NATO

Lord Addington Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Addington]

To call attention to the future of NATO and changing relations within its membership; and to move for papers.

[Lord Addington]

My Lords, when I put down my name for this debate and was lucky enough to be drawn in the ballot, I did so in the almost certain knowledge that I would learn far more from it than any knowledge I would give to others. When I saw the list of speakers, I thought that that impression would be confirmed. I am looking at this from the outside in, and there are those with far greater knowledge of the subject.

My initial approach comes as somebody who regards NATO as something of a fixed term in their childhood. I was brought up in a world in which we were divided into two camps. There was our side, NATO, and there was the Warsaw Pact. We stared at each other across Europe with troops facing each other to fight in northern Germany and nuclear weapons in the background. Effectively, we lived quite happily, looking back at it, with a nuclear Armageddon waiting in the background. I say that because we went to school, we went to work, we listened out for the results of football matches with the knowledge that everything could end tomorrow. Indeed, part of the education process and the entertainment industry was telling us that it could all end tomorrow.

It has changed considerably since then. If we have won, someone must have lost; and that would seem to be Russia. The first point of this debate is our relationship with the successor to the Soviet Union, the controlling interest, if you like, in the Warsaw Pact. We must try to get an idea of how it must perceive the world now. If we do not, we cannot start to make a sensible contribution to the debate.

I had a quick look at a map and realised that the Russian Federation, the successor state to the Soviet Union, finds itself surrounded by enemies which are a lot closer to Moscow than they were. The entire western flank is closer to home, and seems to be turned, if you take into account the Baltic states. To the south, there is a series of what someone called the stans, those unstable states which Russia itself acquired only in the mid-19th century, which now seem to be a breeding ground for the more aggressive forms of Islam and which seem more anti-Russia than anything that Russia ever dreamed of from the West. That is a very unstable place.

One of the first things that NATO must address is how we handle the new reality with Russia—how we try to convince Russia that we are not out to encircle and attack it. In the past few years, we have had some worrying rhetoric from both sides. Indeed, both sides seem rather to have revelled in going back to Cold War rhetoric. The classic example is probably the Russian intervention in Georgia, when Russia felt that its interests were deeply threatened by a bellicose Georgian regime. I do not think that that action was right, but, from Russia’s point of view, it might be understandable. There was also the very worrying period when missile defence was first proposed and the Putin regime seemed to think that it was a direct attack on that regime, whereas we were worried predominantly about missiles from Iran. Both situations seem to have calmed down now and stability has been restored. However, normalising the situation is one of NATO’s biggest challenges. But it is not simply a matter of maintaining weapons and guaranteeing the survival of the surrounding states.

My last thought on this subject is that Poland—a former member of the Warsaw Pact, that great bulwark of Russian-led power—is now a member of NATO. The situation has changed dramatically in less than two decades and it is not surprising that a little paranoia remains. Poland became a NATO member in 1999, a comparatively short time ago. We need to have a little understanding of what is going on there.

As part of this process NATO has moved from a position in which it waited to be attacked to one in which it has become a more proactive—interventionist, if you like—force. Most of the articles on Afghanistan that I read in preparing for this debate, looking to plunder the ideas of others on the way forward, suggest that if we were to do it again, we would not do it again in the same way. If NATO is to intervene in other states—and some would argue that it had a better result in the western Balkans—how should we structure it so that we can guarantee it is not thought to be overly aggressive, overly manipulative and interfering, not just in Russia but also in other states around the world? Can this body of which we are a member be a force for stability and good, as we see it, at the same time as it intervenes to impose our values, which some think are not required? The diplomatic framework to resolve the question does not yet seem to exist.

If we are to belong to NATO we must work with the primary and dominant partner, the United States of America. The United States was perhaps the winner at the end of the Cold War, and it was the originator of NATO—an institution which is now more than 60 years old. How does the United States perceive NATO as part of its world policy? Indeed, should it see NATO as part of its world policy? The way in which the other European NATO member states and institutions present themselves to the rest of the world also is a very big question.

There is one model which is not totally dependent on America, regarding it as simply a partner rather than as the dominant partner, and it might provide a way forward—the Anglo-French agreement. The general consensus, or at least the consensus that I have heard, is that these two nations are of a very similar size and power, with similar traditions, interests and histories of world involvement. These two nations have come together to create a force that, with NATO guidance, can be projected into the world outside. We should remember that this combination of 28 states acting together has considerable force. If these two nations are going to take on this role on their own behalf or in conjunction with other forces, as they are both members of the European Union, although the diplomatic direct link of ASEAN is almost impossible because of the slight difference in membership, the fact that they are the two dominant members of NATO and important members of the EU links them whether we like it or not. Whether we decide that they should be formally linked or not, there is a linkage. To deny it is to defy the logic of the situation. The briefing provided stated that if you want to annoy the Eurosceptics, raise the issue of whether that linkage should be formalised, but the fact of the matter is that it is there. NATO and the EU have very similar memberships although they are not identical.

How do these organisations interact with the rest of the world? How can they expand? Is the United States always going to be required to back them up and to provide ground support for the heavy lifting? Is the United States always going to be seen as having an interest in the defence of Europe? I do not think it will because it is understandably looking towards its Pacific coast and its Pacific boundary. Russia has the rising superpower, China, on its southern and south-east borders, and America has it on its south-west border. That will take America’s attention away from Europe. We have to recognise this reality in the structure of NATO and in the command structures within Europe.

I have made notes about the restructuring of the command structure of NATO—I do not know why I bother making notes if I do not refer to them. There are 11 fixed military headquarters and 14 agencies with overlapping responsibilities manned by 13,000 military officers with 300 international committees. A restructuring is going on, but those figures show that it is slightly overdue. Surely there can be a restructuring that will enable us to have a more flexible organisation that will reflect the changes in the membership and in the realities on the ground. This must happen if this organisation is to remain relevant. We cannot always expect America to be there with us on all occasions, even if it should be consulted and be part of the decision-making process. We have got to become more flexible. Europe has got to look after itself. We have to establish better relationships with the great power to the East, Russia. It is no longer a superpower, but it is a great power. We have got to restructure the way things are organised. If we do, NATO has a future. However, if it sits back and quietly blunders around, it does not have as useful a future. The figures I gave about structure and organisation suggest that a body that is more than 60 years old will take time to die. At the moment, it is a prestige institution for the new member states that have joined it. It will not carry on that way for ever, particularly if diplomatic relationships on a state-to-state basis with Russia improve.

I have the following questions for the Government. Where do we think NATO is going? Could the Anglo-French model be replicated among other states in Europe? Should we be bringing other states into that relationship? Should we be bearing more of the load ourselves? These are very big questions. I hope I will hear answers which address them in ways I have not thought of. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Addington]

My Lords, all that remains for me to do is to thank all those who have taken part, particularly the two maiden speakers. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, warned us that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, is an extremely good speaker and that we would all be doing very well to keep up with him. He was very right. The noble Lord, Lord Flight, pointed out to us in an aside the place that we did not mention until my noble friend proposed it—in global security terms, India will indeed be a player of considerable note.

We will probably have to return to this debate again, as the noble Lord, Lord Browne, said, because the situation will change. The general consensus is that NATO has survived from its original purpose to go on and to do something else. We must observe what that is while being aware that it will probably not be something which we are predicting at the moment. However, any organisation that brings together 28 states, some of which were formerly potential enemies, must have something going for it. With that thought, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion for Papers.

Motion withdrawn.