(12 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe words proposed by my noble friend take us a little further in the right direction. I would like to go a great deal further but am more than happy to support my noble friend’s amendment.
My Lords, despite the cogent words of the noble Lord, Lord Myners, I share the confusion on this side of the House about what these amendments are intended to do. Everyone agrees that it is vital that there should be strong oversight of the governor and the executives of the Bank by the non-executive directors and that we have proper accountability and scrutiny. But what is proposed here is a court that will have a clear and very sizeable majority of non-executive directors. The amendments proposed by my noble friend earlier made it clear that all the members of that court would be directors, and would be directors in common, sharing responsibility for the decisions of the Bank. However the non-executive directors would be in a majority, and if those non-executive directors disagreed with what the executives proposed, they could make that clear in the court and they would have the majority to hold sway.
According to these amendments, the court, involving all directors, would be able only to propose policies and then a sub-committee of the board of only the non-executives would then go away and approve them. That seems to turn corporate governance on its head. Either we have a supervisory board of non-executives, which is a totally different structure, or we accept that the Court of Directors is indeed the Court of Directors and should, with all its members, accept responsibility. What we have here is a very sensible proposal for an oversight committee of non-executive directors that will play its role in allowing non-executive directors to review and scrutinise offline, but to report to the full court, as is normal in any governance process. All directors must share equal responsibility in the end for the decisions of that organisation.