Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Baroness Berridge

Monday 21st March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to applaud the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for bringing this amendment back to your Lordships’ House in an improved form. I do not want this to turn into a lawyers’ fest or to give your Lordships too much pleasure in knowing that the lawyers may disagree about the matters that have just been referred to, but I would remind the House that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, told us earlier that the amendment followed interventions at an earlier stage in the passage of this Bill by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Judge. Both are former Supreme Court judges, one the former Lord Chief Justice and the other the former Deputy President of the Supreme Court.

I do not disagree in principle with what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Viscount. However, we must remember that the power to pass law rests upon Parliament. This is not a court where we act upon precedent. If Parliament wishes to include a judge’s decision in the determination of a matter of law, it is open to Parliament to do so. Let us not pretend that the Government—particularly this Government—do not send for the judges when they are in an awkward position in any event. We know that that is all too common and currently being done with the most controversial Bill before these Houses: the Investigatory Powers Bill.

I therefore suggest to your Lordships that while we of course listened with enormous respect to the two noble Lords who just spoke, nevertheless what they say does not negate the merits of the debate that we have been hearing. Indeed, we have heard some very eloquent speeches dealing with those merits: for example, the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, and of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who had an excellent article in the Guardian this morning, setting out in principle what everybody on my side of the debate might say.

I do not want to give a catalogue of the events that give rise to this debate; we heard from my noble friend Lady Nicholson in some detail. I applaud, as I am sure we all do, the extraordinary work that she has done with the charity AMAR, of which she is the chairman and founder, which has helped so many, particularly young women, affected by genocide, especially in the Middle East. She deserves great praise for that. Indeed, she and the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, are responsible for bringing these very important and painful issues to the attention not just of the House, but of the country much more widely than the political class represented here and in another place.

I simply say this to your Lordships: there is no more arrogant crime than the crime of genocide. Genocide defies all decent religious standards, albeit sometimes in the heretical pretence of religion. Genocide offends all decent secular standards. I know of no secular state that would allow any of the horrendous practices described in the debate. Genocide rejects the proposition that there should be even any limits to the actions and cruelties committed in war. Genocide diminishes the dignity of the human race, quite simply. Surely Parliaments such as this should recognise the suffering of victims of genocide, and not merely by wringing our hands with rhetoric about those victims. Where else have they to turn to if not to Parliaments and to Governments in countries such as ours? Why are we not making the sorts of declarations that have been made, as I understand it, by the French Government and very clearly by the American Secretary of State?

The designation of crimes as “genocide” sends out a clear message, and it is not an unimportant one: it is a deterrent. Designation of genocide sends out the message that those who commit the act and are identified will one day be brought before international courts and punished for their crimes against the rest of the human race. Designation of genocide by Governments such as ours also sends out a warning to those who might be inclined to commit genocide that they will be pursued to the end of the days—to the end of their lives if necessary, when they are old and hiding from their responsibilities, as happened, for example, with the Nazi genocide.

I heard earlier in the evening—I hope that I am wrong—that Her Majesty’s Official Opposition’s position was to sit on its hands in this debate. I hope that that shameful proposition is not correct. I hope that we will not have a situation in which the party that introduced the Human Rights Act 1998 into our law will chicken out of an official vote on this amendment.

We carry out a great responsibility this evening. I hope that we will do so in a spirit that recognises the challenge that genocide presents to humankind.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, the issues that the tablers of this amendment have raised are so important and urgent that I am prompted to speak for the first time on the Bill. Everyone’s hearts this evening are on the same page in your Lordships’ House. Our hearts are weary of seeing the suffering on our news bulletins and we want solutions urgently. I hold the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, in the highest regard, not only for their lobbying on behalf of vulnerable people, but for often placing themselves in harm’s way as they do so. They are entirely right that certain groups of people that we should have been focused on more clearly have been lost from view. However, the mechanism proposed this evening will, sadly, not ensure that the most vulnerable people are helped and with huge regret I cannot support the amendment.

First, the amendment runs the risk of taking too long to help these people, as setting up a judicial process with rules of court, et cetera, will take months. Help for these people is needed now, help that can be provided, as I will outline, through the Syrian vulnerable people scheme. As I understand the amendment, this would not just be declaring acts of genocide; what the High Court would be declaring would be a policy of genocide in a particular situation. Since the Second World War, only two situations have merited that declaration: Rwanda and the Srebrenica incident within the Balkans conflict. This is recognised as the crime above all crimes, to be kept special, to be kept unique and with a particular connotation.

Although we can prosecute genocide anywhere in the world, the case of Eichmann, which many noble Lords will remember, remains of its era and we have seen the development of international tribunals to try this particular crime. This amendment draws the declaration of a policy of genocide, which it took the Rwanda tribunal four years to come to, into a domestic court. That opens the way for other domestic courts to do the same and to disagree with us. It risks diluting this crime and we could end up with one domestic courts saying, “We think this is genocide”, and another saying, “This is not genocide”. The risk of politicising and putting into foreign affairs terms a policy such as genocide is grave.

I watched with care the full announcement by Secretary of State Kerry, most of which asserts the supremacy of the judicial process. I was disappointed that such a campaign in America has led, in fact, to so little. They have promised a bit more aid and that they will do some investigation of the evidence. I would like Her Majesty’s Government to deliver more than that.

Perhaps the most important reason for not supporting this amendment is that it will not only apply only to Iraq and Syria. It is, perhaps, most likely to apply, first and foremost, in Sudan, where al-Bashir stands ready to be tried at the International Criminal Court—if they could get him there—for crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of genocide. This amendment would apply to people in other countries; people might learn through social media that the UK has said that they are victims of genocide and can get asylum here and they might leave to come here. As I say, Sudan might be the first case and a determination of that nature by our courts could cause vast numbers of people to flee, not knowing whether they are number four of the 5,000 we have said we are taking or number 4,555. They will not know that; they will leave. This would be particularly dangerous today because their route is through Libya, through IS-controlled territory where they risk being killed and a much more perilous sea journey across the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy.

I have sat before British diaspora who are desperate for their adult sons to remain in those countries and not to travel. Often, they listen to IS footage in Libya on the internet and see what could happen to their relatives if there was any incentive for them to move. Turkey is closing down as a route and the criminal gangs are looking for a different market, or several different markets.

The movers of the amendment are right in principle. I want to return to that. I hope that I can offer a way forward. Will my noble friend the Minister please look urgently to review the criteria of the Syrian vulnerable people scheme, as Iraqi people are the victims of probably the worst postcode lottery? A century ago, Britain was involved in setting the border between Iraq and Syria, which IS just wiped out. So if you can satisfy the vulnerable persons criteria and are a refugee but happen to live on the wrong side of the border—if you are an Iraqi—you are not eligible for the scheme. If you live hundreds of miles away or hundreds of yards away but you happen to be Syrian, you can get safe passage to the UK. As a matter of utmost urgency will my noble friend the Minister look to expand the eligibility for the scheme so that we can offer protection virtually immediately to the Iraqis who so desperately need it? Will he also please ensure that the relevant numbers are raised to accommodate the extra people?

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Carlile of Berriew and Baroness Berridge

Monday 20th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge]

No. In relation to the likely impact, my point was whether that is considered under the requirement in the Children and Young Persons Act to take into account the welfare of the child.

With regard to 16 and 17 year-olds, it is already the position that they are covered under the mandatory sentencing provisions if they are convicted twice of the offence of threatening with a knife, so it would be inconsistent not to include 16 and 17 year-olds under these provisions where there will be mandatory provisions when you are twice convicted of the offence of the possession of a knife.

I understand that there is not a clear age of majority in this country, but when you can marry and join the Army at age 16, if you have been found in possession of a knife and convicted of that offence and then been found in possession of a knife again by the time you are 17, I do not think it is unduly harsh to say to those young people that a prison sentence is to be imposed unless the provisions of proposed new Section (6B) are found to apply by the judge.

Finally, in relation to the disproportionality issue for black and ethnic minority young people which I have mentioned previously in your Lordships’ House, it is clear that it is also the case that those young people are disproportionately the victims of knife crime. If one is going to plead disproportionality, one has to look not only at offenders but also at victims. The use of knives on young black people—particularly men—is an issue of grave concern in that community, so one has to look at both sides of that issue and not just at the disproportionality of offenders.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I speak in support of my noble friend Lord Marks and will make two points. First, over recent years, I have been involved in a lot of work and study about the treatment of young offenders, partly during the time I spent as president of the Howard League for Penal Reform and partly in preparing reports requested by others. One of the givens of studies of youth penalties—of youth sentencing—is that short sentences by and large are not beneficial: they are usually destructive. They destroy ties with education, they damage ties with family, and they remove ties with good friends as well as, of course, bad friends. This has been recognised by the Youth Justice Board. One of the reasons for the reduction in the number of children in custody, as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Marks, is that it has been seen by the courts that non-custodial dispositions, on the whole, are far more constructive.

That leads me to my second point, which is about judicial—or court—discretion. I do not want to dress this up too grandly, because most of the group we are talking about appear before a youth court in their own local areas, and there is much about youth courts that needs to be reformed. That said, whenever a case comes before a youth court, the court hears all the facts about the young person concerned. It hears the facts of the case; if the defence is properly prepared, it hears about the young person concerned and about everything that has happened in their past. Many of those children who appear before courts—there is no difference in this regard between 16 and 17 year-olds and the immediately younger age group—come from very deprived backgrounds. They usually have had very little attention paid to them and more than half of them have at least one mental health issue—some have multiple mental health issues—that needs to be addressed. To deprive an experienced court of the discretion to impose a non-custodial sentence when that might fly in the face of the merits as set out in the facts and reports before the court is really an astounding proposition. I challenge the Minister to produce any empirical evidence—any studies— showing that this is a proposal that is justified on the merits. I urge him to accept that it is an error of judgment to include 16 and 17 year-olds in this provision.