(1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I will speak very briefly on this. I declare my interests as employee adviser to Banco Santander in Madrid and a shareholder in Santander. I also apologise to noble Lords, as I was unable to speak at Second Reading.
I will follow on from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. I think he and I may disagree on certain aspects of the regulatory and supervisory approach, but I fundamentally agree with every single syllable he has just said. I am very queasy about aspects of the Bill. Many of us spent some time in this Room several years ago trying to ensure that we can hold to account in Parliament, both in this House and the other place, the regulators and supervisors, who hold immense power. That was absolutely right. We put in place a number of measures, including the establishment of the new committee, so ably chaired by my noble friend Lady Noakes, to enable us to do that—just one measure. This clause goes very much in the wrong direction.
I read the letter, for which I am very grateful, from the noble Lord, Lord Stockwood, and I have to say that I am somewhat perplexed by it. My wife says that I have a very little brain, so I very much look forward to the noble Lord telling me that I am wrong—I am very used to it. Let me try to understand what it is saying.
It starts by saying—or, rather, several paragraphs in it says:
“Considering separate rules in isolation is not effective for assessing the cumulative effect of the regulators’ actions—both the benefits in terms of advancing their objectives, and the costs to affected businesses”.
It goes on to say, as noble Lords will no doubt have read, that the publication of the overall long-term strategy will somehow address this. It also says:
“Clause 16 is intended to address this feedback”
from the sector—I am not sure from whom—
“and improve transparency around the regulators’ long-term direction and focus”.
I am very happy to have a long-term strategy but we absolutely need to be able to call to account actions that the regulators take, case by case.
I have read the Explanatory Notes, which say that the long-term strategy will be once every five years. I see that as entirely insufficient. Furthermore, in paragraph 170, the Explanatory Notes go on to say:
“The Government expects that the strategies will be high level and focus on the FCA’s and PRA’s top priorities and the outcomes they aim to achieve over that time”.
I do not see this as anything like the accountability that we were looking for when we introduced the measures in the last Bill, now an Act, and in the new committee. As far as I can see, it is not the case that the Government dispute the need for this case-by-case analysis, for they say this three paragraphs down in the same letter that I quoted earlier:
“There appears to be broad agreement that, in some areas, regulatory requirements on firms have become overly prescriptive, in some cases duplicative, and that this results in high costs for firms, and means that they spend a large proportion of their time and resources focusing on regulatory requirements”.
I agree wholeheartedly. We need, therefore, to address these points case by case.
All these points tie up. We cannot see the regulatory oversight of this House and the other House diluted in the ways that these clauses do when you put them together. I therefore agree entirely with the noble Lord and those who back these two amendments. I will later press for other measures to tighten, not weaken, regulatory accountability.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will be brief because much of what needs to be said on this topic has already been said. I will not detain the Committee for long but, as I have added my name to the clause stand part notice, I thought that it was worth me reiterating my strong opposition to Clause 17.
Picking up on what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, spoke about, in our debate on the first group, the Minister reiterated that the Government think that the FSMA model is the correct model. I do not think that any of us is seriously disputing that as a broad proposition. What we are focusing on is the detail of how the FSMA model can continue to work. When we left the EU, the huge amount of EU law that became assimilated law changed the name of the game around how financial services regulation is lived out in this country.
As we have heard, the 2023 Act tried to deal with that in part by increasing parliamentary accountability through the committees of each House, including the requirement for individual rules proposed by the PRA or the FCA to be accompanied by explanations of how the regulatory principles had been applied. I do not think that any of us clearly understood the scale of the problem back in 2022, when we were considering the Bill, but we thought that these were sensible moves in the right direction. The only thing that has changed is that, now, the Government are coming along and putting even more into the FCA by way of the consumer credit legislation, which is a good idea.
But this has seriously undermined what was still work in progress on how effective parliamentary accountability could be worked. There were never any discussions with either committee of the Houses of Parliament about how the arrangements for accountability following the 2023 Act worked. We suddenly got this decision by the Government to cut away the legs of the committee through its inability to engage with the individual regulations. It is clearly the case that looking at a five-year strategy will never replace the work that needs to be done at a granular level on some of the proposed regulations that come from the regulators. That is the time for interventions—not by looking back at whether actions have complied with a strategy.
We should use this Bill to refine the FSMA model, to make it workable for the scale of the task that is being given by Parliament to the regulators and to make sure that the strength of the accountability mechanisms matches the scale of that activity. That is all that we are trying to do. The direction of this Bill is the wrong direction.