Communications Data and Interception
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Well, we are now coming forward with primary legislation; I hope that it meets with the noble Lord’s approval. I understand his point exactly, but we are dealing with that problem now. It has been the practice of successive Governments to deal with European directives in this fashion. Perhaps in some areas it may pay us to make exceptions to that, particularly if we think that there are matters that really ought to be brought to the attention of the House through primary legislation.
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)
My Lords, I was a member of the Joint Committee which scrutinised the draft communications data Bill. I am sure that all members of that committee would attach great importance to restoring the position that we thought we were in before this. For that reason, I, and I think many colleagues on the Cross Benches, will support the Bill. The sunset clause which has been described will make it necessary to review communications data legislation very early in the new Parliament. I hope that the scrutiny given to it will then bear fruit because I think the result was a good Bill which balanced the essential needs of civil liberty and privacy against the Government’s first duty to protect the security and safety of the citizen.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, speaks from a great deal of experience in this area. I welcome his support. I agree that this is a matter which will have to be addressed very quickly by an incoming Government. This is a live issue, as is properly demonstrated by the debate we are having now.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts(12 years, 9 months ago)
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(iii) at any time when Parliament is sitting or is in recess the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, considers that it would be inexpedient to introduce primary legislation to authorise a temporary extension of detention either because of time constraints or because of the risk of prejudicing the possibility of a fair trial of a person suspected of or charged with a terrorist offence or because of unacceptable risk to public safety or to security, and”
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster
My Lords, I beg to move the amendment standing in my name and in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell of Coatdyke.
Clause 57 establishes clearly the principle that a terrorist suspect should not be detained without being charged for longer than 14 days. Over the years, there has been much debate about how long that period should be. I have no wish to reopen that debate; the only question is whether there are any circumstances in which a terrorist suspect should be able to be detained for longer than 14 days. It has not been necessary to extend the period of detention without charge beyond 14 days at any time in the last five years. Nevertheless, it is the view of the Home Secretary, as well as of the police and of the Director of Public Prosecutions, that it might one day become compellingly necessary to do so.
The Government took the view that, in order to buttress the principle of the 14-day limit and to make sure that the period of detention without charge could be extended only in the most exceptional circumstances and only for the most compelling reasons, there should be no standing power to extend the period by order, and that it should be extendable only by the introduction of emergency primary legislation if and when the need arises.
Draft Bills were prepared, and a Joint Committee of Members of both Houses of Parliament was set up last year to give the draft Bills pre-legislative scrutiny. That committee, which I had the privilege of chairing, concluded that the Government were right to wish to create a contingency power to extend the maximum period beyond 14 days up to not more than 28 days in truly exceptional circumstances. The committee understood and respected the reasons for proposing that this power should be provided by emergency primary legislation, to be enacted when need arises, so as to ensure that temporary extensions of the period of detention would happen only in very exceptional circumstances and be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and approval.
The committee concluded, however, that parliamentary scrutiny of such emergency legislation would in practice be very seriously circumscribed. The legislation might have to be introduced and debated in a period of high tension and against a background of intense media interest and speculation. It might be very difficult to explain to Parliament, and to Members with a direct constituency interest, the reasons for introducing the legislation without disclosing information which would endanger security or public safety or information which could prejudice the right of a suspect or suspects to a fair trial. This could make the process of justifying the legislation almost impossible for the Secretary of State, and totally unsatisfactory and frustrating for Members of both Houses of Parliament.
The committee also thought that there would be an unacceptable degree of risk that it would be almost impossible to introduce and pass the legislation within a sufficiently short time, particularly when Parliament was in recess and would have to be specially recalled. We pointed out that it would be absolutely impossible during the period between the Dissolution of one Parliament and the opening of a new Parliament, because there would be no Parliament. The Joint Committee therefore concluded that emergency primary legislation, as exemplified in the Government’s draft Bills, did not offer a satisfactory solution, and recommended a new order-making arrangement, under which the Secretary of State would be authorised to make an executive order of limited duration, if need arose, to extend the period of detention of suspects without charge to not more than 28 days, if exceptional circumstances applied, subject to strict safeguards and subject also to the agreement of the Attorney-General.
In Clause 58 of the Protection of Freedoms Bill, the Government have accepted the committee’s recommendation in part, and have made provision for temporary extensions of detention by order in the period between the Dissolution of one Parliament and the first Queen’s Speech in the next. But they are still proposing to rely exclusively on the introduction of emergency legislation at any other time when there is a Parliament in being, whether it is in session or not.
I understand and respect the Secretary of State’s wish to make it as difficult as possible to extend the period of detention beyond 14 days. But she has accepted that there will be times when it is impossible to introduce primary legislation because there is no Parliament in being, so the principle is breached. The question is whether there should be any other circumstances in which an order-making power should be available to the Secretary of State.
This amendment would define and limit other circumstances in which the Secretary of State could proceed by order, even when Parliament was in being, if there were compelling reasons why it would be impracticable or injudicious to proceed by emergency primary legislation. She would still be able to proceed by emergency primary legislation if she thought that it was consistent with security, public safety and the interests of justice to do so. But she would have an escape hatch, by means of which she could, with the agreement of the Attorney-General, and subject to strict safeguards, proceed by order if she judged that pressures of time, or the interests of security, public safety or justice, required her to do so. The safeguards would be the same as those applying to an executive order made at a time when Parliament was dissolved.
The principle that there should be an alternative to emergency primary legislation is already established by Clause 58. The amendment I am proposing is an extension of that principle, not a breach of it. It does not seek to establish a new principle. It is of course possible that there will never be any need to extend the period of detention of terrorist suspects beyond 14 days. I hope that it may be so. But the Secretary of State, the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions all think that it is advisable to provide for the possibility that one day there will be a need to do so. If there is, it may be that it will be possible to proceed by emergency primary legislation. If that is so, fine. But I believe, as did the Joint Committee, that there will be circumstances where that is not possible, but where the period of detention ought to be extended.
To take just one example, suppose that the need to extend the period of detention arose during the Parliamentary Summer Recess. Parliament can be, and of course has been, recalled during a Summer Recess during a time of grave national emergency. But in the Summer Recess, Members of both Houses are scattered to the four corners of the world, and the Palace of Westminster is usually undergoing major works of reconstruction and refurbishment. Is it realistic to suppose that Parliament could be recalled in the Summer Recess just to authorise the extended detention of a terrorist suspect?
Four years of service in the Home Office left me with the conviction that, if anything can go wrong, it usually will—at any rate, in that department of banana skins. The annals of the Home Office are littered with overlooked banana skins and Secretaries of State with red faces. In this matter there are just too many foreseeable risks, and too many reasons why it might be too difficult to introduce primary legislation, to justify a decision not to take a sensible precaution.
This amendment is permissive, not mandatory. If it is passed this evening, the Secretary of State need never take advantage of it if she prefers not to do so. But if this amendment is not accepted she will run the risk of finding herself in a situation where she would like, and she ought, to extend the period of detention of a terrorist suspect or suspects, but feels herself to be prevented from introducing emergency primary legislation to do so, by reasons of pressures of time, or by considerations of security, public safety or justice.
In that situation, if a suspect or suspects could not be further detained but had to be released, and then went on to commit some outrage as a result of which innocent people were killed and injured, and which might not have happened had the suspect or suspects been kept in detention, how would the Secretary of State feel? How would she explain to Parliament, to the country and to the relatives of the victims why she had not felt able to take the action which might have prevented the outrage? The Secretary of State may be made of sterner stuff, but if I were the Secretary of State, I do not think that I could live with that thought.
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster
My Lords, I would like to express my gratitude to the noble Lord for taking the time to talk about this matter at a meeting last week. That was useful—I hope to both of us.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the time constraint I had in mind is that which would arise if the need to extend a period of detention became clear after somebody had already been in detention for 10 days and perhaps a weekend intervened and there simply would not be time to carry through emergency primary legislation, even on a fast track through both Houses of Parliament. It would be very difficult to define extensively in legislation what considerations of security and safety might apply but they are clearly considerations of prejudice to national security and public safety considerations relating to the possibility of a terrorist incident or outrage being planned which might be avoided, and information about which had better not be disclosed in a debate.
I am less confident than the noble Lord, Lord Henley, that it would always be possible to avoid the debate in either House straying from general principle into the particular circumstances of an incident if a terrorist incident had occurred, or if there were extensive media speculation about the possibility of such an incident. I believe that there could well be circumstances in which a Member of Parliament might have a constituency interest which would justify him or her raising more detail, or asking for more detail, about particular cases or particular people than would be appropriate or safe to do. Therefore, I remain of the view that the Secretary of State may live to regret not taking advantage of this amendment. However, in the circumstances of this being a straight issue of disagreement, with apprehension I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts(12 years, 11 months ago)
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“(iii) at any time when Parliament is sitting or is in recess the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, considers it would be inexpedient to introduce primary legislation to authorise a temporary extension of detention because of—(a) time constraints,(b) the risk of prejudicing the possibility of a fair trial of a person suspected of or charged with a terrorist offence, or(c) unacceptable risk to public safety or to security,”
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster
My Lords, Amendment 143 is in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell of Coatdyke, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. Clause 57 establishes on a firm and clear basis the principle that a terrorist suspect should not be detained without being charged for longer than 14 days. Fourteen days is already a very long period to detain someone without charge. For any other offence, the maximum would be no more than four days. The case for a longer period in respect of terrorist suspects is justified only by the especial nature and problems of terrorism.
Over the years, there has been much debate about how long the period should be. At one time under a previous Administration, a maximum of 90 days was suggested. This Bill now sets the maximum period at 14 days, to be extended only in the most exceptional circumstances. It has not been necessary to extend the period of detention without charge beyond 14 days at any time in the past five years. Nevertheless, it remains the view of the Home Secretary, as well as of the police and the Director of Public Prosecutions, that the possibility that it might one day become necessary to do so cannot be excluded and should be provided for.
The Government took the view that, in order to make sure that the period of detention would be extended only in the most exceptional circumstances and only when really necessary, there should be no standing power to extend the period by order, and that it should be extended only by the introduction of emergency primary legislation if and when the need arose. They prepared draft Bills to have ready for introduction when required; and they invited a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament to give the draft Bills pre-legislative scrutiny. That committee, of which I had the privilege of being the chairman, believed that the Government were right to wish to create a contingency power to extend the maximum period for pre-charge detention of a terrorist suspect beyond 14 days up to not more than 28 days in truly exceptional circumstances.
The committee understood and respected the Government’s reasons for proposing that this power should be provided by emergency primary legislation, to be enacted only when the need arose, so that temporary extensions of the period of detention would happen only in very exceptional circumstances, and so that the need for and the provision of the power could be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. We believed, however, that the parliamentary scrutiny of such emergency primary legislation to this effect would in practice be very seriously circumscribed. We thought that it might prove in practice to be very difficult to explain to Parliament the reasons for introducing it without either disclosing information that would endanger security or public safety, or information that would prejudice the right of a suspect or suspects to a fair trial. This could make the process of justifying the legislation almost impossible for the Secretary of State and totally unsatisfactory and frustrating for Members of both Houses of Parliament. We also thought that there would be an unacceptable degree of risk that it would sometimes be almost impossible to introduce and pass the legislation required within a sufficiently short period of time when Parliament was in recess and would have to be recalled. It would, of course, be absolutely impossible to introduce primary legislation during the period between the Dissolution of one Parliament and the opening of a new Parliament.
We therefore concluded that emergency primary legislation, as exemplified in the Government’s draft Bills, did not offer a satisfactory solution, and we recommended a new order-making arrangement, under which the Secretary of State would be authorised to make an executive order if need arose to extend the period of detention of terrorist suspects without charge to not more than 28 days for a three-month period, if exceptional circumstances applied, subject to strict safeguards and subject also to the agreement of the Attorney-General.
In Clause 58 of the Protection of Freedoms Bill, the Government have accepted the committee’s recommendation in part and have made provision for temporary extensions of the period of detention by executive order in the period between the Dissolution of one Parliament and the first Queen’s Speech in the next. However, they are proposing to rely exclusively on the introduction of emergency primary legislation when Parliament is sitting. I and the noble Lords who were members of the Joint Committee and who have put their names to this amendment remain of the view that the difficulties of introducing emergency primary legislation might be insurmountable even when Parliament was sitting, and that there needs to be a fallback or fail-safe provision allowing the Secretary of State to make an executive order if in those circumstances it is really necessary to extend the period of detention of a terrorist suspect or suspects for longer than 14 days.
Our amendment is permissive, not mandatory. It would not prevent a Secretary of State introducing emergency primary legislation if he or she were satisfied that he or she could safely and effectively do so. It would allow the Secretary of State to proceed by means of an executive order even when Parliament was sitting, with the concurrence of the Attorney-General if time constraints, risks to security or public safety, or the risk of prejudicing a suspect’s right to a fair trial, made it impossible or impracticable to introduce primary legislation. The safeguards will be the same as those applying to an executive order made at a time when Parliament had been dissolved. The principle that there should be an alternative to the introduction of emergency primary legislation is already established by Clause 58 of the Bill as it stands. The amendment that we are proposing is a modest extension of that principle—permissive, not mandatory; it does not seek to establish a new principle.
I should not like to be the Secretary of State who had to explain to Parliament and to the country after a terrorist incident in which innocent people had been killed or injured that the incident could have been prevented if only the Protection of Freedoms Bill had been enacted as improved by the acceptance of this eminently reasonable cross-party amendment. I beg to move.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, and other members of the Joint Committee. It is an eminently sensible amendment because the Government have rightly recognised the practical impossibility in certain circumstances of emergency legislation, hence the introduction of Clause 58. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, said, there remain real concerns over the workability of the Government’s proposal.
We believe that there is a serious risk of jeopardising a fair trial if Parliament is to be provided with enough information to properly scrutinise the necessity of the use. It seems as though it would be practically unworkable because, as the noble Lord said in his introductory statement, there would be a need to introduce and pass legislation with too short a timeframe to enable proper scrutiny and accountability. The scrutiny of legislation within such a short deadline would appear to be a dangerous way to legislate because the time pressures and state of emergency would undermine proper and dispassionate scrutiny of the legislation. By prescribing the use of an emergency power too tightly, within the most serious situations, the sheer use of the power would indicate to any future jury the unusual gravity of the case and therefore prejudice its views. We support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong.
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster
My Lords, of course I entirely respect the Government’s preference for introducing primary legislation if time and other constraints permit. I am afraid that, having sat through the proceedings of the Joint Committee and having heard a great deal of evidence on the subject, it remains my belief that the Government’s view that emergency primary legislation when Parliament is sitting will always be able to provide what is needed is optimistic. Their determination to rely on emergency primary legislation is admirable. If this amendment were to be passed, they would still be able to exercise that power and resist the temptation to introduce an executive order. I am glad that the Secretary of State and the Minister are of the view that they would always be able to do so.
It is at that point that my view still, with respect, differs from that of the Minister. The risk of great difficulty in introducing emergency primary legislation for the reasons set out in the amendment remains. The consequences of not being able to extend the period of detention over terrorist suspect or suspects without charge could have literally fatal consequences. While I beg leave to withdraw the amendment at this stage, I wish to reserve the right to return to the matter on report.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Lord Armstrong of Ilminster
My Lords, this is a veritable bran-tub of a Bill, as is apparent from the Long Title. It might be more charitably described as a Christmas pie full of plums. I propose, like little Jack Horner, to put in my thumb and pull out a plum—like my noble friend Lady O'Neill, only one plum for consideration at this stage. That plum is Part 4, which deals with counterterrorism powers.
There is clearly around the House a general welcome for Clause 57, which states unambiguously that the maximum period of detention without charge for a terrorist suspect shall be 14 days. That is already a long period to hold anyone in detention without charging him or her—much longer than would be acceptable for any other criminal offence.
However, there remains the persistent fear that there may well be circumstances in which there are compelling reasons for detaining someone suspected of having committed a terrorist offence without charge for longer than 14 days. The need to do so has not arisen during the past four or five years, but in this highly unpredictable area, we cannot exclude the possibility of an emergency in which it might be necessary to be able to do so—in which, indeed, the consequences of not being able to do so might be not just unacceptably serious, but literally fatal: some people might die who would otherwise not have died.
The Government have taken the view that an extension of detention without charge is so serious a restraint of freedom and so grave a breach of the rights of any citizen that it should be effected only by the introduction of emergency primary legislation when the need actually presents itself. They therefore prepared draft legislation, which could be introduced, if and when the need arose, to extend the period of detention of a terrorist suspect without charge for not more than 14 days, up to a maximum of 28 days.
A Joint Committee of Members of your Lordships' House and of the other place, of which I had the privilege of being the chairman, and the pleasure of having the noble Lords, Lord Freeman and Lord Goodhart, as fellow members, was set up to give the draft legislation the sort of pre-legislative scrutiny for which there would not be time if the legislation had to be introduced and passed as quickly as possible in an emergency.
My Lords, we understood and respected the Government's desire to make sure that a power to extend detention without charge should be exercised as rarely as possible, and that, ideally, it should be introduced only subject to the degree of parliamentary scrutiny and discussion which is appropriate to primary legislation. However, we identified certain problems about what was proposed.
First, it might be difficult to pass such legislation with the necessary urgency when Parliament was in recess, and it would be impossible to introduce it at all during the period between the dissolution of one Parliament and the first Queen's Speech in the next. Secondly, it might be very difficult for the Secretary of State to explain and justify to Parliament and for Members of both Houses of Parliament to be properly satisfied about the reasons why the legislation was required without incurring the risk of endangering the success of an ongoing counterterrorist operation or of prejudicing the possibility of a fair trial for someone charged with a terrorist offence.
We feared that those difficulties might be so great that a Secretary of State might be obliged to conclude that it was preferable to run the risk of not extending the period of detention without charge rather than to introduce legislation to provide the necessary powers, whatever the potential consequences of that choice might be. We therefore concluded that the Government's draft Bills did not offer a satisfactory solution to the problem, and recommended that this Bill should create a power for the Secretary of State to make an executive order at any time—not just during a period when one Parliament had been dissolved and the new Parliament had not yet started work—if there was real need to do so.
We recommended that the purpose of such an executive order should be to extend the maximum period for pre-charge detention to 28 days in exceptional circumstances, and that it should expire in three months. We made recommendations to suggest in detail: how to ensure that such an order would be made only in truly exceptional circumstances; how the exercise of the power should be made subject to mandatory review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation; how it should be subject to rigorous safeguards and to judicial review; and how it could be made subject, eventually, to parliamentary scrutiny.
The Government have, I am glad to say, accepted many of the Joint Committee's other recommendations, and will introduce amendments to that effect, but they have accepted the committee's main recommendation only in part. Clause 58 would provide the Secretary of State with power to make a temporary extension order when Parliament is dissolved or when Parliament has met after a dissolution but the first Queen's Speech has not taken place, but not at any other time.
I appreciate and respect the Government's wish to ensure that extensions of detention without charge beyond 14 days are as rare as possible. The committee asked the Secretary of State, when she came to give evidence to us, about the difficulties of presenting emergency legislation, to which I have already referred. We admired the confidence with which she assured us that she thought that she would be able to find a way to steer through or around those difficulties in presenting emergency legislation if necessary.
I remain of the view, however, that when the time came, she or a successor Secretary of State might find those difficulties to be insurmountable. She might, despite any advice to the contrary from the police or the Director of Public Prosecutions, decide that it was ineluctably necessary to take the risk of not introducing emergency legislation. No Secretary of State should be forced into a position where such a decision is forced on her.
If the Bill receives a Second Reading today, I hope at a later stage to put forward for your Lordships’ consideration an amendment to Clause 58 that would allow the Secretary of State to introduce emergency legislation for an extension of detention without charge when Parliament is sitting if she thinks that she can safely and properly do so, but would give her the option of making an executive order under Clause 58 if she thinks, even when Parliament is sitting, that the introduction of primary legislation would in the then prevailing circumstances be too difficult.
I hope for her sake and for all our sakes that she is never called upon to make that choice, but better safe than sorry.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster Excerpts(13 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville
My Lords, I was approached only last night by my noble friend Lord Marlesford to ask what my views were and whether I would vote for him. I cautiously—because caution is my watchword—promised that I would come and listen to him. That is why I am here and, indeed, on my feet. I have not been approached by Westminster City Council, but all politics are local and I once represented that council in the other place, and am therefore sympathetic to it.
I have one personal footnote to make to this debate, a prior example to the body that my noble friend seeks to establish—the Paving Commission in Regent’s Park, which was set up during the period of Nash to look after good order in Regent’s Park. I realise that the Government might say that that is not an exact analogy, but the fact remains that the Royal Parks are another of the places in this great city where free speech is demonstrated, Hyde Park being a particular of that. The Paving Commission consisted entirely of those with a local interest, under an early-19th century statute, with two exceptions—the bailiff of the Royal Parks, who is a civil servant at the assistant secretary level; and a Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury, which effectively means a senior government whip in the House of Commons.
I served as a commissioner for a couple of years and made a small contribution to the work of the Paving Commission by saying that it was all very well for the debates that we had in our regular monthly meetings for those who actually lived in the park, because they recognised absolutely everything that was being talked about. The bailiff of the Royal Parks to some degree and myself to a larger degree, because much of Regent’s Park lay outside my constituency, were not so familiar. I made the suggestion to the head of the commission that we should have a picnic every year and that the whole commission should make a tour of the whole park. I am glad to say that that suggestion was adopted and ever since nobody has ever been able to work out why they had never done it before. The scheme has worked extremely well for 200 years. It is a little difficult to apply modern parking regulations to legislation that was set up in the early part of the 19th century, but imagination has been deployed.
Therefore, having said to my noble friend last night that I would certainly listen to him, it would be churlish of me not to say that I would not listen to my noble friend the Minister. But I have to say on the basis of the debate that we have had so far that I am minded to vote with my noble friend and with Westminster City Council.
Lord Armstrong of Ilminster
My Lords, I sympathise with the objectives and purposes of the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, in tabling these amendments and with those who have spoken in favour of it. There are two points on the practicability of the scheme that I would like to query, which both relate to this Parliament Square committee. First, would the authorities of the Palace of Westminster be represented on it? That is just a query; I do not know what is intended. Secondly, it seems that this committee would be in almost permanent session. I wonder if that is really practicable and I would welcome comments on that before I make up my mind on how to respond in a Division.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, we have had a number of opportunities to discuss the issues that have been raised this afternoon. Indeed, there will be more because while we are still waiting for Committee stages on both Private Members’ Bills to come through, we have the debate today and one more opportunity on this Bill to try and resolve this. The issue itself is not difficult to encapsulate. As many people have suggested, we need some imaginative thinking about the relationship between Parliament, the abbey, the church, the public buildings and the public spaces around them that goes across the various dimensions that have been mentioned in this debate—security, access, traffic, tourism, history, heritage and, of course, the absolute requirement to ensure that demonstrations can take place.
The good thing about the amendment—indeed, it was in the Bill that we discussed last week—is that there is a laser-like focus on the two issues that we have been focusing on today. They are that we want to have a clear space within which the buildings that I mentioned can exist and the activities that we have been talking about can happen, but we also want to encourage demonstration—a very important aspect of this amendment. That far, we agree with everybody who has spoken that that is what we are trying to do but, as has been said already, the problem is that we do not seem able to solve it.
It seems to me and to our side that, as again has been mentioned, we have to be a bit careful that we do not rush into action here. That may seem odd given the number of years we have been working on it but I detect a sense of—what shall we call it?—tentism springing up. We should not do that without thinking very carefully what we are doing. As was said earlier, there are many different ways of demonstrating and it just seems to happen that tents seem to be the vogue at the moment. What that has to do with modern life, I have no idea.
It is also rather sad, in some senses, that the extraordinary contribution to public life which Brian Haw made before his untimely death has been swept away as something that we are against, even though it is in some ways a peculiarly British way of trying to express a view by a sort of silent protest in the face of all possible opposition. With the whole establishment and everybody against it, he continued to make his point. It may not have been to everybody's liking or as effective as he might have wanted it to be but it was there, it was different and it was distinctive. We should worry if we were to squeeze it out by a rush to some form of arrangement.
We also have to be a bit careful about what is happening here. I have never been of the view that a committee is the answer to the problem that we have, and I am a bit surprised to hear other people saying it. Committees do not really solve many things. We had a rather strange intervention last week from the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, who said that the military would have recommended a committee in this situation. I thought that was a contradiction in terms. The other thing that we have to be careful about is that the evening round of the vehicles under Westminster City Council's jurisdiction will be picking up the tents and other materials, if the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, is to be believed. That is really a form of theft, is it not? Again, we should be careful before Parliament legislates in that way. There are people who own those things and we cannot act completely without the rights involved in that.
Noble Lords will detect from what I say that I am sympathetic to what is proposed and would like to support it. The problem is that the amendment in its present form has not been subject to sufficient scrutiny. We had a little of that during Second Reading; in particular, the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, raised a number of points which he felt would improve that Bill. An important way to take forward the aims and objectives of the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, is to have the Committee stage at the right time, to try to go through that Bill and improve it. Unfortunately, the timing would not fit with the present Bill. I do not know how we resolve that but I will come back to it in a minute.
However, it seems to me that there are ways in which the elements that the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, is putting forward do fit with the intentions of the Government. It would be sensible to try and bolt together the two impulses so that at Third Reading, before the Bill leaves this House, the Minister can bring forward proposals. I note that when she responded to the debate last week, she said of discussions and meetings that:
“Those are ongoing and I do not rule out the possibility of bringing forward further measures before the Bill completes its passage through this House. I do not think I can give more detail at the moment”.
She always says that, doesn’t she? It is a bit irritating, and I hope that this time we can get down to it. She went on,
“but it is certainly a matter under consideration and the talks are ongoing”.—[Official Report, 1/7/11; col. 2014.]
Well, more time has passed and presumably talks have taken place. Now let us hear where they are, as the time as come for us to try to resolve this, at least in the first stage.
We on this side would like to support the intention behind the Bill. In summary, we think that provision would be better incorporated within this Bill and taken forward as one piece of legislation. However, it will need—