European Union Bill

Lord Blackwell Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Liddle]

The Minister has misunderstood what I have been trying to say. I apologise to the Committee if I have been giving a false impression but this amendment’s subject encapsulates fully the point that I am trying to make. What concerns us is: why tie up all the flexibilities that are within the existing, ratified structure of the Lisbon treaty, which were discussed in this House in the previous Parliament? Why tie all of those up in referendum locks that could have a very negative effect on Britain's power to act in its own interests within the European Union? That is the point and this amendment looks at one of those specific and unnecessary locks. Let me try and explain its point.

Clause 4(1)(m), which we debated last week, requires an automatic referendum if any amendment is moved to the Lisbon treaty, as it could be within the terms of that treaty, to alter the right of member states to ensure suspension of the legislative procedure. In Euro-speak, this is called the emergency brake and covers three areas of EU activity: social security, judicial co-operation and cross-border crime. It is the right of a member state to refer a matter where legislation is proposed in those areas to the European Council before the legislation can proceed any further. Britain supported emergency brakes in these areas in the passage of the Lisbon treaty. It did so because the previous Government thought that as regards social security, judicial co-operation and cross-border crime there might well be an argument in principle for more Europe. Indeed, there were compelling arguments for more Europe in this area but as a safeguard, just in case we did not like the look of the way things were going, we wanted to see how it worked. Therefore there was a need for an emergency brake.

The logic of this very pragmatic position is that if we find in future years that the European Community is doing a good job in these fields, we will be prepared to rid ourselves of that emergency brake provision. Those who are disposed by nature to see everything that the EU does as a threat will never believe that anything can work, but those of us who think that it can be an opportunity should be open-minded about the possibility of the changes that are provided for in the Lisbon treaty.

I argue that these three areas are issues that are not of the highest national importance, like whether we join the euro, but are of significant importance where change might be necessary in processes that the Government might want to agree to. However, the Bill will require an automatic referendum. Look at them: first, social security legislation, which, as we know, is tied up with the right to work, study, and settle for retirement wherever you want in the EU, which is one of its most appealing citizenship rights; secondly, judicial co-operation, which is essential if we are going to effectively tackle the terrorist threats of the kind that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, talked about earlier in his Statement on Osama bin Laden; and thirdly, cross-border crime, in terms of which we are all aware of the increasing problems of criminal gangs operated from outside the EU but often on its borders, in countries like Russia and some parts of the Balkans.

Surely we want to retain the flexibility to make Europe effective in those areas. That may require changes in these so-called emergency-brake provisions but, on a narrow but significant point, the Government are saying, “Oh no, we can’t do anything for at least seven years or so because we have to have a referendum and we are certainly not going to do anything about that this Parliament”. The argument from this side of the House is a different one: let us not tie ourselves up in these knots but have the confidence that in a representative democracy Parliament should deal with these questions; there is no place for a referendum on them.

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, I must apologise to the House and the Minister for having been unable to contribute to the debate on the Bill so far. I feel compelled to contribute at this point by the extraordinary speech of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle.

When the Government of the day brought the Lisbon treaty to this House, one of their proud claims was that they had protected the red lines that they had set out, including the red lines on areas such as social security and judicial co-operation, through the introduction of these emergency brakes. If legislation was brought forward in the European Union that was seen to be against our national interest in these areas, or against things that we could tolerate, we had the right to say, “We will not go along with this. We don’t think this should be applied to the UK”. Effectively, we have a veto. The other member states can proceed without us if they wish, but it gives us a cast-iron guarantee that in these very sensitive areas the EU cannot override the UK Parliament and the UK people in legislating in what are regarded as areas of national importance. For the noble Lord to say that we should now throw these emergency brakes away—

[Lord Liddle]

I am not saying that at all. I am saying that we should not tie ourselves up indefinitely in the need to have a referendum to make this change. That does not mean that I am in favour of immediate change in these things; I am not. But I want to hold open the possibility of flexibility in order that we can meet new circumstances if necessary.

[Lord Blackwell]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his clarification. However, he talks about trust, and I have to say to him that the reason why the British people have lost trust in politicians to represent them in Europe is that over many years they have seen politicians stand up and say, “Minor changes. These won’t affect you”, but cumulatively those changes have added up to a huge shift in powers.

These brakes were put in the treaty, which was agreed by Parliament. The noble Lord may not want to remove them this year, but when does he want to do it? If he wants to do it at some time, that would be a substantial weakening of the current treaties. In the spirit of the Bill, which I wholly support, I regard anything that removes a veto or anything akin to one as a major change to the treaty that should not be carried through by Government without the provisions of the Bill requiring that as a major change it should be put to the people in a referendum.

In his speech, the noble Lord attempted to confuse the House by suggesting that the referendum would make it difficult for the UK to use these powers. I should make it clear—the Minister can correct me if I am wrong—that nothing in the Bill requires a referendum for the UK to use, or not to use, the emergency brake. The Bill is entirely silent about the use of Articles 48, 82 and 83. It simply says that if the EU seeks to amend the terms of the treaties under which we can use those emergency brakes, that will require a referendum. Whether or not the use of the emergency brakes itself required a referendum would depend on the substance of the matter that was contemplated being brought forward under those provisions, which would fall under other aspects of the Bill.

Removing the subsection, as the noble Lord is attempting to do, would mean that at some point in time a future Government could give away these vetoes without requiring that to be brought back to the people. That is exactly the kind of action that has led to the loss of trust of people in politicians and, unfortunately, in this Parliament, to protect them in this matter.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

I am sorry that the noble Lord’s absence from earlier debates has not enabled him to catch up with where this debate has got to. Some of us were attempting to reduce sharply the number of provisions that require a referendum, for a number of reasons that are not the ones that the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, gave but are related, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, to whether or not you believe in representative parliamentary democracy and the powers of Parliament. A number of us who have done so have put forward amendments that would effectively leave in the Bill the strengthening from the ratification of Lisbon powers, which means simply that if these changes were to be made there would need to be a resolution in both Houses, but would leave intact in the Bill a requirement for primary legislation before Britain could agree to that. That would be a strengthening of parliamentary authority in areas such as this, which in any case require unanimity. The idea that there is not a lock there is completely aberrant. What there is not, if you follow the amendments, is a lock plus a referendum, and that is for principled reasons that I have briefly attempted to explain. I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but really and truly the situation is not quite as he suggests. Those of us who are trying to reduce the number of referendums are not trying to weaken the power of Parliament but to strengthen it.

[Lord Blackwell]

I thank the noble Lord for his intervention. Actually, I am fully aware of the nature of these amendments, all of which attempt to undermine the purpose of the Bill, which is to require a referendum if there is a major change to the treaties or a major shift in power. That is a principle that I fully support and which the noble Lord is attempting to undermine.

I hope that there will never be a referendum under the Bill because I hope that no Government will ever seek to transfer further power to the European Union in a way that would require the referendum requirement to be enacted. In hoping that we will never have such a referendum, I probably agree with the noble Lord. However, if we are going to restore the trust of the people of this country in the EU, we have to give them the cast-iron guarantees that the Bill provides and not undermine it in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, seeks to do.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

I seek some clarification on the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle. It seems to wish to get rid of three emergency brakes but leave in place the one that includes the common foreign and security policy. That seems somewhat inconsistent; the noble Lord has mentioned several areas of co-operation where he believes it would be important, if the EU were to proceed in a manner that would be conducive to our interests, for us to do so. I suggest that the common foreign and security policy would be one area in which we have rather more expansive interests than in those of social security, judicial co-operation and cross-border crime.

Since the noble Lord gave a few examples, may I caution him on, for example, judicial co-operation? He thought that it may well be essential to have improved judicial co-operation if we are to tackle terrorist threats. That is an important point, but I also urge caution regarding the other direction. It is not that long ago that in this House the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, my noble friend Lord Carlile, warned us regarding the proposals for 60 days’ detention without charge that the previous Government wished to introduce. We must not go in the direction of the French legal system, for example, under which people have been interned for several years without charge. It cuts both ways: we may want enhanced co-operation but we may well not want it.

The previous Government negotiated the treaty and put in the emergency brakes. It is unclear what these moves would achieve and why that change of position has come about. Will the noble Lord reassure me on my understanding, which is that the Bill does not require a referendum before the EU can act in areas where the emergency brake exists? Co-operation is a good thing which can benefit the UK, but I thought that this was about making it clear to the British people that a referendum would be required if there is a move to abandon these important safeguards. Can the noble Lord explain what has caused this quite significant change in thinking?

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[Lord Brittan of Spennithorne]

I am not making any statement about whether or not any particular provision was codification. I am talking about the correct interpretation of this provision in this Bill with regard to the future, which determines whether or not a referendum is called on the question. The test is an objective one: whether what occurs in future amounts to a codification, however it has been achieved, or goes beyond a codification and involves a change in the law. It is as simple as that.

[Lord Blackwell]

This is the one amendment this evening with which I confess that I have some sympathy. My interpretation of Clause 4(4)(a) is that it talks about the codification of practice under an existing competence. It does not talk about the codification of an existing competence but the codification of practice. As my noble friend Lord Waddington said, the EU has a history of stretching the practice of exercises of competence to take on ways of applying it that may not have originally been envisaged by those who agreed to the competence in the treaty. The example burnt in my mind is the notorious use of the health and safety provision to legislate from the EU on UK employment law a decade or so ago.

[Lord Brittan of Spennithorne]

I assure my noble friend that whether or not that is a good thing or a bad thing—I have a lot of sympathy with the view that excesses happened there—by no wild stretch of the imagination could that be described in English law, and we are in the process of creating a British statute, as codification. It might be wonderful; it might be disastrous; it might be neither; but it is not codification and therefore the provision would not apply.

[Lord Blackwell]

I said that I had some sympathy with the amendment, and I very much hope that the Minister will be able to reassure me. To my mind, that was an example of a practice coming into effect which could then be claimed was an existing practice that simply needed to be codified. I am not a lawyer, but if something can be done under an existing competence, why does it need to be codified? The EU already has the power to do what it needs. If something is then codified, the danger is that it creates a new base, or ratchets up the base, from which we can then have further ingenious development in practices. I am therefore very nervous about allowing codification of this sort to take place when, if the EU is already doing it, codification does not seem to be needed. I would very much welcome the Minister explaining and perhaps thinking again about whether that exemption is required in the Bill.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I will now argue against the amendment on substance, having dealt with the ancient history to which we were all subjected previously; I do not want to go back on that.

A common-sense application to the amendment would lead one to regard it as bizarre. The object appears to be to ensure that if the European Union, with the agreement of the British Government—which is required under unanimity—conducted an act of genuine codification, we would have a jolly referendum about it. All I can say is that if noble Lords really want to go around this country stirring up apathy about the codification of some obscure piece of European law, common sense has flown out of the window.

The amendment is being moved, and support for it being given, on the basis of fear that a British Government will not know enough about the process to distinguish between a real codification and—in the parlance of noble Lords who support the amendment—competence creep. It is not sensible to add to the 56 other matters, to increase the number of referendums on a subject on which it is frankly just not credible that you could have a sensible political campaign involving the whole electorate of this country. I am not in favour of that.

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[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, the intention of the amendment is to provide the scope for further adjustments to the trade arrangements and the powers of the Commissioner dealing with trade arrangements, given that Commissioners who have dealt with trade arrangements have expressed their anxiety about the limitations that have been placed on them during the negotiations in these trade rounds. It is entirely possible—it may be part of the noble Lord’s point—that these powers exist in any case and can be handled in any case. However, the experience of the difficulty in making progress leads me to believe that there may on occasions be adjustments that would make the process easier, more helpful and capable of moving faster.

My point is not that these are all world-shattering changes—they may be small changes. The scope to make those changes, to respond to circumstances, seems to me to be a power that would strengthen the people of the United Kingdom and strengthen the EU rather than weaken the people of the United Kingdom.

[Lord Blackwell]

I confess that I am having some difficulty following the noble Lord’s argument on this point and I wonder whether he can help me. As my noble friend Lord Lamont has said, the EU already has exclusive competence in the area of international agreements. It has competence over the single market. It has competence over regulation. It can legislate in these areas using the normal provisions of the EU—that is what the competence gives it; that is under the existing treaty—so we are not talking about stopping it legislating. I am trying to understand what it is the noble Lord thinks might require treaty change to enable the EU to do something; and why, if it requires treaty change, that will not in any case take several years to accomplish, in the way that treaty changes normally do. I fail to understand what is the restriction to act in areas where the EU already has competence.