Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations 2021

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Wednesday 26th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his very clear explanation of what is a highly complex matter. In the past, I criticised what appeared to be a long delay between the passing of the 2018 Act and the regulations in respect of human rights. When I saw those regulations and the extreme care and complexity, I fully understood the delay, and I congratulate the parliamentary draftsmen on their work on those regulations and on these ones.

The final page of the document accompanying the regulations boldly states:

“The Regulations will have strong cross-party support in principle”—


and, I add, in practice. This was clear from the principal Act, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 —SAMLA—and the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020, which were debated in your Lordships’ House on 29 July 2020.

This was pressed by a very much cross-party coalition in the other place: Andrew Mitchell and Margaret Hodge, who were joined by a then Back-Bencher called Dominic Raab, who has not lost his zeal in this respect—I congratulate him on this. In your Lordships’ House, my noble friend Lord Collins has been extremely active in this respect, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, who regrets that she cannot be here on this occasion, has helped to lead the campaign.

The mischief is very clear: the poisoning of the well of good governance, and indeed corporate governance, by corruption. The report under the terms of the Act puts it this way:

“Corruption undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It undermines good governance and the functioning of public institutions and international organisations, as well as trust in their integrity.”


Of course, there is a nexus between these regulations and the human rights regulations that we debated in July last year. This is easily shown by looking at the history of Sergei Magnitsky: there were those who were responsible for his torture and murder in that Russian prison who had been dealt with by the human rights regulations, and there were the tax officials in Russia who were responsible for misappropriating the funds of the organisation that employed him.

I congratulate Bill Browder and his team on the work that they have done in this respect in honouring the memory of Sergei Magnitsky—and the number of countries that have adopted similar measures since. I had the privilege of watching the Browder team in action; tracing the trail of the corruption in that respect was an enormously complex matter.

Many of the questions that were raised in the debate in July apply, mutatis mutandis—perhaps we are not allowed to say that nowadays—or in similar measure, to today’s debate. First, what is the definition of “serious corruption”? Will guidance be issued by the Government? For example, does it refer to the amount involved or the eminence of the individual who is responsible for them to be a designated person?

Obviously, the sanctions are more powerful in their effect if they are adopted by several countries: then, the regulations act as a protective shield for the one country that may be targeted by Russia or whoever in that way. The Minister has already said that there are similar regulations in the USA and Canada. I understand that there are not yet similar regulations in the European Union. Perhaps he can indicate what progress, if any, has been made in that respect.

I was disappointed that the newly appointed European prosecutor is supported by only 22 of the 27 EU members, when the €800 billion recovery fund must give very much opportunity for corruption. What is the degree of international support for similar measures? Will we in the UK be spreading the word, seeking to proselytise other countries in this respect, giving advice and assistance?

There are also questions relating to evidence: there must be a problem of obtaining evidence sufficient to support a designation in these cases. Presumably, this will involve the criminal standard of proof. Which international organisations and NGOs will be relied upon for evidence? There are to be only two new employees in the FCDO; a very much wider information diaspora is needed to give the information. It is so easy to point the finger at someone, but it is less easy to provide sufficient and objective evidence.

Lastly, there is the question of due process, which was touched upon by the Minister—namely, how to safeguard the integrity of the process. Presumably, the safeguard provisions are included in SAMLA, the principal act of 2018.

This is a major scourge: the Panama papers, for example, illustrate the extent of the problem, as does Misha Glenny’s work. Progress has been made—I can see it in the overseas territories. I noticed what was said about the British Virgin Islands, which did rather well out of their secrecy in the past; they have been leaned upon to act more responsibly.

To conclude, I welcome the Government’s follow-up to SAMLA, the 2018 principal act. I hope that they will now go out and encourage other Governments to follow this precedent and provide, perhaps with the USA and Canada, advice and assistance to those Governments, where necessary.