(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment, which is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Godson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, was debated in Committee. It concerns a judgment of the Supreme Court in a claim by Gerry Adams arising out of his internment in the 1970s and his escape from prison. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether his internment, or interim custody order as it was more formally known, was lawful in light of the fact that the Government could not prove that the ICO had been personally signed and approved by the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The lower courts decided that it was, but the Supreme Court, in a single judgment from Lord Kerr, reached a conclusion, which surprised many commentators, that it was unlawful—thus leaving the door open for substantial claims by not only Gerry Adams but a number of others who could rely on the decision.
The most prominent critics of the decision were from Policy Exchange, which has consistently and cogently argued that the decision flew in the face of the well-established Carltona doctrine. This is embedded in government practice and can be found in the cautious guidance given to civil servants about “the judge over your shoulder”. It means, for fairly obvious reasons, that such a decision can be taken by more junior Ministers or civil servants and does not require the personal attention of the Secretary of State to render the decision lawful. This practice was spoken to in Committee by the noble Lords, Lord Butler, Lord Murphy, Lord Howell, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven and Lord Browne of Ladyton, among others.
Your Lordships’ House is always slow to legislate contrary to a decision of the Supreme Court. Parliament affords our highest court great respect, and rightly so. When I had the privilege of chairing the Independent Review of Administrative Law, the committee received a number of submissions, including from Supreme Court judges, suggesting caution in our approach to the reform of judicial review, but it was always emphasised by them that Parliament had the right to legislate to reverse decisions of the court. My committee concluded that Parliament could and should do so, but only after very careful consideration of the arguments.
In advancing this amendment, I am considerably reassured by the criticism of the Supreme Court decision by the former Supreme Court judges Lord Sumption and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who last week had an article published on the subject by the Daily Telegraph. I will refer to the beginning of the article, although all of it bears close attention. He said:
“In the last few years, almost without exception, every judgment of the Supreme Court, certainly every unanimous one, has seemed to me to be plainly right, and certainly not plainly wrong. But the Court’s unanimous 2020 decision in Adams is an exception. Importantly this has introduced needless legal doubt about one of the most important principles on which the everyday work of government depends. Parliament has an opportunity—with a proposed amendment to the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill, now before the Lords—to put this right. It should do so”.
While on the subject of Lord Brown, noble Lords will probably have noticed that last week he formally retired from the House. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to his immense contribution to the work of this House. His voice has enriched so many debates. Many noble Lords will remember his sustained championing of the cause of IPP prisoners. His instincts were liberal, but he always understood the difficult choices that any Government have to make. It was not always easy to predict which side he would take in a debate, which made his views so well worth listening to. He also made an enormous number of friends right across the House, and we will miss him a great deal.
The Government understandably wanted time to consider their response to the amendment after it was debated in Committee. Their initial response, while not unsympathetic, was that there were legal impediments in the way of the amendment. I was not convinced by those arguments, despite having the opportunity generously afforded to me by the Minister to meet his officials. Policy Exchange, once more, stepped into the fray and published an article that provided a convincing counter to those arguments.
However, I am glad to say that the Government’s position has changed. For this I am very grateful both to the Minister and to the Secretary of State, Chris Heaton-Harris. I am also grateful to all noble Lords who have lent their support to the amendment. I understand that the Government need a little more time but are proposing to bring forward an amendment at Third Reading that will reflect the concerns contained in this amendment. I have indicated to them that, if the amendment proposed by the Government does not meet the objectives contained in this amendment, we reserve the right to—and we will—vote at Third Reading. In the meantime, I thank them for their constructive approach. The Bill is about legacy. This amendment provides an opportunity to put an injustice right. It will provide legal certainty. What better legacy could there be? I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I also echo his remarks about Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, for many years my noble friend in this House and on the golf course. His wisdom and contribution have been tremendous. The very powerful article he wrote in the Daily Telegraph last week could have been the speech he would have made today.
I want to add two things. One is about public administration and the other is about the implications of not accepting this amendment.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Godson and Lord Faulks. The principal point I want to make is that this amendment is not about the justice of internment as a general principle or the justice of the internment of a particular individual. It is purely about whether an individual should receive compensation because there was found to be a glitch in the procedure in ordering the internment because the Secretary of State did not personally consider it.
As has been said, such orders were signed by Ministers acting under the authority of the Secretary of State in accordance with the very well-established Carltona principle. That was certainly something that has always been understood by the Civil Service, and the reversal of it would have quite serious consequences for government. But whether or not there was a procedural glitch, the issue in my mind is whether compensation should be paid, not for an injustice but for such an error in procedure. I submit that the Government are entitled to protect themselves from having to pay compensation from the public purse for what is not an injustice but a procedural glitch. On those grounds, I support Amendment 154A.
My Lords, I want to briefly offer some words of support for that amendment. In their paper, Professor Ekins and Sir Stephen Laws, the former First Parliamentary Counsel, make a compelling argument that the United Kingdom Supreme Court judgment was wrong. I will not address that, because it is not important for the purposes of the amendment. What is important is that they also make a compelling argument for the deleterious practical consequences that are likely to flow from Adams because of the importance of the Carltona principle to the good and smooth running of government. That is beyond argument, and the risk here is that that principle has been in some way undermined.
Let me give an analogy. As your Lordships will be aware, a number of the most serious and sensitive criminal cases require the consent of the DPP before they may proceed. But the system has always been that the Director of Public Prosecutions designates a small number of his or her most senior prosecutors to exercise this consent function on the DPP’s behalf. Of course, if the DPP wishes to call in a particular case to consider himself or herself, that will and does happen. But if it were ever to be the case that every file requiring DPP consent had to be placed before the DPP in person, the system would swiftly grind to a halt; or, the DPP would exercise that consent allegedly personally but really and practically on the basis of advice that he or she had received elsewhere. So the present system is the more honest. The individual giving the consent, exercising the consent function, is the individual who has actually read and considered the papers. To the extent that this amendment will protect and fortify the Carltona principle, it has my full support.