(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I was merely emphasising. I did refer to earlier clauses as well when I was giving one specific example in this particular group. But I hear what the noble Lord says, and, of course, I recognise that there are issues, particularly in this clause, about the powers that are being proposed. In coming on to that particular point, in relation to the concerns raised by the breadth of powers, each individual power that is being proposed in the Bill is being constrained by its purpose. None of them is a “do anything” power, and Clause 22(1) does not make them so: it merely ensures they can fully fulfil their purposes.
The clause says that regulations under this Act may make
“any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament (including provisions modifying this Act.)”
The words are completely expressed.
As I said, we are seeking to put a power in the Bill, and I will provide clarification on that. Each individual power that we are seeking to take in this respect is being constrained by its purpose—but, if I may, on that point, I will write to the noble Lord once I have talked to officials specifically about this aspect of the debate.
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I recognise what my noble friend has said. Any democratic country—any open society—gives everyone the right to express their view. What demonstrates the strength of our own country is that, while you might not respect a particular view, you respect and defend the right of someone to hold an opinion contrary to your own. We are a diverse, rich country in all sorts of aspects, including our faith diversity. We also recognise that America is a shining light and the closest ally of the United Kingdom. There is much that we share on strengthening democracy and human rights around the world; that will remain a strong sense in our focus globally as well.
Is not the lesson for this country from that decision that there should be absolutely no political involvement in the appointment of senior judges?
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord should recognise—I am sure he does—that, as I have said repeatedly, we have been faced with the worst economic contraction for almost 300 years and a budget deficit of close to £400 billion. It is therefore right that we take time to understand fully what the long-term impact of our financial position will be. As the Chief Secretary to the Treasury made clear this week, we have had to look at a range of fiscal measures, including our situation on debt and borrowing. Last year we borrowed over £300 billion and this year we are forecast to borrow a further £234 billion. We will provide details as we move forward. However, I am sure that, if the noble Lord reflects, he will agree that we are facing very challenging times. Notwithstanding that, we are still among the largest providers when it comes to development support across the globe.
My Lords, I draw attention to the fact that I have a daughter who works in overseas development, but my question is not directed to the merits or demerits of the government proposal. Following up the question of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, how is it consistent with the sovereignty of Parliament, which is, after all, the pre-eminent constitutional principle that all of us in this Chamber embrace, for an unequivocal statutory obligation on the Executive to be postponed without further reference to Parliament, except through a mere Ministerial Statement? At least with Henry VIII provisions we have the notional fig leaf of parliamentary consent, but this is Executive reliance on Section 3 of the Act and it removes that fig leaf. Is not the sight rather unpleasant?
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberWithout this amendment, we are leaving a recipe for lethargy, which is inappropriate. We need it so that the court will get hold of the complaint, if one is needed, as soon as practicable.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for tabling this amendment, and I thank other noble Lords for their contributions. Perhaps I will disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, somewhat by saying that I agree with the substance and constructive nature of the proposal before us. When the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, started talking about “shortly” and so on, I was reminded of my time as the Aviation Minister and the occasion when an announcement on Heathrow Airport was pending—but we got there.
In that mood, let me outline the Government’s position on this amendment. When a request is received from a designated person to vary or revoke their designation, the appropriate Minister should ensure that they make their decision as soon as is reasonably practicable. As sanctions are applied without giving those sanctioned the opportunity to make representations, and because they have serious consequences on the individuals concerned, it is important to ensure that mistakes are rectified swiftly.
As sanctions are intended to change behaviour, it is also important that people should be able to have their designation revoked if they change their behaviour. Clause 19 therefore provides a quicker and less costly option than going to court. It will also have the advantage of keeping unnecessary pressure off the courts and potentially reducing costs to the taxpayer. The reassessment process exists to allow designated persons to seek swift redress when wrongly designated—and I can assure noble Lords that the Government fully intend to act promptly to requests for reassessments.
I shall certainly reflect on the amendment. I have listened carefully to noble Lords, who have made a compelling case for us to look at our position. With the assurance today that we will look at the amendment again—although it is only an assurance at this juncture—I ask the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to withdraw his amendment.
I will not add very much, but I am beginning to think that there is a computer in every department which produces a Henry VIII clause at least once in every Bill. That is what we have here. This is not belt and braces; it is belt, braces and Henry VIII’s great big heavy boots. We do not want it.
The noble and learned Lord made me imagine Henry VIII’s boots for a moment.
As regards thinking, I am forever thinking; I think it is a good thing to do. The Government are reflecting very carefully on all elements of the arguments noble Lords are putting forward on these amendments. I will say at the outset that I can see that a number of these amendments gather around a central theme—namely, the appropriate roles of Parliament and the Government when creating and implementing future policy on sanctions. I assure noble Lords that I recognise that this is a difficult balance to strike. As power flows back to the United Kingdom from the European Union —I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, that it is a case of “when” we leave the EU—it will not be appropriate to simply follow the model in the European Communities Act 1972, where decisions of the EU either apply directly in UK law or are implemented through statutory instruments following the negative procedure.
I assure noble Lords that we have tried hard to strike the balance correctly in this Bill and ensure that Parliament has the right level of oversight of the Government’s exercise of sanctions policy. For example, we have ensured that the UK autonomous sanctions regulations must be approved by Parliament before they are put in place. I continue to listen very carefully to the points that have been made about the need for proper parliamentary scrutiny. I assure noble Lords that I will continue to reflect on those points—and not just in respect of these amendments.
It is perhaps worth remembering that sanctions are, in essence, as I have said repeatedly, a matter of foreign policy and national security, which fall more to the Government than Parliament. This was recognised by the great constitutional lawyer A V Dicey, who wrote that the “right of making treaties” was,
“left by law in the hands of the Crown, and are exercised in fact by the executive government”.
That is also the practice in other western countries with national sanctions regimes and legislation, such as Canada and Australia.
On the amendment we are discussing, it is important to recognise that the imposition of sanctions is not a punishment but an attempt to change the behaviour of those who are acting in a threatening or unacceptable manner. That is why the provisions provide ways of suspending, amending and revoking sanctions. Iran is an example of where sanctions have been suspended. Under the 2016 nuclear deal, Iran sanctions can be “snapped back” by the EU if there is a breach of the international commitments made by Iran in relation to nuclear development. Noble Lords will be aware that those suspension arrangements were part of a delicate political balancing act, which the UK is working hard with the EU and other partners to preserve.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs ever, as I said, we live and learn. The noble Lord is of course right in this context: during Committee, any noble Lord can speak and intervene as appropriate.
If I am allowed to speak, the reality is that neither House rejects subordinate legislation, even if it includes a provision which everybody thinks is lousy, because if you try to do that, the whole instrument falls, and there may be 77 regulations within it with which you agree. Our processes do not in reality admit of proper challenge to secondary legislation. But that is a battle for another occasion, perhaps when we come to Henry VIII.
I respectfully suggest to the Minister that the word “necessary” does not mean the same as “last resort”. If, when deciding whether to exercise these powers, he believed that he was acting in order to implement a treaty obligation or in accordance with a necessary stage in our foreign policy, that would be amply covered by the word “necessary”.
I was going to say that I will allow the Minister to reflect—that is very generous of me; the Minister is allowed as much time as he likes. What I meant was that when he has had time to reflect, I shall reflect on his reflections and return to the issue on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, these amendments seek to remove the ability of the Government to create sectoral financial sanctions measures by removing the power to apply certain sanction measures to, as we have heard,
“persons connected with a prescribed country”.
Amendments 10 to 14, 16 and 17 would make this change in Clause 2 while Amendment 19 speaks to Clause 5, Amendment 22 to Clause 6 and Amendment 81 to Clause 50. Amendment 30 to Clause 10 would make a slightly different change in that it would restrict the Government from being able to designate a person on the basis of their involvement with other designated persons. However, the amendments all have a common theme as they deal with the application of sanctions to persons other than those directly designated.
The Government are clear that sectoral financial sanctions remain a vital foreign policy and national security tool to enable us to meet our UN obligations. It is worth emphasising that we already implement these sanctions under both the United Nations and the European Union regimes. For example, sanctions against North Korea restrict that country’s access to certain financial markets in order to restrict its ability to generate funds for its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. To do this and to make it work, we have had to impose sanctions on groups of persons—or in extreme cases, on all people—connected in a specified way with the prescribed country. This ensures that the sanctions measures are robust and effective.
We accept that this creates the potential for far-reaching sanctions that bite upon people who themselves have done no wrong, but it remains the case that it is a necessary part of some sanctions regimes. The more broadly sanctions can be drawn, the greater the impact they will have. I accept that it is a sad but necessary side-effect that at times this can affect persons who may not be directly involved with the activities of the target regime. For example, the current restrictions on the transfer of funds to and from North Korea—noble Lords will be aware that there have previously been restrictions on the transfer of funds to and from Iran—will affect people who do not directly support Kim Jong-un’s regime.
The UK, EU and Strasbourg courts have all considered and accepted that the harsh effects on individuals are justified due to the importance of sanctions and the need for them to have broad and deep effects. It was summarised by the European Court of Justice, which stated that,
“any measure imposing sanctions has, by definition, consequences which affect the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business, thereby causing harm to persons who are in no way responsible for the situation which led to the adoption of the sanctions. Moreover, the importance of the aims pursued by the regulation at issue is such as to justify negative consequences, even of a substantial nature, for some operators”.
This was the Bosphorus case decided in 1996 in relation to sanctions that were placed on the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It has been a settled principle of law for more than 20 years.
If the amendments were accepted, we would be unable to impose these measures. In some cases, they are mandated by resolutions of the UN Security Council, such as the obligations imposed in 2013 to cease business with North Korean banks and financial institutions. We would then be in breach of international law. Another example of a sanctions regime that we would be unable to maintain is the Ukraine sovereignty regime, which aims to restrict Russia from accessing certain financial services. Similar to the North Korea examples I have already given, we would be unable to maintain those financial sanctions if we were unable to impose sanctions on persons connected with Russia, or with persons of a certain description connected with Russia, such as state-owned banks. The clauses must remain if we are to be able to meet our international obligations and work with allies to use sanctions as an effective foreign policy and national security tool.
Clause 10 currently permits us to determine that a person is an “involved person” on the basis of their relationships with other “involved persons”. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, raised this issue; I hope I can briefly explain the significance of it. A person can be designated only when the appropriate Minister has sufficient evidence to have reasonable grounds to suspect that they are involved in the activities targeted by sanctions. For example, if a senior member of a regime is controlling a public body that is developing weapons of mass destruction, they are involved in that activity and can be classified as an “involved person”. Assuming that the appropriate Minister deems it appropriate—and proportionate—to designate them, they can do so.
Clause 10 also enables a person to be an “involved person” if they are owned or controlled by, or acting on behalf of, an “involved person”—for example, as an agent. It goes further and enables a person to be an “involved person” on the basis of their association with other involved people. The key point is that this is often required of us by our international obligations. It is common for a UNSCR to require states to designate not just those involved in a particular activity, but those acting on their behalf or at their direction. Accordingly, we must be able to do that to meet our UN obligations, but it also has three other advantages. First, it enables us to apply sanctions more widely to affect the people around those directly involved, which would further restrict the regime’s ability to act and place further pressure on the regime to change its ways. Secondly, it allows us to designate those people who enable these activities by providing funds and financial services to the regime without direct involvement in the targeted activities. Thirdly, it enables us to apply sanctions across a whole group who share the same aims but are using different methods to achieve them. For example, it would enable us to designate all members of a terrorist group: not only those who are engaging directly in terrorist activity, but those providing funds and logistical support.
A current example of that would be the EU designation of Bashar al-Assad under the EU’s Syria sanctions regime, which has frozen the assets of Assad in the EU —including the UK—and banned him from entering the EU. However, people associated with him are also designated: leading businesspersons operating in Syria; members of the Syrian armed forces of the rank of colonel, or the equivalent or higher, in post after May 2011; members of the Syrian security and intelligence services in post after May 2011; and members of the regime-affiliated militias. Removing the ability to designate these as “associated persons”, as proposed in Amendment 30, would remove the ability to designate those who have a significant role in threats to peace and security.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, gave a personal example of being connected and made the pertinent point of the definition being very wide: it encompasses many people, even those whose connections are arguably tenuous. As I have already explained, it is necessary to ensure that sanctions are broad and effective. To say that somebody is connected because of a remote family relationship is tenuous. I doubt it would be lawful or stand up to scrutiny in a court, nor would it advance the purpose of the sanctions. However, it is almost impossible to foresee what type of connections will be required in future sanctions regimes, but I do not believe that this one, in terms of the detailed nature of what the noble and learned Lord expressed, would apply.
I have heard and listened very carefully to the concerns, but at the same time I have stated that there are good reasons for casting these powers in the way we have. There will be real difficulties in applying sanctions if they are too restricted. We believe that we have the balance right. With the practical examples I have given, and my interpretation of the Bosphorus case—especially when we bear in mind that power can be exercised only when proportionate and compliant with human rights; any other use would be forbidden by Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998—I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be minded to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I shall withdraw the amendment for now; I may come back to it on Report. However, I do not want the Minister to misunderstand the purpose of my amendment. He has produced a very convincing argument for the need for sanctions to be available and used, and there are compelling cases where they have been used out of absolute necessity. The amendments we are proposing are nothing to do with that. The amendment we are driving at is that, in reality, there is no reason why the word “connection” cannot be defined now, as opposed to leaving it for few months down the road until a Minister gets round to making a definition. I look forward to his reflections on that, and I will reflect on it too.
I suggest to the noble Lord that if there is a person who is not named but is connected to a group on which that sanction is being observed, that would stop them carrying out particular actions. It would ensure that that sanction was effective.
My Lords, it really is not beyond the wit of parliamentary draftsmen to produce primary legislation that says, “Designated by name unless it is impracticable to do so” or “Save exceptionally”. That is not difficult, neither is it difficult for parliamentary counsel to produce for us a Bill which says, “Designated by identifying a group or body”. It is not a problem. I make a fuss about this because we are coming to Clause 16, which will enable a Minister to create offences punishable with 10 years’ imprisonment and define the defences. It will be open to the Minister to say in the regulations: “This is an absolute offence. You, the bank, have dealt with somebody for whom we gave a description. It did not quite fit but you dealt with him”. If we have an absolute offence created, I do not suppose that the bank will go to prison for 10 years. But the whole of this legislation goes together; the Bill needs to be seen in its overall context. I do not think that I should pursue it any further at this stage and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Your name goes on the sanctions list before you are told, so as to avoid the dissipation of your assets, but afterwards you are told that you are now designated, these are the consequences, this is why it is happening, this is what you must not do, this is what you must do and—what is more—you had better know that it is X who has given us this information or that we think you are Igor Judge, but actually there is another Igor Judge who lives in, shall we say, Russia and it is him we are after. That way, you can very rapidly get your review looked at and justice done to you.
My Lords, I agree with the underlying principle of these amendments, which aim to ensure that designated persons are told the reasons why they have been designated and given sight of the evidence on which this designation is based as soon as is practically possible. I reassure noble Lords that I do not believe that these amendments are necessary. As is the case currently, the Government fully intend to inform all designated parties after their designation either directly in writing or, if we do not have an address for them, through the government website. This notification will set out clearly why they have been designated and the clear and transparent channels through which they can challenge their designation via a request for a reassessment of their designation or a legal challenge in the courts. While we intend to inform designated persons of the reason for their designation, as we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Amendment 60 rightly highlights that some evidence may not be suitable for disclosure for national security reasons. In these cases, we would provide a summary of the information.
In short, this amendment would simply codify standards to which the Government are already committed and would in any case be expected to meet by the courts. The courts have already made several findings on the need for disclosure of reasons and evidence in cases of designations, which we think would continue to apply, and the Bill makes no effort to disturb these standards.
However, I have listened very carefully to this short but important debate and in the light of the powerful points put forward and the Constitution Committee’s comments, which the noble and learned Lord did not read out, I will consider further and come back to the House.
My Lords, I agree with the spirit behind the amendments. Targeted sanctions inevitably involve significant impacts on the people affected by them. That reflects the purpose of sanctions, which are about changing behaviour. I shall repeat, as was mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins, what I said at Second Reading: I reassure noble Lords that where relevant rights under the European Convention on Human Rights are engaged, we consider that proportionality and the impact on the individual will be part of the decision-making. Under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, the appropriate Minister must act in compliance with those convention rights as informed by the Strasbourg case law. We consider that that includes satisfying themselves that the designation is proportionate.
In the response to our consultation published in August, we made clear that our approach to sanctions would be compatible with UK and international law and we would continue to ensure that the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly Article 6(8) and Article 1 of Protocol 1, are upheld when imposing and maintaining human rights and maintaining designation. However, as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998, the requirement to act proportionately applies across a wide range of legislation regardless of whether it is stated explicitly in the legislation. It is also relevant that the Bill contains a range of protections to ensure that designations are used appropriately.
In cases where the UK has chosen to act in an area where the UN is not acting, the affirmative procedure will apply, ensuring that Parliament has a vote. This will provide an opportunity for Parliament also to consider whether the designation powers being taken by the Government are appropriate. Parliament will also have the opportunity to consider the exceptions and licensing arrangements that will apply to a regime, which can allow, for example, the release of frozen funds to meet basic expenses or travel to be authorised for humanitarian reasons. The Bill further provides for an annual review of each sanctions regime against the purpose that it was put in place to achieve, which will involve looking at the current global picture. The Bill also provides opportunities for reassessments and court challenges.
I state all that because it is important for the record. I hope I have been able to provide noble Lords with reassurance. Nevertheless, while this debate has been extremely short, it is a pertinent one based on a word. I will therefore consider with my officials what further reassurances we can give and, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said, reflect on the committee reports. For now, though, I am minded to ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
On the basis that the Minister is going to reflect, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, obviously I have noted the opinions that have been expressed, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said. I see that your Lordships’ Committee is concerned about the new criminal offences. To be clear: these types of offences already exist. People who breach financial, trade, immigration and transport-related sanctions can be convicted for those breaches in the criminal courts. We will continue to legislate on this basis so that breaches of sanctions can continue to be an offence.
We have set safeguards. We have set a cap of 10 years on maximum sentences for breaches of trade sanctions, which is consistent with the Export Control Act; for breaches of financial sanctions the cap is set at seven years, which is consistent with recent changes introduced by the Policing and Crime Act 2017. Coming back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about differentiation between the types of offence, we have lower sentences in respect of information provisions and money laundering regulations.
I hear what noble Lords have said. The purpose behind the sanctions is to replicate the existing legal frameworks for enforcement across the various forms of UK sanctions that will be created by the Bill. For all types of sanctions, Clause 16 includes provision for creating offences and dealing with offences, including defences and the treatment of evidence. It also provides for powers and duties to be vested in persons who assist in the enforcement of any prohibitions. For example, for trade sanctions, Clause 16 enables regulations to apply any provision of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, which provides a full suite of powers for the enforcement of these measures. The clause also enables civil monetary penalties, introduced in the 2017 Act, to continue to be issued for breaches of financial sanctions. It does not extend these to other types of sanctions. It also enables regulations made under the Bill to replicate the current position on maximum terms of imprisonment. I have already referred to that. It contains further powers for deferred prosecution agreements and serious crime prevention orders for all measures in the Bill.
Clause 16 also makes a provision that would enable the UK to extend the existing offence of failing to supply information on financial sanctions breaches. As noble Lords know, there is an existing duty on everyone to supply such information, which will be transposed by the Bill. However, the associated criminal offence for not doing so applies only to relevant institutions in the regulated financial services sector and relevant businesses or professions. The Bill enables the UK to equalise the scope of that duty and offence, as I said earlier, by making it a general offence applicable to everyone.
I assure the Committee that I am listening carefully to the representations being made, in particular those made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. However, we believe that the sanctions enforcement provisions, including criminal and civil penalties, remain proportionate to the scale and nature of sanctions breaches and that they will continue to act as a deterrent. That is the ultimate objective. Although I am sure I will not get a ringing endorsement for—or agreement with—everything I have said, I hope I have outlined where the Government are coming from in drafting Clause 16. Based on my explanation, I hope the noble and learned Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment.