All 2 Debates between Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Keen of Elie

Brexit: Legal Position of Withdrawal Agreement

Debate between Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Keen of Elie
Monday 3rd December 2018

(6 years ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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I thank my noble friend for his observations and entirely concur. I emphasise a point he touched on: we are engaged in continuing negotiations with the European Union to determine our future relationship. It would not be appropriate for us to disclose matters that would impact on the conduct of the negotiations, any more than we might expect the European Union to disclose to us the confidential legal advice that it may or may not have received in conducting those negotiations.

Lord Butler of Brockwell Portrait Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)
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My Lords, in the giving of advice in any letter or papers that the Attorney-General submits to the Cabinet, does not good government require complete candour not only on the strengths but on the vulnerabilities of the Government’s position? It would be impossible for the Attorney-General to write with such candour if he were aware that his advice would be published.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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I am obliged to the noble Lord, who draws on a great deal of experience where these matters are concerned. I entirely agree with his observation: it would render the law officers’ position almost impossible when advising government fully, candidly and without reservation, if it was felt that that advice was then to be put into the public domain—let alone put into the public domain when we were carrying on relevant negotiations such as those we are carrying on with the European Union.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Keen of Elie
Tuesday 19th July 2016

(8 years, 5 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Butler of Brockwell Portrait Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)
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My Lords, I find the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, difficult to understand. He made the point that the filter arrangement makes the operations of the police easier, but it makes them easier by ensuring that they do not inspect communications data which are not relevant to their purpose. It therefore protects privacy rather than threatens it. The filter is governed by the requirements of the rest of the Bill. It will apply the tests of necessity, proportionality and the protection of privacy. It is a protection of privacy rather than a threat to it.

Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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My Lords, Clauses 63 to 65 provide that the Secretary of State may establish, maintain and operate filtering arrangements for communications data—the request filter—and detail the appropriate safeguards and restrictions around its use.

Public authorities currently need to receive all the communications data disclosed by communications service providers in response to specific requests so they can determine which specific pieces of communications data are relevant to their investigation. Public authorities will sometimes need to make complex queries. For example, they may need to ask multiple communications service providers for data to identify an unknown person who is suspected of having committed a crime at three different places at different times. Currently, public authorities might approach communications service providers for location data to identify the mobile phones used in those three locations at the relevant times in order to determine whether a particular phone and a particular individual are linked to the three offences. This means the public authority may acquire a significant amount of data relating to people who are not of interest.

The request filter will mean that when a police force makes such a request, it will see only the data it needs. Any irrelevant data will be deleted and not made available to the public authority. The filter acts as a safeguard, as the noble Lord observed a moment ago, protecting privacy by ensuring that public authorities see only the data they need.

The joint scrutiny committee on the draft Bill stated:

“We welcome the Government’s proposal to build and operate a Request Filter to reduce the amount of potentially intrusive data that is made available to applicants”.

It believed that the requirement upon law enforcement to state the operational purpose for accessing data through the filter and the oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will ensure appropriate use of the filter.

Clause 64 makes it clear that the request filter may be used to obtain, disclose or process communications data only if the relevant authorisation specifically authorises that use. The designated senior officer must consider that, in addition to the necessity and proportionality concerns provided for in Clause 58, what is being authorised in relation to the filtering arrangements is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved. It also provides that the relevant authorisation must record the designated senior officer’s decisions on the use of the request filter. I therefore take issue with the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that the request filter could somehow be used to permit fishing trips, as he termed them. The request filter cannot permit such expeditions. The filtering arrangements can operate only in response to a specific, necessary and proportionate authorisation for the acquisition of communications data. In other words, that request must already have gone through all the existing communications data safeguards, such as authorisation by a designated senior officer. Indeed, the operation of the filtering arrangements will be overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Clause 64 makes it clear that the request filter may be used to obtain, disclose or process communications data only if the appropriate authorisations have been made.

Clause 65 provides that the Secretary of State must ensure the application of the appropriate restrictions on the request filter, maintain adequate security measures with regard to the request filter, put in place procedures to ensure its effective functioning and report to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner regarding its functioning on an annual basis, including immediately reporting any significant processing errors. This again underlines the point that the commissioner will be overseeing the operation of the filter.