European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, in the interim there had been certain distractions, including a general election—the outcome of which the noble Baroness will be familiar with.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, may I just be clear? When in future the High Court, say, is given this power to exercise what currently under the practice direction is only for the Supreme Court, will it not merely be saying that we will not follow this precedent from the European Court of Justice, but declaring retrospectively that it was wrong all the time? Or will it be saying in this particular case that we are not going to follow that principle but in all other cases—cases pending, appeals and so forth—we will? In other words, will there be the retrospectivity we now have under the practice direction, with the court declaring what the law in truth is and saying it was wrongly understood before; or is it merely to be, as legislation has it, that this will be the law in future—we are changing it?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That matter will have to be addressed in the context of the regulations that are to be made, but those are the two options available. You can either proceed upon the basis that has pertained since the 1960s, which is, as we have stated, the law as it has always been, or say that the law is about to change. I make the point again that what will be provided for is the circumstances in which a court is not bound by EU case law. It will not be a circumstance in which they are told they are not allowed to follow EU case law; it will be open to them to do so if they wish.

Prisoners: Imprisonment for Public Protection Sentences

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Keen of Elie

Thursday 20th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether in the case of imprisonment for public protection prisoners they will encourage the Parole Board to apply the legal principle that the longer the prisoner serves beyond the tariff period, the clearer should be the Parole Board’s perception of public risk to justify the continued deprivation of liberty involved.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Parole Board may direct release only if satisfied that detention is no longer necessary for the protection of the public. The board will base its decision on a comprehensive assessment of the risk posed by the individual prisoner. This will be determined by reference to all the offender’s circumstances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, call it what one will, the plain fact is that the longer a prisoner serves beyond his tariff, the more he is detained beyond due punishment. Worboys had a tariff term of eight years and within two years of that was recommended for release—a case that has done terrible damage to the IPP cause. However, I am concerned with those at the other end of the IPP spectrum. Six years after the regime was abolished, of the 2,500 remaining IPP prisoners, 261 with a tariff of less than two years have served more than eight years beyond their tariff. Indeed, 129 have served over 10 years beyond their less than two-year tariff for punishment. Does the Minister not agree that that is gross injustice, and that the burden of proving a prisoner to be unsafe for release should in future lie with the detaining authority?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, it is important to remember that the original sentence was imposed on individuals who had committed serious violent or sexual offences so that, at the end of the day, not only should they be punished for those serious offences, but the public and future potential victims should be protected. The Parole Board must, as I said, have in mind all material considerations when it scrutinises the level of risk that is or is not acceptable when one of these prisoners applies for parole. Of course, the time spent in prison post-tariff will be a relevant consideration; albeit that that is not a principle of law, it clearly is one of the considerations the Parole Board will have in mind.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With the greatest respect to my noble friend, there is no basis for distinguishing between the cohort which is driving in the course of employment and the cohort which is not driving in the course of employment when an injury is suffered due to the negligence of a third-party driver. I am not aware of any examination, study or evidence that would seek to distinguish, or of any conceivable basis for distinguishing, between those two cohorts. So, with the greatest respect, I would suggest that it is a distinction without a difference.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

May I just try to assist—I hope—the noble and learned Lord? The fact that the employer can authenticate that the accident was caused while the driver, the claimant, was acting in the course of employment does not authenticate the fact that he suffered a whiplash injury, and that is the vice that this legislation is designed to attack. Why, in any event, exempt from these provisions that particular class of driver? Why not the man taking his wife to hospital to have a baby, or a whole host of perfectly legitimate drivers? I hope to have helped.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am grateful for the noble and learned Lord’s assistance. In the past his interventions have not always been of assistance, but they certainly are on this occasion. I would go further and suggest that it would make no more sense to exempt people who were driving red cars at the time of the accident. It is a distinction without a difference; it is as simple as that. That is why we do not consider this to be a helpful line of inquiry, and it is not one that we intend to pursue further.

With regard to the other amendments that were spoken to in this group, I have endeavoured to address the points made. I acknowledge the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and indeed by the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, about the potential for anomalies where someone suffers a whiplash injury and other forms of injury as a result of the same accident. That is there, and there is no obvious answer to that. Nevertheless, the Bill is structured with the intention of addressing the vice we are really concerned with here and which is generally acknowledged to exist. In these circumstances, I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I seek clarification from the noble and learned Lord. As I understand it, the words “so far as”, are intended to give Clause 2 limited range. Is this a useful touchstone, in so far as without the provisions we would have failed to implement our obligations under EU law? As I understand it, paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) address aspects of our domestic legislation that are designed to give effect, as they had to, to EU law, but only in so far as they are achieving that objective does Clause 2 have any application. Is that right?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is indeed my reading. The noble Baroness alluded to this earlier in her contribution. That is why I sought to emphasise the term “EU-derived” domestic legislation. It is the derivation of that aspect of a particular Act which is to be brought within the ambit of retained EU law for these purposes.

Prisoners: Imprisonment for Public Protection Sentences

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Keen of Elie

Thursday 20th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government when they propose to exercise the power under section 128 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 to alter the test to be applied by the Parole Board to the release of those Imprisonment for Public Protection prisoners who have served years beyond their tariff terms.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the test used by the Parole Board in assessing the suitability for release of prisoners serving a sentence of imprisonment for public protection is working. These prisoners are being released in increasing numbers. In 2016 there were 576 first-time releases of IPP prisoners—the highest number since the sentence became available. This trend is expected to continue. We have no present intention to alter the test applied by the Parole Board.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

That is all very well, but there are more than 3,000 such prisoners left. After the shocking recent press reports about the sex offender treatment programmes tending to increase rather than reduce the likelihood of sexual reoffending, does the Minister really continue to think it fair and appropriate for IPP prisoners long past their tariff date for release having to prove a negative? They have to prove that they will not reoffend on release, which the chairman of the Parole Board describes as “incredibly difficult”.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for his observations with regard to this matter, but I remind the House that we are talking about prisoners who are at a high risk of committing further violent or sexual offences if released. The independent Parole Board, when not directing release, is concluding that the risk to the public is too great for these people to be safely managed in the community. Our duty of care is not only to the IPP prisoners but to the members of the public who may become the next victims of their violent behaviour. I acknowledge that recent reports on the sex offender treatment programmes have indicated that between 2000 and 2012 reconviction rates were higher for sexual offending in respect of those who had undertaken the programmes. By the time that those results were published, Her Majesty’s prison and probation services had already taken the decision to cease delivery of those core programmes and have accelerated the transition to what are called the Horizon and Kaizen programmes.

IPP Prisoners

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 20th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their response to the recommendation of Michael Gove, the former Secretary of State for Justice, in his November 2016 Longford Lecture that the approximately 500 Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) prisoners “who have been in jail for far longer than the tariff for their offence” should be released.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we estimate that there are approximately 200 IPP prisoners who have served longer than the maximum term available for their offence. Release of IPP prisoners is a decision for the Parole Board, made on the balance of risks the offender poses to the public. To improve the efficiency with which IPP cases pass through the parole system, a new unit has been established within the Ministry of Justice, working closely with the Parole Board.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

That is a disappointing if unsurprising Answer, and apparently an answer to an earlier question of mine about prisoners who had served beyond the maximum term. This refers to those who have served way beyond their tariff term. Would not the Minister agree that there comes a point in the life of an IPP prisoner, even if he cannot persuade the Parole Board that he will never reoffend, when he has served so many years—seven, eight, nine, 10—beyond his tariff term that simple justice demands his immediate release?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble and learned Lord raises a complex and difficult problem. It was said previously that this sentencing policy was the legacy of a Labour Government. That is unfair. It was a wrong turning in sentencing policy undertaken with the best of intentions which fell victim to the law of unintended consequences. Successive Labour, coalition and Conservative Governments have wrestled with a simple solution to a complex question. If we were going to resolve this matter as simply as the noble and learned Lord suggests, we would not start from where are at present.

Imprisonment for Public Protection Sentences

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 11th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government how many people still serving sentences of imprisonment for public protection have been detained for longer than the maximum term of imprisonment otherwise statutorily prescribed for their offence, and what plans they have for the release of those people.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

The required detailed data are not routinely collected. However, an exercise to estimate the number of current prisoners sentenced to an IPP who have served beyond the maximum term available for their offence indicates that there are around 200 such prisoners. The independent Parole Board directs the release of a prisoner serving an IPP sentence who has completed his tariff only when it is no longer necessary on the grounds of public protection for the prisoner to be detained.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister for that somewhat sobering Answer. Given that statistic, given that the whole IPP scheme was abolished four years ago in 2012 as being inherently unjust, given that there are 600 to 700 prisoners serving years beyond their tariff terms—sometimes eight to 10 times as long—given that more than half of IPP prisoners self-harm, and given the recent excoriation of the system by an ex-Lord Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke, in a radio programme as being a “stain” on the system and its condemnation by the three last Lord Chief Justices, does the Minister agree that it is high time that steps were taken to bring this continuing scandal to an end?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Steps are being taken to reduce the population of IPP prisoners. Indeed, in the last year the largest number did in fact qualify for release. The parole service carries out independent examinations for this purpose, and where IPP prisoners fail to respond at these parole hearings the National Offender Management Service has now brought in psychologists and policy experts to undertake a central case review of those IPP prisoners, in the hope that they can complete their tariffs and then progress to open conditions.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I was not intending to say anything this afternoon, let alone on this amendment, but following what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, have said, it occurs to me that if one widens out the provision that is the subject of Amendment 48 to introduce some essentially non-legal consideration, one would have to make it subject also, as routinely across this legislation, to ministerial approval. They must be answerable for that non-legal aspect. I therefore suggest that this might be a situation in which one should have two primary decision-makers, not therefore judicial oversight but judicial primary decision-making on the legal aspect—such as whether it is in truth a legal professional privileges situation and whether, in so far as criminal purpose is relied on, that is satisfied. However, in so far as the wider terrorism situation is being addressed, the justification for all that should initially be put at the ministerial door as well.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the Government recognise the importance of legal professional privilege—the client’s privilege—in the context of the rule of law. This is perhaps one of the most important issues that we will consider in the context of the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, outlined the operation of legal professional privilege and explained what is sometimes termed the iniquity exception. He went on to identify what he considered to be the issue of principle that we are concerned with in the context of the amendment and invited me to indicate whether I agreed with his outline of privilege—the iniquity exception—and the principle with which we are concerned. I am happy to concur and accept his clear exposition of the position in that regard. So I shall not elaborate on what is legal professional privilege or the iniquity exception, except to this extent. What is termed the iniquity exception arises where the client is using the conversation with the lawyer in furtherance of a criminal purpose, whether or not the lawyer is a witting party to that. If the lawyer is unwittingly used as a tool or a conduit, the iniquity exception would apply in those circumstances as well; with that, we have no difficulty.

However, there are further circumstances in which the iniquity exception would not necessarily obtain, and when a very important piece of intelligence might become available if the communication was considered by the relevant authorities. I go back to a scenario that I shared with number of noble Lords when we discussed this in recent days. An agency may have intelligence to suggest that an individual is about to carry out a terrorist attack. It knows that he is in contact or about to be in contact with a legal adviser, and it has reason to believe that that contact with the legal adviser might reveal information that could assist in averting the terrorist attack. The example is where the client might refer to his whereabouts. He might say, “I’m in Paris”, or “I’m going to be in Paris tomorrow”, or “I’m in London”, or “I’m going to be in London tomorrow”. It is that piece of intelligence in the course of the privileged communication that is critical. I know that some commentators—and, indeed, the Bar Council—have suggested that that would fall within the iniquity exception; it does not. Indeed, if we try to stretch the iniquity exception, we damage the concept of legal professional privilege, so we must be very careful about how we approach this.

So there is that exceptional situation—and it must be exceptional before any warrant could be contemplated—in which intelligence gleaned from such a conversation would be of critical importance. I stress the word “intelligence” because on occasion it is very easy to refer to this as evidence. Such intelligence would never be admissible in a court of law, so let us be careful about that. We are talking about intelligence as such, not evidence.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested that this would be such an unusual event that to approve the power would be to approve a power of purely theoretical value. With great respect to the noble Lord, the fact that something is highly unusual or highly exceptional does not render the power theoretical. The power may not have been employed in the past and it may not be employed in the foreseeable future; that does not render the power theoretical. The occasion may arise, in the face of a terrible terrorist threat, in which such intelligence can be made available to the appropriate agencies. If we bring down a guillotine, LPP will be denied to them. So the power is not theoretical.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made the very good point: we are really dealing here with the question of balance. Should we intrude upon what we see as legal professional privilege—that fundamentally important concept—for the sake of a highly exceptional case in which such intelligence could be critical? There is an element of balance there.