(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for having given me the opportunity to discuss the matter with him briefly yesterday. I know that he has been involved in this matter for much longer than I have. As he is aware, the Minister with responsibility for Libya has written to him, informing him that we are currently assessing all these matters, including the very specific ones to which he referred. I was involved in discussions on this matter earlier this week. I assure him that we will write to him in due course to provide much more clarity on the issue. The Government’s position has been, and will continue to be, that we want to develop a sustainable and effective partnership with Libya to enable us to resolve all issues, including that of the horrendous terrorism which resulted in huge tragedy for individual families.
My Lords, the previous Government set up a small unit in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to facilitate the discussions that the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, and others were having to try to address this question not just in respect of specific victims in Northern Ireland but of economic benefit for the whole of the United Kingdom from the Libyan sovereign fund. We now have even more to offer than at the time of Gaddafi, when we could offer economic co-operation in exchange for reparations. Now, there is the opportunity to help rebuild civic society, democratic structures and the proper administration of justice in Libya. We have much to offer the Libyan Government. I trust that my noble friend will look again at the revitalising of that small unit in the FCO to facilitate these kinds of discussions.
As the noble Lord will be aware, some progress was made in relation to this matter at a time when Gaddafi was coming in from the cold, as it were. The noble Lord will be aware—as will other noble Lords—that Libya has been through a horrendously difficult period in its history. There has been huge change in Libya and there have been two national transitional Governments. Only two weeks ago, there was a further change in the leadership at the top, with Prime Minister Zeidan standing down, marking another transitional period in Libya’s history. We are working with Libya while it is going through this incredibly difficult period, but I will bear in mind the noble Lord’s comments.
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend the Minister had to leave for a few minutes and just spoke to me. Even in her absence, I want to pay tribute to her opening speech, which was extremely helpful and certainly laid down the approach that the Government are understandably taking.
Many other noble Lords in this debate have pointed out that what the President of Russia is doing is at worst illegal but certainly running roughshod over the wishes of people and the security and stability of the wider region. I would not add very much to the debate if I simply repeated those kinds of sentiments. Instead, I will take a different approach but I want to make very clear in doing so that, while I seek to understand some of the mistakes that we have made in the West and some of the understandings that Mr Putin and his colleagues have in the East, I do it not in any sense to excuse what he is doing but because, if we do not understand it a little better, we may continue to make even worse misjudgments than we have done to date. I rather suspect that some noble Lords will find some of the things I say uncomfortable and maybe even disagreeable, including colleagues on my own Benches.
First, it is extremely important for us to be clear about the difference between tactics and strategy. We are debating the question of Ukraine and the particular situation with Crimea. This is about a tactic of Mr Putin’s, not a strategy. The strategy is a wider issue. I have not heard much being said—except perhaps by the noble Lord, Lord Soley—about the wider approach that Mr Putin is taking and what drives him. I will come back to that in a minute.
On the tactical question of Ukraine and Crimea, we need to be very honest with ourselves. For example, when noble Lords say that it is for the people of Ukraine to decide their future democratically, it is manifestly clear that the people of Ukraine are not of one mind. The problem is that they are absolutely split down the middle, so democracy as we talk about it simply will not work. That is part of the reason we have this problem. It is not going to work, so let us not use phrases like that, which might be very reassuring in this Chamber but are meaningless in the real world outside. One of my noble friends talked about how important it is to be responsible in this Chamber because things that are said here might do damage outside. There might be some element of truth there but, frankly, I do not think many people in Russia listen to this Chamber. It has very little relevance to most of them and the way they see things. The influence it has is modest in our own country and even more modest more widely.
I heard a lot said—very sensibly, rationally and thoughtfully—about the economic issues and the energy drivers. Those are not the things that drive people in situations of conflict—otherwise we would never get into wars. In wars, everybody loses: economically, socially and in every other way. Wars do not come about because of some kind of weighing up of the calculus of economic benefit. When I listened to a number of things said about energy, trade and economic sanctions, my first thought was that that will not make any difference to Mr Putin and his colleagues because they do not make judgments on that basis. They make judgments on the basis that they believe that their great country has been humiliated and set aside by the West for a long period and they are trying—successfully —to fight back against that. That is the driver, not the economy.
The speech by the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, was, as always, excellent. One thing that he pointed out was the interconnectedness of everything. He has often rightly drawn our attention to that. That makes it very difficult to make economic sanctions work, because there are always ways around them, especially if you have an enormous country and other countries, including other members of the Security Council, prepared to play ball with you.
Let us look at the attitude of Mr Putin. It is always important to know your enemy to understand what you are dealing with. When we talk about the war in Afghanistan, we think about our intervention when we were there—at least, the most recent one. Russians think of the previous Afghanistan war, the one in which we backed the mujaheddin, sending huge amounts of weapons and materiel—and backing Osama bin Laden, of course—in order to get them out, one of the last great humiliations at the end of the Cold War. I may be wrong, but I perceive that Mr Putin is riding on the back of a nationalist tiger and saying, “We’re going to put this right in various places”. I could see it in the quartet dealing with the Israel-Palestinian problem when, for all the loud talk coming from the UN, the EU and the United States about who would talk to whom, Russia was happily talking to Hamas and Hezbollah all the way through. They just ignored what the other three said.
When we came to Syria, particularly after the intervention in Libya, it was absolutely clear from the beginning that Mr Putin was saying, “This is my red line. And, by the way, I am going to stick with mine. Now let us see what you do with yours”. What did we do? We drew lines in the sand, which is very convenient because you can always draw more lines in the sand and rub the other one out with your foot. The same mistake has been made with regard to Crimea: saying that this or that will never happen. I do not think it will be much reassurance to say that we stuck to our view in regard to the Baltic states and, three generations later, they got their freedom. That will not be much reassurance either to people in the Baltics now or to anyone else who might reasonably be fearful. Why? Because now we do not make much of a difference.
I come to the European Union. I am a strong supporter of the European Union, but I remember many arguments with some of my Liberal colleagues over the question of widening or deepening the Union. In my view, you could either deepen it and make it a real political Union—at that stage, I was very keen to do that and have a Europe of the regions rather than a Europe of nation states, and I still think that it may well have been possible—or you could widen it and make it in effect a glorified free trade area. My belief was that if you tried to do both, you would make for disaster, and I think that that is what has happened. We will not talk about the economic aspects of it, but the political aspects are that we have allowed the further widening of the European Union and encouraged others to join it because we saw it as a democratisation of the east and of the south of Europe and beyond, but at the same time many of us who supported that were talking about the importance of developing a foreign and security policy and a defence posture. How on earth could that have been seen by Russia as anything other than bringing forward military, foreign and security policy closer and closer to its borders? Was it ever going to be accepted?
I am most grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but if you take the case of Serbia and Kosovo—and it is true of many countries, surely—the Copenhagen criteria and other criteria, including the economic criteria for joining the EU, have been prized and highly sought after. That is not just skin deep; that is strategic—to use the noble Lord’s word—thinking. I ask the noble Lord to reflect on this idea that widening has had no real impact and not been a proper function of the European Union. I disagreed with Jacques Delors on this very point: I believe that widening and deepening have actually gone together.
My Lords, that is precisely the problem which I am identifying. If we try to widen it out to states that Russia sees as being within its purview and at the same time insist that what we want is not merely a trading bloc but a political union with a common foreign and security policy, and with defence implications down the line, how could Russia see that other than as more than an economic free-trade and democratic area? It could only be perceived as a threat. We are reaping some of the problems of that approach.
We are at a dangerous place if we become more aggressive and at a dangerous place if we do not. I am reminded a little of the problem that I perceive in the policy that some of my noble friends on these Benches have espoused regarding nuclear weapons. The approach that is recommended by some says, “We won’t actually send out submarines with weapons on them unless there is a threat. We’ll keep them going out and end our continuous at-sea deterrence”. So if we find a situation now where these submarines are supposedly out and there is a threat—in a few months’ time there might be a greater threat, possibly on the Baltics or possibly somewhere else—at what point do we judge that the danger is sufficient to bring them back and put in the weapons? Is it now? Is it in a month’s time? Are we already too late? If you do that, would it not increase the militarisation of a problem that we already believe we should be de-escalating? We are in a serious problem and there is no easy answer to the dilemma that we are in.
However, I am persuaded that we need to look seriously at our strategic defence posture. I do not believe that what we have at the moment, which was largely defined on budgetary issues after the last election, is serving the purpose of seriously understanding how we deal with the chaos in the wider Middle East, across the north of Africa and below it and, increasingly, in eastern Europe. These are questions which this Chamber needs to come back and explore fully and thoughtfully because they are strategic threats, which we can ignore until the time when they come back to haunt us. Some of our friends, brothers and sisters closer to Russia, are already finding the past coming back to haunt them.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, like other noble Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for obtaining this debate and for introducing it with such a helpful scan of Syria, the Middle East and north Africa. I draw to the House’s attention my registered interests in the region, particularly in trying to deal with conflict in the region.
Many noble Lords have picked on a number of particular countries in which they have a special interest or concern. That is a very appropriate thing to do in the context of this debate, but I shall take a line directed by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. He pointed out the need for us to have a clearer strategic approach to understanding the problems of this region. While it is true that the same thing is not happening in every country in the region, something is nevertheless happening in the broader region and we need to understand it. We need to evolve and develop our own way of addressing the problems.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, has directed us to three issues: Iran, when he said that he hoped our Government and others would maintain some progress and momentum in dealing with the nuclear question; relationships with Saudi Arabia; and containing the Syrian problem. I shall start with the last of those issues.
From the very start I cautioned against any kind of military intervention in Syria. I said that it seemed to me that the internal problems were not amenable to our engagement and resolution and that what was critical was to try, in so far as possible, to limit the spread of the developing disorder and chaos. Part of the process of doing that is to try to give support to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey—a front-line country which has been mentioned a few times in this debate but which has perhaps not received as much attention as it deserves as a NATO ally that has engaged very thoughtfully in this situation. The Government have put a substantial amount of money, time and effort into giving support, perhaps particularly in Lebanon and Jordan but also in Turkey. We had the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey here a week or so ago and he welcomed the assistance that has been given. This is very important. It is one of the positive and constructive things we can continue to do and where we can continue to give a lead.
I am afraid that when the question of military engagement arose the Government seemed to jump with much too great an alacrity to agree despite the bad experiences that we have had with it over some time. Why was that? I have the impression that “engagement” seems to be seen in military and force terms, and that much of our foreign policy seems to be a matter of “Let’s see what our American colleagues say and give them as much support as possible”. In fact, on some issues—particularly the Israel-Palestine question—that is the answer I have received when I asked officials at the Foreign Office what precisely is our policy. “We will wait and see what John Kerry says, we will wait and see what happens, and then we will support it”. Of course one wants to support one’s friends, but you are not a terribly useful friend if the only thing you have to say is, “I agree with Nick”. It is really rather important to say, “I hear what you say and I am sympathetic to it but here’s another perspective”. When it came to dealing with problems in my part of the United Kingdom, our friends in the United States were perfectly capable of taking a very different line from Her Majesty’s Government and, in the end, helpfully so.
Therefore the notion that one might take a slightly different view or have another perspective is not an unhelpful thing; frequently it is a very helpful thing. We should inevitably have a different perspective from the United States, not least, of course, because of our long history in many of these regions, especially the Middle East itself; but particularly because the United States is coming as the only superpower and we are coming from a very different perspective of having limited power, but substantial understanding. At least, that was the case in the past.
What kind of perspective can we bring and what kind of strategic approach can we increasingly develop? The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, talked about Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other. He and other noble Lords have indicated also that these are not allies; that in fact they see themselves very much as competitors for hegemony in the region and also, incidentally, with Turkey. If we are going to maintain relationships with both of them, perhaps we can make a useful contribution. It has been mentioned that Russia is the only member of the P5+1 that has relationships with both sides in the Syrian context and therefore has a very special role.
That is the first lesson we need to learn in our strategic approach: that it is important for us to maintain channels of communication with as many sides as possible in all these problems. It is not helpful for us to line up behind one side or the other—and not only because we frequently appear, ultimately, to pick the wrong side, although that is a good reason in itself. If you are not a real powerhouse, then the power you can bring is your capacity for relationship and communication. A great deal can be achieved if we can use the relationships we have had in the past and others that we develop as time goes on in order to play a particularly useful role. We have fallen down on that. I hope that the Minister will be able to encourage us that the increased investment of money and resources in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will help us increase our communication with all sides. That will mean taking political risks and having more political openness.
The second thing is to deepen our knowledge and understanding of many of these areas. Before I came to this area of work, a quarter of a century or so ago, I harboured the notion that our Foreign Office was far and away the most knowledgeable, understanding and sophisticated organisation of its kind anywhere in the world. However, the more I got involved and the more time passed, the more I found myself becoming rather disappointed. I found that it was increasingly inward-looking and not frightfully interested in advice, understanding or experience from others outside the service itself, including from parliamentarians, and that because of that it developed a kind of groupthink about what was actually happening that frequently was not very well informed by understanding.
I will give noble Lords an example. There has been an assumption for quite a long time—although we are not of course the only country that makes this mistake—that when engaging in countries that have conflicts going on in them, it is key to identify the social and economic drivers because those countries are rational actors, operating in their own best interest. That is simply nonsense. They are devoted actors, frequently acting in ways that are not in their best social and economic interests. The more deeply they are embroiled in conflict, the more they act not on social, economic and power values, but on what one might describe as sacred values. I do not mean religious values, but values that transcend best social and economic interest. There is lots of research in this area to show that that is not just some kind of airy-fairy notion; it can be measured and described and it affects the way we act. For example, in a situation of that kind the notion from outside would be, “Put some more money in and that will help to oil the wheels”. Not only does that not help the situation, it frequently makes it worse—first, because people react very badly when the things that are important to them are couched in monetary terms; and secondly, because frequently all you do is increase or even create a context of corruption, as there is a whole lot more money around than people can properly cope with.
It seems that we have a capacity to use historic understandings and relationships and a devotion to these kinds of issues that will deepen our understanding—and understanding is one of the things that this country can bring to the party. The noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench knows well how much British counsel, in its deepening of understandings, has frequently helped us to understand these things and engage in a much more constructive way.
The third element, with which I will finish, is that we need to come with a capacity to learn from others in our engagement with them. For example, in working with folks in Tunisia I was struck by the remarks of Sheikh Ghannouchi from the Muslim Brotherhood, who said that you cannot create a democracy simply by having elected structures if you do not have a culture of democracy and a culture that develops all that is necessary for liberal democracy. He is right, yet for decades we have very rapidly brought in institutions based on our experience, and are surprised when the whole thing falls to pieces.
The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, referred to the Enlightenment. That was not a light that was switched on and which suddenly enlightened us, but something that took not just decades but centuries of painful emergence. Perhaps that tells us something about what is happening in that region. However, we also ought to be prepared to learn not only how it really is in some other places but how it might be better for us. There are things about the way in which we deal with our economy in which we depend entirely on monetary values. In some of those countries they are trying to develop an economics based more on community values. We cannot only contribute; we can also learn, not just in the context of this debate but in our engagement with those who are living in such terrible circumstances.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord may well be aware that Chang Song-thaek was closely involved with China. At the time of the execution, China issued a statement but said that it was an internal matter for North Korea to deal with. The noble Lord is right that this is an incredibly unpredictable regime. We engage with human rights in North Korea in so far as we can, but he will also be aware that North Korea has refused to engage in any form of meaningful dialogue on human rights.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, has regularly and rightly brought our attention to this matter in terms of the internal implications within North Korea. However, I think that the situation is now coming to the point where the whole Korean peninsula is at risk and there are wider elements. Did the Prime Minister in his engagement with the Chinese raise this wider question of whether the problems within North Korea are now in danger of spilling into the wider peninsula and perhaps even beyond?
My noble friend will be aware that there are six-party talks which deal with the issue of the wider peninsula, which involve China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US and North Korea. We are not a party to those talks but we feel that that is the best forum to take some of these discussions forward.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, we are indebted to the noble Baroness, Lady Hodgson of Abinger, for bringing this matter to our attention. Our involvement in Afghanistan over the past number of years gives this country an especial responsibility. It is often not difficult to convince people that when things are bad they should engage. However, we must always be extremely careful that when we disengage we do not leave a situation which rebounds into something which is worse than before we got involved. One of the first principles one teaches young doctors is: first, do no harm. One of the great dangers is that we have raised the expectations of democrats in general and women in particular in Afghanistan. There is a real danger of a reaction against that, and those who followed our lead and took our encouragement being the ones who will suffer most.
One of the great anxieties for many people is that, despite the change in political institutions, the resilience of an old culture is so strong that it may overwhelm all the achievements that there have been. As the noble Baroness has pointed out, there are some things which have improved significantly: political engagement by women, even at a relatively senior level, albeit in smaller numbers than one would like to see; political involvement through elections; and, of course, education, which the noble Baroness also mentioned. Recently, when the UN Women deputy executive director for policy and programme, John Hendra, visited one of the governorships, the governor there pointed out that 12 years ago there were two girls in school in the 12 schools in his governorship, and now there were 10,000; and in the country as a whole, that number approaches 3 million, as the noble Baroness has said.
These are positive things. In fact, they are essential if there is going to be further development. At the same time, however, we are very much aware of the high level of violence; not just the almost traditional, tragically cultural, violence that there has been, but very specifically targeted killings of, for example, senior female journalists and government officials. That makes it quite clear that any woman who speaks out or stands up is regarded as a target for those who want to turn things back and attack the position of women. This is a serious problem and the question for us must be what we can do.
The noble Baroness has pointed out that, as a donor Government we have some, albeit perhaps modest, leverage. That is one of the reasons I was rather disappointed in reading the last monthly monitoring report to which I had access, that of October 2013. Although there is mention of political and educational issues, both very positive, there is very little else about what DfID and our other government departments are doing in support of organisations which are protecting the rights of women.
Almost more troubling to me was the account of the trilateral meeting in Downing Street on 29 October, where the Prime Minister met President Karzai of Afghanistan and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan. Pakistan is not a country that has particularly distinguished itself as a protector of women—absolutely the contrary in recent times. So I ask myself why we are not engaging more with India. There have been difficulties and some horrific incidents in India recently, but the people, the politicians and the Government of India regard those as dreadful aberrations that must be stopped, which is a very different thing from those countries that regard them as culturally congruent.
This neglect of India as a key partner is something that goes right back to the beginning of the engagement. I remember talking to both senior American security officials and senior Indian army officials about whether we had consulted India in any way before the invasion of Afghanistan. The answer was that we never even thought about it. Here is our ally, with 1 million men under arms, just across from Afghanistan, which could make a real difference and have real leverage; but we do not seem to be engaging with it. When we leave, we may have some little leverage and involvement, but India will be there. Can the Minister say what we are doing to engage not just with Pakistan—which is perfectly reasonable and appropriate—but with India to ensure that, in the region, there is leverage there to ensure some maintenance of the possibilities for democracy in general and the position of women in particular? India, as a country, at least recognises the importance of this matter even if it does not always have a perfect record—no country does, I suppose—in dealing with these kinds of questions.
I have a real fear that that any improvements we achieve in Afghanistan and some of the other places where we have intervened may be short lived. It is not just that we might return to the status quo ante but that there might even be a reaction against them. Along with the noble Baroness, I seek reassurance from the Minister about our involvement with those who are likely to have positions of responsibility—not just those who are currently in government but those in the Taliban. Those of us who were advising engagement with the latter some years ago were told it was a nonsense, but of course in the end it was an inevitability, not a nonsense. We should try to find some way of ensuring that they understand that, if their country is to benefit as part of the community of nations, it must measure up to some of these important requirements that the community of nations now rightly recognises, in particular on the position of women.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord raises an important point but I need to be clear on this issue. There are two parts to what has been discussed over recent months, on the political track. The Government have always been clear that the matter will be resolved politically, but the specific incident relating to chemical weapons and on which the will of Parliament was listened to was a separate situation. Noble Lords would accept and agree that the Assad regime’s now voluntary destruction of deadly weapons in the form of chemical weapons is an important step that has vindicated the threat of military action by the United States. We would not be in this position if the Assad regime did not anticipate that some military action would be taken.
My Lords, the position, as I understand it, of Her Majesty’s Government, the American Administration and our ally, Turkey, has been from the start that any settlement would involve the removal of Mr Assad as President. Given the UNSC decision, does the noble Baroness accept that if he proceeds to dismantle chemical weapons and thus obey the one institution that the UN Security Council has agreed, it may be difficult to sustain that position?
The Geneva communiqué clearly says that there should be a transition Government with full executive powers, which, among other things, will reflect the will of the majority of people in Syria. It is not for us to set those preconditions but we cannot anticipate a situation in which Assad remaining would be conducive to a settlement that would be acceptable to the people of Syria.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I also commend my noble friend Lord Trimble for bringing this important matter to your Lordships’ House and presenting it with his usual methodical and forensic accuracy. The timing of this debate is important, as he has pointed out, given the legal cases in Russia and those coming up at the European Court of Human Rights. However, the timing of the debate at this hour of the evening means that I do not intend to repeat what he has already said with such clarity about the case itself.
Part of the importance of this case, as the noble Lord, Lord Judd, said, is its significance regarding the deterioration of freedom and democracy in Russia. Since Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s arrest, there has been an extraordinary increase in the number of political prisoners in Russia; by most estimates, there are now more than in Belarus. The arrest of Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev in 2003 on fraud charges was probably the first major such politically motivated case brought against Kremlin opponents under Putin. Khodorkovsky was supporting the liberal opposition Yabloko party of my old friend, Grigory Yavlinsky, and challenging corruption and authoritarianism in Russia under Mr Putin, as my noble friend has said. The Russian leader—not the first to do so—saw the legal process as one that could be used to intimidate dissenters. In the words of one of my Russian colleagues, he almost killed off politics from 2003 until December 2011, when the people, outraged by election fraud, came out en masse to protest. In 2009, as my noble friend has pointed out, additional charges of embezzlement were brought against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev and, now, a third case against the defendants may effectively result in life sentences for them.
Then there was the case of the Yukos executive and former company director, Vasily Aleksanyan, who, according to the European Court of Human Rights, was improperly imprisoned and treated in an inhuman and degrading fashion, resulting in his premature death in 2011, some time after he was released from prison as a result of international pressure. In the Yukos case, Russia abused the European Court of Human Rights by, for example, repeatedly replacing the ad hoc Russian judge five times, so that every time a new judge came in, he or she would have to familiarise themselves with all the papers, thus delaying the whole process.
The Pussy Riot case is another example of manipulation of the court system to silence critics. Here, three young women were convicted in August 2012 of hooliganism, motivated by religious hatred, for an illicit performance by their rock group in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. Advised or ill-advised as that may have been, these performance artists were challenging the Kremlin’s increasingly close relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church, which has, sadly, become a central player in Putin’s strategy for national unity. Two of these women are currently serving two-year prison sentences.
The Bolotnaya Square case, brought against 12 defendants for allegedly rioting on Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square on 6 May, the eve of Putin’s inauguration, was largely viewed as a provocation by police to undermine the protest movement. Those 12 people, many of whom had never before even participated in political demonstrations in their lives, are now defendants in a show trial and face up to 10 years in prison.
Therefore, with Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, the pre-inaugural 6 May case and Pussy Riot, Russia is now host to many political prisoners—and their numbers are rising. For example, there is the recent case of the opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, and that of Yabloko’s Pyotr Ofitserov, whose only crime was knowing Navalny; Magnitsky’s post-mortem conviction has already been mentioned; Yabloko’s activists now in jail such as Maxim Petlin, on a trumped-up bribery charge as he fought with a developer who tried to destroy a public garden; and Ivan Bolshakov and Vasily Popov, who were convicted and given sentences on fake evidence for their political activities. Then there are the suspected murders of journalists and human rights activists. Anna Politkovskaya was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, and Yuri Shchekochikhin investigated corruption in the KGB and died mysteriously—like Litvinenko—a couple of months after the first publication of his investigation; and there are many more.
Therefore, the Khodorkovsky case is important not just in itself but because it has paved the way for politically motivated reprisals in Russia. Intimidation and reprisals against political dissenters and opposition have turned into daily practices for the Russian authorities—from intimidation, searches and wiretapping to imprisonment and even, it is clear, extrajudicial killings. In addition to human rights concerns, this increase in political persecution is resulting in increased Russian asylum cases in the European Union, which has a direct impact on the EU economy and society. For example, one young man, Mr Dolmatov, was implicated in the Bolotnaya case, fled, and then committed suicide in a Dutch detention centre after being denied asylum in the Netherlands. Other well known figures such as Garry Kasparov and Sergei Guriev have left Russia for the US and France respectively due to their fear of arrest.
Amid these discouraging highlights, it is important to remember that there are many Russians inside the country who are fighting for democracy and human rights. They need our unwavering political and moral support—from the whole of the international community. Thousands of Russians are working steadily for peaceful democratic change in Russia. Putin’s attempt to use the legal process and other processes to frighten his citizens through the prosecutions we have mentioned will not ultimately work. Dozens of new political parties registered last year and are running candidates in the local elections on 8 September. Thousands of civic activists are preparing to monitor those elections. Those anonymous but courageous Russians want to change their country for the better and they deserve our continuing attention and support.
While my colleague Sergei Mitrokhin maintains that Khodorkovsky is a courageous, inspirational and increasingly symbolic figure for the Russian opposition, Khodorkovsky himself, writing in an opposition newspaper interview just a few weeks ago after his 50th birthday and around 10 years in prison, remains cautious about the prospects. He said:
“The struggle for power with an authoritarian regime always involves serious and mass sacrifices—the loss of a business, a job, or liberty”—
and, he might have added, even your life.
These are serious matters. The least we in this country can do is to give Khodorkovsky and others in the Russian opposition all the support we can in their fight for freedom and democracy in their great country. I welcome the statement by the Prime Minister at the Banqueting Hall and I look to my noble friend to be as robust and strident as she can in condemnation. However, it would be dreadful if our response was only words and we were intimidated, as my noble friend Lord Trimble said, into not taking the kinds of actions that need to be taken to emphasise that we mean what we say. I look to my noble friend to encourage us in that way, too.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, began his intervention by quoting the question that my noble friend Lady Falkner of Margravine asked the Minister quite recently about whether, if the Government were minded to provide weapons to the opposition in Syria, your Lordships’ House would have an opportunity to express a view. As the noble and learned Lord has made clear, the Minister was unable to give a full and clear reply. She seems to have moved things forward a little today in her introductory speech. I thank her for that, as have other noble Lords, and for the opportunity for today’s debate. However, it seems clear even at this stage in the debate that there is very strong resistance to the idea that the Government should arm the rebels or should participate in arming the rebels, so I seek specific assurance from my noble friend that were the Government at any stage minded to move in that direction, today’s debate would not be regarded as an appropriate calling in of advice from your Lordships’ House and that there would be a subsequent debate, as has been undertaken for the other place, whether or not your Lordships’ House is in recess.
This is a major issue, and I wish to say why I think it is so. When the Berlin wall came down and the Cold War drew to a close, we all rejoiced at the opportunity for a change in the world order we had grown up with, a world order in which it seemed clear that there were the good guys and the bad guys and we were the good guys. In a very interesting and important speech, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Truro advised us against regarding foreign policy as best conducted on the basis of good and evil, and when a right reverend Prelate tells us to be careful about regarding things on the basis of good and evil, we would be wise to pay attention.
I think the right reverend Prelate was right because at that time the possibility arose of a new world order constructed on a different basis, a multipolar world where there would be various kinds of arrangements and engagements, but we failed to achieve that. We paid attention to a long-term intervention in Afghanistan when perhaps something much shorter and sharper would have been appropriate, if anything was. We got ourselves embroiled in Iraq in a completely inappropriate way. I supported the intervention in Libya, but we must accept that there have been untoward consequences in other countries apart from the situation in Libya. The most important thing is that in failing to create a multipolar and robust new world order we left a vacuum of power structures, and nature abhors a vacuum, so when the Arab awakening arose, it arose without any kind of structure that could enable people to move forward in appropriate ways and we find something much more destructive, regressive and chaotic.
Borders no longer provide a structure, not only because the people who live in those countries do not regard them as borders that they created but because they see themselves principally not as members of nation states but as people whose responsibilities and relationships are far outside the nation state and depend much more on tribal, religious and other transborder responsibilities and relationships.
When I look at the situation in Syria, I fear that having had the opportunity of moving to a new world order that was not based on one side and the other—good and evil, black and white—we are falling back into precisely that, perhaps with many of the same actors. It does not seem to me that it is simply a question of Mr Assad and his colleagues against the Syrian rebels. I see Russian warships in the eastern Mediterranean lining up and saying to Mr Obama, “I’m sorry. We draw a line”. Although it is the case, as noble Lords have said, that Mr Assad is seen as Russia’s man in the region, Mr Putin is saying to the United States, “Stop recurrently operating without Security Council resolutions; stop taking it upon yourself to decide what you and a coalition of your willing colleagues will do. That is not international law. That is not an international order that we will accept, so we are drawing a line, and we are going to support Mr Assad, whether he is a good guy or a bad guy, because there is a bigger question here of whether you are going to respect some kind of order or whether you will be the determinant of order”. I think Mr Obama realises that and is a little cautious. It would not be a good thing for this country to be liaising with Senator Kerry to push President Obama into some kind of intervention.
It is easy to pillory President Assad. I remember the first time that I went to Damascus, some years ago, specifically because I felt that Syria was an important area and I wanted to meet the Foreign Minister to see whether there was any possibility of an agreement between Israel and Syria at that time. There were indications that there was a preparedness to engage. Indeed, the Syrians said, “Yes, we would like to find a way of engaging and finding a peace agreement, because we believe that peace in the region would be worth while. Are the British Government prepared to engage?”. Well, the British Government did engage, but they did so with a finger-wagging diplomacy which said, “If you do not do what we say, it will be worse for you”.
I returned again, this time to meet President Assad. Unfortunately, his brother died just the day before I arrived, so I went again to meet with Walid al-Moallem, the Foreign Minister. Still there was a preparedness to engage. That opportunity was not taken up either.
We therefore find ourselves with everything deteriorating and much blood being spilt. People can say with ease, “These are the good guys and this is the axis of evil”. In truth, however, some of those whom we regard as our allies have been contributing to some of the difficulties in the region. My noble friend Lord Ashdown has pointed out that weapons are coming, if not from the Saudi Arabian Government, then at least from Saudi Arabian businesses’ pockets, and from the Qataris.
We need to be cautious, but not about engaging; on the contrary, we need to be energetic. When a problem of this kind threatens to blow out all over the place, we need to help to create some security in the region. We need to be more energetic in helping to sustain the stability of Jordan and Lebanon. Certainly, when I was in Lebanon recently, I was much more disturbed when I came away than before I went. It was clear that things were deteriorating very quickly indeed. Even Turkey, which we thought was a relatively stable country, is no longer as stable as it was on its eastern borders; even within the country itself, difficulties are arising. Of course, we have not contributed to an entirely stable Iraq; that much is clear. I do not say that we should be staying out of the problem. We have relationships and an understanding of the region which is substantially greater than many other countries. We should use that relationship and that understanding of the history of the region.
Secondly, we should be doing all that we can to encourage others to assist in the stability of countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. Their humanitarian problems are enormous—by the way, not all the refugees arriving there are unarmed; let us bear that in mind. We must understand that the outcome in Syria may or may not leave Mr Assad in place. We do not know. I have often heard Governments, including those in London, saying that they would never negotiate with this, that or the other rascal—only to find themselves doing exactly that five, 10 or 20 years later. I remember saying that we would have to talk with the Taliban, and was told I was a naive fool who was on the wrong side. Well, now we are negotiating with the Taliban when it is far too late, when it knows perfectly well that it has only to sit tight for a few more months and watch us depart, tails between our legs. Had we negotiated with it at the right time, there might have been some possibility—I put it no stronger than that—of a different outcome.
We must be a little careful, but we should be energetic, not sitting back or avoiding getting involved. We should not be providing weapons in a situation where there are more than enough, but be energetically involved in trying to persuade our allies, and those with whom we differ, that the future is to be found in trying to stabilise the region. If not, I fear that my noble friend Lord Ashdown is right: we may be looking at the beginning of a bloody Sunni/Shia civil war across the whole of the region. By the way, it will affect us here. I have already had colleagues at the other end of the Building telling me about Shia constituents who are worried about what is going to happen when some of their Sunni counterparts in London constituencies start to take these things on to the streets here. This is not just about far away places, or far away problems. We should therefore be energetic in our engagement in diplomacy, not in providing weapons.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberWith regard to working with the opposition and other important allies in the region, we have of course been working closely with Turkey, which unfortunately has had to bear the brunt of taking on the majority of refugees who have come out of Syria. Other partners in the region are playing a constructive role.
With regard to Russia, I think that I made clear when I repeated the Statement that we are using all opportunities to impress upon the Russians, using discussions with our opposite numbers and counterparts in all fora, that there has to be some progress in this matter. Is there a softening of their position? Are we facing a brick wall? At this stage I could describe what we are seeing as a potential crack in the brick wall, but we must continue to ensure that we keep pushing.
With regards to perpetrators of crimes, there is always the possibility—provided that the United Nations Security Council can pass a resolution, which of course would have to be supported by China and Russia—that those crimes could be referred to the International Criminal Court. There is also the alternative option that, at the end of this crisis, these matters could be tried within Syria by a democratically elected Government.
My Lords, does my noble friend recognise that the aid given to our allies like Turkey—particularly Jordan, which has almost 250,000 refugees, and Lebanon—is not merely a humanitarian issue? Let us recall the destabilisation of Jordan in 1970 by the Black September movement. There is a real danger of countries—not so much Turkey but certainly Lebanon and Jordan—being destabilised by the number of refugees coming in. Do Her Majesty’s Government understand that this is not just a humanitarian question but one of stabilisation?
In discussions with the opposition, are we trying to ensure that we get an undertaking from them that, should they find themselves in a position of governance at a later stage, they will hand over all stockpiles of chemical weapons and nuclear materiel to an appropriate international organisation? Can we get that agreement at this point, rather than waiting until we are bemoaning their being abused, should these folk find themselves in government at a later stage?
I agree with my noble friend’s first point; of course our support in the region has both a humanitarian element and a stabilisation element. Countries can find themselves with a large number of refugees and that can lead to internal challenges for those nations. We are therefore supporting countries in the region in dealing with those issues.
My noble friend makes an important point with regard to chemical and biological weapons. We have had these discussions with the opposition coalition. We have asked them to appoint an individual who will be specifically responsible for co-ordinating the discussion of these matters with a view to ensuring, if at all possible during the crisis, that these weapons are safeguarded, and we have urged them, at the end of this, to sign up to the chemical weapons convention and the biological and toxic weapons convention. The opposition coalition is in agreement with us on that.
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in addressing the terms of the Motion to take note of recent developments in the European Union, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, rightly pointed out that the difficulties on this question are not confined to the United Kingdom. Throughout Europe there are anxieties and concerns, and very substantial economic, social and political difficulties. Therefore, some of the difficulties that we have on this question are our own, and some we share with others throughout the European Union and beyond.
My noble friend Lord Maclennan of Roggart referred to Derick Heathcoat-Amory’s quotation about the European Union—or in those days the EEC—being a political decision with economic consequences. The noble Lord, Lord Judd, went a bit further, in a sense. He pointed out that, symbolically, the European Coal and Steel Community developed from France, Germany and others taking coal and steel—the very things that we had used to make weapons with which we destroyed each other’s lives—and turning them from a basis for conflict into an instrument of co-operation. Put more crudely, after two wars in a relatively short period, the European project was an attempt to address the German problem, not just from the point of view of France but from that of many German people who were themselves concerned about what would happen if there was another awful conflagration in Europe.
For a subsequent generation of people—my generation—the European project was a great inspiration. For a young, liberally minded man growing up in Northern Ireland and seeing the results of narrow and dangerous nationalisms on both sides of my community, there was the possibility of a new vision. Instead of arguing about a United Kingdom against a united Ireland, we could see ourselves in a united Europe—a Europe of the regions where we could work together. Essentially, this was to be a Europe where regional diversity and difference was recognised, valued and appreciated—and democratised by holding the Council and Commission to account through a directly elected European Parliament.
However, nationalism is a tough old bird. Monnet and Schuman knew that from the start. That is why, in the construction of the High Authority and subsequently the European Commission, they created a kind of civil service with vastly more power than any civil service would have in a nation state. They perceived, probably accurately, that under the pressure of populist nationalism that had so defaced Europe, it was likely that the European project would not get very far because each country would fight for its own national interest rather than for shared requirements. This may have been extremely important in the development of the European project—the Community and subsequently the European Union—but it tended to move us away from a Europe of the regions with all its diversity and co-operation across boundaries.
The Europe that developed tended to be a much more socialist than liberal, with a lot more centralisation and harmonisation, with currency union, cohesion and solidarity funds. These are perfectly good and proper things, but they began to be seen by many of our people as something that was centralising and distant from them. Even the establishment of a directly elected European Parliament did not address the perceived democratic deficit. Apart from in Northern Ireland, where the three MEPs are particularly well known largely because of their non-European Parliament activities, MEPs in the United Kingdom do not have the kind of profile that enables local constituents to feel that they can identify with their Member. Those of us who are pro-European have to acknowledge that we have failed to develop a European identity that is powerful enough to inspire people and draw them away from narrow nationalism.
There were other reasons. Our Civil Service here in Westminster tends to gold-plate everything. Everything has to be done with a particular enthusiasm and vigour. If we turn away from our old friends—as we foolishly did—we do so with an alacrity and completeness that does not characterise the French in their dealings with their old friends: quite the contrary. This was not a European requirement but the way we tended to do things. I mentioned this to a friend who said, “You are talking about having your cake and eating it”. I said, “What’s wrong with that?”. I am coming at this from an Irish perspective. As the noble Lord, Lord Empey, will recall, we often used to remark that when our friends from England came over, they seemed to play by the rules of cricket. Nobody in our part of the world does that; they are more likely to play Gaelic. I might add that not many people play cricket in the rest of Europe, either. Perhaps there was an unwiseness about the way some of the directives and approaches were carried through.
It is clear, too, that there was a strong decision against a Europe of the regions and in favour of a Europe of nation states. As if to emphasise that, when it came to the appointment of the President and High Representative for Foreign Affairs—two delightful people, Mr Van Rompuy and the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton—there was a general perception that the Heads of Government in Europe did not want to appoint people who would be too powerful or striking, or who would take away to Europe the platform that they believed they were creating globally, as politicians who had only a national mandate, often from relatively small states.
These arguments for the European Union have not necessarily struck a chord with European citizens—our fellow citizens. The war now seems a long time ago to people of my generation and those much younger than me, as distinct from many noble Lords in this House. They do not fear a war. They should, but they do not; it is the way of human nature, that when things go into the past they are forgotten about. The wish for Europe to rival China and the United States, to take its place in the world and so on is absolutely an ambition of politicians at a senior level, but it is not something that ordinary people, particularly people of this generation, are very interested in. They see a much more networked world, and not one where they particularly approve of that kind of power-broking.
Of course, Europe as an economic matter is very much appreciated. That is why many other countries want to join. They do not want to join to prevent a war in Europe, or for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Owen, stated, although he is absolutely right that this would be a way of copper-fastening peace in the Balkans, as elsewhere. However, many of the people themselves see this as an opportunity to do well economically out of Europe, particularly with the Germans paying for it. I am not sure that that is necessarily something that inspires, builds and develops a European identity.
Tragically, the debate has become polarised. We see it here today, where those who are for Europe speak as though everything in Europe must be adopted and moved ahead with more and more enthusiasm, whether or not the people want it. Those who are against are fervently against, without an appreciation that the nationalism that they are beginning to espouse was exactly the thing that took Europe into a terrible place for which many British soldiers, men and women, died in the previous century, in order to escape from it.
I was a little warmed by hearing the noble Lords, Lord Owen, Lord Tugendhat and Lord Howell of Guildford, talking about moving forward into Europe with enthusiasm. They are not for making some of the mistakes of the past, and certainly not with the rigidities of the past. Neither do they wish to pull back from it, but to develop a European Union with the kind of constitutional creativity, flexibility and imagination that has characterised this country. It has taken people from four separate jurisdictions and brought them into a United Kingdom where they work together. We have something to contribute from that British experience, and we should not be frightened by taking the opportunity to do so positively in Europe.