties than relying on the old system before the Consumer Duty was created. Therefore, I believe that FCA rules are part of a living instrument: they are binding, enforceable and subject to consultation and scrutiny. At the end of the day, if someone breaks the law, they are of course subject to the courts as well. That goes without saying and to suggest the contrary would be nonsense.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Baroness Noakes

Monday 17th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes]

I completely understand that but the examples given are relatively few. One of them is abortion and it is very different from same-sex marriage, which concerns two people who love each other wishing to formalise their relationship. We cannot compare that with the circumstances that led to the law allowing conscience objections in relation to abortion.

Similarly, we are not talking about teachers dealing with the law of the land. Teachers have been given a conscience opt-out in relation to something that is not the law of the land. If the Bill is passed, as I hope it will be, it will become the law of the land and same-sex marriage will become part of the law of the land, and public servants should, in general, be required to comply with the law of the land.

I understand what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lady Berridge said in relation to the Joint Committee on Human Rights—there might be a need for transitional provisions—but I cannot see that there is a need for the provision put forward by my noble friend Lady Cumberlege. I am not sure that a transitional provision is needed. It will depend on whether a number of people are genuinely affected by this, and I do not think that we have conclusive evidence of that. We have heard that in the past some local authorities have made arrangements on a transitional basis with those who have had problems in applying the law in relation to civil partnerships, but it may well be that we can achieve any transitional issues that arise through non-legislative means. Putting something in the Bill would seem to elevate the fact of same-sex marriage to something way beyond where it needs to be, when it is, as I said, simply about two people who want to formalise their relationship in accordance with the law of the land.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I have listened to this debate with some concern because we have heard references to conscience in a space in which conscience may not belong at all. We have heard about shades of grey in this debate; this evening, we have had shades of brown. I strongly agreed with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, when he referred to the judiciary. What occurs in these situations? Things may have changed a little since the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, was Lord Chancellor. Perhaps in those days county court judges in Welshpool, Caernarfon or Lambeth were able to pick and choose their way through cases they liked or did not like. However, if I may respectfully say so, the reality is that a judge is a very senior form of public official who hears the case that is presented before him by an often hard-pressed and unsympathetic listing officer. It is form of appointment, as a doctor’s appointment might be.

Equally, if somebody wishes to enter into a civil marriage, what qualifications are needed? They have to establish that they are 16 or over, free to marry and not closely related. There is no issue of conscience involved in that. Then they have to make a convenient appointment to attend before the registrar who, like a judge hearing a case, happens to be on duty on that day. They have to produce some documents—it is a bit like opening a bank account—including their passports, birth certificates and a utility bill or bank statement. Once the appointment has been made with those documents, they attend and there is no liturgy whatever. They are required to exchange promises if they are marrying, but there is no set form. Of course, the registrar helps out if required but they can write their own promises and exchange them quickly and informally. Where is the conscience aspect of this? The registrar is simply a public official providing the statutory facility to enter on a register the names of two people who wish to be married. That is the beginning and end of it. It could not be more different from going to see a vicar, priest, rabbi or imam to seek a marriage founded on a religious belief.

I have huge respect for my noble friend Lady Cumberlege and it is with great regret that I disagree with her so profoundly. However, on this subject, I think we are allowing this debate to trespass into an area in which it does not belong. I urge your Lordships to reject this amendment accordingly.