Ukraine
Earl of Oxford and Asquith Excerpts(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Earl of Oxford and Asquith (CB)
My Lords, first, I warmly welcome the noble Lord, Lord Camoys, to this House and congratulate him on his speech.
In the course of this war, much has been said about possible territorial concessions to Russia by Ukraine as the condition for resolving the so-called stalemate of the present moment. I should like simply to sound a cautionary note. If you analyse everything said or written by Vladimir Putin since at least June 2021—more than eight months before the invasion of Ukraine—you see that he has made it very clear that he sees no reason why Ukraine should exist as a separate sovereign state; that Ukrainians and Russians are a single nation; and that the so-called artificial division between Russia and Ukraine is a ploy devised by Washington and NATO to weaken and partition Russia. In summary, like Carthage in the second century BC, Ukraine is to be destroyed.
We have known for a long time that Mr Putin has a peculiarly delusional relationship with history. It has also been argued that he has long aspired to restore the Russian empire. Today’s Russian elites certainly aspire to assert that Russia is a great power—if you do not sign up to that, you are not a member of the Russian elite—and that, without Ukraine, Russia cannot be counted as a Eurasian imperial power. In my experience, if you suggest to an otherwise reasonable-sounding member of Mr Putin’s circle that Russia would ultimately be better off if it let go of Ukraine, you will be met with a fierce snarl of denial.
Let me recall the early months of 2014, when President Yanukovych of Ukraine and some EU Foreign Ministers havered over the negotiations on a treaty with the EU that might have given Ukraine some trading benefits. What sparked the revolution at that time was when some Kyiv university students demonstrated in favour of what they called “European values”, and more specifically against Yanukovych personally: his criminal record and his thuggish regime. I was there on the streets and saw them hunted down at night and shot dead the next morning by Yanukovych’s security forces. Ukrainian society boiled over in disgust and Yanukovych fled. That revolution convinced Mr Putin to intervene in Donbass and Crimea.
Whatever mistakes the Ukrainians and their leaders had made since independence in 1991, whatever their complicity in corrupt practices and political foot-dragging, as of 2014 Ukraine society had been moving in a direction that resulted in greater prosperity, greater responsibility and more diversified individual and collective freedoms. By 2014, let alone by 2022, Ukraine in Mr Putin’s eyes was on completely the wrong course of development—a course that was entirely antithetical to the model of government and state that Mr Putin espouses and that, in his view, threatened Russia.
It is sometimes said that Mr Putin wants to rewrite history. I think a better way to describe the mentality that dominates him and his circle of ideologues is that he wants to rerun history to achieve a different or better result in his eyes. Of course, we know that that is a nonsensical absurdity: that way madness lies. But we must understand that, in the last 20 years, Mr Putin has presented himself to his population much as the Russian tsars used to—as the embodiment of Russia itself and as a quasi-mystical expression of Russian state and country. He often says that the war against Ukraine is being fought to preserve the existential integrity of Russia, as a defence against the corrupting infiltration of western ideas and values through Ukraine into Russia. He frequently details—as recently as last week to his soldiers—almost any excess he can ascribe to western cultural decline. Of course, in our terms he is talking strange nonsense. But in his terms the narrative makes sense—and Ukraine’s liberty does indeed represent an existential threat to Mr Putin himself.
We discount this mentality at our peril. The cautionary note that we must bear in mind is that, even if Ukraine were to make territorial concessions in this war, why would Mr Putin be content to remain in possession of 15% or 20% of Ukraine? What assurances could we ever accept that he would not continue to suborn and destroy the sovereignty of the whole country, as he set out to do in February 2022? It is my belief that, while hostilities may be suspended in Ukraine for a time, underlying the causes of this war there is a war under way against everything that we hold dear in Europe and among our transatlantic allies. That is the narrative which Mr Putin constantly repeats to his fellow Russians. They are told every day that in the West we have only enemies and that the West’s encouragement of Ukrainian statehood is a key element of its general anti-Russian strategy.
Russian prison guards now say to their Ukrainian prisoners, “It’s very simple; we want you to be with us, otherwise we will kill every one of you”. The truly sadistic violence and cruelty exercised by Russian soldiers and their adherents, and the kidnapping and deportation of Ukrainian children by their puppets, will take Ukrainians a long time to forget. Nor should we forget that, in its present configuration, Russia resembles a gangster state, addicted to violence, from which we can accept no assurances of security while Mr Putin’s ideology prevails. I am not convinced that territorial concessions will end this war.
My second main point relates to the future reconstruction of Ukraine. It is a theme that we often address, and it will be a major subject of our discourse for years to come. We held a large conference on the subject here in London last autumn. But do we really understand what we have in mind? I have been asked by three significant business entities from Ukraine and the Far East to give, in a week’s time, some guidance on the British Government’s position. To be honest, apart from offering some obvious platitudes, I do not really know what to say. There is very little around which any practical discussion or action can coalesce. At least in 1948, at the time of the Marshall plan, there was a General Marshall. As yet we have identified no such figure: no special envoy for Ukraine around whom we can build an institution, a managing staff, a reputable audit mechanism or a programme of prioritisation.
We know very well that there are plenty of gangsters on the loose, not just in Russia but in Ukraine. We know the present Ukrainian Government’s lamentable record of so-called corporate raiding. It is very clear that many Ukrainians are looking to the United Kingdom to provide them with guidance and support for the rule of law, security of property and enforceable titled assets. We can talk about British Government-backed insurance policies and export guarantees, but these concepts cannot operate in a vacuum. Our Government must insist that, for public and financial aid to proceed, legal reform in Ukraine must be implemented, at least in parallel if not before. Otherwise, investors will simply not be forthcoming. But in the first place we need a person who can focus and explain our thinking on the reconstruction of Ukraine.
Syria
Earl of Oxford and Asquith Excerpts(7 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
First of all, the Government have no plans to reopen an embassy in Damascus until such time as we see a meaningful transition away from the Assad regime—that position has been made clear—and the position is in the hands of the civilian population and the communities themselves. In terms of the sanctions, I do not agree with the noble Lord. As I am sure he is aware, the sanctions that have been imposed include travel bans and asset freezes against 300 persons and other entities that are linked directly to the Assad regime, and they remain in place.
The Earl of Oxford and Asquith (LD)
My Lords, barring the unforeseeable, President Assad will remain in place until 2021, or until the Syrian people elect a successor. Three years is a long time, and mention has twice been made of sanctions on Syria. I do not think anyone expects sanctions to be lifted on the Syrian military, for example, but the country is, as the Minister recognised, suffering severely from food, clothing and especially medical shortages. As the formal position is that humanitarian aid is not embargoed, but in practice the controls on the mechanisms for financial transfers are considerable, and the acquisition of medical aid is severely sanctioned, does the Minister see scope for a review of humanitarian aid in Syria based on a more calibrated policy of exemptions or licences for the purchasers and purveyors of humanitarian aid?
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
I assure the noble Earl that, as others in your Lordships’ House know, the Government have taken a very firm line on ensuring, and, indeed, leading the way on ensuring, that in particular the NGOs working in the context of the Syrian conflict and in Syria get the necessary exemptions to allow them to deliver humanitarian aid. He will also be aware of the UK’s contribution: we are second to only one other in our contribution of close to £2.5 billion-worth of aid, assistance and humanitarian assistance. He may also be aware that we were very pleased to note the renewal of UN Resolution 2165, on the cross-border provision of humanitarian aid directly to Syria without the approval of the regime. That underlines the humanitarian commitment and support that the UK Government are delivering to the war-afflicted people of Syria through DfID and other NGOs working with great courage on the ground.
Syria
Earl of Oxford and Asquith Excerpts(7 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Earl of Oxford and Asquith (LD)
My Lords, I welcome the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, on the facile narrative that underlies much of the western media reporting. As she has noted, in Syria, we have for several years collectively promoted a demonised portrayal of one side and a highly romanticised version of its opponents. That leads to my general theme—that of legitimacy.
For several years, the British and the United States political leaderships have maintained that this war is largely a matter of a dictator killing his people. It is the accepted line whereby western Governments have sought to promote the policy of regime change to their public. By contrast, what has most impressed me on my visits to Syria recently is the overwhelming and objective evidence of deliberate programmes of assault by ISIL or Daesh, by al-Nusra, as it was, and by other, largely external, forces. It is an assault aimed at dismantling the Syrian state, and the very concepts of Syrian society, identity and culture. This is why it is so crucial to focus on getting hold of genuine facts, evidence and contributions from Syrian citizens and representatives of civil society. They know, none better, what destruction has been inflicted by the militants on their educational infrastructure, for example, deliberately to ensure that ignorance and illiteracy prevails in what is being called a lost generation of students. They know and have seen what is being done to their women, who are carted around the streets of Aleppo in cages for public humiliation—and worse—by the groups we call moderates. They know that those moderates seldom control or influence an area or constituency larger than the extent of this debating Chamber, whatever they may claim in Geneva as they negotiate with our diplomats.
This assault on the structures of the state is, for Syria, an existential war for its identity. The British Government have repeatedly said that Assad can have no legitimacy among his own people. That is a judgment that I believe history will show to be suspect and one which will in due course be put to the test, if there are elections. I have seen little evidence of a craven personal loyalty to Assad in Syria, but there can be no doubt that where the Syrian Government and army have established enduring control, there is order, health provision, schooling and none of the takfiri horrors that the armed militants impose. These are public goods that are welcomed with respect and command large support.
It is often said that Assad would not survive were it not for Russia, Iran or Hezbollah. I myself have seen no evidence that either Russia or Iran has an unshakeable, personal loyalty to President Assad. They support the existence of a coherent Syrian state. If another figure, hypothetically, were to replace Bashar al-Assad, Russia and Iran would undoubtedly continue to uphold the state. But what we have really been implying all along is that we want not simply Assad’s departure but some kind of popular movement—fomenting a resistance to illegitimacy that we endorse—that will effect regime change. This is not going to happen. It is an illusion we should not continue to entertain. I think of Ariel Sharon’s warning to President Bush after the last Iraq war that if Bush intended to go about the same dismantling of Syria as he had effected in Iraq, he would create an explosion throughout the Middle East.
I have gone on too long already. We need to engage in a thorough, probably painful reappraisal of what the structures of Syrian statehood should be, which we will support, and the conditions of their legitimacy that we can recognise.
EU Foreign and Security Strategy (EUC Report)
Earl of Oxford and Asquith Excerpts(8 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Earl of Oxford and Asquith (LD)
My Lords, I echo and wholly endorse the comments of my noble friend Lady Suttie about the quality of the chairmanship of the sub-committee by the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat. I will pick up on the section of the report that alludes to a new Helsinki dialogue in relation to Russia and to European security. This issue will be with all of us in Europe for the long term, irrespective of whether or not the United Kingdom remains a member of the European Union.
As many of us will recall, the Helsinki Final Act came into being in a period of very high tension with the Soviet Union and was built on a structure that required considerable concessions and constant dialogue between the parties. As the report states, our Government believe that there is no need to invent new structures and new treaties to address our current problems with Russia. That is perfectly understandable. The Helsinki Final Act is not in fact a treaty and there is little likelihood that we today could greatly improve on the framework our forebears achieved in 1975.
I suggest that the real issue at stake here is not one of structure or treaty but rather one of intent and purpose. Helsinki responded to a need for reassessment and a change of outlook. The current parallel is that today, however you look at it, there is very little resembling a European security strategy with regard to the tensions we are experiencing with Russia. I know it will be objected—indeed, it has been—that, on the contrary, through its sanctions on Russia the EU has demonstrated a united foreign and security policy. It is striking how repeatedly one is referred to the unity of the EU’s sanctions regime as a self-evident definition of its success. But, as the report concludes,
“sanctions are an instrument of policy, not a strategy”,
and unity is not in itself proof of a policy’s success. Only its consequences and outcomes will demonstrate whether or not it has worked.
Today it is not my purpose to question the efficacy of the sanctions against Russia. Realistically, some of them will probably remain, although I suspect that they may eventually prove to have turned to the greater advantage of the Russians. One is told that the Russian economy is buckling as a result of the measures we have taken, but if you look at the figures relating to the profitability of their companies, the government budget, their balance of payments, unemployment and so on, the Russian economy is doing surprisingly well, or better than we thought.
My point is that at the height of the Cold War, when politically Europe was in a state of much insecurity, when there were indeed also embargoes and sanctions on the Soviet bloc and COMECON, at the same time a constant dialogue was maintained through the sophisticated use of various instruments to ensure that the dangers of escalation were recognised and contained. What should concern us today is that there is hardly that level of dialogue now.
The argument, understandably, is that Russia has breached the principles of European security and that the consequence must be political, diplomatic and economic isolation. There is no doubt that Russia has breached those principles, but the USSR also violated the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. We Europeans objected very strongly, but we maintained the motivation to engage, recognising that that was the sensible means to manage tensions. Today, tomorrow—who knows? Perhaps we may need to become more confrontational with Russia, but we should not deceive ourselves in the meantime. You cannot for long run a disconnected relationship—saying, as it were, to the Russians, “We shall co-operate with you over Iran. We may share joint objectives against ISIL. But, by the way, we shall do our best to destroy your economic and commercial infrastructure”. As a model of strategy, that does not work.
There is a strategic framework that we Europeans can negotiate with Russia over the longer term to address the many problems that lie between us, but for this to happen we have to be honest on two fundamental issues. To depend on a policy of isolation, economic sanctions, the belief that Russia will implode and the hope that Putin and his court will disappear is wishful thinking, and the US seems now to have recognised that that is the case. But while the US can and will act independently, if we in Europe are to enter into a longer-term engagement with Russia than our current attitude enjoins, we shall need to consider some different instruments from the ones we are presently using. The Russians and Americans will not do that for us.
Russia in Europe is a recurrent theme in our continent’s history and, by the same token, it has regularly had to be reassessed. This report is to be welcomed for its recognition of the need for a genuinely strategic European approach.
EU and Russia (EUC Report)
Earl of Oxford and Asquith Excerpts(9 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Earl of Oxford and Asquith (LD) (Maiden Speech)
My Lords, I should first like to express my deep appreciation for the assistance and guidance that I have received from all those who work in this building. I know that my experience differs in no way from others who have come before me, but it has been a real encouragement to encounter such courtesy and helpfulness from the officials, staff and doorkeepers on whom the functions of this House depend. It is not just their civility that I wish to pay tribute to but their infinite patience.
I welcome the committee report which has prompted this debate. I have lived and worked in Russia and Ukraine for over 30 years, and I continue to take a close interest in the region, as detailed in my entry in the register of interests. The report contains a great range of insights and level-headed recommendations, but I shall try to limit myself to a few specific points arising from it. Before I do so, I should like to make some observations on the current situation in eastern Ukraine in particular, which of course post-dates the publication of the report.
It is always rash to make predictions of events in time of war, but in my assessment, Putin has achieved militarily what he wanted to achieve in Donetsk and Lugansk: he has won his battles and humiliated the Ukrainian leadership; he has created an island of instability in eastern Ukraine; and he has destroyed much of Ukraine’s economy—the mines, factories and infrastructure in the region are shattered and people have fled.
Undoubtedly, there will be flare-ups, but for the time being at least, and assuming as an overriding caveat that Kiev observes, or accepts, the ceasefire, in my view the Russian military phase is largely over. Economic pressure, I believe, will characterise the next steps. In the last month, the Russian Government have relieved Russian private banks of their exposure to Ukrainian businesses. Over $50 billion of bank debt will be absorbed by the Russian Government, allowing the Russian commercial banks to restructure their balance sheets and giving surety over Ukrainian assets to the Russian state. I believe that, in the next 12 months or so, there will be a Russian push to buy out distressed Ukrainian assets. To put the policy in perhaps simplified but, I believe, not misleading terms, Russia’s aim will be to become as close to a 100% shareholder of Ukraine as is possible.
In that context, therefore, I want to make just three points. The first relates to the evidence that the report collects on “hard questions of strategy”, integrated foreign policy and diplomatic competences. I believe that one day Russia’s interventions in Ukraine will be seen as a critical mistake. Nevertheless, if we are to attempt to resolve the great instability in eastern Europe, at some stage we will have to negotiate with Putin—with Russia. Who “we” are is another matter—a most important one, indeed—but there has to be a process of negotiation on strategic issues. At the moment there is no process.
Of course, the German Chancellor and the French President have twice now gone to Minsk. They have shown much courage and persistence, but these very necessary negotiations were essentially about a ceasefire and peacekeeping. We know that there is a strategic basis on which Putin will negotiate. There is a specific framework. But we have not yet entered that stage and, until we do, I agree with the report that there will be no real settlement of this conflict.
Secondly—although I say this with regret—part of the problem lies now with the Ukrainian Government. They came into being with much promise of renewal and democratic process, but, as with previous Ukrainian Governments, there is constant constitutional conflict between the Prime Minister and the President. As the report recognises, the seeds of this crisis have been sown over 20 years of Ukrainian government mismanagement, but the mismanagement—if that is the right word for it—continues. Even now, and despite Minsk, the Ukrainian leadership says that the constitution should not be altered—that is code for abandoning Donetsk—and it believes that the country should join and be armed by NATO. That reads to me like a suicide note which the Ukrainian nation will not accept. At the same time, with the war receding, deep splits are being exposed in the Ukrainian power elites. These threaten stability and play to the Russian line that the country is sliding into lawlessness.
That leads me to my final point, where I would like to pick up on those parts of the report that allude to an ideal of a Ukraine transformed into an attractive civil society with a people whose energies are released—a model state, dare one say, for the region. Over the past year, the mood of the country has fluctuated through hope and disillusionment, but I see that at most levels of civil, social and economic activity there is now a widespread recognition that the country has missed the turning point that occurred, for example, in Poland some 10 years or so ago, when there was a fundamental change of direction. There are and there have been innumerable reform programmes for Ukraine on the table, but I believe that there is now a recognition that it is time to find the political will to implement some major changes, starting with legal reform—without which, in my view, there is little point attempting others. It is time that genuine mechanisms were devised and enforced so that investment funds reach the real economy.
For Ukrainians, the only incontrovertible answer to Russian pressure is to develop in their country a prosperous climate that will deliver the rule of law and economic success. That is the forward-looking, optimistic scenario on which I should conclude, but not before saying how truly honoured I am that your Lordships have welcomed me to your numbers.