Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Earl of Erroll and Lord Strasburger

Wednesday 7th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger]

My Lords, I would like to put three questions to the Government, which arise from Mr Anderson’s latest report. There are not many surprises in the report but one of them—certainly to me and most other people who follow these matters—was the revelation that bulk personal datasets are used by agencies beyond the intelligence agencies. Perhaps the Minister could give us some information about which other bodies use bulk personal datasets.

I also ask the Minister to put on the record the difference between bulk equipment interference and thematic targeted equipment interference. I got the impression from Mr Anderson’s report that he was struggling to spot the dividing line, apart from that bulk equipment interference is likely to be required where,

“the Secretary of State and the Judicial Commissioner is not ... able to assess the necessity and proportionality to a sufficient degree at the time of issuing the warrant”.

Necessity and proportionality are the golden rules throughout the Bill and their apparent demise in respect of bulk equipment interference seems to alter the relationship between the citizen and the state. My third question is to ask the Minister to comment on this apparent relinquishing of the golden rules of proportionality and necessity in the case of bulk equipment interference.

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, although I acknowledge that this power may be necessary to try to track down and deal with certain terrorist threats at certain points, the huge danger is that although we may regard the people currently in control of the state as being benign, we do not know that they will always be so. The real problem is privacy and that is why this amendment is particularly important. The moment no threat is urgent, we must get back to a state where privacy is the most important issue, because this power can also be used by organs of the state to protect themselves when they may have done something wrong or there may be someone not so benign within them.

This is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the data collected may be very useful and may prevent some incidents, although some people challenge that; on the other, this could also mean a great weakness in the system whereby someone could get inside the system and then protect themselves. I would be very careful about assuming that it is always good and the state will always behave in a benign way. Just because I am paranoid, that does not mean they are not out to get me—that is the great saying. I do not think I am being paranoid but at some point in the future we will need to get back to a position where the state does not have the same ability to acquire data about its citizens as totalitarian states did in the recent past.