Perhaps I may intervene and say that before we go home in a really gloomy state of mind, I did catch the point made by the Minister that below a certain number of homes on the site, there is likely to be an exclusion from this whole system. If that number is high enough, an awful lot of rural exception sites will still be possible. Before the noble Lord concludes his remarks, I should say that I cling to that hope.
As I say, I have no doubt that we will be able to discuss this between now and Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 55E, 55EA and 55F. Amendment 55D, standing in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, would require the Secretary of State—that is, the Planning Inspectorate—to adhere to the same timetable as that imposed on local authorities when the inspectors consider appeals under Clause 6. This means responding within 28 days or within a period specified by the Secretary of State. Given that much of the Bill is about speeding up the planning process, I guess that the amendment will find favour with the Government.
Amendment 55E in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Shipley and Lord Tope, would ensure that the Planning Inspectorate gives material weight to the original decision made by the local authority and looks at all the evidence on which it was based. There will be local considerations and local issues with which the inspectorate may not be familiar; this amendment will ensure that these are taken on board. Going through the evidence collected by the local authority also prevents duplication of effort by the inspectorate.
Amendment 55EA would guard against the developer obtaining an unjustified windfall gain where estimates of future sale prices, on which the inspectorate has judged the viability of the scheme and decided to sanction a reduction in the affordable housing requirement, prove too pessimistic. The amendment would mean a clawback, or so-called overage payment, to the local authority of a portion of the sales proceeds above the predicted levels. It seems only fair that if developers are to benefit from Clause 6 where prices have fallen, that they share their extra profits if, in fact, prices are better than feared. We have already aired Amendment 55F very fully in combination with Amendment 55ZA, and it goes to the heart of the matter. It would ensure that society gets at least something—a swift start on site—in return for the loss of precious affordable housing. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak to two of these amendments. First, I cannot support Amendment 55EA. It has a mild whiff of retrospective taxation which I do not approve of. More importantly, it fails to understand the motivation of an entrepreneur, and his or her assessment of risk. If a particular project is marginal, then the developer does their own assessment of the upside and downside risk. They will proceed only if they personally believe that the upside returns are sufficient to justify the downside risks. If the upside is threatened, as seems to be the case in this amendment, and only the downside risk remains, I do not believe that they will proceed. In that case, one nullifies the whole purpose of this clause.
Furthermore, it occurs to me that if the local authority wants to share in the upside benefits, it should equally share in the downside risks. I cannot believe that the local authority would be happy to pay the developer if the housing price should drop below the estimated figure. In other words, it seems only fair that if it is going to share in the upside, it might also share in the risk. This applies if it wishes to see the development take place as soon as possible; of course, I would personally prefer that it did neither.