Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Avebury

Monday 10th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, the new clause proposed by the first amendment in this group would remove the restriction whereby an appeal against the refusal of asylum can be brought only where the person has been granted leave to enter or remain for more than 12 months. Noble Lords will be aware that unaccompanied children who are refused asylum are granted humanitarian protection or discretionary leave for periods of three years or until they reach the age of 17, whichever is the shorter, on the basis that they cannot be sent back to their country of origin. Bearing in mind that the UKBA takes months and sometimes years to decide whether to grant humanitarian protection in lieu of asylum, the child might arrive at the age of 15 or even earlier, might be refused asylum at the age of 16 and might still have to apply for discretionary leave to remain for a period that would make the total more than 12 months before appealing against the refusal.

I take it that there are very few refusals of the extension of discretionary leave, as almost all unaccompanied asylum-seeking children will have had no contact with family in their country of origin and therefore will still be ineligible for return when they reach the age of 17. The effect of the provision in the 2002 Act is to delay the permanent settlement of these children in the UK, making it harder for them to access the whole range of public services, including further and higher education, so that their economic and social potential is less than it would be if and ultimately when they become permanent residents of this country.

My noble kinsman said on 4 July 2012, in col. 710, that it was an “unfortunate consequence” of the otherwise very sensible 12-month restriction. He gave an assurance that the policy as it affects children would be reviewed. I was looking forward to hearing the outcome of that review at this stage of the Bill. It seemed to me that the Bill could only confirm the unfortunate consequences, as my noble kinsman called them, and that the Government would explain how they would eliminate them. Instead, my noble friend Lord Taylor told me in a letter of 20 November:

“We have considered this matter very carefully and have concluded that no change in current practice is appropriate”.

He stated, quite inaccurately, as I see it, that the,

“amendment would undermine the intention of the existing appeals framework, namely, to prevent multiple appeals that result in significant cost to the taxpayer”.

Those who are recognised as refugees will not need any second appeal, but the children and trafficked persons in question will get no appeal at all until they face removal—something that, had their case been decided correctly at the outset, they would never have faced. My noble friend says that the young persons affected by Clause 83(1),

“are on the cusp of adulthood, and … the detrimental impact of any delay in an appeal right arising is less severe than it would be for children of a younger age”.

I think the opposite is true, because younger children tend to accept the situations they face as a result of adult decisions, but as they approach maturity they can recognise deliberate unfairness inflicted on them by authority. I would like to know whether my noble friend sought the advice of experts such as the Children’s Society before he expressed that opinion or whether it was ex cathedra.

Does his review cover trafficked persons, who are granted leave for one year following a determination through the national referral mechanism set up by the Government to identify and support victims of trafficking in the UK? That process was established in pursuance of the Government’s obligation to identify victims under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Human Trafficking. Article 14 of the convention provides that a victim of trafficking shall be granted a residence permit, which will be without prejudice to the right to seek and enjoy asylum. That seems to imply that the 12-month residence permit granted to trafficked persons would not debar them from submitting an asylum claim. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how this can be squared with Section 83(1).

I turn to the second of the new clauses. The purpose is to remove the statutory presumption that a country other than a person’s country of nationality is a safe country to which a person seeking asylum can be removed simply because the Secretary of State asserts that it is a safe country. A safe country is one where the person will not be persecuted and from which he or she will not be refouled in contravention of the refugee convention or the European Convention on Human Rights.

Section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 establishes a scheme whereby persons seeking asylum may be precluded from a right of appeal against the refusal of asylum unless and until they have left the UK, including where this may mean returning to their home country or to a third country that the Secretary of State asserts to be safe. Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 limits what the asylum seeker can argue on a judicial review about the safety of the third country.

Section 94(8) creates a statutory presumption that, when the Secretary of State asserts that a country other than the person’s home country is safe, it is presumed that in that country the asylum seeker will not face persecution for a refugee convention reason and will not face being returned to a country in which he or she does face persecution for a refugee convention reason. The statutory presumption seeks to oust the jurisdiction of a court to consider the correctness of the Secretary of State’s opinion as to the safety of such a country.

The provisions of Schedule 3, which the new clause proposes to delete, require a court dealing with a judicial review relating to a removal to make presumptions of safety. For example, paragraph 3(2) states:

“A State to which this Part applies shall be treated, in so far as relevant to the question mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), as a place … where a person's life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.

In the case of NS, the claimant asylum-seeker had sought judicial review of his third country return to Greece. Whereas the Administrative Court in England and Wales had been concerned as to the conditions in Greece, it considered itself bound by previous authority to uphold the UK Border Agency decision to return NS to Greece. The Court of Appeal referred the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union. That Court concluded, in the context of European Union arrangements for safe third country returns within the European Union, under what are often referred to as the Dublin Regulations, that,

“to require a conclusive presumption of compliance with fundamental rights … could be regarded as undermining the safeguards which are intended to ensure compliance with fundamental rights by the European Union and its Member States. That would be the case, inter alia, with regard to a provision which laid down that certain States are ‘safe countries’ with regard to compliance with fundamental rights, if that provision had to be interpreted as constituting a conclusive presumption, not admitting of any evidence to the contrary”.

The presumptions in Section 94(8) and the paragraphs of Schedule 3 seek to be such provisions, and accordingly ought to be removed.

Greece is not the only safe country where these presumptions may be unfounded. Section 94 allows the Secretary of State to list not only countries that are safe, but countries that are safe for a given description of persons. Thus a number of African countries are designated as safe for men, so that women threatened with return to those countries still have an in-country right of appeal. However, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual people, who suffer relentless cultural, social and even legal pressures and persecution in more or less the same list plus Jamaica, have no such right.

In the case of HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon), which was dealt with in the Supreme Court in 2010, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, spoke about the,

“rampant homophobic teaching that right-wing evangelical Christian churches indulge in throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa”.

It was lucky for HT that he did not come from one of the countries designated as safe such as Malawi where, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out, two gay men who celebrated their engagement had recently been sentenced to 14 years in prison. If those men had sought asylum in the UK, their claim would have been treated as unfounded and they would have had no right of appeal. Curiously enough, two lesbians in the same circumstances would have had a right of appeal, since Malawi is treated as a safe country for men only in Section 94.

If the Government are not prepared to accept this amendment, the least they could do is to make the list in Section 94(4) correspond with the reality of persecution on account of sexual orientation as well as gender, which can be done by order. My noble kinsman replying to a similar amendment at Committee, claimed that an appeal after removal was a satisfactory remedy for those removed to a “safe country”. Could the Minister tell your Lordships how many people who were removed after claiming asylum from a supposedly safe country on the basis of their sexual orientation managed to appeal from abroad, and in how many of those cases they were successful? I know that the Government are very well aware of the widespread persecution of LGBT people, so I assume that they will have kept records of these cases, although I do not expect the Minister to be able to produce them on the spot.

I turn to the third new clause. The purpose is to ensure that an appeal is not treated as abandoned when leave to remain is granted to the appellant. The situation at the moment is that under the provisions sought to be left out of Section 104 of the 2002 Act, this happens automatically, and the result is that the tribunal is prevented from reaching judgments on points of principle that are dealt with in the case. It can happen that a series of cases, all turning on the same principle, are aborted by the Secretary of State in this way, contrary to the interests of justice.

In the case of Osman Omar, the judgment handed down on 29 November 2012 by Mr Justice Beatson addressed this issue. He resisted attempts by the Secretary of State to argue that the claim was redundant in that she had already granted the claimant further leave to remain. He ruled, in effect, that the Secretary of State cannot keep knocking cases out by settling them on the facts and refusing to litigate on the point of principle. As Mr Justice Beatson said:

“The substantive issue raised by the claimant is an issue which arises regularly. It arose in Francis. It will arise in the case of Ahmed ... which, as I have stated, is listed for hearing at the end of January 2013”.

Therefore, the challenge in these particular cases is to the vires of the regulations, which provide for a fee to be payable for an extension of discretionary leave, but with no discretion for the Secretary of State to waive it in the case of an applicant who seeks leave on human rights grounds but cannot afford the fee because he is either destitute or in receipt only of NASS support. I hope the Minister will agree that it is important for this question to be determined, and that in cases of this kind, it is common sense to leave the matter to the tribunal. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I have a good deal of sympathy with the noble Lord’s first amendment, but am not perhaps quite as persuaded by the subsequent amendments. However, in any event I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for his consistent concern with the problems of a particularly vulnerable group in our society and his very powerful advocacy on their behalf. He has obviously seized the opportunity to bring that concern into this Bill. I object less to that spatchcocking than I did to the previous amendment moved by the Minister in relation to burglary, but perhaps it is not the best forum in which to take these matters forward. I hope that the Minister can go a little further than he appears to have done in correspondence with the noble Lord and at least indicate that this whole area should be reviewed. It is some time since we have had a proper debate around the particularly delicate issues to which the noble Lord referred. While it is probably the case that this is not a matter to be voted on today, it should not be neglected indefinitely and ought to be considered.

Perhaps the Minister could indicate that discussions, not in respect of Third Reading but more generally, could take place around these and allied issues in connection with asylum and immigration matters where they impinge on the presence or otherwise in our country of people who have fled persecution and danger elsewhere, in a context that is outside the legislative framework for the time being. That might be a way forward in which a broad consensus could be reached across the House rather than dealing with it in terms of the amendments that are before us today. Again, I pay tribute to the noble Lord for raising these matters. I hope that can be seen as a first step and not the last step in a process of looking at the issue.