(14 years ago)
Lords ChamberWell, my Lords, we have a free press, do we not, and we may not always agree with either what they say or do. This is not quite so germane to the noble Lord’s question, but it turns out that the correction I made was erroneous. The Home Secretary did not speak to the mayor; I had said it was the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, so I apologise to the House. However, as is clear from the Statement, there was contact between the Government and the police. There has also, obviously, been extensive contact today as a basis for giving accurate information to the House.
My Lords, yesterday when watching television I had a sense of déjà vu watching the disgraceful events in Millbank Tower. The déjà vu was: 1996 in Seattle with the World Trade Organisation, where I was one of the people inadvertently suffering from pepper gas and tear gas, because the police were seeking to protect the delegates but had the Seattle sound with a 30 mile an hour wind to put up with. The thing that was in common was watching people dressed entirely in black and wearing hard hats, smashing into Millbank Tower then encouraging young people to go in and themselves, noticeably, not necessarily going in but walking away. That is exactly what I saw when a Starbucks coffee house was burnt out in Seattle. The gentleman who threw the brazier in—he had lit a whole pile of rubbish—then walked away, taking off his black shirt and putting it underneath his other T-shirt.
It is therefore not necessarily just a question of students, because I suspect that some of the people have nothing to do with being students. I trust that the investigation will therefore look at that. More particularly, there was intelligence about Millbank Tower, where I used to work. It is a large building with lots of staff who must have been very terrified when that happened. If there was such intelligence, was the management of the building informed of the likelihood of such dangers?
The noble Lord makes some good observations about what went on. The Statement was rather careful in just referring to a “faction”, because at this stage we simply do not know exactly who was involved. He is quite right, and anyone who viewed television saw what he saw, that there was obviously preparation; you do not come along with a mask without the intention of doing something, or indeed with, I believe, a hammer. Clearly there was premeditation.
The noble Lord is also right to say that this must have been pretty frightening for those who were in the building. I would say that one of the first cares of the police when they arrived in that building was to secure the safety of those in it and, thereafter, to begin to eject the intruders.
I cannot answer the question about the information to the management. I would hope that because of the route, and given that the police were there, the management of the building had some forewarning.
(14 years ago)
Grand CommitteeThe noble Baroness asks a perfectly reasonable question to which I shall try to get her an answer. I share her feeling that one must have accountability and that one must be certain that, at the end of the process of determining whether there is prosecutable evidence, information is destroyed. Both these things need verification.
There are two government changes to Clause 10. The first inserts a time limit of 28 days and the second defines that the information used must be strictly relevant. It is all subject to the terms of data protection legislation. While we could not be expected to inform a suspect that information about them was being held, one can rely on the fact that use of the data and all the provisions governing their retention will be subject to the terms of the data protection legislation. So they are not exempt; you cannot just do your own thing under this legislation.
I am fascinated by the idea that information from a private sector credit reference agency, whose staff are not vetted by anybody, is considered to be reliable and secure enough for us to see it as a key part of the provision of passports. Concern was rightly expressed during the passage of the 2006 Act about government security and the destruction of the information being held. The Bill states that the information will be destroyed within 28 days. Can the Minister go into more detail about what “destroyed” means? Does it simply mean wiping out the tape that holds the information? Does it mean a wider destruction of information? For example, every piece of information that is put on the record goes on the computer, which has a hard drive that retains it. The word “destruction” carries with it a fairly comprehensive meaning, but the reality is that 28 days is a short period of time. Can we have more of a flavour of what physically has to be destroyed?
(14 years ago)
Grand CommitteeI seem to have caused part of this confusion with my amendment. As I understood during that brief period when I was the Minister responsible for identity cards, you have the information that is on the passport database and additional points that are on the national identity register. We are scrapping the national identity register, but we are told that virtually everyone who has an ID card is on the national passport database. So, on the national passport database we need to have an indication that some individuals have an ID card as well, as a travel document. To me, that seems to be the only information that needs to be transferred from the national identity register to the database for passports. That does not sound very resource-intensive or difficult in terms of legal base. I cannot see why any other information is required to be transferred if we are getting away from a register and back to just having a passport, albeit a plastic one.
My Lords, the amendment does not contain all that accompanying detail. It is not easy, therefore, to interpret what the noble Lord actually thinks should be transferred. If he wants to make that clearer, perhaps that might help, but, as things stand, these amendments have not been thought through. That is a pity because there is the germ of a good idea here. The idea of a passport card is not new, and Members of this House may be aware that—
They have, however, been written to to say that the scheme will be cancelled. The key issue is not that of a refund to the individual but how much the taxpayer is expected to pay to end this wanton scheme. We have already seen that the previous Labour Government spent £292 million on the ID scheme and the associated biometric work. That is a staggering amount for a scheme that was predicted to be self-financing through the fees, and given that only 15,000 cards are in circulation in the first year of issue, 3,000 of which were given away free anyway. The amendment’s effect is that the 12,000 cards should be given away free of charge. We cannot go on spending taxpayers’ money in this fashion, particularly when the public have shown overwhelmingly—there is no ambiguity about this—that they do not want ID cards. At the previous election, they showed their unwillingness—
Will the noble Baroness provide the evidence to back up her conviction that the public do not want ID cards, as all the opinion polls taken by this and the previous Government do not indicate that that is the case? However, more importantly, is she saying that some people are rich enough to write off the £30 without worrying and complaining, while the people who are being punished are the poor people for whom £30 is more than they can afford, even if they can afford Sky Television? That is the logic of it.
My Lords, we do not have a socio-economic profile of those who bought cards. We have other profiles but not that one as we did not inquire about people’s incomes. However, I do not think that the public are very interested in the Government spending a further £400,000 on refunds. Unfortunately, the sum is not £360,000 as an administrative overhead is incurred in refunding the £30 fees, which themselves amount to £360,000. You might say that £400,000 is not a significant sum in the previous Government’s overall scheme of spending on ID cards. Indeed, I hear noble Lords present saying that. However, I am afraid that the Government maintain the contrary view. It is a significant amount and, frankly, noble Lords opposite have not provided a good reason why a refund should be given. Instead they accuse the coalition of being mean-spirited. If mean-spirited means extricating ourselves from an expensive failure at the least possible cost to the taxpayer, I think that we are doing the right thing. We do not accept that yet more money has to be spent on ID cards.
I am happy to ensure that the details of how we extricate ourselves from the ID card mess are placed in the public domain. As the Immigration Minister made clear on Report in the other place—I again confirm this—a Written Ministerial Statement will be made to the House on completion of the destruction process. I will place a copy of the planned destruction process referred to in the amendment in the Library.
My Lords, it is certainly the Government’s intention to cancel it, assuming that Parliament gives its assent.
My Lords, would it be helpful if a copy of that letter were placed in the Library of the House so that we could all examine it before Report?
The Information Commissioner needs to be satisfied that the destruction process has been proper, thorough and complete. That is why we are in touch with the Information Commissioner. We really do not see the need for yet another layer of oversight that could get in the way of the exercise of his functions. In fact, it would duplicate what he is already charged to do—effectively, I would hope.
I would also say that the Government are committed to transparency in this process. We have nothing to hide and we are absolutely committed to the citizen’s rights in the matter. While I realise that I might not last for ever—the thought of being translated to a higher place is rather worrying—nevertheless, I will say with absolute confidence that this Government, whether I am in your Lordships’ House or not, are committed to ensuring that this process is carried out properly and that there is no doubt about its integrity and thoroughness. I hope that, in the light of my comments, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, personally I am sure that the reference by the noble Baroness to a higher place was simply to a more senior position in the Government, if only because I am not sure that anyone who is a politician can hope to go to heaven.
I am disappointed with the Minister’s reply. I do not think that we are looking for bureaucracy in the amendment I have tabled. I believe that the Government are just as concerned as the previous Government were about issues of identity fraud and we know that things would have come from the identity card scheme that would have helped. However, it is not to be persevered with and we have been told that a plan is to be put together by the end of this year. The Bill requires a report to be made only within one year. I would have thought that, without too much bureaucracy, it would be possible to look at the extent to which the Bill will provide for those things that were provided for by the various parts of the Identity Cards Act, particularly in relation to individual identity fraud. We have seen that, online, someone’s identity might be used again and again.
So, I am disappointed, but I hope that between now and Report, the Minister will look at this again with her advisers. Transparency requires other people to be able to see something. In some ways, the only people who can report back with all the facts at their command, which we can then scrutinise, are the Government. Even at this stage, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to reconsider the matter. In the mean time, I shall withdraw the amendment.
(14 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberThe fact is that there is significant sunk investment and there would have been future costs if we had operated the system. Those future costs will now not be incurred.
Here is more precision on the point that the noble Lord has just raised. In October 2009, the cost report provided the figure of £835 million for future investment. Noble Lords will be aware that fewer than 15,000 cards have been issued, which has been against an investment of £292 million. The difficulty is that one cannot be as confident as the noble Lord that the costs would be recouped from fees. Irrespective and independent of the attitude of the Opposition at the time, which I am sure acted as a dampener on the general public’s enthusiasm to purchase a card, it was clear that the public were voting with their feet. A total of 12,000 cards is not a large number of applicants.
The point has been made about the restricted areas—one in Manchester and one in London—but there was also a general inquiry register, to which members of the public from other parts of the country could apply so that they could have access to their cards when the cards became available. That is a rather different issue and a rather different figure.
I hope that the noble Lord will acknowledge that, at the end of the day, this was not going down a bomb.
If the question of refunds is the only complaint that the Opposition can find, that shows that there is not a great deal to object to in the legislation. Several points were raised. I was asked about refunds and whether we could supply discounts against other documents or at least allow the documents to have their full-life validity. As I pointed out, full-life validity would mean keeping the system open, which would probably cost an extra £60 million to £80 million. We simply do not think that that is justified or sensible. Noble Lords have said that this would involve a small sum of money, but we believe that £400,000 can be spent to the benefit of the general public in a rather more useful fashion than on a refund of £30, which is rather less than probably most people pay for a monthly subscription to Sky. We have to have a sense of proportion about this.
One or two noble Lords said that they found the Bill unnecessarily complex. In fact, when one gets into the detail of the Bill, there are quite a large number of complexities to unwind. However, I am happy to talk to them about the issues that they have raised and, if the Bill can be simplified, I shall be most delighted to do so.
A point about fraud was raised. The National Fraud Authority and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau have produced a strategic threat assessment of the harm impact of identity crime—a matter with which I think we in the House are all concerned. It will lead to an action plan, which will be overseen by the Home Office. We have started work on it and the first meetings have begun to take place. I am personally very interested in this subject. The House probably shares the view that identity, and its protection, is something that we have to get right. It relates to issues such as how we combat crime that takes place through cybernetworks, so I do not underestimate the importance of getting this right. As I said earlier, we do not believe that the national register is the way to tackle it. However, we have a great concern about the need to protect victims of crime relating to people’s identities having been swiped.
In conclusion, we believe that the Bill is in the public interest and we are pleased to have brought it forward this soon. We believe it is right to start getting the balance that we think should pertain between the citizen and the state more where we would like to see it, and of course other legislation is coming forward which will swing further in the direction of the liberty of the citizen. I ask the House to give the Bill a Second Reading.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberThere certainly have been prosecutions. I am not sure that I can give the noble Lord the actual figure, but I shall certainly write to him. The most reverend Primate also raised this issue of criminalisation. There are people who have previously been trafficked who then exploit other children who have been trafficked for the purposes of criminal activity. There have been examples in cannabis farms. So it is right to prosecute those who engage themselves in criminal activity.
The Minister has twice referred to CEOP, a very valuable agency created by the previous Administration which is very highly valued by the public. It is therefore not clear why the Government have decided, in their new regime, that CEOP should not exist any longer. Is it to be merged with another body? More importantly, can the Minister assure me that there will be no less funding than there is at the moment so that its valuable work can continue?
My Lords, the functions of CEOP will certainly remain within the new structure for the National Crime Agency. There is no intention to abolish those functions. As to the budget figure, obviously I cannot give an assurance of that kind until we know the outcome of the CSR review. But I note the point that has been made.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have to disagree with my noble friend. We believe that opting into the EIO is in the interests of justice. It does not transfer any jurisdiction, which is what many might have feared, and we actually believe that the system of mutual legal assistance, which is already operating, deserves to be improved by one of the main innovations that will take place as a result of the EIO—setting deadlines for the receipt of evidence that is sent from one country to another. That is one of the current defects of mutual legal assistance. In other respects, the EIO does not change the present regime.
My Lords, I welcome today’s decision by the Government, which perhaps gives little comfort to the noble Lord who asked the Question. Should it not be the case—will the Minister agree?—that there should be greater consideration of the rights of the suspect, and should this not include judicial scrutiny at both the issuing and executing stages?
I am afraid that I did not hear the noble Lord’s question. Can he repeat it, please?
Fortunately it was brief. Does the Minister agree that there should be greater consideration of the rights of the suspect and that it should include judicial scrutiny at both the issuing and executing stages?
My Lords, there are certainly some reservations about the operation of mutual legal assistance, which is a separate issue from the actual operation of, or changes to, the regime that the EIO will bring. Some of the matters that we are reviewing include the reservations expressed about the operation of mutual legal assistance.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for repeating the Statement made by the Home Secretary in another place and for her letter notifying me of the review and inviting views.
Passing over the pejorative paragraph, repeated by the Government ad nauseam, about public finances, I am struck by the rhetorical style of the Statement, with phrases such as,
“power back to the people”.
I know that the Minister bears no resemblance to Wolfie Smith, but the Home Secretary’s call sounds to me more like that of the Tooting Popular Front than of responsible government. I refer particularly to the proposal to legislate to remove police authorities in favour of elected police commissioners with wide powers. This is done in the name of accountability. It is backed up by the police being required to publish local crime figures and data, and the mandating of meetings so that people can meet, and challenge the performance of, their neighbourhood policing teams. Is that revolutionary action? Well, not quite.
The Minister tells us that the Government have scrapped the policing pledge. I am sure that that was said in the other place with a flourish. Let us examine what has been scrapped. Let us look at policing pledge number 9, which states:
“We will arrange regular public meetings to agree your priorities at least once a month, giving you a chance to meet your local team with other members of your community. These will include opportunities such as surgeries, street briefings and mobile police station visits which will be arranged to meet local needs and requirements. We will provide monthly updates on progress and on local crime and policing issues. This will include the provision of crime maps, information on specific crimes and what happened to those brought to justice, details of what action we and our partners are taking to make your neighbourhood safer and information on how your force is performing”.
The pledge now contains an update on progress and meetings with local representatives. Therefore, what the Statement promises is already in place in the policing pledge, which the Home Secretary has chosen to scrap.
I turn to elected police commissioners, which the Statement says is about accountability to the public. Let us see how it impacts on the public. What is the current level of accountability? I commend to all Members of your Lordships' House an excellent debate last Thursday on policing and crime rates proposed by my noble friend Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate. He made clear all the areas of accountability that the police already have. Consultation on local policing, as set out in the policing pledge, is now apparently to be reinstated.
The issue is therefore one of scrapping the police authorities, which are currently made up of elected council members from all the major parties, independent councillors and independent appointed members. Their role is to be invested in a police commissioner, who, unless he or she has a wide-reaching consultative body of some kind, will inevitably narrow the consideration of public accountability that now exists in law enforcement and local government.
A number of people have voiced to me their fears of political interference and the potential for cronyism and corruption among elected police commissioners. Why should that be? In an elected police authority, which comprises members of different political parties, people will express different views about policing. They will be tackling the same issues. There is no evidence that that has led to anything other than consensus policing, which has assisted chief constables in meeting their operational requirements while enforcing the accountability that we want. No one in the police service, in police authorities or in local authorities has any great confidence in this proposal.
If the overwhelming response to the consultation on elected police commissioners is negative, as it was when a similar question was asked in a survey in 2004, will the Minister abandon the proposal? The Local Government Association says that elected police commissioners will cost £50 million. What is the Minister’s estimate of the cost? Will not the abolition of the police authorities remove a reservoir of knowledge and experience that no single individual can replace?
If I were to stand for police commissioner for Cumbria, in whatever competition there was—and I buy completely the idea that there should be no interference in the policing part of the role of the chief constable—I would get elected by making promises. That is how people get elected. Those promises might include a rebalance between rural and urban policing in Cumbria. The chief constable is very clear that with the reduced resources he is likely to have, the way to do it is the way he is doing it, so I have a problem at re-election of presenting how I delivered my promises. That at least has major potential for political interference. If I do not interfere, how do I deliver the promises on which I have been elected against whatever party or non-party opposition that has stood in the same competition?
On the SOCA proposal, the coalition agreement talks of refocusing SOCA, not eliminating it. Is this a coalition U-turn? A press briefing over the weekend talked of creating a British FBI. Is this the Government’s intention? This has been denied in the past and there have been very clear views from senior police that that is not what is required. A good friend of mine with the metropolitan police in Washington DC said to me in the late 1980s that FBI stood for “famous but incompetent”. When I questioned that, he said that he was referring not to the ability of FBI agents but to everything from what you might call turf wars to the unwillingness of certain parts of local law enforcement and the agency to accept the authority of the other. There are major problems attached to this, and I would be very interested to hear more on that subject.
We also hear that there is to be an enhanced border police force. Is this to replace the UKBA? Is this going to impact on numbers? It is very odd because in the debate last Thursday, and indeed in every previous attempt by this side in both this House and the other place, we have tried to persuade Ministers to admit simply that with the kind of cuts that they are contemplating, there will be fewer police on the beat and fewer resources available to maintain the present successful battle against crime. When I say “successful”, I agree with the noble Baroness that it can always be improved, but it is not a damaged record. It is the best record for 30 years, the level of confidence among the public is the best in 30 years, and there is the least lack of confidence in the ability to deal with social issues and anti-social behaviour. It is therefore a rhetorical, Wolfie Smith-type Statement, and it would be better if we dealt with it in a much more serious manner.
We are making major moves ahead of the review that we are told will take place in October, so I ask yet again: is that going to reduce the number of front-line police officers or not?
My Lords, 68 per cent of the public in recent surveys support the idea of having elected commissioners, and I hear what the noble Lord says about the way in which the police authorities have performed. I do not think that the Government are suggesting that the police authorities have done a sustainedly bad job, but they are invisible to the local population. One of the main objects of this exercise is to reconnect the police force of the locality with the people of the locality, and we believe that the way to do that is to have an official who has to account to the people. We are trying to get away from the police accounting bureaucratically upwards instead of being the servants of their local populations. With all the measures that we are trying to put in place, including the beat meetings and the crime and policing panels, it is not true to say that there will be no checks and balances in the system. The police commissioner will himself be answerable to these panels. They have the right to challenge his decisions. They cannot override them, but they can certainly conduct dialogue in the name of the local people, so you will have local discussion. There is probably a philosophical difference between my party and the other side of the House on the need to reconnect authority over the police to the local community.
The noble Baroness makes a great play of the lack of connection. We have had elected and appointed members on police authorities for a number of years. Does she have information on a failure of people coming forward to be independent members of police authorities? I happen to know that in Cumbria there were 100 applicants last time for what I think were two or three posts. Is there evidence to sustain the argument that there is a disconnect, other than in surveys?
Only 8 per cent of wards have a councillor on their local police authority. It seems to me that there is a much more slender connection between local accountability and the people than is suggested by that kind of assertion. Police commissioners are much more directly responsible and accountable to the locals than a police authority, which has relatively few councillors among its number, with an election behind them.
The noble Lord made a number of other points. The general proposition that we are putting forward here is that accountability is not to and for government but towards local communities. As the Home Affairs Committee said in its report during the last Parliament, the previous Government succeeded in micromanaging too much local policing while neglecting some of the national issues.
On the national side, the noble Lord asked a number of questions about the nature of the National Crime Agency. The agency will be a much more powerful body than we have at the moment. It will be at the centre and will take issues of national importance. It will perform in two areas. One is serious organised crime. It will build on what SOCA has done and achieved and will retain SOCA’s facilities, including its intelligence-gathering capability.
At the same time, the agency will also have control over the border police force and will direct a chief constable directed at that. The border police force will sit alongside the UKBA, which will not be incorporated into it. We have decided that for a number of reasons, including the need for economy. Also, with the Olympics in sight, it is not sensible to have vast structural change at this juncture. It therefore seems more sensible to us to have, overarching the agency, a strategy to which the agency will work. The agency will then be responsible for the part of the strategy over which it has control: serious organised crime and border policing. The UKBA will, however, be tied into that overarching strategy as well. We will therefore have a single strategy for border control, part of which will lie with the National Crime Agency—that is to say, SOCA and the functions that it performs, plus the functions that will be created for the border police command. The UKBA will work alongside the border command within the framework of that overriding and overarching strategy. The object of that exercise is to create more coherent control of the borders without resorting to excessive expense in an era in which that is not going to be possible.
I am sure that the noble Lord asked me some other questions, which I would be happy to answer; I am looking at my notes.
The noble Lord asked if it was going to be a British FBI. No, it is not going to be a British FBI. We want to try to ensure that the National Crime Agency has broader powers, but it will not have a FBI-style role. All the powers it exercises will in the end also link back to the constabularies. Part of the role of the National Crime Agency will also be to link into the constabularies when it comes to, say, level 2 crime. So it will not be divorced from the role of the 43 police forces round the country, but it will give a strategic override to that function.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Order in Council was laid before Parliament on 12 July. If it is made, it will bring a group of cathinone derivatives—so-called legal highs, which include naphthylpyrovalerone, known as naphyrone and commonly branded as NRG-1—under the control of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 as class B drugs. There it will join mephedrone and other cathinone derivatives which were brought under the control of the 1971 Act as class B drugs from 16 April 2010, with cross-party agreement in the final days of the last Parliament.
The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs indicated in its cathinone report of 31 March that it would provide further advice on this additional group of cathinone derivatives as a priority. That is what we are dealing with today. They are familiar but sufficiently different from mephedrone and other cathinone derivatives that the ACMD needed to consider them separately. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary received the council’s report on 7 July and she was pleased to accept the council’s recommendation for control, on which this draft order is based. She did so on behalf of the Government.
The council is to be commended for using this extra time well to provide a further thorough, forward-looking piece of work. The proposed control of naphthyl analogues by a wide-ranging generic definition, as set out in the draft order, is consistent with the UK’s legislative approach to other synthetic drugs. Now that we have the council’s advice, we are asking for Parliament’s agreement to expedite control without delay and before this House rises for the Summer Recess. We need to learn the lessons from the UK’s experience on mephedrone, which became rapidly established before it was controlled in April. It is proposed that the order will come into force on the second day after the day on which it is made. That could be as early as 23 July and the legislation would therefore have an immediate impact, not least on the current music festival season, as supply and possession of these drugs would become unlawful with immediate effect.
Action to address the health risks arising from the use of existing so-called legal highs and the issue of further legal highs coming on to the market is a priority for the Government. We need to consider how we can reduce the supply and demand for new substances; our response must be wide-ranging, encompassing prevention, education, treatment and enforcement. That is at the core of our legislative response. There are those who look to subvert our laws and sell potentially harmful drugs advertising them as legal. This can lead people, especially young people, to think that these drugs are therefore safe. We need our drug laws to move faster to protect the public and to combat these unscrupulous manufacturers and suppliers.
As we set out in the coalition agreement, we will introduce a system of temporary bans on new psychoactive substances while health issues are considered by independent experts. The underlying purpose of the temporary banning power is to enable Parliament to be highly responsive to emerging new psychoactive substances and, at the same time, provide the advisory council with the time or space that it needs to formulate its full advice. Full details of the temporary banning power will be announced shortly. It is the intention to undertake legislation on this later this year.
While the temporary banning power will be a key and necessary tool in our legislative response to this changing landscape, our preferred approach to drug control will remain one which the advisory council and the Government have adopted for the past 40 years: a full assessment by the council before any controls are invoked by Parliament. The order before Parliament is an example of that process working. We need to add naphyrone, and related substances, promptly to the cathinones already controlled under our misuse of drugs legislation. This is because they are structurally similar to cathinone derivatives, such as mephedrone, which are already classified under the 1971 Act as class B drugs, and they pose similar harms to those who use them.
The advisory council commented that, consistent with the known or reported harms of the cathinones and traditional amphetamines, the predicted harmful effects of naphyrone include adverse effects on the heart and blood vessels, hyperthermia, dependence liability and psychiatric effects, including psychosis and anxiety. However, the more concerning aspect of the advisory council’s advice is that naphyrone has a high potency by comparison with other cathinones. This suggests that its use is likely to be associated with a higher risk of accidental overdose. I also emphasise that we are not aware of any legitimate use of these chemicals.
Enforcement action has been, and is being, applied to naphyrone. This included an immediate worldwide importation ban on naphyrone under the Import of Goods (Control) Order 1954 on receipt of the advisory council’s advice. The open general import licence was amended to exclude naphyrone from its scope. The UK Border Agency has been instructed to seize and destroy shipments of this, and related drugs, at the border; and we will also continue to work with other law enforcement agencies to strengthen their enforcement response to the identification and sale of illicit substances being mis-sold as legal highs.
The Serious Organised Crime Agency is actively developing approaches to identify websites offering mephedrone for sale, both at home and abroad, so that it can take action at an international level to close these down. This action will be extended in scope to include naphyrone.
Enforcement action of this sort is effective. We continue to monitor the impact of the ban on mephedrone but it has curtailed the availability of the drug, enabling enforcing authorities to take action to seize mephedrone at our borders and on our streets. Since the ban has been introduced, the UK Border Agency has made a number of detections and stopped more than 115 kilograms of chemicals that it suspects to be mephedrone from entering the UK. We also know that the legal-highs market self-regulates and withdraws banned drugs. The ban has also provided the strongest support to our public health message about the harms of mephedrone and like drugs.
Control of naphyrone also provides us with the opportunity to repeat our public message that although this drug may currently be advertised as legal—as a so-called legal high—it does not mean that it is safe or that it is necessarily legal. The advisory council’s report on naphyrone highlighted research from test purchases. Clearly, sellers are using the brand NRG-1 and masquerading it as naphyrone—and therefore legal—and marketing it as a mephedrone substitute. A branded product of this sort may, in fact, contain a number of illegal cathinones, legal stimulants or other active or inactive constituents. Any brand name that purports to be legal cannot be trusted. It does not mean that they are safe or legal. Users are putting their health at risk and could be committing a criminal offence.
We have taken a number of actions based on this information. It is now a key message for the FRANK service—which is available to users—on legal highs. Last month, the Minister for Crime Prevention—my right honourable friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup—wrote to organisers of music festivals to make them aware of this information, asking them to review the measures that they put in place to ensure that their festivals are as safe an environment as possible.
The department has also called on local trading standards teams through local authority chief executives, to work in partnership with the police to deal with the sale of any legal highs, taking full account of this latest evidence, and to make appropriate referrals to the police and otherwise apply their responsibility for enforcing offences under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. The Association of Chief Police Officers for England, Wales and Northern Ireland will also update its enforcement guidance on new psychoactive substances.
It is intended to make two further related statutory instruments, which will be subject to the negative resolution procedure. The Misuse of Drugs (Designation) (Amendment No. 2) Order 2010 will specify naphthylpyrovalerone analogues including naphyrone as drugs, which have no statutorily recognised medicinal or other legitimate use. The Misuse of Drugs (Amendment No. 2) Regulations 2010 will similarly amend the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 to include these drugs. These instruments were laid on 14 July to come into force at the same time as the Order in Council, if it comes into force as proposed.
The Government will publicise the approved law changes on naphyrone and related substances through a Home Office circular and the Talk to Frank and drugs.gov.uk website. Reference to the law changes and health risks relating to the drugs will be included in future government materials for young people. I commend the order to the House.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the detailed explanation of why this order is both important and necessary. In proposing this order, the Government are continuing the policy pursued by the previous Labour Government. I commend the Minister for this and suggest that continuing the policies of the previous Government in a number of policy areas in the Home Office would also be commended as useful. Beyond that, I applaud the Pauline conversion of the minority party in the coalition to the policy set out in the Minister’s explanation. As I recall, it showed far less support when the same policy was put forward previously by the last Government.
My colleague, the Opposition spokesman in the other place, sought and gained the assurances from the Government that I would have placed before the Minister today. On that basis, it remains only for me to indicate support for this order and commend it to the House.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Opposition support the order so I shall not delay the House too long. However, our support comes with something of a health warning. The contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, highlights this.
In the past few days in respect of various other proposals to review, Members on all sides of your Lordships’ House have sought to persuade Ministers to speculate on the outcome of the examinations that have taken place and have been rightly rebuffed. Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, refused to speculate on the outcome of the anti-terrorism review that we debated last week. Accordingly, I am not sure that it was wise of the Home Secretary to indicate a personal preference for 14 rather than 28 or any other number of days when this order was debated in another place. To be fair, she said that she did not think it right to pre-empt the review, which is the most important issue. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, spelt out cogently the risk that still exists.
The risk has not diminished in the past year at all. There has been no diminution in the risk of terrorist activity. Indeed, in Northern Ireland there has been an increase. The threat level remains severe and the police and the DPP support the continuance of the 28-day provision. It is a year since its renewal—I accept that that is why we are renewing it, albeit for six months, as it is a temporary provision. Nobody in your Lordships’ House would be happier than us, on these Benches, if we found the risk so diminished that the requirement for any pre-charge detention could be removed completely.
We have learnt more in the past year, by means of Operation Overt, about the so-called liquid bomb plot involving the planned destruction of seven passenger aircraft flying to North America. In that case, pre-charge detention beyond 14 days was necessary for six people. There was Operation Pathway in Greater Manchester, which was raised in the debate in the other place a year ago, and we know that that plot was successfully thwarted. We understand much better that it was a serious and advanced plot. These cases explain why, to date, 28 days has been deemed necessary. Noble Lords on all Benches will be happy to see that reduced, I am sure.
I am not sure how this argument can be taken. It is cited that there are few cases, which means that the power is not required. We are also told that there is a natural propensity—Parkinson’s law—in security that the more time you give people, the more time they will take. I would be astonished if that were the case in security issues. I would be very surprised if the security services and the police were not aware that smart lawyers, many of whom represent clients in courts and are Members of your Lordships' House, are willing to demolish any case built on a prevention of charging when charges could be brought.
It is the right of all Governments to review and it is right to review this order annually. The question is whether in the past year sufficient has happened to persuade us that the threat is diminished. That is where the health warning comes in. I am not sure that I like the idea of a default position of 14 days before a review takes place and before all the key authorities involved have been briefed and made their contribution. Therefore, it is important that the review should be evidence-based. Ultimately, sound judgment is required, which is what we expect from our Home Secretary and our Government, to establish whether we have reached the point where we can withdraw the 28-day provision or impose alternative powers. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, with her knowledge, experience and integrity, will wish nothing less. I support the Motion.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their characteristically thoughtful contributions. The purpose of this short extension is to enable the Government to have enough time to do two things. The first is to look at the legislation concerning pre-charge detention and other counterterrorism legislation that we want to review in the round and in relation to each other. The second is to look at the existing operation of the 28-day regime. I was asked, for instance, whether post-charge questioning, which has not yet commenced, will come into operation. That is precisely one of the factors which we want to look at, together with a number of other provisions which seem to us to be relevant in deciding whether we can reduce the maximum time for pre-charge detention.
I mentioned “contingency” and the Civil Contingencies Act. I stick by my comment that, given the threat about which I will say something in a moment, we cannot say with absolute certainty that a time longer than 14 days might never be needed. Equally, we take the view that the current evidence tends to suggest that we ought not, if we can avoid it, continue with the current maximum length of pre-charge detention. However, we want to look at that and at whether it is possible to put in place some kind of contingency that will enable us, with safety, to reduce the normal maximum time.
A number of noble Lords asked why the UK had to have so long a time when other systems somehow managed to do with less. Like other Members of your Lordships' House, I greatly value the work done by organisations such as Justice and Liberty. However, when one is comparing systems, it is right to do a thorough job and, as the noble Lord, Lord West, said, it is not entirely fair to compare the UK system with, say, France’s. Indeed, even among common-law countries, the practice is not uniform. In Australia, for example, there is a 14-day limit that can be significantly extended by something called the stand-down time.
We should not forget that the threat remains. I very much hope that, by other flanking measures which the previous Government put in place and policies which we continue, we are managing to harden our targets and to become a more difficult target for terrorists. We also know more about the enemy than previously. All those are relevant factors in considering whether it is right and safe now to reduce the maximum time for our pre-charge detention.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, among others, asked whether there was any evidence for the operation of the 28 days and whether history showed that we needed it. He also asked whether it was right, and in accordance with the ECHR, that the suspect was not given sufficient information at an early stage about the charge. That is not the case. The grounds of arrest are put before a defendant when he goes before the magistrate, and he must go before the magistrate no later than 48 hours after arrest. There is no question that people's rights are being violated in that respect. Much as we would like not to have the legislation if we could—the object of the exercise is to see whether we can dispense with it safely—it is human rights-compliant. I hope that the House will accept that in prolonging the provision for a period while that detailed and careful examination takes place, we are not violating the rights of any current or future defendant, while protecting the public.
I have one last point to make. A noble Lord asked about the difference between the varieties of terrorism that we face. It is disturbing that we have an increase in terrorist activity in Northern Ireland. The nature of that terrorism is somewhat different from the Islamist terrorism that we face, which is one reason why we have the 28-day provision in place at the moment. We will look at introducing other measures in conjunction with a different regime on pre-charge detention, combined with our assessment of how we stand in relation to the threat. Our examination of the legislation will take all those factors—the operation of the legislation itself, our view of the threat to us and our ability to withstand the threat—into account. All those are relevant factors in deciding whether we can find some other way to deal with pre-charge detention in normal circumstances.
With that summary, I thank noble Lords for their contributions and invite the House to approve the order.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I think the whole House will agree that secure passports are an extremely important part of combating terrorism. It is certainly the case that there are no exit controls at the moment but it is intended that they should come into operation as part of the e-Borders programme.
My Lords, first, the noble Baroness reminded us that exit controls were removed. Can she remind us which party was in government when they were removed? Secondly, she said that we are going to strengthen the security of passports. Can she tell us how?
The existing facial biometric is a chip inside the passport, and that type of passport has been issued since 2006. It is possible, and we intend, to strengthen the security technology that surrounds that chip to decrease the ability of any forger in any way to clone it or counter its security.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have great sympathy with the principle enunciated by my noble friend. This is a country that stands for freedom of conscience and the right of individuals to exercise it. We are certainly committed to upholding those principles and to allowing people such freedom to hold religious beliefs. However, we have to strike the right balance and ensure that we do not allow discrimination on any grounds. When it comes to offering public services, the law of the land must be obeyed. We do not have plans to change the current law, the effect of which, when it comes to Catholic adoption agencies, will take effect when the Equality Act is commenced. I see no contradiction, however, between that and the principles enunciated by my noble friend.
My Lords, the noble Baroness declared war on big government. She also said in her previous answer that she saw no conflict with her answer to the preceding question. It rather conflicts with her statement of a war on big government. At the same time, in law and order, we are looking at 5,000 fewer prison officers and a 25 per cent cut in the police budget. Can the noble Baroness explain why that is not a lessening of the war on crime and why, in that area, the Government are doing far less their predecessor?
I think we are straying from the Question. I think everyone would accept that we have an extremely tight financial situation. It is not possible to continue with all departmental budgets at their previous levels, which were not funded, in any case, by the previous Government. It is for the police to decide where the operational effect will take place. We are, however, absolutely committed to effective policing.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his response. His first point was about what happened with the draft. As I understand it, this was one of those things that happen in government. The earlier draft, which the Home Secretary had not seen and had not approved, somehow escaped into the parliamentary Chamber, but it was not her view of what she needed to say. The Statement that I read is what the Home Secretary thinks is the correct position.
I entirely share the noble Lord’s sentiments about the tribute that we should pay to the police for the work that they do. That was particularly apt yesterday, which marked an occasion in our national life when we saw the effectiveness of the police, the resilience of the emergency services and, indeed, the bravery, courage and common sense of ordinary people. In essence, that is what will, in the end, get us through this period of international threat to us.
The noble Lord picked up the sentence in the Statement relating to our view that we would not have appealed the judgment had we been in office. He rightly said that the domestic court had previously rejected some of the arguments. However, it is fair to say that, in opposition, both parties of the coalition had been extremely critical not only of the excessive use to which the Metropolitan Police had put these powers but also—this is the second point, which the noble Lord did not mention—of the fact that the powers were drafted too widely. In our view, this law is defective. That does not mean to say that there is not legitimate need and that there may not be circumstances in which a power of this type will be needed. That is one of the issues that we will take up in the review.
The Home Secretary made it quite clear that this is interim guidance for an interim situation. The police cannot be left in legal limbo, which is why it is necessary for us to take these measures now. We have done so in consultation with the police. Their main concern was to ensure that they were operating legally, because not to be doing so would clearly leave them in considerable difficulty—indeed, in legal peril. They needed clarity and guidance, which is what they have been given. We will continue our discussions with them about the powers that may be necessary.
As for the views of others, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has told me that he agrees with the measures that have been taken. He takes the view that the position that has been arrived at is in substance desirable. We will look at whether that is the case and at whether there are contingencies in which it will be necessary to have some other reserve power, although we have not come to any judgment on that.
The noble Lord asked whether we will consult during the review process. Consultation will be built in to the review process. We do not intend that it should be only an internal governmental activity.
The final point was about the need to ensure that the security services and the police have the resources to keep us safe. Of course that is right. I hope that there is nothing between the two sides of the House on the question of taking national security seriously. However, we have to recognise that there is a difficult financial and public expenditure situation, from which the police cannot be entirely immune. None the less, I have confidence that the police take their priorities seriously and we in the Government will certainly act with due care in relation to public expenditure choices that directly affect national security.
My Lords, it seems to me that much is placed on this being interim and on the review. Will the noble Baroness indicate the timescale? For how long will these interim measures be in force? When can we expect the consultation to be complete? When can we expect our security forces to have a clear understanding from Ministers of what is required for the future?
I do not think that the police have any doubt about their position. That position will continue for as long as we are not, in parliamentary terms, able or willing to put in place any other legislative provision. As I say, that will be a matter of consideration in government and consultation. There are a number of related issues in the whole area of counterterrorism and it does not make a great deal of sense to take decisions on one in isolation from considering the impact on others. A wider group of powers need to be considered together. Our aim is to ensure that as much of this package as possible is in the freedom Bill. Therefore, we are talking about a timescale in which the legislation will certainly begin its passage this year.
(14 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for repeating the Statement made by the Home Secretary in another place, and I am sure I speak for the whole of this House when I say that we join the Home Secretary in sending our condolences to all those who are affected by this tragedy in west Cumbria.
A number of noble Lords live in the county of Cumbria—the noble Lords, Lord Henley, Lord Judd, Lord Inglewood, Lord Clark of Windermere, Lord Dubs, me and others—and we have seen at first hand the resilience of west Cumbria in the face of the devastation of last year’s floods, the tragedy of the loss of young people’s lives in a major road accident a week ago, and now this tragedy. We also share the Home Secretary’s admiration for the speedy response of the emergency services and the police yesterday to a wholly unplanned and unforeseen tragedy. It is a tribute to them that the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the Lancashire and Cumbria constabularies could work so quickly together, undoubtedly reassuring the natives of Cumbria in that very difficult situation.
The co-ordination at that stage has proved to be wholly successful. Hopefully that will continue. I note the comprehensive nature of the Home Secretary’s Statement and that, if necessary, additional funding will be made available. It seems to be almost beyond doubt that it will be. The 100 detectives who are being deployed from Cumbria, and perhaps from elsewhere, on this case alone will dig deep into the reserves of that relatively modestly sized police force, and the news that the local authorities will also be offered assistance is welcome.
Some questions need to be asked, but I am not sure that now is the time to ask them. Basically, the only question that comes to my mind immediately is that there are health checks by doctors when people apply for licences to own shotguns and so on, but are people who go on holding those licences adequately supervised afterwards? After all, the incidents that have occurred have not happened immediately after a licence was offered and accepted by an individual. I hope that those questions will be dealt with as the policy inquiry fulfils its task and, as the Statement says, as the Home Secretary and the Government inquire into this further.
The resilience of west Cumbria is being tested, and the Home Secretary’s visit tomorrow will be appreciated. I understood from listening to the Statement in the other place that the Prime Minister will also go. That will give great comfort to the people. I also join in the tribute to Jamie Reed, my honourable friend the Member of Parliament for that area, who manfully and most effectively stood up and represented his constituents in the floods and now has that task again.
Basically, our task here today is one of solidarity with the people of west Cumbria. As the noble Baroness said when she repeated the Home Secretary’s Statement, these tragedies are few and far between but we must learn the lessons. At this moment, however, our thoughts go out to all those who are affected, as does our sympathy for the relatives of those who were injured and killed.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his sympathy for those who have suffered. I am sure that he expresses the sentiment of the whole House, to which I add my own. Hutton Roof is in Cumbria, so I too have connections with the county and feel this loss personally.
The noble Lord is quite right that this is a small force with a big task ahead of it. As he rightly said, the Government will make sure that it has the resources necessary to carry out that task, and we will look, as I have said, at the lessons to be learnt, but the House will probably agree that we should not draw conclusions precipitately. As he also rightly said, the resilience of west Cumbria is being tested. I thank the House for the understanding that has been exhibited. I have no doubt that we will hear more when the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary have visited in person.