Finance (No. 2) Bill

Debate between Kit Malthouse and Nigel Mills

2nd reading
Wednesday 29th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Nigel Mills]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I remember the anger when I was first elected about people working in the private sector getting a very small pension and seeing the large generosity of the public sector ones that they could never dream of aspiring to. To have a more generous tax arrangement on top of a more generous pension that they were effectively paying for would be hard to sell to people. I think the Government have found a sensible fix on that.

Where has this situation left pension tax policy? We now have a regime where when someone earns the money and pays it into their pension, they do not pay income tax and national insurance on it, and when they draw the pension, they pay income tax, but not national insurance. We are not quite sure we like that. If someone is earning too much—more than £260,000 now—we start reducing the amount they can put in every year from the £60,000 cap down to a £10,000 cap. Then, if someone wants to draw their pension, they can have a quarter of it completely tax-free, even if they do that 10 years before they retire, but now we do not like that either, because that might be too much, so we have capped it at the level of the lifetime allowance that we have just scrapped. What are we trying to do? Added to that is the fact that if I have a defined-contribution pension that I do not draw and leave in my estate, there is no inheritance tax on it. I do not even pick up the tax at that point.

If we stood back and said, “What are we trying to incentivise and encourage people to do by the £50 billion or so of annual tax that we forgo”—or defer, strictly speaking—“on pension saving?”, I am not sure we would design this system. The Government would be well advised to create some kind of commission or review to look in the round at all the various ways we incentivise pension saving and all the ways we tax it and try to work out what a coherent system that people have some hope of understanding would be. I suspect we would get far better outcomes if we did that. I encourage the Government to do that. That would need to be on a long-term, cross-party basis. It cannot be done on a whim every few months.

The danger is that we get to a Finance Bill or Budget and we want a bit of money here, or we have found a little fire we want to put out there, or we want to make another tweak, and we end up building and building more and more strange bits on to this rather ugly looking house until it finally falls over. We should try to get it in some kind of shape before we get into that position.

Moving to the various corporation tax measures in the Bill, I am prepared to accept the rise in corporation tax. Given the fact we bailed out nearly every business in the economy three years ago in the covid pandemic, there is justification for saying that we need to pay those bills, and corporation tax, which businesses only pay when making a profit, is the right way to do that. It takes a little bit of believing to convince ourselves that we can raise the rate that businesses pay on all their future profits—all the fruits of their investment—and that that will not deter investment, but a short-term deferral of when they pay tax by having full expensing will somehow encourage loads of investment, even though they will end up paying the extra 6% on the profit they will earn from the use of new machinery at some point in the future. They will not pay it in the first year, but they will pay more in all of the subsequent years.

[Kit Malthouse]

My hon. Friend points to an argument that, I have to confess, has perplexed me. People say that raising corporation tax to 25% will not necessarily damage investment or, indeed, British business, but then why stop at 25%? Why is that the appropriate amount? If businesses are impervious to the tax rate and it does not affect their behaviour, why not have 30%, 35% or 40%? He understands my point. They are making a value judgment about where the line of damage is to be drawn, and I think he is quite right that it is hard to think that it will not have some kind of impact.

[Nigel Mills]

My right hon. Friend makes a fair point. I guess there is an attraction in that 25% is an easy calculation. We could go for 26%, which Labour had in its manifesto at the last election, and perhaps that could have been a submission. I think it also had a small companies rate rising to 21%, which it does not want to remember these days. I just think that we cannot really have it both ways—that deferring taxes encourages investment, even though businesses end up paying them, but raising them somehow does not. I think we should try to be a bit coherent about what we actually think in that situation.

Again, I have no idea what we are trying to do in giving people tax relief on their expenditure on capital assets. We now have a capital allowance regime that, for most assets, is generally 25% on a reducing balance, unless it is an asset for too long, for which the long-life regime is 4% a year, or it is a short-life asset, such as a computer, when they can choose a different regime over a shorter period of time. Then there is an up-front initial allowance, depending on whether we have one in place, and now we have a 100% initial allowance for a short period, but we do not give any tax relief at all for industrial buildings. If I want to build a new factory to bring some jobs back from China, I need to go through convoluted calculations—such as proving that the air-conditioning in my building is actually a piece of plant and equipment, not a part of the building—which makes huge amounts of work.

Could we just stand back at some point and think about what we are trying to incentivise business to do? I am not actually convinced that many businesses will really be able to use full expensing on large capital expenditure, because they just will not have the profit. It may give them some cash-flow advantage, but they will have the complexity of how much they can claim, and which company a loss gets trapped in to make sure they can use it all around the group. We are just creating difficulty. Most of the large businesses I ever worked with focused on the rate of tax they had to account for in their accounts—of course, having accelerated deduction does not change that—rather than the cash position, which was hugely complex if they were leasing an asset, finance leasing it, hire purchasing it or God knows what. So I would be a little suspicious or cynical about our actually getting the big change that the Government were hoping for here.

I would go back to an amendment I tabled a decade ago, when I said, “Why don’t we just try to move to giving people tax relief in line with their accounting treatment, so if they think this piece of kit has a five-year life and they account for it over five years, let’s just go for that? Why have all this hassle, and all the cost of all these different regimes? Let’s be more generous on the assets you get relief for, and let’s try to simplify it.” I have a feeling that, if we could somehow get to that, it would be more attractive to most businesses than the annual tinkering of saying, “You can now do this and get a bit more”, and no one knows where on earth they are in such a situation. I would recommend that.

On the multinational top-up tax, I actually support it, and I think I argued for it when it was being discussed. I have always been a little bit suspicious of the OECD—I once called it the organisation for excessively complex drivel, and if Members read the causes we have ended up with, they might think it was relatively complex. What I think we have started trying to do on base erosion is to stop people hiding profits in tax havens with very low rates of corporation tax. We generally know where they are and what their rates are. We could have gone back to what we used to have with our controlled foreign company regime, which was a list of naughty countries. If a business had a subsidiary in one of those, it had to go through some extra compliance to prove that real genuine trading profits were arising in that country, rather than that it was hiding passive income that should have been taxed somewhere else.

I think we could have found a way to have a regime that most countries accepted, where we just said, “If you’ve got a subsidiary in one of these naughty regimes then you have to pick up some tax on it,” rather than having dozens and dozens of hugely complex clauses to effectively create a whole new corporation tax range applying to companies in every country in the world, which have to try to work out whether they are paying too little tax or not based on whatever the local tax differentials are on timing and rules, which we then have to adjust for to try to work out whether someone is being naughty or not, when we know damn well a company in the Cayman Islands is paying zero on the £100 million-worth of profit it has salted there, which is what we were after in the first place.

I welcome where we have got to and I accept that if this is the way we have to do it, it is better than not doing it, but surely if anything highlights how complex our corporate income tax regime has become it is the fact that we need to have 150-odd clauses to try to tax income that is being hidden in territories that have a zero rate. It really is almost beyond belief that we have made it that difficult.

We have to remember that a lot of our own overseas territories and Crown dependencies have seen some of the worst behaviours in this area. As it was when we had to have more transparent disclosure regimes, we need to set a lead on this issue to get the rest of the world to follow. If we are not doing it and not encouraging parts of our UK family to do it, there is a fair chance that the rest of the world will think, “Well, if they’re not going to do it, we’re never going to do it.” So we end up moving at the speed of the herd, which will be standing still.

I welcome the fact that we are doing this. It is the right thing. We need to try to find a way of stopping profits being hidden in places where there is absolutely no justification for them being there. A 15% top-up rate is a good compromise. I would hope that most regimes would see the writing on the wall and up their rates to 15%, and not go for dubious reliefs, deemed deductions and so on to try to contrive their way of having a headline 15% but never applying it. Let us just say that this is the way that the world wants to go. This is what responsible ethical business looks like. This is what responsible ethical government looks like. We do not want money hidden where there is absolutely no justification for it being earnt there. We can try to end up not needing all these hugely complicated rules, which UK-headquartered companies might be having to apply to every territorial subsidiary they have, to try to catch some naughty things that they are not even doing in the first place.

Intriguingly, I do not see in the Bill the repeal of our controlled foreign companies rules. If we have a new regime that tops up the tax in every subsidiary owned by a UK group to 15%, do we need all the old compliance rules to stop UK companies hiding their profits offshore? It seems to me that we will end up with a collection of different regimes all trying to do the same thing. Maybe we could find at least a partial simplification to offset the 150-odd clauses here in the Bill.

My concluding remark on these key issues is that I welcome what the Government are trying to do, but at some point we need to stand back and think, “Have we got our tax code regime in a sensible place where we are realistically, and in as understandable a way as possible, trying to achieve these sensible aims; or have we, through quite understandable tinkering, ended up with some kind of hugely complex monstrosity that at some point will fall over and in the meantime is probably not incentivising the things we want people to do or disincentivising the things we really we do not want them to do?”