European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Keir Starmer and Bernard Jenkin

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Monday 13th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I have seen that poll, which is of course important, but this is a matter of principle. This is a question of whether this House should be able to vote on the deal reached in two years’ time before the European Parliament votes and should be able to have a meaningful say, and that is what it has been, in principle, from start to finish.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

The amendment does not simply give this House the right to vote on these matters; it also gives the other place the right to vote on these matters. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman explain what would happen if this House voted to accept what the Government want to do, but the other place dug in and rejected it? What would happen then?

[Keir Starmer]

There is a reason why the amendment spells that out in detail: it is precisely what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box should be the position last time this was debated. Lords amendment 2 carefully reflects what the Government say is their assurance, so such a question about the amendment should be put to the Secretary of State.

Parliamentary Scrutiny of Leaving the EU

Debate between Keir Starmer and Bernard Jenkin

Wednesday 12th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

The prerogative has come up so often that I will deal with it now in substance. Prerogative powers, of course, developed at a time when the monarch was both a feudal lord and Head of State. That is the origin of prerogative powers, but they have changed over time, yielding where necessary to the demands of democratic accountability. There are plenty of examples, as the Secretary of State will know, in the courts of that change in accountability, but there is also the example of the prerogative power to commit troops in armed conflict. In theory, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet retain the constitutional right to decide when and where to authorise action, but in practice Governments in recent times have ensured parliamentary debate and a vote.

Responding to the Chilcot report earlier this year, the then Prime Minister made the point during Prime Minister’s questions when he said:

“I think we have now got a set of arrangements and conventions that put the country in a stronger position. I think it is now a clear convention that we have a vote in this House, which of course we did on Iraq, before premeditated military action”.—[Official Report, 6 July 2016; Vol. 612, c. 881.]

A strong political convention modifying the prerogative has thus been set.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

[Keir Starmer]

I will just complete this section on the prerogative.

The underlying premise of the development of the prerogative is clear and obvious. The more significant the decision in question and the more serious the possible consequences, the greater the need for meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. That lies at the heart of this, and it is hard to think of a more significant set of decisions with very serious possible consequences than the terms on which we leave the EU.

I will press this point because all this is well known to the Secretary of State. After all, he tabled a ten-minute rule Bill in June 1999 that was concerned with

“the exercise of certain powers of Ministers of the Crown subject to control by the House of Commons”.

I shall quote his approach to the prerogative. When he introduced that Bill on 22 June 1999, the right hon. Gentleman, now of course the Secretary of State, said:

“Executive decisions by the Government should be subject to the scrutiny and approval of Parliament in many other areas... The Bill sets out to...make”

the prerogative

“subject to parliamentary approval, giving Parliament the right of approval over all Executive powers not conferred by statute—from the ratification of treaties to the approval of Orders in Council, and from the appointment of European Commissioners, some ambassadors, members of the Bank of England”.—[Official Report, 22 June 1999; Vol. 333, c. 931.]

So he has changed his position. Back then, he recognised that the prerogative ought to be subject to Parliament. It was 20 years ago, but progressive movement with the prerogative is usually in favour of greater accountability, not less, so the fact that he argued that 20 years ago is not an argument against doing it now. That Bill did not proceed, but the principles are clear and set out. The prerogative is not fixed; parliamentary practice and convention can change the prerogative, and have done so in a number of ways. In any event, I fall back on my primary point: even if the prerogative permits the Government to withhold the plans from Parliament, it does not require them to, and political accountability requires the Government to put their plans before Parliament.

[Mr Jenkin]

The hon. and learned Gentleman misses one rather important fact: there has been a vote of the British people—a vote delegated to them by the terms of the European Union Referendum Act 2015. This is the question that he has to answer: suppose there was a vote in this House; how would he vote? Would he vote against article 50 invocation, or in favour? Just give a straight answer to that.

[Keir Starmer]

I will not take long responding to that, because I have made the point, which is that the mandate on 23 June was not a mandate as to the terms, and I think that most people understand that; I cannot put it any clearer than that.

There is the question of how Members would vote, what they would vote on, and what happens if Parliament does not like the terms. The Secretary of State, in his statement on 5 September, emphasised that he would consult widely, including the devolved countries, which of course are very important in all this, and which deserve scrutiny of how exit will impact each of them. He also said he would

“strive to build national consensus around our approach.”—[Official Report, 5 September 2016; Vol. 614, c. 38.]

The question for the Secretary of State is: how will he build consensus around his approach if he will not tell the House what his approach is?