Defence Spending

Debate between John Baron and Bob Stewart

Thursday 19th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

Yes, I completely agree. If anything, we need to spend more than 2%, but there have been quite authoritative reports, most notably in the Financial Times, suggesting that our defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP will fall below 2%. One of my questions to the Minister—if he cannot answer it in this debate, I am happy to take a written response—is what truth is there in the suggestion that our defence spending will fall well below 2% or, as some figures suggest, 1.8%?

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Or 1.7%.

[Mr Baron]

Or 1.7%, as my hon. Friend suggests.

I believe it is particularly incumbent on us to ensure that we have a strong defence policy—more incumbent on us than on other powers, perhaps—because in addition to our global interests and territories, we are highly dependent on maritime trade. The South China sea and the straits of Hormuz may seem far-away places, but I can assure the House that if those sea lanes ever became closed, we would certainly feel the pinch. A shock on the other side of the world, as we all know, can have reverberations here—a rise in the oil price is just one example.

There are many less tangible benefits to a strong defence policy. These include maintaining influence, supporting our defence engineering and industrial base, and global partnerships through defence diplomacy. Despite bruising deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, Britain still rightly sees itself as a global power, at the forefront of diplomacy. It is impossible to do this without the options that strong defence gives us. Furthermore, there are many strands to the special relationship, but the ability to deploy force by land, sea and air is an essential component. If this is not present, we can expect a markedly different relationship, as former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates recently testified.

I hope we will continue to be close allies of the US. We share common interests and common values. However, we need to play our full part in being a good ally lest our influence and, ultimately, our interests suffer. We should not forget that we would be foolish to depend entirely on the US. Sometimes we may have to act alone. The Falklands is just one example of that. In the absence of US support, we need to ensure that Britain can face the world with confidence, and that will involve strong and credible defence.

[Mr Baron]

Nobody in the House would disagree. It is a sad fact that many of our NATO allies are not pulling their full weight. But that should not stop us accepting what we need to do, particularly given our reliance on maritime trade and our global interests, territories and possessions. If anything, it is more incumbent on us than on many of our NATO allies to wake up and realise that we need to spend more on defence, but I take my hon. Friend’s point on board.

Despite the need for a strong defence policy because of both the tangible and the intangible benefits, we continue to make cuts. The Royal Navy, for example, has been reduced to a mere 19 surface ships. Not so long ago, a strategic defence review suggested the figure should be closer to 30.

[Bob Stewart]

Forty-two. [Interruption.]

[Mr Baron]

I will take further bids. For the moment, though, I will stick with my figure of 30. Have the threats declined since that defence review? No, not since we were recommended to have 30 surface ships. Our aircraft carriers are being built, but there is no certainty that the second one will see service. There is talk about it perhaps being mothballed. The other carrier will have to await fighter jets.

The situation is not much better in the skies. The F-35 fighter is beset with problems. Britain without a maritime patrol aircraft—that is an extraordinary position for an island nation such as ours to be in. We need to try to put that right.

I speak with a vested interest here, I suppose, but it is the Army that has borne the brunt of our short-sightedness. Cost-cutting plans to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists will create unacceptable capability gaps in the short term and, I believe, false economies in the long term. Unfortunately, my attempt to get the Government to think again during the passage of the Defence Reform Bill fell on deaf ears, although Members of all parties made their views well known. It was, to a certain extent at least, a close-run thing, given the strong three-line Whip.

These legitimate concerns were echoed—in fact, I suggest, amplified—by an authoritative and critical report from the National Audit Office. It provides a list of critical conclusions, so let me read some of them. It states, for example, that

“significant further risks…could significantly affect value for money”.

Another conclusion was:

“The Department”—

it means the Ministry of Defence—

“did not test whether increasing the trained strength of the Army Reserve to 30,000 was feasible.”

It added:

“The Department’s recruitment targets for reserves are not underpinned by robust planning data”

and:

“Reducing the size of the Army will not alone deliver the financial savings required.”

It goes on:

“The Department did not fully assess the value for money of its decision to reduce the size of the Army.”

These are pretty damning conclusions. Another is:

“There are significant risks to value for money which are currently not well understood by the Department or the Army.”

It then states:

“The Department should reassess its targets for recruiting reserves.”

As I say, this is all pretty damning stuff. I believe that the decision taken in 2012 to cut the Regular Army by a fifth before the replacement reservists were even recruited has not gone well; in fact, it has been a shambles. The NAO has said that it does not believe that the MOD will be able to replace those lost regulars until 2025—a full 10 years away.

2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers

Debate between John Baron and Bob Stewart

Thursday 18th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

Yes, and Newcastle. I could go around the country—Rochdale, Bury—but I am sure the regiment will forgive me for not listing every city, town and village. However, it certainly recruits from the three largest cities, and I will not forget Newcastle, of which I have many happy memories.

The letter from the Secretary of State was revealing because it omitted to mention London as one of the regiment’s recruiting grounds. How can the MOD talk about demographic sustainability if, in its list of what it considers to be the regiment’s regional recruiting grounds, it fails to include London, probably one of the key recruiting grounds? We should not forget that the headquarters of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is based at the Tower of London, yet London was conveniently forgotten.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Perhaps the Ministry of Defence had indeed forgotten that the regimental headquarters of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is distinctly in the Tower of London, which I think is in London.

[Mr Baron]

It is; my hon. Friend is quite right. [Interruption.] I am pleased that the Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Claire Perry), agrees. It is strange: we go through the recruiting regions of the whole country for the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, yet somebody forgot to mention London. That is absolute nonsense.

I love Scotland; I am married to a Scot and I believe in the Union. However, this is not the way to go about cementing that Union, and it is impossible to believe that the demographics of Scotland are healthier than for the three largest cities in the country, and the four largest counties—let me mention Newcastle again. Figures also confirm that for battalions exclusively recruited from a country, England has a population of 3 million per infantry battalion, against fewer than one million for Scotland.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baron]

Briefly, if there have to be military cuts, I suggest to my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) that they should be based on military logic, not political calculation. As he knows, he and I are at one when it comes to priorities and Government spending.

We should not be blind to the social costs of axing 2RRF. Not only will 600 soldiers find themselves out of work—many of whom are recruited from areas that do not have healthy employment opportunities—but there will be a knock-on effect on their families, on veterans and on local affiliated cadet organisations. Furthermore, if 2RRF goes, I suggest that Warwickshire will be the only county in England without a direct battalion link. We should perhaps remember that Field Marshal Montgomery was a Warwickshire fusilier, and his regiment became 2RRF.

[Bob Stewart]

Not Staffordshire?

[Mr Baron]

We will argue about that later; we are all claiming Field Marshal Montgomery. [Interruption.]

Looking at the bigger picture, and to follow the intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti), I have severe doubts about the extent of the cuts to the Army and our armed forces generally. We must never forget that the first duty of Government is to national security. As the Foreign Secretary reminded us:

“The range of threats and dangers is, if anything, increasing.”

Many countries, not necessarily friendly to the west, are increasing their defence spending. Much as I respect the Territorial Army, having been on operations with it, I question the extent to which we are asking it to step up to the plate and plug the gap left by the loss of regular battalions. I am sad to say that the coalition Government continue to cut. Defence spending has halved over the past 20 years, and it continues to decrease.

I suggest that our relationship with the United States is a process of give and take and is not free. It is based on shared values and a close working relationship on nuclear and security issues, and it is underpinned by our military capability. These are austere times, but given that the first duty of Government is to national security, I suggest that money could be saved in other areas.

I am not suggesting that the Government do the right thing within the MOD budget; I have made it clear that I am not pointing the finger at other regiments. I am saying that we need to reprioritise our spending. I, for one, have trouble with all the extra billions of pounds that we are sending in our contribution to the EU budget. I also have a problem—I know this is unfashionable but I will say it anyway—with sending £1 billion in aid to India, a country with its own space, nuclear and rearmament programmes, an aircraft carrier, and its own aid programme. We are, in effect, subsidising those programmes, which I think is wrong.

In conclusion, the Government are wrong. Military logic and not political calculations should determine Army cuts. I am a firm believer in the Union, but this is not the way to achieve it. In my view, the Government’s culpability is illustrated by their reluctance to justify their decision, and the evidence has been damning. That was illustrated by a freedom of information request that I submitted on 6 September, asking for the first draft of the Chief of the General Staff’s recommendations as to which battalions should be cut. I received the answer late last night, saying that that they will not release that information. I ask the Government to think again and reverse the decision to axe 2RRF. I am not calling for any other battalions to be cut, just for this very bad decision to be reversed.