Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Borrie Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Borrie (Lab)]

My Lords, reading the House of Commons Hansard in relation to this Bill, I noticed that one Conservative Member of Parliament said that it was,

“a Christmas tree of a Bill”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/10/13; col. 696.]

That makes it very difficult to discuss many of its aspects due to lack of time. Even in the last few minutes of Third Reading in another place, a second Conservative MP said,

“we are yet to have a proper debate on the extradition provisions”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/10/13; col. 700.]

I think I am right in saying that there never was an opportunity to discuss the extradition provisions, hence the importance of this House debating these matters becomes enormous. A Bill of this sort with 13, 14 or 15 parts, with a very disparate group of subjects to discuss, means that even in this House we shall find it quite difficult to do proper justice to all the matters that should be raised.

I thought that one matter in this Bill was very welcome and indeed fairly bold. Perhaps the Government have their finger on the pulse when they propose that to be a chief of police you do not necessarily have to have been a police constable in the UK. That is a very welcome proposition because many professions over the years have been extremely restrictive in their approach, particularly the legal profession. It took a great deal of effort to get the law changed and to get the desirability of competition accepted across the different parties in this country. It is very useful that the opportunity is being taken to say that, from time to time, it may be desirable for the police to do what the Bank of England has done and choose a boss from another country, provided that he or she fulfils the requirements designated by the police college. I do not suppose there will be many new chief officers of police who have not been a police constable on the beat because that is surely a useful qualification. The difference is that it is only a desirability to be taken into account and is not necessarily required. I was pleased to hear the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Condon, who is not in his place at the moment. As an ex-Metropolitan Police Commissioner, he takes the broad view that I mention.

I was also impressed by the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan. She referred to the provisions in the Bill dealing with miscarriages of justice. She made it quite clear—as would everyone in the Chamber make it clear—that it is part of the rule of law in this country that no one can be found guilty of a criminal offence unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt. She made a good case for saying that that proposition is brought into question if on an occasion when someone seeks to establish a fact after being found guilty of an offence—someone who seeks to establish a miscarriage of justice by reference to new facts and new matters that he or she wishes to bring before a court—there is a clash in the attitudes of the different stages of the procedure. Yet here we have it. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, made it quite clear that under Clause 151 someone can establish a case for a miscarriage of justice to claim compensation only if he or she can show beyond reasonable doubt that he or she is innocent. The clash between that and the normal aspect of the rule of law in establishing guilt was made very clear.

In the case of Adams—which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, because he wanted to mention that he was involved in that case—the Supreme Court had such a matter in front of it. The deputy president of the Supreme Court, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, said:

“A person is only guilty if the state can prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt”.

She continued:

“He does not have to prove his innocence at his trial and it seems wrong in principle that he should be required to prove his innocence now”,

“now” meaning in establishing a miscarriage of justice before the Supreme Court. The Government want clarity, but what is the advantage of clarity in relation to what the Government are proposing? Why is that more clear than clarity based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Adams, to which I have referred?

I want to refer to one other matter—shoplifting. Noble Lords may think that this is an unimportant part of the Bill but I was fascinated to find a clause about shoplifting because in the 1950s, as a young barrister, I used to prosecute accused shoplifters up and down Oxford Street. They came into the magistrates’ courts and normally pleaded guilty but, even if they did not, they certainly did not want a jury trial; they wanted it all over there and then.

I find it difficult to consider where Clause 152 has sprung from. I do not think the word “shoplifting” has ever previously been found in a statute to describe what is involved in shop theft or market stall theft. Nowadays the prosecution is of course conducted under the Theft Act 1968; in my long and distant days it was the Larceny Act 1916. We got rid of the word “larceny”, which is good because it is a technical phrase, and the word “theft” is understood by everyone. To call theft “shoplifting” rather lends credence to the idea that some people have that shoplifting is somehow not as serious as real theft. I see no point in Clause 152 and no sense in distinguishing between the theft of £200-worth of goods and something less than £200-worth of goods. I shall be glad to hear from the Minister whether there is a real case for that particular provision in the Bill.