Asked by: Lord Bridges of Headley (Conservative - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether the planned 2027 homeland defence exercise will test the ability of essential services, including electricity, telecommunications, banking and payments, food distribution, and transport, to continue operating during simultaneous disruption lasting seven days or more; and whether the exercise will involve relevant private-sector operators, local authorities, and voluntary organisations.
Answered by Baroness Twycross - Parliamentary Secretary (Cabinet Office)
The Cabinet Office has committed to delivering one major ‘Tier 1’ Ministerial exercise annually under the National Exercising Programme.
The detail of Exercise ALBISTON SHADOW, the 2027 Homeland Defence exercise, is classified. The Cabinet Office recognises the valuable role that the voluntary sector, local authorities and private-sector operators play in all aspects of resilience. Much of this exercise will be conducted at higher levels of classification and only limited details will be made public.
Asked by: Lord Bridges of Headley (Conservative - Life peer)
Question to the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government:
To ask His Majesty's Government how many Local Resilience Forums have identified and tested physical locations at which members of the public could obtain authoritative information and emergency assistance during a prolonged loss of electricity, mobile telephone, and internet services; and what assessment they have made of the level of public awareness of such arrangements.
Answered by Baroness Blake of Leeds - Baroness in Waiting (HM Household) (Whip)
The Department does not hold data on the number of Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) that have identified and tested physical locations to use for members of the public during prolonged power or telecommunications disruption.
Individual LRFs plan for the local consequences of a prolonged loss of electricity and telecommunications. Government guidance encourages LRF partners to consider identifying suitable community hubs in advance, including premises with resilient power, which could provide information and support to the public during a National Power Outage. These premises may change regularly based on local assessment of suitability. LRFs are also encouraged to exercise their plans and share effective practice through the Local-National Energy Risks Planning Group.
Asked by: Lord Bridges of Headley (Conservative - Life peer)
Question to the Home Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the threat posed by hostile unmanned aerial systems to UK critical national infrastructure; which public authorities or infrastructure operators have the legal powers and operational capabilities to detect, disrupt, or disable such systems; and whether they plan to extend counter-drone capabilities to those responsible for protecting critical transport, energy and communications infrastructure.
Answered by Lord Hanson of Flint - Minister of State (Home Office)
The Home Office coordinates the government’s domestic counter-drone policy. We lead work to understand potential risks posed by the misuse of drones to ensure we have the right capabilities, personnel, training and powers to counter the threat.
We recognise that drones can be used for a range of hostile activities, including disruptions to critical national infrastructure but also surveillance, data gathering, using drones as weapons, or to support organised crime and terrorism. It is therefore essential to take a strategic cross-government approach to this challenge. In 2019 the Home Office published the UK’s first Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy, which outlines the government’s efforts to reduce the risks posed by the malicious and negligent use of drones.
In 2021, the government introduced the Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act (ATMUA). This created a suite of counter-drone powers to ensure that the police have the right powers in place to tackle hostile use of drones. ATMUA provides police, including Civil Nuclear Constabulary and Ministry of Defence Police, with stop and search, seizure powers, the ability to issue fixed penalty notices (similar to traffic fines for drone users), and legal authorisations for the use of counter-drone equipment to detect and mitigate against drone use.
In 2019, the Home Office supported the creation of the National Police Chiefs' Council Counter-Drones Unit to provide strategic leadership to policing on counter-drones capabilities. This unit provides support to local forces to ensure they have the appropriate training and equipment to tackle the misuse of drones and we continue to work closely with this team.
How and when the police use their powers and capabilities is an operational matter. Civilian operators at critical national infrastructure sites can already operate certain drone detection systems but are not legally permitted to use counter-drone equipment that would disrupt a drone (effectors). Guidance from the National Protective Security Agency (NPSA) is available to site operators to aid with response plans and protective security measures to mitigate the likelihood of an incursion at their site. In some cases, Government departments have also issued sector-specific guidance.
The Armed Forces Bill plans to strengthen the MoD’s ability to respond to drone misuse by providing new powers, including for staff at military bases.
The Home Office keeps under review options to expand the capabilities available to private businesses and infrastructure operators to protect themselves against drone threats.
Asked by: Lord Bridges of Headley (Conservative - Life peer)
Question to the Ministry of Defence:
To ask His Majesty's Government whether the United Kingdom is participating in, observing, or otherwise contributing to the European Union’s integrated resolve 2026 crisis management exercise; if not, whether it was invited to do so; and what arrangements exist for the United Kingdom to participate in European exercises testing responses to coordinated hostile-state hybrid attacks on critical national infrastructure.
Answered by Lord Coaker - Minister of State (Ministry of Defence)
The UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership provides a framework for increased cooperation to counter hybrid threats. This includes coordinated sanctions against cyber criminals linked to the Russian Intelligence Services as well as exchanges through UK-EU Hybrid Strategic Consultations.
The Partnership also provides the possibility for the UK and the EU to invite one another to each other’s respective crisis management exercises. As such, the UK has been invited to engage with certain aspects of the EU’s Integrated Resolve (IR26) exercise. Officials are now exploring what the UK’s role could look like.
Asked by: Lord Bridges of Headley (Conservative - Life peer)
Question to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs:
To ask His Majesty's Government which public authority would have lead responsibility for ensuring that vulnerable households continued to receive food during a nationwide electricity and telecommunications outage lasting seven days or more; when such arrangements were last tested in a national exercise; and whether they intend to publish an operational national food emergency plan.
Answered by Baroness Hayman of Ullock - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs)
Under the Lead Government Department model, responding to a prolonged nationwide electricity outage spans several departments. Defra leads on food supply resilience working across Government, industry and local partners to support preparedness for severe disruption.
At local level, Local Resilience Forums and local authorities have a crucial role in identifying and supporting vulnerable people working with emergency responders, health authorities and the voluntary sector. The Government last tested its response to a National Power Outage in a national exercise, including food, through the cross-Government exercise Mighty Oak (2023).
Defra is working with industry and across Government to strengthen preparedness for food supply disruptions, including the development of a shared framework for food preparedness and response, building on the work of the Food Preparedness Group. As part of the Food Preparedness Group, the Government is engaging with industry alongside local and household groups which focuses on impacts of disruption at local community and household level.
Asked by: Lord Bridges of Headley (Conservative - Life peer)
Question to the Cabinet Office:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the cost of resettlement packages for civil servants who move to work in No. 10 North.
Answered by Baroness Twycross - Parliamentary Secretary (Cabinet Office)
It is standard practice for employers to support staff when they are required to move between locations. Any resettlement packages would be covered by existing departmental budgets.
Asked by: Lord Bridges of Headley (Conservative - Life peer)
Question to the Department for Transport:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the level of public subsidy provided to the Bee Network in Greater Manchester.
Answered by Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill - Minister of State (Department for Transport)
The Government is committed to supporting local leaders to deliver high-quality local transport services because we know how important this is for access to education, employment and vital local services.
Over this spending review period we're providing a significant amount of funding, and local leaders can decide how best to use this funding to improve services for passengers, including supporting the Bee Network in the case of Greater Manchester.
We have allocated £3.69bn of transport funding for 2022 - 2032 through the devolved City Region Sustainable Transport Settlement/Transport for City Regions funding, Local Authority Bus Grant funding, Active Travel funding and consolidated Active Travel fund, which the Greater Manchester Combined Authority can use for its Bee Network and wider transport activity.
This funding empowers Mayors to invest in transport projects that will make a difference to their local area, and which meet local objectives and needs. The Integrated Settlement also consolidates other transport funding streams, which creates further flexibility for Mayors.
Asked by: Lord Bridges of Headley (Conservative - Life peer)
Question
To ask His Majesty's Government, in light of the National Risk Register identifying a malicious cyber attack on the electricity system as being capable of causing prolonged disruption to telecommunications and other critical infrastructure, what additional resilience measures they have required communications providers to implement to ensure that citizens can continue to access emergency services throughout such an event.
Answered by Baroness Lloyd of Effra - Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport)
Great Britain has one of the most reliable energy systems in the world, and operators have well-developed plans to respond to and recover from any disruption. The Cyber Security Resilience Bill will further strengthen the UK’s cyber defences and protect more of the essential services people depend on.
Government works in partnership with communications providers to ensure that networks remain secure, resilient, and accessible, including during emergencies and service disruption. There are statutory obligations on communications providers to take appropriate and proportionate steps to ensure their networks and services remain available. Communication providers are required to take appropriate measures to prepare for and reduce the reduce the risks of incidents occurring, and Ofcom have published Network and Service Resilience Guidance that sets out expectations on how providers can meet statutory obligations.
Whilst networks are designed to be resilient, events such as severe weather, loss of electricity transmission, and technical faults can sometimes cause disruption. In these cases, providers must guarantee access to emergency services for at least one hour during a power outage for customers who rely solely on landlines. Although not resilient over days of disruption to services, Battery Back Up Units for broadband services are available free of charge to vulnerable customers or can be purchased from communication providers. In March 2025, providers such as BT, Vodafone, KCOM and Zen Internet announced battery back-up units capable of powering routers for 4–7 hours during a power cut. These measures are designed to prevent disconnection and ensure continued access to emergency services.
If the current mobile network is unavailable, all emergency 999 calls made from mobile phones should automatically switch to an alternative network. This ensures that even if some mobile networks are down or has poor signal, your emergency call can still go through by using another available network.
Asked by: Lord Bridges of Headley (Conservative - Life peer)
Question
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the effect on the UK's national resilience of replacing the centrally powered Public Switched Telephone Network with Digital Voice services which depend upon electricity and broadband equipment within individual premises; and whether they have undertaken any comparative assessment of the resilience of the two systems in the event of a prolonged nationwide power outage arising from a hostile cyber attack or other major civil emergency.
Answered by Baroness Lloyd of Effra - Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport)
The Government is committed to ensuring that any risks from the industry-led migration of the analogue Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) to digital Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) are mitigated for everyone across the UK. VoIP technology is more resilient, more secure, enables better quality phone calls, and can be used to block scam calls. Over 92% of PSTN landlines have already been migrated.
Communications providers are under legal obligations to ensure uninterrupted access to emergency services, including 999 and 112, and to take appropriate and proportionate steps to identify risks to network resilience and mitigate service disruption.
In November 2024, the Government secured additional safeguards from the telecoms industry. These include the provision of free battery back-ups for vulnerable and landline dependent customers to ensure access to emergency services beyond one hour in a power outage. Many providers have gone further, providing 4-7 hours.
Communications providers are also subject to robust cyber security and resilience requirements under the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, including obligations to identify, manage and mitigate cyber risks that could affect network availability and services.
Asked by: Lord Bridges of Headley (Conservative - Life peer)
Question to the Department for Education:
To ask His Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the closure of private schools.
Answered by Baroness Smith of Malvern - Minister of State (Department for Work and Pensions)
School closures can be influenced by a range of factors, not just the VAT policy. While VAT may have compounded pressure, school closures cannot be attributed to VAT alone. Factors such as school performance, financial viability and demographic shifts also play a role. In the 2025/26 academic year, more private schools opened than closed. The department monitors the private school sector via the ‘Get Information about Schools’ (GIAS) system, which shows that between 1 September 2025 and 31 July 2026, 108 private schools opened and 51 closed.