(6 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a deeply irresponsible approach. I have to say that it is one that the Labour leadership have taken, but it is one that all Members on all sides might have to think about very carefully when we bring back a good deal from the EU.
The Secretary of State has now published 106 technical notices relating to no deal. The analysis by the Institute for Government shows that, taken together, his own technical notices commit the Government before next March to the creation or expansion of 15 quangos, further legislation in 51 areas, the negotiation of 40 new international agreements either with the EU or other countries, and the introduction of 55 new systems and processes. That is a huge legislative task for any Government, let alone this troubled Government. That is his own analysis. On a scale of one to 10, can the Secretary of State indicate how confident he is that this can all be done in the next 22 weeks?
I thank the shadow Brexit Secretary. What he has set out, of course, is the concerted plans and preparations that we are rightly undertaking to make sure that, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations—and we want a good deal—we will be ready to deal with the short-term risk, which there will undoubtedly be, and make a success of Brexit.
I notice that I did not get a number between one and 10, and I notice, therefore, that the Secretary of State is not adopting the blind confidence in the face of the fact that his predecessor went in for. The truth is that it is already too late to plan for no deal. This is bluff not planning. May I ask a very simple question? Why was this legislation not introduced months ago?
There has actually been a variety of legislation, including the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which is now in place. The irresponsible thing to do is take the position of the shadow Chancellor, who has said that he would make no financial provision for no deal. That is deeply irresponsible, as it would leave us as a hostage to the negotiations and leave the UK overexposed in the unlikely and regrettable outcome that we do not get a deal with our EU partners.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI welcome my right hon. and learned Friend’s question and his comments. Let me try to address them, if I may. He fears, if I understand correctly, that the Government are in favour of an unamendable motion, but in fact, as the memorandum he cites makes clear in paragraph 4:
“The approval…will be a substantive motion”—
that was, I think, the first point he made—
“and therefore, under existing House procedures, will be amendable.”
I hope that gives him some reassurance. It is also worth pointing out the implications that we set out in paragraph 6 of the memorandum, which was published on 10 October, which is that
“due to the legal status accorded to the motion under s. 13 of the 2018 Act,”
which I know he scrutinised very carefully,
“a clear decision on approval of the motion is needed in order for the Government to be able to ratify the Withdrawal Agreement.”
Again, I hope that that makes clear what the basic challenge is.
If I understand my right hon. and learned Friend correctly, he may wish to change the terms of the agreement that has been struck. I think that would come up against very real, practical and diplomatic obstacles. So late in the day, there would not be time to revisit the negotiation. Secondly, just from a practical, diplomatic point of view, is he really suggesting that at that point we would actually be offered different or more favourable terms? I think that that is unlikely in the extreme.
It is very important that this House is presented with a very clear decision of the most meaningful sort available, which is between the terms of the best deal that the Government can negotiate and the alternative. I hope and I am sure that that will focus minds when that point comes.
Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting the urgent question.
May I start by saying this: I profoundly disagree with the Prime Minister on a number of issues, including Brexit, but some of the quotes and comments about the Prime Minister this weekend, attributed to Conservative MPs, Ministers or former Ministers, are nothing short of disgraceful. In a time of growing extremism, hostility and threats to those in public life, MPs should know better. The comments are, as ever, from unnamed sources. I hope the House can agree that this kind of language has no place in our politics and has to stop.
Labour has spent 18 months campaigning for a meaningful vote and for Parliament to be properly involved in the Brexit negotiations, yet at every stage the Government’s response has been to push Parliament away. We fear that this is the latest example. Labour is clear that Parliament must be able to express its view on any deal the Prime Minister brings back, yet the Secretary of State’s letter brings that into question. Of course Labour recognises that Parliament will have to approve or disapprove of any Brexit deal—it must be a decisive decision—but it is the role of Parliament, and not the Executive, to decide how that view is to be expressed.
Labour has always believed that Parliament should be able to table, debate and vote on amendments. That is consistent with paragraph 5 of the Government’s own legal advice, which makes it clear that absent a business motion being approved by the House,
“Multiple amendments may be tabled”,
the selection of amendments and the order they are taken in is
“in the hands of the Speaker”,
and that multiple amendments can be selected. I want to be clear that Labour will not support any business motion that does not meet these criteria, and I urge the Secretary of State to think again.
I thank the shadow Brexit Secretary for his comments, and I agree with him about the need for a serious, substantive debate and for the right tone for this debate. He is right that the meaningful vote needs to be a decisive decision. We set that out in the memorandum and that is what section 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provides. As the memorandum that we have published makes clear, we expect amendments to be allowed on the motion, although again, that is an issue for you, Mr Speaker. The distinction that needs to be borne in mind is between the likely impact that any procedural amendments would have on the withdrawal agreement at the international level. The shadow Brexit Secretary is far too assiduous and astute a lawyer not to know that as a matter of basic law, they could not have an effect of altering the withdrawal agreement. Also, common sense—he will know—means that it will be highly unlikely, if not impossible, for us to refer back to the negotiating table.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Mr Speaker, I will update the House on the progress in the negotiations to leave the EU and on the Government’s planning for no deal. Since I last updated the House, our negotiations with the EU have continued and intensified, and we were engaging constructively with our EU counterparts over the recess break. Let me take the main areas of the negotiations in turn.
On the withdrawal agreement, while there remain some differences, we are closing in on workable solutions to all the key outstanding issues, building on the progress made during the summer on issues such as data and information, the treatment of ongoing police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, and ongoing Union judicial and administrative procedures after the date of exit. We have also been discussing our proposals on the linkage needed between the withdrawal agreement and the future relationship, and the EU is engaging constructively.
On the Northern Ireland protocol, we remain committed to the undertakings we made in the joint report back in December to agree a backstop in case there is a delay between the end of the implementation period and the entry into force of the treaty on our future relationship. That was agreed to avoid any risk of a return to a hard border in the intervening period, but we will not accept anything that threatens the constitutional or economic integrity of the United Kingdom. Creating any form of customs border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, which is what the EU had proposed, would put that at risk and that is unacceptable. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said, it is not something that she, nor any British Prime Minister, could agree to. We are engaging with the EU on our alternative proposals that preserve the integrity of the UK. They will be in line with the commitments we made back in December, including the commitment that no new regulatory barriers should be created between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK unless the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly agree.
On the future relationship, we continue to make progress on, for example, both the internal and external security arrangements for future co-operation, although there is still some way to go. As the House will know, the Prime Minister presented our proposals on the economic partnership to EU leaders at the informal Salzburg summit. We understand that the EU has raised some concerns, particularly around the distinction between goods and services under the common rulebook and with respect to the facilitated customs arrangement. We continue to engage constructively with the EU, and we continue to press our case. The UK’s White Paper proposals are the best way of ensuring that there is continued frictionless trade in goods after Britain leaves the EU while fulfilling the joint commitment to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland and respecting the referendum.
The negotiations were always bound to be tough in the final stretch. That is all the more reason why we should hold our nerve and stay resolute and focused, and I remain confident that we will reach a deal this autumn because that is still in the best interests of the United Kingdom and the European Union. It is the best way of protecting trade between Britain and the EU—trade which underpins jobs across the continent. It is the best way of ensuring that we continue to co-operate seamlessly on security matters and to tackle crime and terrorism to keep UK and EU citizens safe. It is also the best way to avoid a hard border in Northern Ireland that would adversely affect communities living there or separating Northern Ireland from Great Britain, which we will not countenance. To achieve those aims, the UK has brought forward serious and credible proposals. We continue to engage with the EU to press our case and to better understand the nature of their concerns. Equally, it is time for the EU to match the ambition and pragmatism that we have shown.
While we intensify our negotiations to secure the deal we want and expect, we are also expediting preparations for no deal in case the EU does not match the ambition and pragmatism that we have shown. As the Prime Minister stated on 21 September after the Salzburg summit, the Government have made it clear that we will unilaterally protect the rights of EU citizens in the UK in the event of no deal. To the 3 million here, we say, “You are our friends, our neighbours, our colleagues. We want you to stay.” We will set out the details as soon as is practical, and we now urge the EU and all its member states to step up and give UK citizens on the continent the same reassurances. It is time, on both sides, to provide all our citizens with that comfort and confidence.
Since I last updated the House in September, we have published 52 more technical notices in two further batches. They inform people, businesses and other key stakeholders of the steps they need to take if we do not reach a deal with the EU. They cover a wide range of sectors, building on other work that has taken place across Government over the past two years to prepare the UK for Brexit irrespective of the outcome of negotiations. They acknowledge that there are risks to a no deal scenario, but they also demonstrate the steps we will take to avoid, mitigate and manage any potential short-term risks and disruption. Overall, we have now published 77 technical notices, which form part of the sensible, proportionate measures we are taking to prepare the country for every eventuality.
Our most recent batch of technical notices were published on 24 September; they are set out in a written ministerial statement today. There are 24, and they range from aviation—the advice for airlines on the impact of no deal and the actions for them to consider to maintain services on the day we leave the EU—through to car insurance and the arrangements to ensure that green cards will be available free of charge from insurance companies to enable UK drivers to continue to drive on the continent. The publication of the technical notices enables further engagement as part of our no deal planning. For example, our earlier technical notice on VAT set out the VAT changes that companies will need to prepare when importing or exporting goods from the EU, when supplying services to the EU, or when interacting with EU VAT IT systems. It was welcomed by the British Chamber of Commerce, and we are grateful to them and all of our stakeholders for their constructive ongoing engagement on that necessary planning.
More broadly, on 17 September I met with the British Chamber of Commerce, the CBI, the Institute of Directors, the EEF and the Federation of Small Businesses, as part of the Government’s business advisory group, to make sure that we are explaining our negotiating proposals and no deal planning, and listening to UK businesses of all sizes and across all sectors. We will keep providing people and businesses with the advice that they need as we negotiate our exit from the European Union.
We also keep working with the devolved Administrations on all aspects of our planning for exit. I attended the Joint Ministerial Committee on 13 September. It has now met 12 times, and our last meeting was a valuable opportunity to give the devolved Administrations a full update on the negotiations, as well as to discuss the necessary no deal planning. We continue to listen very carefully to all their views. Mr Speaker, that is the way, with a concerted effort on all fronts, that we have put ourselves in the best position to make the very best of Brexit, and I commend this statement to the House.
I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement. It is always good to see him in his place, but may I politely point out that it would have been much better if this statement had come from the Prime Minister? It is no good hiding behind the badging of the Salzburg summit as informal. It was the Prime Minister who pushed for Brexit to be on the agenda at Salzburg; it was the Prime Minister who was there to lead the negotiations, and it was the Prime Minister who failed to secure a breakthrough. So it should be the Prime Minister, not the Secretary of State, in Parliament this afternoon explaining what went wrong.
After all, while the Prime Minister was negotiating in Salzburg, the Secretary of State was busy writing gimmicky letters to me about Labour policy. The image of the Secretary of State writing gimmicky letters on the very day of the Salzburg negotiations speaks absolutely for itself. It would also have been better if today’s statement contained details of substantive progress. Instead, it is like groundhog day. We get the same old story. The Secretary of State pretends that everything is going according to plan; it is just a question of dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s; everything will be all right in the end; and if it isn’t, we just crash out with no deal, stockpile food and medicines and declare that to be a great success.
I know that the Brexit Secretary will be tempted in reply to me to do what he usually does—to read out his pre-prepared attack lines about me and the Labour party. Can I urge him to resist that temptation and respond to the very serious questions to which this House and the country deserve answers? First, this Secretary of State repeatedly assured Parliament, including from that Dispatch Box, that a deal would be reached by the October Council—his words. Well, that is next week. The statement contains no such assurance today, so can he, first, update the House on when he now expects a deal to be put before Parliament?
Secondly, it is all very well the Secretary of State saying that we are
“closing in on workable solutions”
and listing the areas of agreement reached months ago, but we have been here before—many times—and that overlooks the fact that the remaining bit is the hard bit of agreeing the backstop in Northern Ireland. A solemn commitment to a legally binding backstop in Northern Ireland in all circumstances was made last December. Ten months later, all we are hearing is that the Government will publish updated proposals on the backstop at some unspecified date. There are nine days to go, so when will that be? There is no answer in today’s statement and we need an answer. Can the Secretary of State take the opportunity now to scotch rumours that the Government are not even intending to publish a backstop proposal by next week? [Interruption.] I am being repeatedly asked what I would do. I would happily swap sides at any stage, and a lot more progress would be made in the negotiations. [Interruption.]
On the backstop, it is being reported that the Government are now willing to accept an indefinite UK-wide customs union as part of the Northern Ireland backstop offer—of course, it will not actually be using the words “customs union”. So can the Secretary of State set the record straight: is a customs union now the Government policy, at least for the Northern Ireland backstop—yes or no?
Thirdly, the Secretary of State repeatedly told Parliament that the final deal this House votes on would include a “clear blueprint” for the future relationship with the EU. In recent days, the Government have been emphasising just how precise this will be, yet it is nowhere to be seen. The Chequers proposals have been widely rejected by the EU and by MPs from across this House, and there is growing concern now that the Government are heading for no deal, as recent warnings from businesses, including Toyota and BMW, underline. If it is not no deal, will it be a vague deal asking us to jump blindfolded into the unknown? Labour will not support that. So will he take this opportunity to rule out a vague or blind Brexit?
For all the warm words, the reality is this: the Government have had 18 months yet they have not even concluded the terms of the withdrawal agreement and they have barely started negotiating the details of the future relationship with the EU. A responsible Government would realise the fix they are in. Instead, this Government simply repeat the mantra, “It’s Chequers or no deal.” It is not so much “nothing has changed” as “nothing can change”. This is not a necessity; this is a political choice, and it is deeply irresponsible. No Government have the right to plunge the country into chaos as a result of their own failure. Time is running out, but there is still time to change course, and I urge the Secretary of State to do so.
I thank the shadow Brexit Secretary—for his opening remarks at least. He asked a number of questions. First, let me say that the Prime Minister would not normally update the House on an informal summit; that was not the practice under the previous Labour Governments, as he probably well knows. He asked me about the October Council. We have always been clear that we would aim for the October Council but there would be leeway that it might slip into November—we are still clear on that. The October Council next week will be an important milestone. We expect that to be a moment where we will make some progress. Of course, as I have said already in my remarks, we need the EU to match the ambition and the pragmatism that we have shown.
The shadow Secretary of State asked whether we were signing up to an indefinite customs union for Northern Ireland; no, that is categorically not correct.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Secretary of State for early sight of his statement, but I am sorry to say that that statement is not going to reassure anyone.
I appreciate that the Secretary of State has to put a brave face on it, but there is no hiding the fact that the Government are in a real fix. There are two parts to that fix. The first is the reckless red lines set out by the Prime Minister two years ago, tearing us out of the customs union and single market with no European Court jurisdiction, which meant that a deal that safeguards our economy and avoids a hard border in Northern Ireland simply cannot be negotiated. The second part of the fix is the Chequers fudge, cobbled together nearly two years later. It satisfies no one and is being attacked from all quarters. It is obvious that something is going to have to give. The only question being asked up and down the country is, what is going to give?
Time is running out. The October summit is on 18 to 19 October. That is 44 days away. When the Secretary of State last updated the House in July, he said:
“Our expectation is to reach agreement in October.”—[Official Report, 24 July 2018; Vol. 645, c. 891.]
I note that he has not repeated that today. Can he account for that change? The reality, of course, is that no one now seriously expects the deal to be agreed by then, hence the talk of a special summit in November. The trouble with that is that even November only buys four extra weeks. It is impossible to see how the Chequers proposal could lead to a deal that would command a majority in Parliament in that time. Meanwhile, the confidence of businesses and working people in the Government’s ability to reach a deal sinks by the day.
Hence what we have seen is a summer of debate about no deal. There have been two sides to that debate. On one side is the Secretary of State talking up what he calls the “countervailing opportunities” of no deal—something he repeats today—and the Prime Minister saying that no deal would not be “the end of the world”, which is an interesting but hardly inspiring description. On the other hand, we have the Chancellor warning that there will be “large fiscal consequences” of no deal and the recently appointed Foreign Secretary saying it would be a
“mistake we would regret for generations”.
May I gently say to the Secretary of State that all his talk of no deal is not kidding anyone? Being told that we only need to stockpile medicines for six weeks and that there are no plans yet to deploy the Army to maintain food supplies has not reassured anyone.
There are obviously huge gaps in the Secretary of State’s no deal strategy, and there is no better example than Northern Ireland. I want to dwell on this for a moment, because once again the Secretary of State’s statement identifies the problem but offers no solution. The anxiety on both sides of the Irish border about the risk of no deal and the failure to agree a legally binding backstop is real. It is not a myth; it is shared by all communities. I have spoken to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and I know how seriously he is taking this. For the former Foreign Secretary to say that this issue has been manipulated by the Irish and UK Governments is completely and, I am afraid to say, typically irresponsible, and I invite the Secretary of State to take this opportunity to dissociate himself from those remarks.
The technical notices that the Secretary of State mentioned—issued two weeks ago—are themselves revealing. When it comes to no deal and Northern Ireland, they say simply this:
“we stand ready to engage constructively”.
That is not a plan for no deal. The truth is that the Government have no idea how they will mitigate the impact of no deal when it comes to Northern Ireland. That is just not good enough. In December last year, the Government signed up to a solemn commitment to a backstop agreement in Northern Ireland. This House is entitled to know this afternoon how, in six weeks, the Secretary of State actually intends to keep that commitment.
The Brexit negotiations are in serious trouble. It appears from the Secretary of State’s statement that the Government’s strategy is simply to plough on regardless, to pretend everything is going to plan and to hope that, somehow, the dynamics of the negotiation and the arithmetic in this House will magically change. That is incredibly irresponsible. It will reassure no one. The Secretary of State is likely to face significant challenge from all sides this afternoon, and he knows it.
The Government must change course and put forward a credible plan that can break this impasse—one that can command the support of the House, protect jobs and the economy, and avoid a hard border in Northern Ireland. The Government have six weeks to get this right. More of the same will not do.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his reply and some of the constructive tone in it. On timing, both I and Michel Barnier repeated on Friday that we were aiming for the October Council but recognised that there would be some margin of leeway, as is often the case with negotiations.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman has asked me at various points to comment on the newspaper commentary throughout the summer. Actually, I have been focused on the negotiation and getting the best deal for Britain.
On the negotiations themselves, may I just reassure the right hon. and learned Gentleman that progress is real on data sharing, criminal justice co-operation, passenger name record and Prüm data, and continuing fast-track extradition co-operation, which Michel Barnier and I talked about on Friday? Those are the areas one might think a former Director of Public Prosecutions would attach serious weight to, but there was not one mention of them at all.
On the outstanding separation issues, including data protection and cases going through administrative and judicial procedures when we leave, I would have thought that the right hon. and learned Gentleman might at least have paused to welcome some of the progress in those areas.
That is what the Government have been doing over the summer: making progress towards a deal that is within our sights. As for the right hon. and learned Gentleman, well, last week he said that Labour’s position is that a second referendum is “on the table”. I have to say that it is rare that I agree with the shadow Trade Secretary, who said that a second referendum would be “damaging” to the foundations of this country, but I think, in democratic terms, he is right about that.
I am afraid that that shows how frankly useless the Labour party would be, if it were ever in charge of Government, in terms of standing up for the United Kingdom in these negotiations. Nothing could be calibrated to weaken the UK’s negotiating position more than dangling the prospect of a second referendum, which would only invite the very worst terms.
On the technical notices, we are doing the responsible thing that any responsible Government would need to do: striving for the very best deal but preparing for all outcomes. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has not actually asked me a single question of substance about any one of the 25 notices that we have published.
In relation to Northern Ireland, he clearly has not read the technical notices, because they were referred to at various points where they are applicable and relevant to the individual sectoral notices. Again, I am afraid that the Labour party is demonstrating that it is not fit to govern. We have the leader of the Labour party admitting in an interview on LBC that he would accept any deal, however bad its terms, and the shadow Chancellor explaining that he would not set aside any money to deal with the worst-case scenario of a no deal Brexit. Yet again, I am afraid that the Labour party has shown that it would roll over in Brussels and fail to stand up for this country.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Secretary of State for providing advance copies of his statement and the White Paper. I am glad to say that that was two hours ago, and it is much appreciated.
We will of course scrutinise the White Paper closely, but a quick reading reveals a number of important points. First, the gimmick of fixing exit day as 29 March 2019 in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act has already come unstuck. We warned at the time that it would not work and would need to be rubbed out and that large parts of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act would need to be amended. Here is the proof.
Paragraph 56 of the White Paper states that
“EU law will continue to have effect in the UK in the same way as now”
for the implementation period—that is, until December 2020—but section 1 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, which took 18 months to get through Parliament and received Royal Assent only 28 days ago, repeals the European Communities Act on exit day, 29 March 2019. The implementation Bill will amend section 1 of the withdrawal Act by saving the ECA, as the White Paper makes clear in paragraph 60. So the ECA is repealed, and before that comes into force, it is amended and saved. The Secretary of State says that just “parts of the ECA” are saved until 30 December 2020, but that is a huge understatement. Almost all of it is saved, with amendments not to the applicability of EU law, but to collateral issues.
However, not just section 1 of the withdrawal Act now needs major surgery. The other big ticket item in the Act was the much-vaunted “conversion of EU law” into our law—again, fixed by the gimmick of the date of 29 March 2019. We warned that that would not work, because the gimmick gets in the way, so it is going to be rubbed out. Paragraph 69 of the White Paper makes it clear that the conversion exercise is now not needed until December 2020.
Then, of course, there is the European Court. Just a few weeks ago, many Brexiteers cheered section 6(1) of the withdrawal Act, which would extinguish the role of the European Court on the fixed date of 29 March 2019. But not so fast: as we said at the time would happen, paragraph 80 of the White Paper preserves the full role of the European Court until December 2020. Again, the withdrawal Act will need major surgery.
I cannot remember legislation that has needed such great revision and amendment before the relevant parts have even come into force. Of course, the provisions of the withdrawal Act that have come into force relate to delegated powers. During the 18-month passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill through the House of Commons, it was acknowledged that it contained sweeping provisions packed with Henry VIII powers. They were supposed to be strictly limited by a two-year sunset clause. The White Paper now proposes that those clauses should be extended: sunset is now December 2022. On the face of it, paragraph 75 of the White Paper suggests that if there is no deal, the huge exercise of amending what will be hundreds of legislative provisions will be carried out through delegated legislation. I hope that that is not true, and I look to the Secretary of State for reassurance that that is not the implication of paragraph 75.
Then there is the elephant in the room: if there is no deal, there is nothing to implement. Can the Secretary of State tell us what is the legislative plan, to be in place by March next year, if there is no agreement on citizens’ rights—the Secretary of State said a lot about them—on the financial settlement, on Northern Ireland and on many other issues? If there are not to be sweeping delegated powers, what legislation will there be, and when, between now and March 2019?
There was no mention of Northern Ireland in the Secretary of State’s statement, and there is just a brief reference to it in the White Paper. I appreciate that elements of the Northern Ireland agreement are still being discussed, but with nothing substantive on Northern Ireland, the White Paper contains a huge gaping hole.
There are proposals on the financial settlement. The Secretary of State now seems to be saying that the EU will have to fulfil its side of the bargain, or we will not pay up. We have been down this track before. The Chancellor has previously dismissed that approach by saying:
“That is not a credible scenario. That is not the kind of country we are. Frankly, it would not make us a credible partner for future international agreements.”
So which is it: has it been agreed, or are we back to conditionality?
I have heard what the Secretary of State says about the withdrawal agreement being reached by October this year, but he knows that he is in a minority here and in Brussels. If agreement is not reached until November or December, how will the Secretary of State ensure that there is proper scrutiny of the implementation Bill, and will he guarantee that it will not be packed with wide-ranging Henry VIII powers?
We have a White Paper and we have time to scrutinise it, but we also have serious questions that now fall to be answered.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his welcome for the White Paper in general. He will appreciate that the decision to publish it now was a finely balanced one because the negotiations are ongoing, but ultimately it was deemed more important and more respectful to this House to provide the information and consult as early as possible.
On the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s point about the date of departure, I presume he welcomes and supports the implementation period. I have not heard any substantive suggestion how he might have done it differently; perhaps as he reflects he will have some, but otherwise calling the implementation period a gimmick when businesses have called for it and welcomed the certainty it provides is, I think, rather an indication that the Labour party is reverting to type.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman had nothing to say on citizens’ rights, nothing to say on welcoming the mechanism to secure the rights of EU nationals here and nothing to say on welcoming the mechanism to make sure UK nationals have their rights abroad protected. In relation to no deal, we will be prepared regardless of the outcome, as he knows. This is not the legislation being provided to that effect, as we are focused on getting the right deal for the UK and the EU.
In relation to Northern Ireland, the right hon. and learned Gentleman will have seen the White Paper on our future relationship with the EU and the arrangements for frictionless trade, which are not just important for businesses but will avoid any return to a hard border. Our position is that that provides a clear, workable model that maintains our commitments under the Belfast agreement and avoids any friction at the border, but also frees us up to strike free trade deals abroad.
On conditionality, the right hon. and learned Gentleman is a learned lawyer, but I have to say to him that as a matter of basic general international law, whether through the interpretation of treaties under the Vienna convention or customary international law, when countries sign up to a treaty, both sides must commit to the obligations on both sides; there is reciprocity. Of course, if one side fails to live up to its commitments, it is open to the other side to take proportionate measures, including in relation to financial means, to make sure good effect is given to the whole deal. That is what it takes to stand up for the interests of the United Kingdom; if the right hon. and learned Gentleman would roll over, it is a good job Labour is not handling the negotiations with the EU.
This White Paper is about delivering a smooth and orderly Brexit and one that respects the referendum. I gently say to the Opposition that it is not entirely clear that it is Labour’s overriding objective to give effect to the referendum. Straight after the referendum, the leader of the Labour party demanded the immediate triggering of article 50; with a similar lack of strategic foresight, Labour Members repeatedly voted against the EU withdrawal Bill, whose sole purpose was to deliver a smooth and orderly Brexit, including on Second Reading; and now the Labour party will not rule out a second referendum. It is clear that Labour Members are taking the opportunistic political low-ground, rather than rallying together to try to secure the best deal for the UK with our EU partners. The withdrawal agreement Bill is essential, and I hope that all who wish to see a smooth and orderly Brexit will support it and engage seriously on the substance.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberMost of our no deal preparation has been developed internally with targeted engagement with the relevant parties, but we are now at the point at which more of that delivery will start to become more public. Over the summer, the Government will release a series of technical notices to set out what UK businesses and citizens in various sectors will need to do in a no deal scenario and to make public more of our preparations. That is the responsible thing for any Government to do.
Yesterday, the former Brexit Minister, the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), made a direct threat to the Secretary of State that Conservative MPs on his wing of the party are not prepared to vote for any Brexit deal that does not meet their demands. Talking about the White Paper, he said that 40-plus Conservative Members
“do not like this deal and are willing to vote in line with that dislike”.—[Official Report, 18 July 2018; Vol. 645, c. 489.]
Against that threat, and without just saying that it is a great White Paper, what evidence can the Secretary of State point to that suggests the White Paper could command a majority in this House?
The right hon. and learned Gentleman seems more interested in doing the job of whipping Conservative Members than in coming up with any serious, substantive proposals. We have a White Paper, and I am going to Brussels. We ought to unite the United Kingdom behind getting the best deal for this country and for our European friends.
Let me follow on. Given the threat that has been issued by the hon. Member for Wycombe, the burning question for the Secretary of State, which will be asked again and again in this House, across the country and, I have no doubt, by Michel Barnier later today, is whether he personally is prepared to face down that threat. What is the answer?
I am not interested in the media circus or in any of the drama. We have proper scrutiny in this House, and we have relentlessly and unflinchingly focused—I am sure our European partners will be doing the same—on narrowing the differences, accentuating the positives and getting a win-win deal that is good for this country and good for our European friends. The right hon. and learned Gentleman should get behind that effort.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is no good the Secretary of State shaking his head, because that is what it says in paragraph 16 of the White Paper. It is complicated. It is no wonder that businesses have said that they are sceptical about it and it is no wonder that the EU has said that it does not think it can operate such a system. It is no doubt for that reason that paragraph 17a says, after a description of the arrangement:
“However, the UK is not proposing that the EU applies the UK’s tariffs and trade policy at its border for goods intended for the UK.”
There is no reading of that other than, “This is so complicated and bureaucratic that we know the EU will not be prepared to do it and we are not going to ask it to.” There is no other reading of that sentence.
Enter Monday’s European Research Group new clause 36, which says:
“Subject to subsection (2), it shall be unlawful for HMRC to account for any duty of customs or VAT or excise duty collected by HMRC to the Government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom”,
unless
“arrangements have been entered into by Her Majesty’s Government and that government under which that government will account to HMRC for those duties and taxes collected in that country on a reciprocal basis.”
In other words, it will be unlawful for us to collect and account for taxes at our borders unless other countries and territories—the EU27—collect tariffs and account for them for us. It will be unlawful. The White Paper says that we are not going to ask the EU to do it, but new clause 36 says it will be unlawful if the EU does not.
I invite the Secretary of State to intervene if he wants to quibble with that analysis. By that amendment, the Government have cut across their White Paper and inevitably made it more difficult for the Secretary of State to negotiate with the EU when he goes there tomorrow, because the EU has said, “This is not attractive to us and we don’t want to do this.” The White Paper says that we will not ask the EU to— presumably, as part of that discussion, that makes sense as the logical next move—but Monday’s new clause, which was a wrecking amendment, has now made it unlawful for a sensible way to be found through.
I shall make further progress, then give way.
This is not just a forensic challenge to the White Paper; it is fundamental. Absent a workable customs arrangement, the Government have no answer to the question of how they would protect the manufacturing sector. Absent a workable customs arrangement—
The right hon. and learned Gentleman’s analysis is not that forensic, because—inadvertently rather than deliberately, I suspect—he omits the key words from the White Paper:
“The UK and the EU should agree a mechanism for the remittance of relevant tariff revenue. On the basis that this is likely to be the most robust approach, the UK proposes a tariff revenue formula”.
That, of course, will be agreed as well; that is what the negotiations are for. It is set out plainly and squarely in the White Paper, and I think he knows that.
I anticipated that challenge, and I anticipated that sentence. Let us read the sentence:
“The UK and the EU should agree a mechanism for the remittance of relevant tariff revenue.”
Will it be reciprocal or not? If it is not reciprocal, it will be unlawful; that is the difficulty. If it is intended to be reciprocal, what is the point of the sentence reassuring the EU that
“the UK is not proposing that the EU applies the UK’s tariffs and trade policy at its border for goods intended for the UK”?
Whatever the arrangement is, we know one thing about it: it will not involve the EU applying UK tariffs and trade policy at its border. Otherwise, what is the point of that qualification?
I am afraid that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is making a false distinction. The key line in the paragraph is that
“the UK proposes a tariff revenue formula, taking account of goods destined for the UK entering via the EU and goods destined for the EU entering via the UK.”
That is the most explicit statement of reciprocity. What more could he expect?
I invite the Secretary of State to intervene just one more time. What is the point of the sentence that follows the one that he has just read out?
It is the exception to those arrangements, which is that we are not requiring the EU to levy the tariffs.
This must be my failure to comprehend. There is an arrangement whereby tariffs are applied at the border and accounted for. The UK is not proposing that the EU applies the UK tariffs and trade policy at its border for goods intended for the UK, so how is it going to account for them?
I am grateful for that intervention, because it demonstrates why this is so important. Unless there is a customs arrangement that works for manufacturing, there is not an arrangement that works for manufacturing. The Government last night voted down an amendment to say, “If we cannot make something else work, we will have a customs union.” So if this does not work, there is nothing for manufacturing. Equally, if this does not work, there is nothing for Northern Ireland.
The Secretary of State shakes his head, but if this does not work, what is the plan? If he wants to intervene, that is fine. If this plan does not work—if this facilitated customs arrangement is not acceptable—the default, according to the Government, is not a customs union. What is the plan?
This model will work. I gently say this to the right hon. and learned Gentleman: if he cared about it that much, why did the Labour party go into the last election committed to having an independent trade policy, which can only mean leaving the customs union?
I really do not like the Secretary of State saying, “if he cared about it that much”. The suggestion that we are not both engaging in a difficult analysis of the White Paper with the interests of our country at heart is not fair. I care about this greatly, because without the right arrangement, I genuinely believe that manufacturing in this country will be at risk. Having worked in Northern Ireland for five years, I genuinely believe that, without a working arrangement, the solemn commitment to no hard border in Northern Ireland may not be kept. It is really serious, and point scoring about whether one is serious about it or not does not help; doing so demeans the Secretary of State in his role. It is not the way to conduct such debates.
It is not just the manufacturing sector; the White Paper’s proposals on services reveal a huge black hole. Likewise, the proposals on rights and protections are simply inadequate. On social rights, employment rights and environmental rights, there is a non-regression approach: we will not necessarily keep up and we will not necessarily improve, but things will not necessarily get worse.
There is no clarity on the role of the European Court of Justice. [Interruption.] The Secretary of State says, “It ends”, but it clearly does not end. The European Court has two different primary jurisdictions: first, dispute settlement; and, secondly, reference. That is the jurisdiction that it has had, as he very well knows, with his experience. The second of those is being preserved for everything in the common rulebook. That is why it has caused such difficulty within his own party. The jurisdiction of the Court would exist on reference procedure for that wide range of issues, and he well knows it. It will operate, I should imagine, in precisely the same way that it operates now. That is, there will be a reference to the Court, the Court will decide the question before it, it will give a ruling and an interpretation, and that interpretation will be binding, because if it is not, there is no point in that reference procedure, as he knows.
Well, if the Secretary of State is going to suggest that the reference to the Court is for a ruling that is not binding, I will be very interested to hear about it, because there is not much point in referring something to a court for a ruling and then saying, “Well, it’s very nice but we’re not going to apply it.” The whole thing only works if the ruling of the European Court can be binding.
The proposal for the labour mobility framework says things about business trips and tourism, but is completely silent on the terms under which EU citizens will be able to live and work in the UK and UK citizens in the EU.
The grim reality is this: it has taken two years to get to this point, yet, on analysis, there is nothing there—or, more accurately, there is nothing that the warring Conservative party can agree on. The Prime Minister’s plan is exposed as unworkable and unacceptable to her own party, but she cannot move forward, as Monday night showed, and she cannot move backwards, as last night showed. That is not taking back control; it is no control—stalemate. But the country cannot keep paying the price for these divisions in the Conservative party. We need a Brexit plan that can unite the country and protect jobs and the economy, and I am sorry to say that this White Paper is not it.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThank you, Mr Speaker. I did not say anything because I assumed the Secretary of State was being briefed on the contents of the White Paper.
As for the facilitated customs arrangement, we think the proposals would be a bureaucratic nightmare, unworkable and costly for business. They rely on technology that does not currently exist. If, based on analysis, the EU27 agree with that assessment and reject the proposal on a customs arrangement, is the Government’s position that we should then negotiate a customs union with the EU, as the majority in the House think we should? On services, there is almost nothing, so again, if the Government’s proposals for mutual recognition and enhanced equivalence fail, what then?
In the short time I have had available to me, a number of features of this White Paper have leaped out. Vis-à-vis travel to work, the Secretary of State said in his statement that that was for business trips. The White Paper says that it is for “business activity”. I wonder if he could clear up the difference between the two. That is in paragraph 76 of chapter 1. Paragraph 89 of chapter 1 refers to reciprocal arrangements on social security. Could he elaborate on what that is? Paragraph 4 of chapter 4 says that the UK’s proposal
“would take the form of an Association Agreement”.
Again, could he elaborate on that? In paragraph 42 on page 93, there is a reference to the role of the European Court and interpretation. Perhaps he could elaborate on that as well.
Coming 15 months after article 50 was triggered and just three months before the article 50 agreement is expected, this White Paper has obviously arrived very late in the day. The Chequers statement unravelled in two days. When the details of this White Paper are examined, there are very few reasons to believe it will not suffer the same fate.
May I just apologise for the late arrival of the White Paper? We will look into what happened with the Clerks. I apologise to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, and we will avoid its happening again.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his generous welcome. I noticed that it came in two parts, but I am genuinely looking forward to working with him at this historic crossroads for our country. Like him I am a recovering lawyer, like him I voted to trigger article 50, and at the last general election we both stood on manifestos that promised the British people we would leave the EU, so I hope he will forgive me if I remind him of that every now and again.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman made some rather disobliging comments on unity. May I say to him ever so gently that people in glass houses should not throw stones? At the last count, there have been 103 Front-Bench resignations from Labour under its current leader, a record that is unlikely to be rivalled any time in the foreseeable future.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman made a number of procedure and process points, which rather seemed to be displacement activity for anything Labour might have to say on the substance of Brexit. [Interruption.]