Syria and the Middle East

Lord Alderdice Excerpts

Thursday 27th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alderdice]

My Lords, like other noble Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for obtaining this debate and for introducing it with such a helpful scan of Syria, the Middle East and north Africa. I draw to the House’s attention my registered interests in the region, particularly in trying to deal with conflict in the region.

Many noble Lords have picked on a number of particular countries in which they have a special interest or concern. That is a very appropriate thing to do in the context of this debate, but I shall take a line directed by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. He pointed out the need for us to have a clearer strategic approach to understanding the problems of this region. While it is true that the same thing is not happening in every country in the region, something is nevertheless happening in the broader region and we need to understand it. We need to evolve and develop our own way of addressing the problems.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, has directed us to three issues: Iran, when he said that he hoped our Government and others would maintain some progress and momentum in dealing with the nuclear question; relationships with Saudi Arabia; and containing the Syrian problem. I shall start with the last of those issues.

From the very start I cautioned against any kind of military intervention in Syria. I said that it seemed to me that the internal problems were not amenable to our engagement and resolution and that what was critical was to try, in so far as possible, to limit the spread of the developing disorder and chaos. Part of the process of doing that is to try to give support to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey—a front-line country which has been mentioned a few times in this debate but which has perhaps not received as much attention as it deserves as a NATO ally that has engaged very thoughtfully in this situation. The Government have put a substantial amount of money, time and effort into giving support, perhaps particularly in Lebanon and Jordan but also in Turkey. We had the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey here a week or so ago and he welcomed the assistance that has been given. This is very important. It is one of the positive and constructive things we can continue to do and where we can continue to give a lead.

I am afraid that when the question of military engagement arose the Government seemed to jump with much too great an alacrity to agree despite the bad experiences that we have had with it over some time. Why was that? I have the impression that “engagement” seems to be seen in military and force terms, and that much of our foreign policy seems to be a matter of “Let’s see what our American colleagues say and give them as much support as possible”. In fact, on some issues—particularly the Israel-Palestine question—that is the answer I have received when I asked officials at the Foreign Office what precisely is our policy. “We will wait and see what John Kerry says, we will wait and see what happens, and then we will support it”. Of course one wants to support one’s friends, but you are not a terribly useful friend if the only thing you have to say is, “I agree with Nick”. It is really rather important to say, “I hear what you say and I am sympathetic to it but here’s another perspective”. When it came to dealing with problems in my part of the United Kingdom, our friends in the United States were perfectly capable of taking a very different line from Her Majesty’s Government and, in the end, helpfully so.

Therefore the notion that one might take a slightly different view or have another perspective is not an unhelpful thing; frequently it is a very helpful thing. We should inevitably have a different perspective from the United States, not least, of course, because of our long history in many of these regions, especially the Middle East itself; but particularly because the United States is coming as the only superpower and we are coming from a very different perspective of having limited power, but substantial understanding. At least, that was the case in the past.

What kind of perspective can we bring and what kind of strategic approach can we increasingly develop? The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, talked about Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other. He and other noble Lords have indicated also that these are not allies; that in fact they see themselves very much as competitors for hegemony in the region and also, incidentally, with Turkey. If we are going to maintain relationships with both of them, perhaps we can make a useful contribution. It has been mentioned that Russia is the only member of the P5+1 that has relationships with both sides in the Syrian context and therefore has a very special role.

That is the first lesson we need to learn in our strategic approach: that it is important for us to maintain channels of communication with as many sides as possible in all these problems. It is not helpful for us to line up behind one side or the other—and not only because we frequently appear, ultimately, to pick the wrong side, although that is a good reason in itself. If you are not a real powerhouse, then the power you can bring is your capacity for relationship and communication. A great deal can be achieved if we can use the relationships we have had in the past and others that we develop as time goes on in order to play a particularly useful role. We have fallen down on that. I hope that the Minister will be able to encourage us that the increased investment of money and resources in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will help us increase our communication with all sides. That will mean taking political risks and having more political openness.

The second thing is to deepen our knowledge and understanding of many of these areas. Before I came to this area of work, a quarter of a century or so ago, I harboured the notion that our Foreign Office was far and away the most knowledgeable, understanding and sophisticated organisation of its kind anywhere in the world. However, the more I got involved and the more time passed, the more I found myself becoming rather disappointed. I found that it was increasingly inward-looking and not frightfully interested in advice, understanding or experience from others outside the service itself, including from parliamentarians, and that because of that it developed a kind of groupthink about what was actually happening that frequently was not very well informed by understanding.

I will give noble Lords an example. There has been an assumption for quite a long time—although we are not of course the only country that makes this mistake—that when engaging in countries that have conflicts going on in them, it is key to identify the social and economic drivers because those countries are rational actors, operating in their own best interest. That is simply nonsense. They are devoted actors, frequently acting in ways that are not in their best social and economic interests. The more deeply they are embroiled in conflict, the more they act not on social, economic and power values, but on what one might describe as sacred values. I do not mean religious values, but values that transcend best social and economic interest. There is lots of research in this area to show that that is not just some kind of airy-fairy notion; it can be measured and described and it affects the way we act. For example, in a situation of that kind the notion from outside would be, “Put some more money in and that will help to oil the wheels”. Not only does that not help the situation, it frequently makes it worse—first, because people react very badly when the things that are important to them are couched in monetary terms; and secondly, because frequently all you do is increase or even create a context of corruption, as there is a whole lot more money around than people can properly cope with.

It seems that we have a capacity to use historic understandings and relationships and a devotion to these kinds of issues that will deepen our understanding—and understanding is one of the things that this country can bring to the party. The noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench knows well how much British counsel, in its deepening of understandings, has frequently helped us to understand these things and engage in a much more constructive way.

The third element, with which I will finish, is that we need to come with a capacity to learn from others in our engagement with them. For example, in working with folks in Tunisia I was struck by the remarks of Sheikh Ghannouchi from the Muslim Brotherhood, who said that you cannot create a democracy simply by having elected structures if you do not have a culture of democracy and a culture that develops all that is necessary for liberal democracy. He is right, yet for decades we have very rapidly brought in institutions based on our experience, and are surprised when the whole thing falls to pieces.

The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, referred to the Enlightenment. That was not a light that was switched on and which suddenly enlightened us, but something that took not just decades but centuries of painful emergence. Perhaps that tells us something about what is happening in that region. However, we also ought to be prepared to learn not only how it really is in some other places but how it might be better for us. There are things about the way in which we deal with our economy in which we depend entirely on monetary values. In some of those countries they are trying to develop an economics based more on community values. We cannot only contribute; we can also learn, not just in the context of this debate but in our engagement with those who are living in such terrible circumstances.