Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Earl of Kinnoull and Lord Pannick

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 19th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)]

The following Members in the Chamber have indicated that they wish to speak: the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Berkeley. I therefore call the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in welcoming the Advocate-General for Scotland, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, to his post. I thank him and the Minister in the Commons, Alex Chalk, and their officials for taking the time to discuss with me and many other Members of this House our concerns, the House’s concerns and the concerns of the Constitution Committee about the delegated powers in the Bill and how those concerns can be accommodated by amendments. The noble and learned Lord has taken a very welcome constructive approach to these issues and I thank him sincerely for that. He has tabled amendments that go a significant way, in my view, to meeting those concerns.

Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I would have liked, ideally, to see greater restrictions on the use of delegated powers in this context, but the theme tune that often—not always, but often—accompanies Lords’ consideration of Commons amendments is the Rolling Stones song “You Can’t Always Get What You Want”, and since we will not get exactly what we want today, the next best thing is for the Minister to assure noble Lords of the Government’s intentions in this context. Again, he has very helpfully gone a long way to do that this afternoon. I ask him to confirm my understanding on three topics that are raised by paragraph 1A, on consultation, as introduced by government Amendment 4B.

The first of these topics is the purpose of the consultation. There is a mandatory obligation to consult. It is not a discretion; there is a duty to consult. The amendment does not expressly say what the purpose is, but does the Minister agree that it is implicit that one of the purposes of the consultation will be to assist the Secretary of State in deciding whether it is appropriate to implement a particular international agreement by regulations, or whether primary legislation is needed?

Can the Minister confirm that the Government recognise that some international agreements, even when they are in the scope of this Bill, as explained by the Minister, may require changes that are so significant that it would not be appropriate to implement the international agreement other than by primary legislation? I suppose, also, the consultation might assist on whether the international agreement would alter substantive law, albeit incidentally, which I understood the Minister to accept would not be an appropriate subject for delegated legislation. That is the first matter: the purpose of consultation.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Earl of Kinnoull and Lord Pannick

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 9th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Kinnoull (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke, in his very seasoned contribution for a newbie—and indeed the other 18 speakers so far in this very important debate. The European Union Committee published our report on the Internal Market Bill on 16 October, and I take this opportunity to remind noble Lords of our conclusions. Our report was short. It deals only with Part 5 of the Bill, and its interaction with the Government’s implementation of the withdrawal agreement.

The withdrawal agreement is a complex document, around a third of which is taken up by the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol, itself a testament to the importance that all parties place on getting things right in that regard. I said before in this Chamber that there is an inherent tension at the heart of the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol which is evident in Article 1, which describes its objectives. There are other examples, as I said in my Second Reading speech.

The only way to reconcile these tensions is for all sides to show pragmatism and willingness to compromise. Our committee reported in June on the protocol, expressing our concern that there was not enough urgency among the parties to negotiate these compromises, so protecting first the Good Friday agreement and secondly the two mighty single markets involved: those of the EU and the UK.

The report also dwelled on the multilayered dispute resolution mechanisms contained in the withdrawal agreement. The Bill before us supplants those mechanisms without their ever having been tried. As we have been reminded already several times, in September the Secretary of State made clear and repeated statements that in doing so it breaches international law. The result is that the Bill strikes at the heart of the withdrawal agreement and the protocol. It is corrosive too to the future relationship negotiations, undermining the trust that is a precondition for a successful outcome.

The Government’s argument now, as we have already heard, not least this morning on the radio, is that the Bill is a safety net: that it does not itself break international law but is a precaution in case of unreasonable behaviour by the EU. The problem with that argument, as we point out in paragraph 106 of our report, is that the Government’s decision to act pre-emptively in the absence of evidence has put the UK, and not the EU, into the wrong. Our report ended by seeking further explanation of the Government’s approach, and in particular the disclosure of any evidence that the EU had acted in bad faith. Those explanations have not been forthcoming, and I therefore hope that, even at this late stage, the Minister will indicate a change of heart and give his support to the removal of Part 5 of the Bill.

In closing, I note that amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, are in keeping with the thrust of our report—albeit that we had asked the Government to cure the problems themselves. Convention, however, prevents me from expressing a view in the Division Lobby tonight.

[Lord Pannick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Earl, whose work as chair of the EU Committee has illuminated the issues on this Bill, as on so many other issues that we have been debating over the years.

I agree with the speech made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. There are occasions, as this debate confirms, when clauses in a Bill raise issues of political, and indeed moral, principle of fundamental importance. This House has a responsibility to identify when that occurs.

I will make some observations on Clause 47, which has not featured in detail in this Committee debate. Clause 47 is innocuously titled “Further provision related to sections 44 and 45 etc.” Clause 47 is, however, a very substantial interference with the rule of law. Clause 47(1) says that any regulations which Ministers may make under Clauses 44 and 45

“have effect notwithstanding any relevant international or domestic law with which they may be incompatible or inconsistent.”

Clause 47(8) defines

“relevant international or domestic law”

to include

“any other legislation, convention or rule of international or domestic law whatsoever.”

So whatever Ministers produce by way of regulations cannot be challenged in a court of law on any grounds.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Earl of Kinnoull and Lord Pannick

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register, particularly those in respect of the insurance industry. The 2017 Conservative manifesto provides an interesting lens through which I feel one ought to consider various amendments in this group. It states the following in a section entitled, “Cutting the cost of living”:

“We will reduce insurance costs for ordinary motorists by cracking down on exaggerated and fraudulent whiplash claims”.


At a high level, the Bill seeks to do that principally by dictating how whiplash claims procedures will work in the future; that is, through the use of a tariff. Several amendments in this group seek to interfere with the principle of a tariff either by removing it or by making it rather more generous than market forces allow today. Both of these approaches seem to fly directly in the face of that express manifesto commitment. I remain very much of the view that any tariff should be set out in the Bill, just as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has recommended.

We are in extraordinary and difficult circumstances here, with around 1% of the population of the UK annually successfully concluding a whiplash claim. I submit that a social and political necessity trumps jurisprudential purity, such as that advanced by my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf, even before considering the manifesto commitment point that I made earlier.

A tariff will bring benefits in terms of certainty and the potential for ordinary citizens to file claims online easily, without the need for external professional help. Any reduction in hassle and the costs of processing a claim will inevitably benefit everyone. Indeed, we heard at Second Reading how a tariff system seemed to work well in Spain. Deleting Clause 2 would deny those benefits. It would certainly deny the Government the ability to deliver on their manifesto commitment because the hugely unsatisfactory status quo would simply continue, with a numerous minority of our fellow citizens continuing to abuse the current environment to their financial advantage. Therefore, I strongly oppose Amendment 18.

Turning to the quantum in the tariff table, I accept that the issue is rather a Goldilocks one. If the quantum is too generous, the problem of exaggeration and fraud will persist. If it is not generous enough, the genuinely injured will be badly dealt with. The Government have attempted to walk this line in their draft statutory instrument; I make no comment on the numbers it contains. The structure of the Bill allows the Lord Chancellor to vary the tariff with suitable safeguards.

I fear that Amendments 10 and 17B are too generous because they depend on the Judicial College numbers, which are derived from cases heard. The numbers are actually above where the market—if I may call it that—is today because the cases that tend to get to court tend to have non-standard features, such as being more complex or involving psychological issues. Therefore, I fear that if either of these amendments were adopted, there would be no saving per the impact assessment—possibly even a negative saving—and thus they too defeat the Government’s manifesto commitment. Accordingly, I oppose them.

In turning to Amendment 30, I start by expressing my support for Amendment 12, which restores constitutional balance in a very elegant way. Indeed, I congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, on his excellent speech. Amendment 12 goes some way to addressing the issues that were set out well by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, in introducing Amendment 30. However, Clause 3 is not only a fully important part of a package to frustrate the designs of the claims industry but an important part of a strategy to deliver the manifesto commitment. On that basis, I feel that this amendment should also be resisted.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My noble friend Lord Kinnoull referred to “jurisprudential purity”. I would prefer to describe it as the essential role of the judiciary in deciding what compensation is appropriate. I would be very grateful if the Minister would tell the House whether there is any precedent for a Minister, rather than judges, deciding on the appropriate level of compensation for a civil claimant when that compensation is being paid not by the state—I recognise that that may be a different matter—but by a private wrongdoer or, more accurately, their insurance company. I suggest that either there is no precedent or this is rare, for a very good reason: put simply, judges, not Ministers—or their civil servants, more accurately—have expertise and independence in this area. For those reasons, I strongly support the speech made by my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf.