Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Bridges of Headley and Lord Stockwood

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, we turn to the important topic of the accountability of the financial services regulators. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the noble Lord, Lord Bridges of Headley, for tabling these amendments and for the thoughtful contributions made by noble Lords during this debate. I hear what the Committee has said on regulatory accountability and am glad to be meeting the Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, next week. I have also written to noble Lords, as has been mentioned, about the existing framework that governs the accountability of regulators and a copy of the letter is available in the Library.

Amendment 121 proposes establishing an independent panel for periodic independent review of the FCA, the PRA and the Bank of England. The Government agree that it is important that regulators are held to account for their performance. This is why they have formalised biannual performance reviews, which the Economic Secretary to the Treasury holds with the CEOs of the FCA and PRA. The minutes of these are published on GOV.UK to support transparency.

A prescriptive, legislative requirement would duplicate this and would not be a good use of taxpayers’ money, as the purpose of such a review could be only to understand the regulators’ performance. But through FSMA, Parliament and the Government already have a large number of levers to understand and assess the performance of the regulators. There is of course nothing to stop the Financial Services Regulation Committee from calling up the CEOs of the FCA and the PRA, or the Governor of the Bank, to discuss their performance as frequently as that committee desires. It is also difficult to see where the panel would get its legitimacy from, when the Government and Parliament are responsible for democratic oversight and accountability for the regulators—the regulators that Parliament has vested with the responsibility for regulation of our financial services sector.

It is the Government’s view that the existing avenues for accountability are appropriate and sufficient, and that Parliament has the authority to do this in a way that no other body could. If Parliament wants to enhance the scrutiny of the regulators, it must consider how best to do that.

Amendments 133 to 139—including Amendment 135A —would, taken together, create a new statutory body, the office for financial regulatory accountability, charged with examining and reporting on the performance of the FCA and the PRA, supported by a charter setting out the Treasury’s regulatory objectives, with full information access rights and funding drawn from the regulators themselves. Such a body would complicate the accountability framework in a way that could dilute individual responsibility and accountability, and create significant additional costs. As such, the Government cannot support the amendments.

Since this proposal was last made, during the debates on the Financial Services and Markets Bill in 2023, the landscape has changed materially. The Financial Services Regulation Committee of this House was established precisely to provide sustained, expert parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators, and it has done so with considerable rigour. In the other place, the Treasury Select Committee continues to hold the FCA and the PRA to regular account. These are active, resourced bodies with the standing and powers to interrogate regulatory performance in depth. More importantly, as parliamentary committees, they have the constitutional authority to scrutinise and opine on the effectiveness of our independent regulators.

Creating a new statutory office alongside these structures would fragment accountability, rather than strengthen it. There is a risk that the existence of a parallel body would blur the lines of responsibility and create confusion about where the authoritative scrutiny sits.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

I just do not understand this argument at all. The committees in this House and in the other place, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said, have the power to summon but, as far I know, they have one policy adviser and one expert adviser—and that is it—to analyse regulations and the actions of regulators and supervisors. As the Minister knows full well, that is nowhere near enough to fulfil what would be the purpose of OFRA.

As I said, OFRA would establish a means by which there is independent analysis of regulations—on the specifics and in the round—and of the performance of the regulators and supervisors. They are very different things. One is a means to hold regulators to account; the other gives parliamentarians the means, analysis and insights to do that. I do not understand how the Minister can say that that would dilute accountability.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

The point I was making is that the structure that exists today gives the effective governance that we believe is required. We are open to a conversation about the noble Baroness’s options to improve accountability, but the noble Lord rightly raises a separate conversation about the requirements to make sure that those committees are sufficiently resourced. That is a separate conversation but, in our current position, we are trying to balance the accountability that already exists with the ability for the regulators to be flexible. As I have stated previously, we are open to that discussion, because we want to make sure that this process does not dilute that.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

I completely agree, but this is not about making them inflexible; it is about giving Parliament the ability to hold them effectively to account. I do not hear anyone saying that there is that means at the moment, and I cannot think that there would ever be a committee, of either this or the other place, enabled to do that. It would require an enormous resource for a committee, which would be completely impossible, as far as I can see. That is why we need a separate body.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

We are happy to have that conversation. We believe that the framework we have set out is the right one: it balances that ability to have oversight with the flexibility that we have empowered through FSMA. However, I agree that this debate has clearly illuminated that there is work to do, and I look forward to having that conversation with the Committee next week. I am sure that there are more conversations to be had on this issue between Committee and Report.

Amendment 139 would require the FCA and the PRA to fund this new body from their own resources, which are ultimately drawn from industry levies. The regulators would presumably need to increase their fees on authorised firms to cover this. Establishing a body of this kind, with its own membership, staff, legal powers of information access and publication obligations, would involve significant and recurring costs. We would be making industry pay twice to fund functions that have significant overlap.