UK Terrorism Threat Level

Debate between Julian Lewis and James Brokenshire

Thursday 5th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his support and that of the Opposition. As he highlighted, the Home Secretary spoke to the Leader of the Opposition. Indeed, I also spoke to leaders in the devolved Administrations to ensure that there was good communication and co-ordination across the whole United Kingdom, recognising that this threat level speaks to all the UK.

The hon. Gentleman asks about the role of JTAC. I can say to him that JTAC keeps the threat level under constant review, so it is a question always of assessing not only the intelligence and information that is available, but the context, which is why, as I indicated, the international perspective is also so important when analysing this.

The hon. Gentleman talks about the public communication. I underline that the counter-terrorism policing network effectively sent a communication around the entirety of the network so that policing in all parts of the UK had consistent messaging. There are established processes and procedures that apply to ensure that we step up visibility in public places, thinking about how to provide support to places that may have areas of vulnerability, crowded places and all those sorts of themes. Therefore, this is part and parcel of the standard approach that is reflected in the resources we provide to our intelligence and counter-terrorism policing.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the Prevent strategy. We are in the final stages of the recruitment of the independent reviewer, and there is a real opportunity to examine those elements of our work and see what further steps we need to take. As I have indicated to the House already this afternoon, we will continue to challenge ourselves on what additional measures may be appropriate.

In terms of Northern Ireland, we judge that a separate assessment is appropriate. It is a separate process that operates, and the Security Service is involved in that step, looking at the threat, sadly, from dissident republican terrorism in Northern Ireland. That threat very much endures. We remain vigilant and robust in meeting the challenges there, in co-ordination with the Police Service of Northern Ireland, as well as other agencies.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. We stand united against those who would seek to divide us. National security and the safety of our citizens remain the utmost priority for this Government.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)]

I welcome the fact that the Government have chosen to make this statement. The attack plans of lone terrorists are obviously the hardest to anticipate, yet their behaviour often sends signals to those in their immediate circle. What advice does my right hon. Friend have for people who see worrying signs that someone they know is developing an extremist outlook?

[James Brokenshire]

My right hon. Friend makes a really important point about the nature of the threat that we face from self-motivated individuals, but they are not isolated and they are not alone; they sit within communities and within families. They have connections with different agencies. That is why we introduced the Prevent duty on statutory agencies, but if people have concerns, they should report them in confidence to the police. The counter-terrorism hotline is 0800 789 321. There are additional resources online at gov.uk and also the Action Counters Terrorism—or ACT—app. That can be downloaded and provides further information and ways to report.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Julian Lewis and James Brokenshire

Committee stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Report stage & Report stage: House of Commons
Thursday 15th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

The UK will comply with obligations under the Human Rights Act, including when they arise extraterritorially. The UK is also bound by obligations under international human rights law.

I wanted to speak to the new clause tabled by the Intelligence and Security Committee and I thank its members for their support for the Bill. I think that underlines the role for the ISC in the scrutiny that they apply. Indeed, as the Minister who took the Justice and Security Act 2013 through Parliament, I recognised, in the creation of that Committee, its role in providing that rightful scrutiny and confidence in relation to this matter. I welcome the spirit with which new clause 3 has been tabled to emphasise the important role of the Committee, which I respect and appreciate.

I have written to the Committee Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), to underline ways in which I believe we can provide the information that has been sought by the Committee, and I will place the letter in the Library to provide that certainty and clarity. I would say to my right hon. Friend that operational agencies will consider requests and specifics in the usual way, and I can commit to them considering that through the 2013 Act. The fact that it may relate to a live operation should not preclude that information’s being shared. I hope that that will be helpful to him in underlining the importance of the information’s being forthcoming.

[Dr Lewis]

I accept that assurance in good heart. In the letter, the Minister said, “Such information as is requested in order for the ISC to provide effective oversight of these policies relating to these authorisations shall be provided to the Committee,” so I take it he is saying that we will not get refused those statistics when we want them.

[James Brokenshire]

I take in equally good faith the way in which my right hon. Friend and the Committee have approached this, and it is firmly my intent that information will be provided. He knows the debate and discussion over live operations and being bounded in that way, but I would want to ensure that information is given to his Committee, so that they can fulfil their oversight function and also, I think, give confidence to the House. He and his Committee have raised an important point, and I recognise the contribution that they make.

I turn to the issues of redress in relation to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy), in amendment 2, the Leader of the Opposition, in new clause 1, and the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland in amendments 20 and 21. Let me be clear: there is no barrier under the Bill for affected persons seeking a judicial review of a decision made by a public authority. Similarly, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal already has jurisdiction in relation to conduct to which part 2 of RIPA applies, which will include the amendments made by the Bill. I am, though, listening to concerns expressed by Members about the Bill’s potential impact on routes of redress, and I am happy to consider whether anything further is needed.

I shall now discuss the amendments that seek to place further limits on what can be authorised. The limits that other countries have chosen to place on the face of their legislation have featured prominently in this debate, as they did at Second Reading. Further to the Second Reading debate we have continued, for example, to engage with our Canadian friends with regard to their limits on the conduct of their covert human intelligence sources. The Solicitor General and I agree that it is correct to say that limits are found on the face of their legislation, but it is not straightforward to make comparisons between what we are proposing here and what might exist for other countries. We have our own legal systems; our operational partners each have their own practices and functions; and—perhaps most importantly—we have a very different threat picture.

For example, our friends and partners, such as Canada and the US, are not signatories to the European convention on human rights. We are the only members of Five Eyes that are bound by the convention and the obligations that it comes with. Again, I reference clause 1(7)—it has been focused on quite a lot during today’s debate—which makes specific reference to the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 being taken into consideration. Placing explicit limits on the face of the Bill risks creating a specific list of prohibited activity that would place into the hands of criminals, terrorists and hostile states a means of creating a checklist, as I have explained and as I think my hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland) set out so clearly in his contribution. Therefore we cannot accept amendments 8, 13 or 22.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Debate between Julian Lewis and James Brokenshire

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 5th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

If the hon. Lady will allow me, I will make some further progress, but I will allow her to intervene on me later.

In order to build the credibility and trust of those under investigations, there are occasions where, in carefully managed circumstances and subject to robust independent safeguards, CHIS may need to participate in criminality themselves. This is an inescapable and essential feature of CHIS use and has always been fundamental to this work. Although I am unable to go into the detail about the specific criminality that a CHIS may participate in, for reasons I will come to, limited examples have been discussed in the public domain. For example, a CHIS may be required to join the organisation that they are seeking to disrupt. This membership alone will sometimes be criminal but will be deemed necessary and proportionate to prevent more serious criminality from taking place. Again, without going into the specifics, the use of that tactic enabled the police and MI5 to disrupt a planned terrorist attack on No. 10 and the then Prime Minister in 2017. The necessity of CHIS participation in criminal conduct has been accepted in the UK and around the world for many years. In December 2019, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that MI5 has a lawful basis for this activity and recognised that CHIS participation formed an essential part of MI5’s core activities. I want to reassure the House that this Bill does not confer the power to carry out a new activity, but enables CHIS to continue to deploy the methods that they already use. Notwithstanding those powers, this Bill puts that existing practice onto a clearer statutory footing, putting the matter beyond doubt as to Parliament’s intentions. The Bill provides certainty for CHIS and their handlers and will augment our ability to recruit and retain in the future in this regard. It is important to stress that the Bill does not change the position of CHIS who have previously been properly authorised to participate in criminal activity. It has no retrospective effect.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)]

Can the Minister explain one difference between the situation that has applied in the past and the situation that will apply in the future if the Bill goes through as it is? We are now legislating to make properly authorised criminal conduct lawful, rather than continuing with the current position whereby MI5 or another authorising authority is able to argue that it would not be in the public interest for prosecuting authorities to prosecute properly authorised criminal conduct, but there is no guarantee of immunity. What we are now saying is that they are not breaking the law, rather than, as in the past, that they were breaking the law, but that it was against the public interest to prosecute. Why the reason for that change?

Intelligence and Security Committee: Russia Report

Debate between Julian Lewis and James Brokenshire

Wednesday 22nd July 2020 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

The one thing I agree with in what the hon. Gentleman said is the threat we face from Russia, as I made clear in my opening statement in terms of all the different varieties in which that threat presents itself. We recognise and have always recognised the enduring and significant threat posed by Russia and Russia remains a top national security priority for this country. However, in terms of the other assertions that he makes, I reject them. It is a bit rich for those on the Labour Front Bench to lecture this Government on our stance in relation to Russia, given that the shadow Foreign Secretary herself even said at the weekend that the Labour party had got its position wrong.

The hon. Gentleman highlighted the issue of strategy and again I point to the Russia strategy that was implemented in 2017. Indeed, a cross-Government Russia unit is focused on all this and brings things together across Government with accountability through the National Security Council. He highlights the issue of the protection of our democracy. Unlike the Labour party, I am proud that we stood on a Conservative manifesto that committed to defend our democracy, highlighting that we will protect the integrity of our democracy by introducing identification to vote at the polling station and stopping postal vote harvesting, and through measures to prevent any foreign interference in elections. I look forward to the Labour party supporting those measures, which it did not in its own manifesto at the last general election.

Our approach to the threat Russia poses is clear-eyed. That is why we have taken the steps that we have, and, as I outlined, all the different measures we have implemented over the last months and years. Indeed, we have set out the message to Russia that, while we want to maintain a dialogue with it, there can be no normalisation of our bilateral relationship until Russia ends the destabilising activity that threatens the UK and our allies and undermines the safety of our citizens and our collective security.

We take the issue of our national security incredibly seriously. As I have said, I will take no lectures from the Opposition on putting the interests of this country first.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)]

Given that the Minister has so much to say on this subject, it is really rather sad that it is having to be said in the context of an urgent question rather than a voluntary statement by the Government.

The Russia report could not have been produced to this high standard without the dedication, the expertise and, above all, the objectivity of the ISC’s brilliant staff, some of whom I have worked with previously, yet according to the journalist, Tim Walker, some people within Government tried to sack the secretariat and make political appointments. Will my right hon. Friend, as I still regard him, resist the temptation to fob us off with clichés about not believing everything we read in the media and give this House now a categorical commitment that no party political special advisers will be allowed anywhere near the ISC?

[James Brokenshire [V]]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his comments on the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. He will recall that he and I served on the Bill Committee establishing the ISC so he will know the weight and consideration I give to it, and indeed to the work of its officials and those who work to support its activities, inquiries and investigations. He can certainly have my assurances on the weight and support I give to his Committee.

I commend the work of the previous Committee, which produced the report that is the subject of this urgent question. I also commend all members of the Committee on the robust and rigorous work that I know they will do in the course of this Parliament.