Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Bridges of Headley and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Shortly after my proposal first surfaced, I was contacted by people involved in the Australian royal commission on financial services, because they had noted that I had reached the same conclusion as them: that it was too big a job for Parliament to do by itself, given everything else that national Parliaments have to do.

Australia introduced two-yearly reviews, and it is not the only country to have an independent review. A similar arrangement now exists in New Zealand, and in the US all regulators come under powerful scrutiny by the Government Accountability Office. One advantage of my proposal is that it follows a path we understand from Section 1S reviews, and it could be done quickly—maybe as an interim solution, for example, until an office such as that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, could be formed. By having regular reviews, oversight of progress would also be possible. After her review, Dame Elizabeth Gloster told the Treasury Committee that we are left to “hope” that the regulator “implements” regulations. Hope is not a system.

Why did I propose this? It was the point at which the Government were looking at the post-Brexit future financial framework. As has already been rehearsed in this Committee, this Parliament does not have the structure and focus that was available in the EU Parliament. Having been chair of the ECON committee dealing with all the post-financial crisis legislation, I can safely say that I know what it takes and that it is not easy. That is another reason why I do not recommend a continuous process.

There will be more to it in the UK, because many issues arise from the execution of supervision post rule-making. Brexit created the first need, which we eventually tried to patch with a new committee. Your Lordships heard from members of that committee and in the report of the Industry and Regulators Committee, Who Regulates the Regulator?, that now the overwhelming conclusion is that significant independent review is needed.

Now we have a new, second need due to the changes in this Bill, which remove the “have regards” away from operational effectiveness and into a five-year strategy. How is that to be monitored? Is there any intention at all for follow-through? The changes make the already difficult acquisition of information even harder. Several things that the Minister has said in his replies ring alarm bells and show the absolute need for scrutiny. We need it because financial services regulation and supervision is too important to allow issues to creep up—all the more so in a higher-risk environment. LCF-type regulator risk needs even more guarding against.

The Minister has said that proportionality will now be tested only at the strategic level. Let us be clear: testing proportionality at only the strategic level is barely a nudge. Rule-level and supervisory-level proportionality is the real test, but that has been put out of reach of accountability, as there is nothing to measure against. Indeed, they are not even looking at it apart from every five years. From that, it is pretty clear that substantial follow-ups on the five-year strategy are necessary. The Minister says that annual reports and remit letters provide accountability. Some substantial upgrading and interrogation of those is needed. What actionable event flows from an annual report? It is judge, jury and public relations all in one place. Does the Minister genuinely believe that an example here and there constitutes accountability?

The Minister argues that principles remain central, yet they are being moved into a document that cannot be enforced by the courts and cannot be used to test a specific rule or supervisory action. They are applied every five years, when the future cannot really be seen. This is not lip service; it is just print service, and as my noble friend Lady Kramer has shown us from the current version of the five-year report, there is little substance. Will we get something detailed for every category and size of financial market business?

The Government’s rhetoric suggests that reducing the burden of accountability will unleash a more dynamic and agile regulator, but that does not demonstrate the stability that is a prerequisite for competitiveness. Stability is the best friend of a competitive financial sector. Whether you cite centuries of institutional experience or the second law of thermodynamics, left to their own devices, systems corrupt or tend to disorder. Someone has to be on their case. But the Government are making the regulators far more insulated from the procedures that keep them on their toes. Avoiding the burden of accountability today is like banking a much larger, more expensive crisis for tomorrow. Additional periodic or permanent oversight has become even more necessary. I beg to move.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 133 to 135 and 136 to 139 in my name, but not Amendment 135A, which is in the name of my noble friend Lady Lawlor. I thank my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Lawlor and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for putting their names to my amendment. This little clutch of amendments is turning into déjà vu, because the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has just spoken about issues that she raised some years ago. My amendment is one that I raised in this very Room, sitting on the other side, exactly three years ago—so it is déjà vu all over again.

I start from a basic point, which picks up exactly where the noble Baroness left off. I believe that we here in Parliament need more powers and, critically, more independent analysis to hold financial regulators and supervisors to account. In fact, I just mention here that we need to do far more to hold the Bank of England to account, but that was declared out of scope. I had wanted to table an amendment calling for a regular, probably five- or six-yearly, review led by Parliament into the remit and performance of the Bank of England as an entity and as an institution. I believe that that is an enormous democratic deficit that we need to address. I was told that it was out of scope for this piece of legislation, but I very much intend to return to that at a future date. It is much to the Minister’s relief, I am sure, that we are not going to do that now.

We spent Monday debating clauses in the Bill that I see as weakening parliamentary accountability. My amendments and those of the noble Baroness will take us in the opposite direction, towards more accountability. A number of us, on all sides of the Committee, have been asking a very simple question: do we, in this House and in the other place, have sufficient means to hold our financial regulators and supervisors to account without compromising that operational independence? The answer keeps coming back, resoundingly: no, we do not.

It is not as though this is the first time we have said this. As the noble Baroness mentioned, in its excellent 2024 report, Who Watches the Watchdogs?, your Lordships’ Industry and Regulators Committee found that parliamentary scrutiny of regulators remains too fragmented, too reactive and—I stress this—too limited by the resources available to Parliament. It concluded that the balance between regulatory independence and democratic accountability needs to be strengthened. As I said, that report came after all the debates we had in this Room on the previous Financial Services and Markets Bill, now an Act. We warned then that the transfer of extensive rule-making powers from Parliament to the regulators had created an accountability gap. That is why I addressed this very same proposal then. My concerns about accountability have not diminished; if anything, they have grown in the years since I was standing over there, so I am trying again.

Noble Lords will be grateful to hear that I will not go line by line through what each of these amendments would do. I simply say that Amendment 133 would establish an office for financial regulatory accountability, OFRA, as an independent body to support Parliament in scrutinising the work of financial regulators. It is crucial to stress that I do not see this as second-guessing regulatory judgments or interfering with regulatory operational independence. Rather, as set out in Amendment 135, which is pretty key in this clutch of amendments, it would provide Parliament and the outside world with impartial analysis of regulation, the actions of regulators in the round and, crucially, their performance at meeting their objectives, as set by Parliament.

Why do we need this? For a very simple reason—my noble friend Lady Noakes will pay testament to this. The volume and technical complexity of financial regulations are now making this absolutely necessary. If Parliament is to fully and effectively scrutinise the hundreds of pages of regulation that our regulators keep churning out, we need to do more. My concern—I would be grateful if the Minster could put my mind at rest—is that the Government seem to be suggesting that we do not need to have a case-by-case analysis of regulations. That is wrong: it is absolutely critical to have that analysis. We cannot rely on a five-yearly strategic report, or overall impressions and analysis, from regulators. We need to be able to analyse regulation point by point.

If the Minister responds by saying, “Don’t worry. The regulators will reflect their objectives in their actions and decisions, so we have nothing to worry about here”, I will say, “Let’s prove it”. Let us have the independent analysis to make sure that it is indeed the case that our regulators are reflecting the objectives that Parliament has set them in what they do. Greater scrutiny and, with it, greater accountability, will surely strengthen trust, which is critical.

The Minister might go on to argue that my proposal is not needed for two other reasons, the first being the cost-benefit analysis panels that my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and others talked about when discussing previous amendments. I completely accept that they perform a very important function, but I see their role as being very different. Their role is to improve the quality of individual cost-benefit analyses prepared by the regulators. They are advisory bodies to the regulators themselves. They are not designed to provide Parliament and others with an independent assessment of the overall effectiveness and proportionality of regulation, bit by bit. This amendment would therefore complement rather than replace those panels: the cost-benefit analysis panels improve regulatory decision-making from within; OFRA would strengthen parliamentary accountability from without.

The second reason the Minister might use to oppose my proposal is that the FCA introduced its rule review framework in 2024, with the stated aim of undertaking increasingly rigorous post-implementation analysis of what it does. I stand to be corrected, but my delving into this suggests that the results so far of this new framework are modest. As far as I can see, since its introduction, only one full impact evaluation has been published, and one other has appeared in the past five years—I think that is overall, pre the framework being introduced. I would like to know whether that is the case and how effective the rule review framework has been.

Either way, that underlines the point that Parliament needs access to independent analysis, especially as the Government want to give regulators more discretion. This seems to be the entire drift of the Bill: more discretion for the regulators. If that is the case, surely the quid pro quo for more discretion must be having more mechanisms for accountability. If we are being asked to entrust the regulators with more, we need greater ability to have independent scrutiny of what they are doing.