Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill
Lord Bishop of Portsmouth Excerpts(1 day, 8 hours ago)
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The Lord Bishop of Portsmouth
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 193A, 193B and 193C and declare my interest as chair of the National Society for Education. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, for her support of Amendments 193A and 193B. I will address these two first and together.
These two amendments are about good communication. They would require the chief inspector to include the relevant religious body along with the academy proprietor and the Secretary of State when a report is circulated at the conclusion of an inspection of a multi-academy trust that contains a school with a religious foundation. For example, in the case of the Church of England, the relevant body would be the Diocesan Board of Education.
Under the DBE Measure 2021, DBEs have a range of duties and powers, including advice-giving, data analysis and information gathering in relation to their schools and academies. Timely receipt of a multi-academy trust’s inspection report will enable the fulfilment of these duties and powers.
I seek the Minister’s assurance that these straightforward amendments, enabling good communication and the delivery of statutory duty, will find their way into the Bill.
Amendment 193C in my name would ensure that where multi-academy trusts contain schools with a religious designation, these are inspected on and held to account for their ethos, religious education and collective worship.
At present, over 42% of Church of England’s schools are academies, amounting to over 20% of all academies in England. When we include Roman Catholic academies and those with other religious foundations, the total percentage rises still further to approximately one-third of the entire academy estate.
All these academies will fall under the proposed new requirement for the inspection of multi-academy trusts. However, at present there is no provision for the specialist denominational inspection of those multi-academy trusts that have direct responsibility for the leadership and governance of academies with a religious foundation. This contrasts markedly with current arrangements, in which individual schools and academies with a religious foundation are inspected by the relevant religious body under Section 48 of the Education Act 2005 and by the contractual provisions of an academy’s funding agreement.
There is no provision within the Bill as drafted which would mirror Section 48 provision and deliver expert, individual, school-based evaluation and accountability for multi-academy trusts containing schools of a religious character and foundation. This is an omission or oversight with potential to affect adversely the quality of accountability and inspection for approximately a third of the academy estate.
Amendment 193C addresses this omission by seeking to mirror current Section 48 provision and good practice for multi-academy trusts containing schools with a religious foundation. Led by the inspectorates of religious bodies such as the Statutory Inspection of Anglican and Methodist Schools, inspections would combine, as they do most effectively today, the application of expert religious knowledge with inspection expertise to ensure that the accountability regime for the proprietors of academies includes all significant elements of the life, leadership and governance of schools in their purview. I thank the Minister for engaging with key partners in educational delivery within the National Society for Education and the Catholic Education Service ahead of this debate. I trust that the Government will continue to work with us to find a way forward and to address this omission.
To conclude, Amendments 193A and 193B are intended as friendly, simple, straightforward insertions to enhance lines of communication and to keep the relevant religious body informed when one of its schools is inspected. On Amendment 193C, however, I remain deeply concerned that, without the provision outlined in the amendment in my name, providers of schools of religious character will be left with wholly inadequate inspection arrangements. This is an entirely avoidable state of affairs which, if unaddressed, as I said in earlier comments, will affect approximately a third of the academy estate and represent a backward step from current inspection arrangements under Section 48 of the Education Act 2005. Can the Minister give assurances that she will bring forward proposals to address the omission I identify and work with the National Society for Education and the Catholic Education Service to bring forward proposals or pilots that address our concerns prior to Third Reading?
Baroness Spielman (Con)
My Lords, a substantial new chapter is being added to the Bill on Report by the Government’s Amendment 193, which provides for the inspection of multi-academy trusts. This has considerable significance for the regulation of all academies, and I must therefore make some wider points before I turn to Amendments 193D and 193E in the name of my noble friend Lady Barran, to which I have put my name. I must also declare my interest as a former Ofsted chief inspector who has advocated strongly for MAT inspection for many years.
Everyone is familiar with school inspection. For more than 30 years, this was unequivocally framed by government as a public accountability mechanism to defend the interests of children and parents. The very last strands of support activity were removed from Ofsted more than a decade ago so as to avoid any blurring. Published inspection judgments and reports with real consequences are a powerful regulatory force, precisely because they have real traction. This model has long been the subject of relentless hostility and efforts to undermine it by some within the sector.
But the law relating to school inspections has not kept pace with the evolution of sector structures over the past 20 years. The academy trust model, which now goes back 20 years, places legal responsibility for a school unequivocally with the trust board, not with a school-level governing body or an individual head teacher. Successive Governments chose to keep inspection to school level while evolving a separate regulatory approach for trusts. That separate approach broadly consists of private review within DfE of published and other data and periodic private discussion between each MAT and the DfE regulatory team, with escalation to Ministers where necessary. In the main, trust-level concerns are dealt with privately, except where the most serious failings justify terminating a funding agreement or acting against an individual. This mechanism is highly susceptible to producer capture of government —I know of more than a few examples—and it creates an imbalance; it feels unfair to many heads and those beneath them, as individual schools are publicly reported on.
There is also no clear dividing line between schools and trusts. Trusts may choose to centralise many activities, including the choice of curriculum, lesson planning, teacher training and professional development, assessment, pastoral approaches and behaviour policies as well as back-office functions. A centralised MAT with 60 schools will have around 15 inspections a year. In each of these, inspectors must ask questions about decisions, some of which are not taken at school level, to form a rounded view of the quality of education and safeguarding in the school. A judgment of school quality may have to encompass aspects that are not under the control of a head teacher, which of course feels unfair to those heads. The current model also makes it particularly hard for government to intervene when a MAT is slightly underperforming across the board but no one school is severely failing. All this makes clear that a refresh is sorely needed, and here I am only repeating what I have said publicly in the past. I genuinely welcome the Government’s decision to act.
Turning to the detail, Clause 193 in effect creates a skeleton containing the powers and obligations to put in a system of MAT inspection, but no policy proposals have been published to explain the set of purposes. MAT inspections may be purely to facilitate accountability to government and to justify inspections at MAT level. They may be intended to increase transparency for parents. They may be intended to function partly or entirely as a support mechanism for trusts. But we do not know. Nor do we know how they are intended to interact with school inspections, whose purposes have also become blurred. The Government no longer link defined consequences to overall inspection judgments, which I believe, and hear from many, has increased uncertainty and anxiety in the school sector.
The Government have also not clarified whether the policy purposes of school inspections have changed. I infer that true education quality is not the highest priority for the Government because they have accepted the current school inspection approach, which has startlingly removed all but a cursory scrutiny of education itself so as to make more time for specific government priorities such as attendance, belonging and now, of course, mobile phone policy enforcement. In so doing, government and Ofsted have intentionally, and in my view unwisely, made themselves blind to all the many ways that good education can be limited and compromised if school quality judgments are predicated too narrowly on outcomes. This watering down of school inspection makes it even more important that the MAT inspection model is well conceived, well defined, well understood and likely to be fully effective. It is also highly desirable for the judgments to be made independently of Ministers if they are to have the legitimacy that they need as a basis for government intervention.
That brings me to Amendments 193D and 193E. First, these amendments seek to ensure that the necessary work of consultation, piloting and reporting is done before the new sections are commenced and the full inspection regime begins. This period could be used to calibrate the range of judgments needed and the corresponding range of regulatory interventions, and to clarify the purposes. The thresholds also need to be tested against realistic system improvement capacity so that this can be allocated effectively.
Secondly, the amendments aim to create a coherent overall model that reflects the multi-level nature of MATs as well as the variety of organisational models that they deploy. One trust may operate in a highly integrated way, with all major decisions and the finances controlled centrally and local head teachers focused on effective implementation of the central model; another trust—including many of the faith trusts—may operate a highly devolved model, leaving most matters to heads and determining only aspects of faith-related provision and, perhaps, core administrative systems and processes. At the moment, there is only limited evidence on the relative effectiveness of different models, at least as far as I know. The trust inspection may generate some good evidence but, in the absence of stronger evidence, inspections should not force MATs into a particular operating model, as I know some fear.
Thirdly, the amendments ensure that inspection takes account of a MAT’s ability to manage schools efficiently, as well as their education quality and other direct child-facing aspects. This has the potential to simplify and to unify the regulatory arrangements for trusts. There are parallels with the model used in the Netherlands, which has structures similar to multi-academy trusts. There does need to be join-up in the regulatory system. It is hard for government to make and sustain decisions if it is getting conflicting messages from different strands of monitoring. I hesitate to say it, but overall judgments have their place.
Finally, I would value the Minister’s assurance that she will make it explicit that the conception of quality against which inspection is carried out should be grounded in a strong evidential foundation, in trusts as in schools, and that the regulatory framework should be revised whenever the accumulation of evidence points towards a change.