Withdrawal Agreement (Windsor Framework and Governance) (Amendment) Regulations 2026

Lord Bew Excerpts

Monday 14th September 2026 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Baroness Twycross) (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise to noble Lords for the delay to the start of these proceedings. I will begin by setting out the background to this instrument. It concerns the governance arrangements for the Windsor Framework and Northern Ireland’s trading arrangements, and the UK/EU withdrawal agreement.

First and foremost, the instrument takes forward and supports certain commitments the Government made in response to the independent review of the Windsor Framework that was conducted by my noble friend Lord Murphy of Torfaen and published at the end of 2024. It does so by providing greater flexibility in the process for the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Democratic Scrutiny Committee to scrutinise regulations that are applicable under the Windsor Framework. It also clarifies the statutory obligations of Northern Ireland departments to support the committee by providing it with responses to reasonable requests for information.

Secondly, the instrument helps facilitate the Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee to use written procedure to adopt decisions or recommendations such as those in relation to the Windsor Framework, which is, of course, a crucial element of the withdrawal agreement. This will keep the governance arrangements of the withdrawal agreement working effectively, particularly where we need to keep rules that apply in Great Britain and Northern Ireland in step.

I will now explain in more detail how the instrument meets its purposes, which are threefold. First, in response to recommendations made by the independent review of the Windsor Framework, the Government committed to providing greater flexibility to the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee in examining and considering EU legislation relevant to Northern Ireland. The committee plays a valuable role in scrutinising regulations relevant to Northern Ireland. Its reports and engagement with affected stakeholders inform the work of government, just as they will inform the work of many Members of the Assembly. These changes to Schedule 6B to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 are aimed at providing the Assembly with greater latitude in conducting its work within a two-month window following the publication of relevant EU Acts, if it wishes to use it.

A timeframe for the scrutiny of EU Acts under the Windsor Framework is provided for in law so that everyone is clear—MLAs, businesses and civil society—about how the process works and what the impacts of those enactments are. Currently, the committee has five working days to vote on whether to hold an inquiry into a replacement EU Act. If an inquiry is held, a report must be produced no later than 15 working days before the end of the two-month scrutiny period, which begins the day the EU publishes the Act in its Official Journal. This instrument gives the committee greater flexibility by expanding the inquiry decision window to 10 working days and alters the publication deadline for inquiry reports to no later than 12 working days before the end of the scrutiny period. These changes will allow the committee greater latitude to choose how to run its inquiries, take evidence and report on them.

Secondly, the instrument takes account of the need to ensure continuing, effective governance arrangements that are fit for the future. This future includes the three new agreements we are seeking to take forward with the EU on SPS, electricity and emissions trading. This change is made by omitting Section 15C of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. This will allow the UK to agree to decisions and recommendations at the joint committee between meetings in a process known as written procedure. In effect, this will revert the arrangements to how they were when the withdrawal agreement was first agreed, as this mechanism has always been contained within the treaty text. It will enhance the UK’s ability to take necessary decisions without having to wait for a meeting of the Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee, which typically happens only once or twice a year.

As with the changes to the Democratic Scrutiny Committee’s procedures that I have already set out, written procedure will be an optional flexibility and will not be utilised for every decision. The effect will be to enable the Government to ensure, where there are EU regulatory obligations applicable in Great Britain, that Northern Ireland can keep pace. This could also, for example, cover urgent measures needed to protect the smooth operation of Northern Ireland’s dual market access and its place within the UK market.

I emphasise that these changes do not amend the process of scrutinising those decisions where the Government maintain obligations to Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. The process remains as it is today, including where it is provided for in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and in the Government’s EU scrutiny arrangements with the European Affairs Committee and the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee. By removing this restriction, the governance of the withdrawal agreement will be aligned with that of the trade and co-operation agreement, which has no similar restriction on the use of written procedure. As with the EU-UK Partnership Council, which was established under the trade and co-operation agreement, the joint committee would still remain the default forum for UK-EU decision-making in relation to the withdrawal agreement and continue to meet, just as the Partnership Council does.

Finally, the instrument provides for and clarifies the responsibilities that Northern Ireland departments and Ministers are already under to the Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee. This is aimed at supporting the work of the Democratic Scrutiny Committee and the governance arrangements of which it forms part. This instrument clarifies the duty on those authorities to comply with a reasonable request for information from the committee, and that such a request should not be regarded as unreasonable solely on the ground that a Northern Ireland department or Minister lacks primary responsibility for the EU Act in question. This change is made in response to recommendations in the independent review on how Northern Ireland departments should be empowered to provide evidence to and support the committee.

I also note, for completeness, that the instrument makes some technical amendments to existing legislation. Specifically, it amends outdated references within the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, so that these now refer to the Windsor Framework. This minor change provides clarity and aligns UK domestic legislation with the international context.

In conclusion, this instrument demonstrates the Government’s commitment to implementing the recommendations of the independent review of the Windsor Framework, to ensure that Northern Ireland’s trading arrangements work well, and to take the practical steps necessary as we build a stronger relationship with the EU, from which Northern Ireland will benefit and which will deliver the good growth that we wish to see in every postcode. I beg to move.

[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome this SI and am grateful to the Minister for introducing it so effectively and carefully. It is part of a process in which the Windsor Framework becomes more centre stage and the withdrawal agreement takes a step back. This is a vital process: the core of the Windsor Framework is to introduce more suppleness in facing up to the difficult question of Brexit. It is not perfect and there are many, many imperfections, but I think—this might not be a bad day to say it, following the meeting of the First Minister of Northern Ireland and the First Ministers of Wales and Scotland in Cardiff—that there is a danger, within Northern Ireland, of not coming to terms with the fact that the Windsor Framework has actually effected positive changes, and that this is part of the process.

A long time ago, there was a taskforce report following the 1985 Hillsborough agreement, signed by Margaret Thatcher—the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, will remember this. That was far more threatening and destabilising in its impact on Northern Ireland than anything in the Windsor Framework or the initial withdrawal agreement. The taskforce report represented a conclusion involving the two main unionist parties, after some period of rather sterile activism against the United Kingdom Government. It said that there was no set security or sanity in the junior partner in the United Kingdom being permanently estranged from the senior partner. The period since Brexit has opened up a similar period of estrangement, and it is time that this came to an end.

The crucial thing about the Windsor Framework, as underlined by the Minister’s remarks, is that it moves away from the very problematic commitment in the withdrawal Act that the British Government would foster an all-Ireland economy. How you would do that I was never quite sure, by the way, because the all-Ireland economy is based on a model condemned by Piketty, Krugman and Stiglitz—all Nobel Prize winners in economics—which is basically one of low tax for incoming American firms. It is difficult to do anyway. The point is that the Windsor Framework unhooks the British Government from a commitment to further the all-Ireland economy. In that sense, given the problematic aspect of the withdrawal agreement, many difficulties and flaws remain, but I welcome the fact that the Minister has come today and, essentially, refreshed certain aspects of the Windsor Framework. I am grateful to the Minister for her introduction.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, I am deeply grateful for being given permission to take part in this debate. I welcome these regulations, like I have welcomed the Windsor Framework on many occasions, because it deals with special arrangements to prevent a hard border on the island of Ireland. I do not want to see borders anywhere between the UK and Ireland and between Northern Ireland and Britain. Therefore, it is important that the challenges and impediments presented by the Windsor Framework are ironed out—hence the appointment 18 months ago by the then Secretary of State, Hilary Benn, of the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, to deal with particular issues regarding implementation.

The noble Lord was fairly circumscribed in what he could do, but some of those recommendations looked at democratic scrutiny and the democratic deficit. He also proposed that Assembly Members on the Democratic Scrutiny Committee would have a greater amount of time for scrutiny. A committee that I am a member of, the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee, met the Democratic Scrutiny Committee on several occasions and it raised with us the lack of time that it has been given to do scrutiny, so I was very pleased when the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, proposed that the instrument would extend by five days the time by which that Democratic Scrutiny Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly must vote on whether to hold an inquiry. That recommendation was accepted by the Government and now we are giving it legal effect. I welcome that.

I also ask this of my noble friend the Minister. Our Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee and the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, proposed a hub. I note that I am sitting beside my noble friend Lady Anderson, who has met me on that specific issue to seek an update on the hub. How far is it progressing and what work has been done already? When will there be a report to the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee and to your Lordships’ Chamber on the progress that has been made? In summary, I support this instrument and the changes that it seeks to introduce as they will bring greater accountability from the work carried out by the Democratic Scrutiny Committee.

Social Media: News

Lord Bew Excerpts

Thursday 11th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bew (CB)]

My Lords, I add my thanks to those of other noble Lords to my noble friend Lady Kidron for initiating this debate. I begin by declaring an interest as chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which has a particular interest in this subject, as the role of social media took up a large part of the report that we produced before Christmas at the Prime Minister’s request on intimidation in public life.

For the committee’s review and publication of the report on intimidation in public life, we were interested in the role of social media companies in relation to illegal content, particularly threats of violence and illegal hate speech, such as racist abuse. Let me say straightaway that we recognised that, in many respects, social media is a force for good and democratic expression and is a democratising force in our public life. It promotes in many important respects engagement with politics. None the less, the scale of the problem which confronted us disturbed us. We had to come to terms with the fact that the legislative framework governing the responsibility of social media platforms is based on the EU e-commerce directive of 2000, which was framed well before social media companies and online news platforms existed in their present form, when they were essentially fledgling bodies.

The e-commerce directive shields companies from liability for illegal content where they are simply “hosts” and where their relationship to content is “technical, automatic or passive”. This exemption from liability requires that the company does not have knowledge of the illegal content, and takes it down expeditiously if it becomes aware of it. This formed the basis for what is known as the “notice and takedown” model. Our committee took the view that it is no longer appropriate to see social media companies as mere platforms. These companies choose the format in which users can post content and they curate that content, using algorithms to analyse and select content, including for commercial benefit. This is well beyond the role of a passive host. But nor are they publishers which should be held fully responsible for all their content, because they do not approve every item that appears on their platform and they do not create the content themselves.

Our committee concluded from this that we need new categories and new ways of thinking about this problem that go beyond the platform/publisher distinction; that we need to think properly about the role and responsibility of social media companies; that there should certainly be a shift in the liability towards social media companies for illegal material; and that the Government should bring forward legislation so to do. I have to say, when the committee started work on this, this was not a conclusion that was in our minds, but it was a function of our many discussions during the period of work on that document.

This shift in liability could be for particular types of content, or could be based on how difficult or how expensive automatic monitoring or removal of types of content is. As my committee made clear in our report, to address intimidation will require all those in public life—this is broadly across the problem of intimidation—to come together and work constructively.

I am very grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester for mentioning my next point. Our committee also agrees with her that the BCS, the Chartered Institute for IT, which is convening discussions between the social media companies and the political parties to think about solutions to online abuse and its effect on the democratic process, is doing valuable work. The Committee on Standards in Public Life fully supports that work.