Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Baroness Laing of Elderslie and Geoffrey Cox

Committee stage
Wednesday 13th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. We had three hours for this debate. The first four speeches have taken more than two hours. We have about 55 minutes left and 10 people wish to speak. I do not have the power to put on a time limit, but you all have the power to act decently, and speak for four or five minutes and no longer. I hold you all to honour. You should take four to five minutes, otherwise you are preventing other people from speaking. I call Sir Geoffrey Cox.

[Sir Geoffrey Cox]

I will be quick. I have listened with fascination to the contributions and speeches made this afternoon. If I thought that the Bill would produce a durable and permanent solution, I would support it, but I do not believe it will produce a durable and permanent solution. The fact is that we cannot impose on Northern Ireland, or on any other party to a treaty that we signed, unilaterally a political solution. A political solution has to be reached politically; it cannot be imposed by this House through legislation. The EU—like it or not—and the Irish Government are a party to these negotiations. Unless we are able to achieve assent to the arrangements that we propose, they will not last. It will have to be resolved ultimately by agreement. It is much the same as the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill—another attempt by the Government to impose a political solution on Northern Ireland, without first having reached the solution and then produced the legislation that works out and implements that solution. I do not believe that this legislation will produce a permanent solution.

We come to the question of necessity. I am not prepared to say that there is an impossibility that the basis of necessity could not justify the actions that the Government are taking. I have the gravest of misgivings about it, and the deepest of scepticism about whether or not it affords a proper legal basis as a matter of international law, but we have not seen the evidence. It is possible that the Government and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General have seen some evidence that we have not seen that could crystallise at least the plausible case that this action needs to be taken.

I support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), but the fact of the matter is that even necessity is not a legal basis for a permanent solution. The doctrine of necessity in international law requires the measures that have been implemented as a necessity to answer the urgent and imminent peril to be removed as soon as the basis for taking action on the grounds of necessity has gone. Indeed, necessity does not even remove the breach; one is still in breach of the agreement. Necessity simply removes the wrongfulness, which further emphasises the fact that necessity cannot produce a permanent solution as a matter of international law. Only agreement—only the reaching of a political solution—can do so.

Nobody need tell me about the politically tone deaf intransigence of the European Union in negotiation. I recall vividly in my visits to Brussels in the early months of 2019, saying to Michel Barnier, “But do you not see, Michel, that this produces an anomalous situation? If a farmer in Northern Ireland wants to take up the issue of cattle tagging, to whom does he go? When the law is imposed by the European Union, the only place he can go is either to Brussels itself or to Dublin, and how will that feel for one whole section of the community of Northern Ireland?” I must tell the Committee that the European Union representatives reacted as if they had been stung by wasps. We have to understand that those at the European Union believe the protocol to be the very zenith of creative diplomacy. They cherish and prize it, as if it were their own child. But that does not mean that we do not need to engage in the patient effort—maybe it will take months, maybe years—gradually to make them see that this is an unsustainable situation.

What we should not do is reach immediately for a solution, over which there are the gravest doubts as to its efficacy as a matter of international law, over which there are the gravest doubts about the sincerity and good faith of the Government—for I take it that the Government have advanced their case on the basis of necessity sincerely. I assume that they must mean, and genuinely mean, that they genuinely believe that there is a respectable case on the basis of necessity. If they do, why should we not at least be told the evidence—the evidence! We can gist it, we can summarise it if it is security sensitive, but at least let this House acquit itself of the doubt that exists over its legal efficacy as a matter of international law. It is no light thing for this House to take a step—

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Laing of Elderslie and Geoffrey Cox

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 15th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

Order. There is very little time left and many people still want to speak. I cannot regulate the length of speeches, but hon. Members can do so if they do not want to incur the wrath of their colleagues who will not get a chance to speak if speeches are too long.

[Mr Geoffrey Cox (Torridge and West Devon) (Con)]

I will try to be brief, Mrs Laing. I wish to address some of the constitutional implications of this extraordinarily important Bill. I suppose that this is the most important constitutional Bill that this House has considered in many years. It is difficult to think of a Bill as important as this one, certainly since 1972.

This is not the first time that this task has been accomplished by sovereign nations. Provisions such as clauses 1, 2, 3 and 4 are to be found, in a simpler form, in the constitutions of a number of Commonwealth countries to which this country granted independence after the second world war. Invariably, those constitutions contained provisions that seek to preserve the laws as at the date that those nations became independent.

Now, they are simpler provisions because the complexity of our laws and the European Union’s laws, with the legal federalism that the EU implies, is much higher. But the essential task that those nations faced was not dissimilar from that which we face. When they became independent and the legal source of their laws changed from being the Queen in Parliament to a constitution, the task that the courts faced was not dissimilar in that, while retaining the body of the law that had existed up to the date of independence, they then became free to interpret those provisions and principles in the light of the new constitutional fact of their independence. And that will be the case for our own Supreme Court. The Bill intends to preserve continuity up to the point of exit day, and to allow the Supreme Court, under clause 6, to diverge where it thinks appropriate and to develop its own jurisprudence over successive years.

I have sat and listened throughout the debates yesterday and today, and it seems to me that we have done something of an injustice to the draftsmen of the Bill. Some very careful thinking has gone into the way in which the provisions have been balanced. I am not saying to Government Front Benchers that it is not possible to tighten some of those provisions and to provide greater safeguards, particularly in respect of the width of the powers permitted under clauses 7 and 17. But I can quite understand the policy and principle behind those provisions in the manner in which they are thus expressed.

Clause 4—we are speaking to the question of whether clause 4 stands part—is obviously an important provision, which seeks to mirror the wording of section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) asked what the word “allowed” meant in clause 4(1)(b) of the Bill. I would propose that, under that clause, the word means to admit, acknowledge or accept into our law. The word “allow” does not only mean to permit. It also carries the connotation of acceptance or admission; it certainly did in 1972. It seems obvious what clause 4 is intended to achieve: to ensure that a law that was enforced, available, recognised and allowed continues beyond exit day, in so far as that has not already been provided for by clauses 2 and 3.

I suggest to the Committee that the provisions introduced by clauses 2 to 4 are sensible, coherent and logical. I am not saying to the Government Front Bench that they cannot be improved, but I certainly understand their import. It is under section 2(1) of the European Communities Act that all the case law, the general principles and the decisions of the European Court of Justice on the interpretation of treaty provisions become admissible and admitted into our law. I take it that clause 4 is intended to achieve precisely that.

Although I accept the need for, perhaps, some tightening, I do not accept that the Bill is as wanting or as deficient as has been suggested. For example, I do not think that clause 7, which we will come to debate at a later stage, is as broad an invitation to the Executive to abuse their discretion as some right hon. and hon. Members have suggested. It is governed by three critical factors. The first is the fact that there has to be a deficiency caused by the withdrawal from the European Union. Now, if the power of the Government is limited by the fact that they have to be curing a deficiency caused by the withdrawal from the EU, it is difficult to see how they thereby gain a licence to interfere with fundamental rights or rights that have been acquired over many years in the decision making of the European Court of Justice.

My general point to those on the Front Bench is this: some parts of the Bill would benefit from some tightening, and perhaps some expression of the limitations on the discretion that is being conferred on the Executive, but I do not accept—I say this to my right hon. and hon. Friends—some of the more exaggerated and, frankly, hysterical analyses of the Bill. It seems to be a reasonably well-judged, measured and balanced set of provisions. Yes, it allows a lot of legal points to be taken, but, frankly, when a legal order is being changed to the extent that this one is, it is not surprising if lawyers are likely to have a field day.