Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Armstrong of Ilminster and Lord Butler of Brockwell

Thursday 17th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, having supported the Minister on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, may I now say to him that he is being unnecessarily negative about this? He has explained why he thinks the amendment is unnecessary, but he has not explained what the positive arguments are against it. It seems to me that it can only be helpful. Unless there is some positive reason for rejecting the amendment, I would urge him to consider again before Report. The problem is that we cannot repeat this amendment exactly on Report, and it would be difficult to improve on the wording already suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I ask the Minister whether he could consider again the idea that this amendment is designed to be very helpful to the Government. The fact that it may not, in the Government’s view, be strictly necessary, does not seem to me a convincing argument as to why it should be rejected.

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)]

My Lords, we are talking about what the Secretary of State considers. I wonder whether the difficulty could be resolved if the Minister were to state formally, on the record in Hansard, that the Secretary of State must consider that,

“for objective reasons the requirement is strictly”

necessary.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Armstrong of Ilminster and Lord Butler of Brockwell

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster]

My Lords, I hope that the House will forgive me. I have to chair a committee upstairs at 4 pm so I rise perhaps a little prematurely to commend to your Lordships my Amendment 22ZB. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has already described what the amendment is intended to do; I do not need to repeat that, as he did so better than I could do myself. It loses the Speaker and the 14 days. It lays down precisely what is to happen if there is a vote of no confidence, and lays upon the Prime Minister the first duty to seek a dissolution of Parliament in the event of a vote of no confidence being passed. It defines with clarity what shall be regarded as a vote of no confidence for the purpose of triggering that Motion. That seems to be clear, simple and practicable. I strongly commend it to your Lordships as a way of resolving these problems in a simple and clear way and establishing a sensible procedure for the duration of the Bill if it becomes an Act.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, I raise one question with my noble friend about his amendment. Under subsection (2)(a) of the proposed new clause, the Prime Minister would be bound to submit to Her Majesty a request for a proclamation leading to a general election if the Queen’s Speech had been rejected. Would not that go against what happened in 1924, when there was indeed a defeat on the Queen’s Speech, but one which had been expected, and an alternative Government was then appointed? Would it not be regrettable to make it inevitable that there should be a general election in a circumstance such as that?

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Armstrong of Ilminster and Lord Butler of Brockwell

Wednesday 9th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster]

My Lords, once upon a time there was a man called Procrustes. He made a very beautiful bed, and he liked people to come and lie on it. Being a man of very high and strict principle, he insisted that the bed and the people should fit. Unfortunately, he made the bed unalterable, so he had to make the people fit the bed. He either stretched them out a little if they were too small or chopped a little bit off if they were too tall, with painful, serious and sometimes fatal consequences for the people concerned. Quite apart from the consequences for the people concerned, Procrustes found his reputation deeply damaged; great hostility was shown towards him and there were demonstrations in the street.

Then four good, independent people came along and suggested a simple mechanism whereby some of the strain could be relieved. It was closely restricted; it could be used only in exceptional circumstances and for reasons of an extraordinarily compelling nature. It was a simple mechanism whereby, in these very exceptional cases, the bed could be stretched or shortened by a very small amount. The number of cases would be few but there would be cases in which the variety of human nature was recognised and allowed for and the painful consequences to which I have referred were avoided.

There were many arguments about the principle; it was thought to be very proper, good and strictly maintained. I am sorry to say that Procrustes grumbled greatly about the idea that there should be any stretching or changing of the bed. But in the end he accepted that there had been one or two cases which he agreed should be allowed past and the exceptions and exceptionally compelling reasons were such that the further breaches of the principle which would ensue would not be very serious or great. Therefore, grumbling, he accepted—to the relief of those few people whose lives and bodies were spared and, in the end, to the contentment of Procrustes himself, who accepted that this small degree of flexibility had enabled the bed to survive and the principle to be broadly maintained.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, this amendment allows the Boundary Commission, in very exceptional circumstances, to exercise its discretion within a range of 15 per cent rather than 10 per cent. The noble Lord, Lord Rennard, made the point that this would give people who wished for one reason or another to delay the operation of the reforms greater scope to introduce litigation. Of course, even within the 10 per cent provided in the Bill, the Boundary Commission is exercising discretion. It is not clear to me why, in these very exceptional circumstances, there would be more scope for challenging under the 15 per cent variation than under the 10 per cent. If people, for reasons of their own, wish to obstruct this process, is there not exactly the same power to do that under the 10 per cent provision? The advantage of having 15 per cent is that without giving much greater scope—or, indeed, any greater scope—for challenge, the Boundary Commission can reach reasonable recommendations in cases where it is necessary.