(7 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Lady has cleverly used her point of order to make the political point that she wished to make. I think she knows, as the House knows, that it is not a point that I can answer from the Chair. If, however, she is endeavouring to bring the Chancellor to be held account to the House, then I can tell her that that is exactly the process that we are currently undertaking. The Chancellor of Exchequer is here, and I am sure that the hon. Lady will be able to make her point in debate later in the day.
I give way to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman).
I should say to the House, for the benefit of new Members, that there is a difference between an intervention in a debate and a point of order. The hon. Lady is being clever in using her wisdom about how the House works, but she knows that that was not a point of order, and that it is not something that I can answer. What she really wants to do is intervene on the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
For the benefit of new Members of the House, let me make it clear that a point of order should not be used to make an intervention that the Chancellor has not taken. The Chancellor is perfectly capable of choosing the interventions that he wishes to take. He has taken many, and I am sure that he will take many more.
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs the House would expect, I make my judgments about military matters—in particular, the resilience and capability or otherwise of any particular forces—on the basis of military advice, and that is the military advice that I am receiving. However, I am not sure that my hon. Friend is necessarily right in seeing nothing but a reinforcement of the insurgency after the end of 2014. On the one hand, ISAF will not be present in the same numbers or in the same role, but on the other hand, there is no doubt in my mind that the presence of foreign forces has been one of the great recruiting sergeants of the insurgency, and that the removal of foreign forces changes the dynamics. There are definitely Afghans who would have signed up to the insurgency to fight foreign soldiers but do not wish to join up and kill their Afghan brothers in the ANSF.
Finally, I call the very patient Mr Stephen Mosley.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberIf the Secretary of State has an answer to that question as it concerns the workings of the House, I will ask him to comment.
Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am not sure whether it would be in order, but if you say that it is, I will happily place in the Library of the House a document that shows the fields. This document will have been circulated in the Army today and it will become publicly available, but I am happy to put it in the Library of the House.
It is certainly in order for the Secretary of State and his Ministers to give information to Members of this House. I am grateful to him for reacting so quickly to a request to do so.
The hon. Gentleman knows that it is inappropriate and out of order now to carry on the arguments rehearsed during the statement. However, if the Secretary of State would like to give further information on a point of order about information to Members of this House, I will allow him so to do.
Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. You will be interested to know that the document I intend to place in the Library will set out the fields and the numbers against each field. However, unless my hon. Friend is a very credible detective, I doubt that he will be able to determine much about the geographical distribution of those redundancies.
(11 years ago)
Commons ChamberI have heard these arguments from my hon. Friend before. I have always been clear that we have no choice but to reduce the size of the Regular Army to operate within our budgets. The difference between an Army of 102,000 and an Army of 82,000 is £1 billion a year. He does not have that funding available, and neither do the Opposition. If we are to operate within our budgets, we have no choice but to draw down the Regular Army as we withdraw from Afghanistan and to build up the reserve strength that will primarily be needed if we again become embroiled in an enduring operation with six-month troop rotations.