Brexit: Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration

Lord Bowness Excerpts

Thursday 10th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bowness (Con)]

My Lords, in a debate on 20 November, at col. 192, I asked the Minister what the Government’s plan B would be if the so-called deal were rejected. I received neither acknowledgement nor answer. I do not expect one today. I am content to wait for the three days after any rejection of the deal in the other place.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that the thoughts of the Government have gone no further than the so-called deal and that, in the event of rejection, they contemplate a no-deal Brexit. Of course, I do not know whether this is a crude attempt on the part of the Government to lure Members of the other place into the Lobby in support of the so-called deal, or a policy in default of any other.

We need the Government to be clear and straight- forward with the public. This is not really a deal for the future. It sets out the terms of our withdrawal but does nothing about the future relationship. This is evident from the political declaration, which is misleadingly spoken of as part of the so-called deal. It is merely yet another statement of what we would like and hope for, but is largely unachievable in view of our own self-imposed red lines.

All the arguments remain unresolved about a hard or soft Brexit, Norway or Canada. The arguments currently raging will continue, whatever the outcome, unless there is some real leadership from all parties on where we really want to be. If the so-called deal is accepted, we have until the end of the transition period to resolve that. If we follow the precedent of the last two and a half years, what faith can anyone have in a resolution being achieved? If it is agreed, we have until 29 March to enact the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and all the promised Bills on a multitude of policies and issues.

This provokes some questions. How is it going to be possible for Parliament to do a proper job of examining and scrutinising the legislation, to say nothing of scrutinising and debating the pile of affirmative statutory instruments now building up, given this timetable? Even if we manage to deal with the legislation, can the Government ensure that we will not limit our scope for negotiation again in the transition period, imprisoning ourselves within another set of red lines? Will the ultra-Brexiteers not threaten the Government over that legislation, as they have done to date, to ensure that it becomes more difficult—if not impossible—to negotiate the close relationship with the European Union that the Government tell us they desire?

If the deal is rejected, this will not reduce the amount of legislative work to be done by 29 March. It becomes increasingly clear that, whatever the outcome of the vote in the other place, we have presented ourselves with an almost impossible task through our own incompetence.

We need political leadership to level with people now that it is blindingly obvious that we cannot leave the European Union and retain anything like as advantageous a position as we enjoy as members; we certainly cannot do so if we insist on our red lines and reject the customs union, single market and any involvement of the Court of Justice. I am realistic enough to realise that it is unlikely we will see a withdrawal of Article 50; however, I believe it is vital that we seek an extension so that the alternatives may be explored unfettered by prior red lines.

Your Lordships’ House is required only to consider the proposal, but we can hope that our concerns are noted in the other place. The Motion in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, is the only means of formally registering our concerns. If it is moved, I shall vote for it. I am grateful to her for emphasising the concerns many share about a no-deal scenario. Her Motion also criticises the agreement and the declaration, but they have been challenged across the spectrum of remain and Brexit views. We should not have issued Article 50 before we knew what we hoped to achieve or, indeed, without considering what would be possible. We did it, and we are about to pay the price of our own incompetence unless we can achieve more time for whatever we decide to do.

Parliament has a role to play and, if the proposals are indeed rejected, Parliament must fill the vacuum of political leadership and not abdicate responsibility to another referendum. We must seek a compromise realistically acceptable to our own different parties and factions, and to the European Union, without the fetters of ill-advised red lines. We have had the farce; we must now avoid it turning into tragedy. That needs to be an important consideration for this House and the other place.