Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Debate between Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Elystan-Morgan

Monday 17th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

I, of course, need the most rudimentary lectures in any scientific subject you care to mention, but I appreciate—and it was said time and again at Second Reading—that there is a distinction between equality and sameness. However, that is no bar to giving the gay community—same-sex couples—the same term to celebrate and enshrine their faith in and commitment to each other. If the Bill goes through in its present form and those couples are henceforth asked, “Are you married?”, they will be able to say yes, but if the amendments that are now suggested go through, they will still have to say no, and I for one would regret that.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I find myself in total agreement with the submissions made so clearly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. I have immense respect for and sympathy with those who stand firmly on each side of this argument. If it is proven that there can be no actual sameness in single-sex and dual-sex marriage, then on a very artificial basis the argument seems to be carried that way. There cannot be total sameness, and we all know that.

However, the question that we should humbly be asking ourselves this afternoon is: can there be so much in common that the idea of marriage can accommodate both in respect and in status? That, I think, is the real question. If the argument was that the Christian concept of marriage is now and always has been immutable, unchangeable and utterly the same from generation to generation, then my case would fail. However, is that in fact the case?

Prior to 1836, people could get married in this country only in the Church of England. My forebears were staunch Welsh Presbyterians but they had to submit to a ceremony that they regarded as wrong. Was that not a massive change in so far as the institution of marriage was concerned in 1836? I am sorry to pontificate about matters that are well known to many distinguished lawyers in this House but before 1882 and the Married Women’s Property Act of that year, a married woman could not hold substantial property in her own name. She could hold what I think was called her “paraphernalia” but other property became the property of her husband and she herself was essentially a chattel of her husband’s estate. Immediately after that Act of 1882, could anybody say that marriage had not changed at all, any more than one could say it after 1836?

Then, in 1925, the criminal law was substantially changed. Previous to that point, if a married woman was present when an offence was committed by her husband, there was a clear presumption—a rebuttable presumption, it is true—that she was acting under his dominion and under his orders. Would one not say that that substantially changed the situation of marriage in the criminal law?