Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: Follow-up Report (European Affairs Committee) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Alderdice
Main Page: Lord Alderdice (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Alderdice's debates with the Cabinet Office
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Jay, admirably fulfilled his challenging role as chairman of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland Sub-Committee in achieving a considerable level of agreement across the wide range of views in the committee about the impact of the Northern Ireland protocol and, in the second report, the Windsor Framework.
The first report found, wholly unsurprisingly, that businesses reliant on trade between Great Britain and Northern Ireland had been negatively affected. Contrarywise, businesses trading with Ireland and the rest of the EU found that the protocol had had a beneficial impact. The committee caveated its observations by noting that the overall impact of the protocol on the Northern Ireland economy was perhaps uncertain because of all the other things that have been happening: the Covid pandemic, labour shortages, rising costs from the war in Ukraine and so on.
Interestingly, the committee noted that those from whom it took evidence could reach opposite conclusions from the same information. That is characteristic of our problems. It is not surprising: those who are unionists but supported Brexit, which they did not all, will naturally look for something other than Brexit to be the main reason for their undoubted problems. Those who are nationalists, who were mostly opposed to Brexit, will see any development towards an all-Ireland economy as in their long-term political interest. Businesspeople, of course, will simply try to do the best that they can, whatever circumstances they work in.
The committee tried to avoid judgments on these issues of deep difference, but we need to address them if we are to take our thinking forward. Those who supported Brexit did not pay much attention to what were quite predictable consequences for Northern Ireland. They thought that it would be relatively straightforward and easy, but it has not been.
A number of realities need addressing and, given my professional background, noble Lords will not be surprised that the first reality I suggest is the psychological one. When a relationship breaks up because one side wishes to walk away from it and the other does not, there are inevitable emotional consequences. The one who is leaving minimises the consequences and says, “We can still be friends”, and the one who is being abandoned feels anxious and angry. The EU was never going to respond with equanimity to Brexit for these reasons, so even where there were some problems that could be mitigated in the early days, it was not going to happen immediately until people had begun to settle down to the reality of what had happened.
There were some problems that I would characterise as real-world problems. It is ironic that those who most fervently upheld the importance of taking back control of national borders were the very ones who dismissed the importance of the national border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. That was never a coherent position. If national borders are not important, there was no reason to leave the EU; if they were important enough to leave the EU, they were going to be important and problematic in respect of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, particularly given the historic, and even current, matter of dispute about that border.
Let me be clear: Brexit was an entirely legitimate ambition and, when it was voted on by the people and the people supported it, it had to be implemented. However, it has consequences. If I jump off a windowsill I will fall and there is no point in me saying how unfair it is that gravity will result in me being crippled. There are certain consequences to our actions, especially in relationships.
One of the other consequences was for our relationships with the EU and the United States. When Prime Minister Sunak took over the reins of government, he realised that the key challenges for his Government were resetting the relationships with the EU and the US. They had been damaged by Brexit and the UK cannot afford to be at odds with its most important trading and security partners. That is why the Windsor Framework was a dramatically successful initiative in resetting relationships with the EU and the United States. I think it extremely unlikely that the current UK Government or any successor Government will embark on an unstitching of those relationships and these arrangements.
There can be some window-dressing about the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, but that position and the devolved settlement of Northern Ireland are of less consequence for Britain as a whole now than relationships with the EU and the United States. The emotional attachment, which was very strong when I came to this House more than a quarter of a century ago, does not feel the same now. For example, I was struck when John Simpson, a very distinguished journalist, on seeing what had happened with the Scottish nationalists, said that the “union is now safe”. I could not help but think to myself that he was not thinking very much about the union with Northern Ireland and that he is not the only one on this side of the water who has that perspective.