Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Blair of Boughton and Lord Mackay of Clashfern

Monday 21st July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly oppose the proposal that Clause 25 should not stand part of the Bill and it appears that commissioners may think in the same way, according to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Since the early 19th century, it has been the received wisdom that people are deterred from committing crime by the likelihood of detection rather than the length of sentence. I agree with that in general.

As a former Metropolitan Police commissioner and deputy-commissioner, I have experience of two categories of crime that proved the rule by being exceptions to it. The first is the one that Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe has apparently already mentioned: that is, the reduction in shootings that occurred in London after a five-year mandatory sentence was announced. That occurred because communication among the criminal fraternity is good. It is particularly good among the women of that group, who stopped carrying the guns in their handbags. Therefore the guns are not as much in evidence as they were.

I imagine that many noble Lords will recall my second example, which was a response to the marked rise in fatal and near fatal stabbings of teenagers in London a few years ago. The most important factor in reducing that was the issue of a practice direction from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—I do not think that he is in his place—when he was Lord Chief Justice, that a first offence of unlawful possession of a knife should normally be considered for a custodial sentence. Knife crime started to fall and I believe that is because people knew that that message was passing around the streets of London.

I believe that, with knife crime falling, a custodial sentence for a second offence of carrying these weapons makes much better sense than for a first offence. The reason for that is it provides people with a chance. A sentencer now sentencing someone for a first offence can give them a very simple message which is very easy to understand—“Don’t do this again or you will go to jail”. Normally, I am in favour of leaving judges and magistrates free to exercise their judgment but this crime has an additional catastrophe attached to it. It ruins the life not only of the person who is seriously injured or killed but also the life of the offender in those circumstances.

I had to talk to the families of people who had been murdered in these circumstances. We have not heard enough from those who oppose the clause or, with respect, from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, about the victims of knife crime. Knife crime can change lives catastrophically. One of the awful things about that period when teenagers were killing each other in London was how often there was only one knife wound. A single blow had caused these deaths, as if these young people had no idea that that action would kill someone. It seems to me sensible to pass a message to stop the thing happening that will then allow someone to be murdered. One cannot murder someone very easily if one does not have a knife or a gun. I strongly oppose the proposal.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, judicial discretion is a very important aspect of the judicial process. However, embedded in judicial discretion is the fact that you cannot know in advance with precision how that discretion will be exercised. If you have studied the sentencing guidelines you may know roughly the areas in which the discretion will operate, but having a fixed penalty as a minimum means that it is known in advance that unless there is a particular circumstance to take you out of the situation a fixed penalty will happen. You know that in advance.

I have heard what has been said in support of this clause and also the other point of view from a very experienced police officer. I know a case of knife-carrying that was enough to kill somebody and give the carrier a life sentence. I found that a very traumatic experience. Telling people in advance what the sentence will be is an extremely important deterrent. It has been done in various parts of our judicial system. Therefore I do not regard the principle on which this is based as one that can apply in all circumstances. In a second offence for knife crime it is reasonable for a statement to be made about precisely what the sentence as a minimum will be unless there are circumstances that take it out of the ordinary.

My noble friend Lord Marks has commented on the nature of the exception. If he wishes to improve on that, there is the option of an amendment to that effect. So far, none is forthcoming. I shall take it that the exception, in so far as it is stated, is a reasonable exception in the circumstances of this case. Of course the idea is not to put more people in prison; it is to prevent people from going to prison by knowing that if they do this particular thing for a second time that is where they will go. On the whole, one hopes that that has a deterrent effect.

Information about this will quickly get around among the people who are affected by it. One can understand the idea of discrimination but of course it depends on the way in which the power to stop and search is used. As far as I am concerned, this power must be used in accordance with the best discretion of the police officers on the street. However this amendment has come about—it was made in the other place—the Government have decided in the light of their experience and of their policy as a whole that it should be adhered to and given effect.