Neighbourhood Planning Bill

Debate between Lord Cameron of Dillington and Lord Stunell

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 6th February 2017 Grand Committee

[Lord Cameron of Dillington (CB)]

My Lords, I hesitate to intervene. I am not an expert on planning and I have never served on a local planning authority, but I have been involved from the other side, the side of the applicant—not big developments but small developments in villages and so on—so I probably see this slightly differently.

I am on my feet because I cannot quite see why all the conditions and the problems that have been mentioned by noble Lords—drainage, lighting and so on—cannot be dealt with, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, suggested, in the pre-decision planning conditions. In other words, in the normal planning agreement, you work with the planning authority to determine under exactly what conditions the planning permission will be granted, but surely Clause 12 is not about planning conditions; it is about a situation when all the conditions have to be implemented before the building starts. That is where the delay seems to be, and the clause seems to me quite reasonable.

I realise that the problem is probably the financing of planning departments, which do not have the resources to deal with all the issues prior to giving or not giving planning permission. To some extent, pre-commencement conditions are added after the council has decided on an application because there may not have been the resources to deal properly with the application before that point. The local planning authority also may not have the resources to check during the building of the development that all the conditions that had originally been agreed to are being met. In other words, the only way in which this can be done simply is to do it pre-commencement, so that applicants have to apply before they can start building. It is a cheap route out of a particular problem.

I am not an expert on planning, as I said, but it seems to me that there is a difference between ordinary planning conditions and pre-commencement planning conditions. As someone who has applied, I know that sometimes pre-commencement planning conditions delay the scheme and can be, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, described, an ambush—suddenly new conditions are added after the planning conditions and all the terms have been agreed to. However, I am not sure why all noble Lords’ concerns are so targeted against the pre-commencement conditions.

[Lord Stunell]

My Lords, I would like Clause 12 to be taken out of the Bill. It is unsatisfactory because it is written so broadly. Under subsections (1) and (2), the Secretary of State is in a position to do practically anything as long as it is a prescribed description, but subsection (9) says that,

“‘prescribed’ means prescribed by the Secretary of State”.

So there is no limitation on the Secretary of State’s capacity to change the current planning system, not simply the pre-commencement conditions, although that has been the immediate focus of the debate.

Although the clause is widely drawn, for the Minister it clearly has a much more limited intention. I asked a question to see whether I could establish exactly what that limited intention was. On the face of it, from what the Minister has told us this afternoon, it is intended simply to ensure that the National Planning Policy Framework is the bedrock on which all planning decisions are made; in other words, to make the NPPF in effect a statutory document. If that was his intention, it could have been expressed much more clearly by a clause that would be fundamentally different from Clause 12 and be something we could debate the pros and cons of much more satisfactorily. If, on the other hand, it is intended to inhibit or prevent local authorities imposing conditions that would otherwise be in conformity with the NPPF, he needs to go to greater length to explain why the Government believe the NPPF needs to be trimmed back a bit.

I hope the Minister can see that if the NPPF is the reference, it would be useful if it was referred to in some way in the Bill, particularly in this clause. It is beginning to look as though his letter will be as long as the National Planning Policy Framework, which, incidentally, comes in at 59 pages, two of which are a list of the 44 codes of practice that it supersedes, which themselves were about 1,000 pages long. By the time we have some regulations to say exactly what we mean as a result of Clause 12, we will begin to unravel the NPPF.

There is a fundamental disconnect between what is in the Bill and what the Minister says its intention is. When I saw the Government’s amendments, I thought we were going to see something helpful, but I noticed that five of the amendments in the previous group were to insert the word “relevant” before the phrase “planning conditions”. One wonders a little whether one needed that word added. It is good that it has been, but can we just have the answer to the philosophical intent of the clause relating to planning as a whole and to pre-commencement conditions?

At Second Reading I mentioned that the National Planning Policy Framework—which is now treated as though it had originally been carved in stone at the top of Mount Sinai—had quite a troubled birth, with version one going around the Government for preapproval before it went out to consultation from the Department for Communities and Local Government, in which I was at the time a junior Minister. It came back from the Treasury with red ink all over it. It could not go out until the amendments the Treasury required had been made. Of course, there was uproar when it went public. In particular, the National Trust organised a very vigorous campaign against it. It turned out that the National Trust is the good cause of choice for a large number of Conservative Party members, who proceeded to let their Conservative Members of Parliament know about their dissatisfaction. One way or another, the consultation resulted in a completely different document coming forward, which was very similar to the document that had been drawn up and altered by the Treasury in the first place.

I rather fear that Clause 12 is another NPPF, except that we are at only the middle point, where something quite sensible has been turned into something that is not nearly so sensible and is fundamentally threatening many of the safeguards that the final version of the NPPF established so clearly, in particular the three pillars of sustainability when there is consideration of a planning application. Originally, I thought that the department had had the same experience this time that it had with the NPPF—it had gone off to the Treasury, which had put some red ink on it. But I realise that the current Secretary of State in the Department for Communities and Local Government was in fact the Financial Secretary to the Treasury at the time when the NPPF went on its rounds, so it is possible that the red ink was added at a much earlier stage.

I suggest that the Minister has a quiet word with the Secretary of State to explain to the high proportion of Conservative activists who belong to the National Trust—because he will soon find that out again—how much regard the NPPF has now attracted on all sides as a short, intelligible and easy-to-read planning document, and consider either scrapping Clause 12 completely or introducing a provision stating that local authorities are not permitted to impose conditions which go beyond the National Planning Policy Framework. I would have thought that that would achieve the objective which I think the Minister is seeking. Finally, the Minister should also convey to the Secretary of State the fact that this is a Henry VIII clause that Charles III will be most unhappy about.

Housing and Planning Bill

Debate between Lord Cameron of Dillington and Lord Stunell

Tuesday 8th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Dillington (CB)]

My Lords, I had not really intended to intervene in this debate because better, more knowledgeable people than me have spoken. However, I add my voice in support. I have built houses in Scotland and England in the past 10 to 12 years and therefore put in a very low-carbon spec. No consumer of any intelligence would build a house without a low-carbon spec because the annual savings in heating that you get give you a nearly 50% return on your money, but unless builders and developers are obliged to give the consumer what they really want, it is unlikely to happen in all cases.

It is interesting that this debate should follow the one on self-build because I cannot believe that anyone who is building their own house would ever dream of not putting in a very good low-carbon spec. The Government should ensure that consumers—also known as voters—get what they want.

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, I support the amendment. I do so as somebody who in the other place proposed the Sustainable and Secure Buildings Act, which was the foundation for the changes to Part L which were introduced in 2006, and also as the Minister who preceded my noble friend Lord Foster in the department in 2010.

I am disappointed to find that the arguments that were going on between the Department for Communities and Local Government and the Treasury at that time appear still to be burning. Those arguments were repeatedly put and repeatedly refuted, yet this time the Treasury has come out on top. This amendment provides an opportunity to revisit that, and I hope that the Minister will take away the spirit of this debate as well as the substance of the amendment. The problem is that there is a completely false tension between quantity and quality in housing. There seems to be a very firm grip in the Treasury on the concept that, if it is cheaper to build, more homes will be built and, as good building costs more than bad building, it is obvious that you have bad building rather than good building in order to get more building.

The Minister gave us some figures on Thursday which she described as the,

“implied first-time price of new build”.—[Official Report, 3/3/16; col. 1014]

She went on to distinguish that from “demand price”. I am not quite sure what the difference is, and I am not quite sure what the first-time price of new build is, but for the south-east of England she gave an implied price of £352,000 for a property which would be affordable and within the scope of the starter homes project. That is an interesting figure because it highlights the fact that something approaching £250,000 of that price is nothing to do with the construction of the house, which will be about £100,000, and everything to do with the land price, which is actually what drives house prices universally. The construction cost is a minor part of the house price cost that the retail purchaser has to pay. It does not set the retail price, let alone whatever the demand figures are, which I strongly suspect would be higher sums of money than the Minister gave us last Thursday. The costs of complying with this amendment per house are trivial in relation to the construction costs, let alone the total retail price at which a house will be put on the market.

I will be interested to hear what the Minister’s brief tells her is the right figure for the extra cost of zero-carbon homes. I would be astonished if it did not have such a figure in it; mine always did. If there is one thing that history tells us, it is that that estimate will be too high. I say that because back in 2010, when the original improvements were made—I say “original”; perhaps I just mean original to me—and that 30% rise in building standards that took place in that five years was initiated, the UK Green Building Council, which has already been referred to, estimated that a typical cost addition would be £5,000 per home. The Treasury disbelieved those figures and believed that it would be an additional £10,000 per home, and it was those figures that were hotly debated between the departments and which formed the basis of impact assessments and so on at the time.

Actually, the cost per home has turned out to be £3,000 lower than the Green Building Council assumed and only one-third of the cost that the Treasury assumed. A £3,000 price differential in building a house is absolutely lost in the noise of housebuilding, purchasing and disposal. The cost is marginal, as the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, rightly said—something around 1% of that south-east London house going on the market, at a time when house prices in the south-east are rising by something like 6% a year. Indeed, if they were not, there would be some kind of political backlash because people would fear that their houses were losing value.

So the barrier to more private sector building is not construction costs. Rather, it is the knowledge that, if a home is completed next year rather than this, the seller will be 6% better off because of the rising price of land and of sales. The very last thing that a developer wants to do is to produce so many houses that the price falls next year; indeed, you can see with some building in the centre of London that that is exactly what is happening. So the quality versus quantity argument, which is the only slightly tenable point of view in this U-turn, is not actually credible or realistic.

On the other side, there is the reputational risk to the Government. “The greenest Government ever—not!” is the message that seems to be coming through, and that is a really sad outcome, both for the present Government and for the country. There is an environmental risk because so much CO₂ comes from our housing stock. As the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, eloquently put it, if we put up another 1 million homes alongside the 22 million that we have at the moment, and deliberately make them of lower quality than we could, then that affects not just the environment but our international reputation regarding, for instance, last year’s Paris agreement.

There are economic and social risks as well. Poor energy efficiency means higher costs to those poorer householders who are going to be moving into the starter homes that the Government want to see built. People whose income is so stretched that without the starter home they would not be able to get into the market are going to be saddled with an extra £1,200 a year of running costs simply because of this U-turn. It occurs to me that this sort of process usually takes longer than Ministers hope, and that those starter homes will start to come on to the market in a significant way in about 24 months’ time, which is of course pretty much the time when interest rates will no doubt also be rising, so their mortgages and fuel prices will go up but their energy efficiency will be deliberately lower than it needs to be.

I ask the Minister to have a rethink, to go back and yet again have a good push back at the Treasury, and to ensure that by Report we have a rather better picture of what the Government intend to do to be the greenest Government ever.