Children and Families Bill

Debate between Lord Bishop of Chester and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Monday 21st October 2013 Grand Committee

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I have to say that in my experience as a family judge, speaking perhaps as the only family judge present, although of course the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is a family magistrate, those judges would be issuing care proceedings immediately and removing the child while they debated whether the issue could be concluded in favour of the local authority’s view at the care hearing. On the interim care proceedings I have no doubt about the protection issues. Based on this, they would remove the child.

It is also interesting to note that despite some very strong attacks by two well known and respected family academic lawyers, another well respected family academic lawyer, Andrew Bainham, a reader in family law at Cambridge, has gone exactly the wrong way and has taken the view that the Supreme Court was right.

The last point I want to make is this: are we really right to change the point at which the threshold should be crossed, something on which seven Supreme Court judges have reached a conclusion with the greatest possible care? I urge the Committee not to do so.

[The Lord Bishop of Chester]

My Lords, at the risk of lowering the tone of this extraordinarily learned exchange, in the church we face a similar issue when trying to discern when someone poses a potential risk but nothing can be proved. It is a difficult line to establish. In the drafting of this amendment, my eye has been caught by the juxtaposition of the words “likely” and “possible”. I wonder whether there is a better way of phrasing it. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, used the word “might” at one point, but interestingly then corrected herself and said “was likely to”. There is a real difference between someone being assessed as “might” be a threat and “is likely to” be a threat. I think that I come down on the side of the noble and learned Baroness. However, it is good to know that the lawyers have only two views in these situations.

If this comes back, I hope that we will be able to look at the phraseology. To deduce that something is “likely” from a certain level of possibility seems to carry a stigma that we should not attach unless we really have to do so.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Debate between Lord Bishop of Chester and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Monday 8th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord across the Chamber. I want to make a brief point to the noble Lord, Lord Lester. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, had asked for the phrase, “traditional marriage”, the point made would have some benefit and would be something that we should perhaps take into account. But the amendment refers to “same sex couples” and “opposite sex couples”, so how on earth can anyone suggest anywhere that one sort of couple is better than another sort of couple? They just happen to be different—different and equal. So I cannot see how the noble Lord, Lord Lester, can make the point that one group will be downgraded because they are the same sex and another will not be downgraded because they are opposite. That is not an argument that can be used in the present wording—very clever and careful wording, if I may respectfully say so—of the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.

[The Lord Bishop of Chester]

My Lords, I find myself asking, what would actually change in the Bill if we accepted the amendment? As I understand it, there would be recognition of difference yet equal treatment of the two types of couple. That is what would happen. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Lester, who we all respect so greatly, is it the case that the couples would not be regarded equally when, in fact, the treatment of the couples would be exactly equal in law? The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, made a similar point. Would accepting the amendment of noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—there are two Lord Mackays now in the House—accord either of these forms of marriage a superior status, as was alleged? I do not see that on the face of the Bill. It simply accepts a certain difference.

Behind this lies a seductive aspect of the Equality Act itself, that any differentiation amid the protected characteristics is all the same. Therefore, the difference between a woman of childbearing age and a woman beyond childbearing age is just the same as the difference between a man and a woman. That is plainly not the case. There is a greater distinction between a man and a woman biologically than between a woman of childbearing age and one who is not. An element of recognition of difference within equal treatment in law is entirely consistent with the purposes of the Bill.