Online Safety Bill

Debate between Lord Allan of Hallam and Lord Curry of Kirkharle

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Allan of Hallam (LD)]

My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 218JA in this group, in my name, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, has added her name. This is really trying to understand what the Government’s intentions are in respect of access restriction orders.

Just to take a step back, in the Online Safety Bill regime we are creating, in effect, a licensing regime for in-scope services and saying that, if you want to operate in the United Kingdom and you are covered by the Bill—whether that is the pornography services that the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, referred to or a user-to-user or search service—here are the conditions to which you must adhere. That includes paying a fee to Ofcom for your supervision, and then following the many thousands of pages of guidance that I suspect we will end up producing and issuing to those companies. So what we are exploring here is what happens if a particular organisation does not decide to take up the offer of a licence.

Again, to go back to the previous debate, success for the Bill would be that it has a sufficient deterrent effect that the problems that we are seeking to fix are addressed. I do not think we are looking to block services or for them to fail—we are looking for them to succeed, so stage one is that Ofcom asks them nicely. It says, “You want to operate in the UK, here is what you need to do—it’s a reasonable set of requests we are making”, and the services say, “Fine”. If not, they choose to self-limit—and it is quite trivial for any online service to say, “I’m going to check incoming traffic, and if this person looks like they are coming from the UK, I’m not going to serve them”. That is self-limiting, which is an option that would be preferable if a service chose not to accept the licence condition. But let us assume that it has accepted the licence condition, and Ofcom is going to be monitoring it on a routine basis—and if Ofcom thinks it is not meeting its requirements, whether that is to produce a risk assessment or to fulfil its duty of care, Ofcom will then instruct it to do something. If it fails to follow that instruction, we are in the territory of the amendments that we are considering here: either it has refused to accept the licence conditions and to self-limit, or it has accepted them but has failed to do what we expect it to do. It has signed up and thought that it is not serious, and it is not doing the things that we expect it to do.

At that point, Ofcom has to consider what it can do. The first stage is quite right, in the group of clauses that we are looking at—Ofcom can bring in these business disruption measures. As the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, rightly pointed out, in many instances that will be effective. Any commercial service—not just pornography services, but an online service that depends on advertising—that is told that it can no longer take credit card payments from UK businesses to advertise on the service, will, one hopes, come into line and say, “That’s the end of my business in the UK—I may as well cut myself off”. But if it wants to operate, it will come into line, because that way it gets its payment services restored. But there will be others for which that is insufficient—perhaps that is not their business model—and they will carry on regardless. At that point, we may want to consider the access restrictions.

In a free society, none of us should take pleasure in the idea that we are going to instruct the internet services or block them. That is not our first instinct, but something that is rather potentially a necessary evil. At some point, there may be services that are so harmful and so oblivious to the regime that we put in place that we need to block them. Here we are trying to explore what would happen in those circumstances. The first kind of block is one that we are used to doing, and we do it today for copyright-infringing sites and a small number of other sites that break the law. We instruct service providers such as BT and TalkTalk to implement a network-level block. There are ways you can do that—various technical ways that we do not need to go into in this debate—whereby we can seek to make it so that an ordinary UK user, when they type in www.whatever, will not get to the website. But increasingly people are using technology that will work around that. Browsers, for example, may create traffic between your web browser and the online service such that TalkTalk or BT or the access provider has no visibility as to where you are going and no capability of blocking it. BT has rightly raised that. There will be different views about where we should go with this, but the question is absolutely legitimate as to what the Government’s intentions are, which is what we want to try to tease out with this amendment.

Again, we should be really candid. Somebody who is determined to bypass all the access controls will do so. There is no world in which we can say that we can guarantee that somebody with a UK internet connection can never get to a particular website. What we are seeking to do is to make violating services unavailable for most of the people most of the time. We would be unhappy if it was only some of the people some of the time, but it is not going to be all of the people all of the time. So the question is: what constitutes a sufficient access restriction to either bring them to heel or to ensure that, over the longer term, the harm is not propagated, because these services are generally not made available? It would be really helpful if the Minister was able to tease that out.

Certainly, in my view, there are services such as TOR—the Onion Router—where there is no entity that you can ask to block stuff, so if someone was using that, there is nothing that you can reasonably do. At the other end of the spectrum, there are services such as BT and TalkTalk, where it is relatively straightforward to say to them that they should block. Then there are people in between, such as browser owners that are putting in place these encrypted tunnels for very good reasons, for privacy, but which can also add value-added stuff—helping to manage bandwidth better, and so on. Is it the Government’s intention that they are going to be served with access restriction orders? That is a valid question. We might have different views about what is the right solution, but it is really important for the sector that it understands and is able to prepare if that is the Government’s intention. So we need to tease that out; that is the area in which we are looking for answers from the Government.

The second piece is to think about the long term. If our prediction—or our hope and expectation—is that most companies will come into line, that is fine; the internet will carry on as it does today but in a safer way. However, if we have misjudged the mood, and a significant numbers of services just stick their thumb up at Ofcom and say, “We are not going to play—block us if you dare”, that potentially has significant consequences for the internet as it will operate in the United Kingdom. It would be helpful to understand from the Minister whether the Government have any projections or predictions as to which way we are going to go. Are we talking about the vast majority of the internet continuing as it is today within the new regime, with the odd player that will be outside that, or is it the Government’s expectation that there may need to be blocking of significant numbers of services, essentially for the foreseeable future?

Other countries such as France and Germany have been dealing with this recently, as the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, is probably aware of. They have sought to restrict access to pornography services, and there have been all sorts of consequent knock-on effects and challenges at a technical level. It would be helpful to understand whether our expectation is that we will see the same in the United Kingdom or that something else is going to happen. If the Government do not have that information today, or if they have not made those projections, it would be helpful to know their thinking on where that might happen. Who will be able to inform us as to what that the future landscape is likely to look like as it evolves, and as Ofcom gains these powers and starts to instruct companies that they must obtain licences, and then seeks to take enforcement action against those that choose not to play the game?

[Lord Curry of Kirkharle (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 217 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, and very much support the comments that he has made. I will speak to Amendments 218C, 218E, 218H and 218K in my name within this group. I also support the intent of the other amendments in this group tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bethell.

I appreciate the process helpfully outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Allan. However, when looking at Ofcom’s implementation of existing provisions on video-sharing platforms, the overwhelming impression is of a very drawn-out process, with Ofcom failing to hold providers to account. Despite being told by Ofcom that a simple tick-box declaration by the user confirming that they are over 18 is not sufficient age verification, some providers are still using only that system. Concerningly, Ofcom has not taken decisive action.

When children are at severe risk, it is not appropriate to wait. Why, for example, should we allow porn sites to continue to host 10 million child sexual abuse videos while Ofcom simply reports that it is continuing to partner with these platforms to get a road map of action together? As has been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, Visa and Mastercard did not think it was appropriate to wait in such circumstances—they just acted.

Similarly, when systems are not in place to protect children from accessing pornography, we cannot just sit by and allow all the egregious associated harms to continue. Just as in Formula 1, when a red flag is raised and the cars must stop and go into the pits until the dangerous debris is cleared, sometimes it is too dangerous to allow platforms to operate until the problems are fixed. It seems to me that platforms would act very swiftly to put effective systems and processes in place if they could not operate in the interim.

The Bill already contains this emergency handbrake; the question is when it should be used. My answer is that it should be used when the evidence of severe harm presents itself, and not only when the regulator has a moment of self-doubt that its “road maps”, which it is normally so optimistic about, will eventually fix the problem. Ofcom should not be allowed to sit on the evidence hoping, with a wing and a prayer, that things will fix themselves in the end.

Agriculture Bill

Debate between Lord Allan of Hallam and Lord Curry of Kirkharle

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 15th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Curry of Kirkharle (CB) [V]]

My Lords, my interests are as listed in the register. I should add in relation to Amendment 18, to which I wish to speak, that I am a former chair of the Better Regulation Executive and worked closely with the Regulatory Policy Committee which has been referred to already. I also worked closely with the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, who has tabled this amendment, and with the noble Earl, Lord Lindsey, who has supported it. I fully endorse their comments. I am particularly disappointed in Defra’s poor performance with regard to the impact assessment of this Bill or, more accurately, the lack of an adequate impact assessment. When I chaired the BRE, Defra was one of the better performing departments and regularly produced satisfactory IAs. As the Minister knows well, I fully support this Bill and the policy changes it will introduce. As has been stated numerous times, this is the most serious change in agricultural policy in a lifetime. We need fully to understand the implications of this fundamental change.

Of course, this amendment is a process issue. For many, it is rather tedious and not “sexy”, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, stated. However, it is a crucial part of understanding how new policies or changes in regulation will impact on those affected by it. As one well-known system is demolished and another unknown system is introduced, we have a huge void by not having an impact assessment better to understand of the economic costs and benefits of this change. I hope that the Minister will explore this further with his department and be able to reassure the House that this issue will be addressed as the Bill progresses on its journey through both Houses and into legislation.

[Lord Allan of Hallam (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I was happy to add my name to Amendment 28, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, as I feel it is important that we debate the question of what information will be published under the new farm payments scheme during the passage of this Bill. The provisions in the Bill currently lack detail and firm commitments, and that raises legitimate concerns that we might in fact go backwards from the status quo in terms of transparency around the common agricultural policy.

In supporting the amendment, I want to talk briefly about the value of publishing comprehensive data, as described in the list set out in the amendment. There are two core arguments for this. The first is the accountability that we want for any significant public expenditure, and this Bill will certainly usher in a great deal of such expenditure. The more insight that we have into how our money is being spent, the more effectively we can hold our Government to account for it. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, certainly made that point very forcefully, and it was echoed by the Minister for the Cabinet Office, who in his recent lecture at Ditchley Park talked very much about opening up government data precisely in the interests of other people being able to hold the Government to account.

There is a second benefit that might be even more significant: the innovation that can happen around public datasets. The Government do their best to devise good solutions for the farming community, and I would not for a second question their good faith in doing so, but nobody has a monopoly of good ideas, and there will be people outside of government who have ideas that could be of real benefit to the UK agricultural sector. The dataset described in this amendment would provide a foundation on which those ideas and innovative solutions could be built. I draw attention in particular to making associated geospatial data available—that is, data around the parcels of land that are being funded—as this is especially useful for developers who work in this area. I understand that Defra already collects much of this data. For example, it publishes geospatial data in respect of environmental stewardship payments. Therefore, my starting point is that I do not believe that the list of data described in the amendment would add to the burdens for the farming community as it is data that it produces for Defra, but we are asking that Defra releases it to the wider world.

I hope that in his response the Minister is able to put some more flesh on to the very bare bones of the text of the Bill and that, in particular, he can do two things. First, it would be helpful if he could describe the dataset that the Government are currently thinking of publishing. I understand that they have been engaged in a consultation exercise over the summer, so I hope that they have some idea of what they intend to publish under the secondary legislation that the Bill envisages. Secondly, it would be extremely helpful if they could indicate whether they have concerns about any of the items listed in Amendment 28, so that we can focus on them and discuss them further. With that, I look forward to hearing the contributions of other noble Lords and, in particular, the response from the Minister.