Earl of Sandwich
Main Page: Earl of Sandwich (Crossbench - Excepted Hereditary)(13 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I start by expressing my regrets at the tragic loss of more British soldiers last week. It will soon be a decade since 9/11, a reminder that no one expected our commitment to Afghanistan to last this long, let alone to cause so many casualties among the Marines as well as the Army. I would also like to mention, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, has on this occasion, the much higher number of fatalities among the Afghan police—up to seven a day, as we have heard, including those in Kabul during the past week. It is rare that the sacrifice of Afghans themselves is recognised outside that country. We all look forward to a time when the fighting will end, but even if it ends for NATO in three years or so it will continue for much longer for men and women in uniform in Afghanistan.
I sincerely congratulate Sub-Committee C on its report. It is exactly the kind of subject that that committee should tackle—a specific and topical aspect of foreign affairs that might otherwise be ignored by Parliament. The Sudan report, published today, is another good and timely example that I hope we will be debating soon because of South Sudan’s independence in two and a half weeks. That is another country divided in two. This does not detract from my view that we should one day have a committee in this House with a much wider remit on foreign affairs, a view shared by many colleagues but not by the Liaison Committee, which still believes that we would be poaching on another place. Nevertheless, I notice that another place has decided to investigate piracy off Somalia, so soon after Sub-Committee C had done its own excellent report. If that is not poaching or duplicating, it seems at the very least to be a waste of resources.
The report, among other things, demonstrates failure by the EU, including this country and other members of ISAF, to bring western standards of policing into a country with its own traditions and methods of security. We should not be surprised that “policing” in Afghanistan means something quite different from policing here at home, yet we expect someone of the calibre of Chief Superintendent Nigel Thomas to make a lasting impact on the operations of the police in Kabul and many other places, and to do so at the double before we leave the country altogether at the end of three years.
Noble Lords can see that I am sceptical, perhaps too sceptical, of the value of what amounts to imposing our own standards on another country and culture. I recognise that there are universal rights and values and I supported our early intervention in Afghanistan, but implementing those rights across the board in central Asia is much more than a challenge, as the euphemism goes—it is an impossibility unless the mission is very narrowly defined. I am certain from what he said in evidence that the chief super and his colleagues personally did a lot of good and certainly had some influence on planning and behaviour. Some valuable training, even in only a six-week crash course, may have rubbed off on the Afghan police. However, when you know the scale of the problem, the poverty and illiteracy in the country, the relatively small numbers of European police officers involved and the degree of insecurity, you soon realise that we are not going to make a lot of difference. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, rightly referred to the loss of quality, which can be even more important. Surprisingly, the Government respond in a similar vein. They state:
“The Government recognises that, whilst EUPOL has had some successes, it is not yet delivering to its full potential. Its capabilities have been stretched by the challenges of operating in such a complex conflict environment. … The reality is that many parts of Afghanistan are not yet ready for civilian policing, so EUPOL’s ability to demonstrate impact is limited”.
In that case, why are we doing it, especially when NATO is already carrying out the lead training role for both the army and the police? Does the Minister agree that one explanation for this is that, not for the first time, there is a muddle between NATO and the EU about their respective roles?
In line with the devastating written evidence from Dr Ronja Kempin in appendix 3, the committee concludes that the lack of a formal agreement between the EU and NATO is quite “unacceptable” and, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, has said, puts British lives among others in danger. Her Majesty’s Government in their response go so far as to deny this and mention hospital access via ISAF, but I am unconvinced by that.
There are numerous incidents of the less trained elements of the Afghan police doing or being forced to do the work of soldiers in less secure areas and either getting shot or shooting at the wrong side, or turning out to be Taliban in disguise. The noble Lord, Lord Selkirk, referred to this very convincingly. Civilian police training is not going to improve that situation, but NATO training of police alongside soldiers will, because during conflict it is sometimes impossible to distinguish between the two. The issue of attrition is related to this because any police, especially local police, required to leave their home area are bound to have their first loyalty to that area, from what has become a purely defence point of view, and they see training as being directly related to conflict.
Having said all that, I acknowledge what Karen Pierce, our special representative, said in her evidence in question 106 on page 29—that EUPOL has an enabling and not an executive role. It could hardly have anything else. It may well be true that it has had some success in Kabul using the “ring of steel” technique borrowed from the Met but it is also true, as I know from several recent visitors to Kabul, that the city is a much less safe place than it was when I was last there only three or four years ago. Because of the unique character of Kabul and the substantial foreign presence there, other centres are unlikely to respond to the same concentration of external training and influence, yet for the same reason Kabul may attract more suicide attacks on the police, as occurred only last week.
Karen Pierce also mentioned the much bigger issue that Afghanistan,
“does not have very effective rule of law institutions”.
I remember that in Mazar-i-Sharif on my last visit a young boy ran under our 4x4 and bounced off on the pavement, stunned but unharmed. About 50 people gathered quickly and surrounded us. There was no sign of the police or indeed any question of justice. If we had not gone with the family to the hospital and given them money, our driver would certainly have gone to prison for quite a time. Bribery is too grand a word for what in a developing country is simply payment and is often the only way to escape punishment or pass through a road block. It is petty corruption, not a culture which will be cured in a few years by the expertise of foreign police.
Of course, there are many activities which over time will help to change the culture of bribery and corruption, and whatever the outcome of this war I hope that, one way or another, we will continue to encourage good governance and the rule of law. Making people more aware of their rights is also a necessary task, already carried out in south Asia and all over the world by our own DfID and many non-governmental organisations.
Finally, what is the United Kingdom doing now to encourage neighbouring countries to take over this work in the future? The noble Lord, Lord Radice, has helpfully quoted the new book by Sherard Cowper-Coles, and I notice that India has just announced another half a billion dollars in aid to Afghanistan. Surely that country, with all its resources and experience, is the natural partner through which EUPOL, or perhaps another institution, can further this work in the years to come. This report, apart from highlighting that valuable work, also makes us more aware of our own limitations in the West.